Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

You are here: Home / Archives for covid-19 pandemic

covid-19 pandemic

Russia’s battle with COVID: One Step Forwards, Three Steps Back

by

Russia continues to struggle against the Covid-19 pandemic as cases and deaths increase each day (by focusonmore.com; licensed under CC BY 2.0)

Russia was the first country to approve a vaccine to treat the SARS-CoV-2 virus, its Sputnik V jab, which has since been complemented by the development of two other homegrown vaccines, CoviVac and EpiVacCorona. Moscow also directs a national vaccination program which is free and accessible to all Russian citizens who wish to receive a shot. Russia ought to be well on its way to achieving a high-level of immunity in its population, with the government repeatedly claiming ‘victory’ over the deadly coronavirus.

Yet any claims of victory are false. The country’s Covid defence is in a poor position relative to other large nations. As of July 21 Russia has a paltry 14.38% of its population fully vaccinated; 54.3% are fully vaccinated in the UK by contrast. Meanwhile, cases and deaths multiply at alarming rates each day, with 24,098 infections and 711 fatalities recorded on 20 July. Though democracies are also still struggling to defeat the virus, especially the highly transmissible Delta variant, responsibility for Russia’s poor performance in managing the pandemic largely falls at the feet of Vladimir Putin and his authoritarianism.

Rather than properly getting to grips with the pandemic, the severity of which the Kremlin has sought to downplay, the government has instead often prioritised its shady political objectives, carrying out a comprehensive crackdown against civil society following Alexei Navalny’s imprisonment and preparing for the upcoming elections to the State Duma, Russia’s parliament, scheduled to happen this year on 19 September. Meanwhile a combination of a historic lack of trust in the state among Russians, government disinformation about vaccines produced outside Russia, and lack of adherence to proper development standards in the production of Russia’s vaccines has seen the Russian population largely shun vaccination and remain vulnerable to the third wave of Covid. The authorities, when they do try to mitigate the virus’ effects, are increasingly being forced to impose restrictions which are widely unpopular with the public, including the enforcement of mandatory vaccinations and infringements on everyday life such as requiring proof of vaccination status to visit cafés and restaurants, which has led to a thriving black market in fake QR codes and vaccination certificates.

Putin has repeatedly expressed confidence about beating the virus but his government continues to lag behind in terms of its response (World Economic Forum; licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

Russia’s continued covid-crisis has three main causes: vaccine hesitancy and mismanagement, disinformation, and an undemocratic political system. Firstly, vaccine hestitancy is widespread among the Russian population. While this is also an issue in many other countries, including democracies, it is a problem which is particularly pronounced in Russia. Data collected by a poll conducted by the Levada Centre, Russia’s largest polling agency, revealed that 54% of respondents were unwilling to be vaccinated, 25% were willing, and 19% reported that they had already received the vaccine; 69.4%, 68.6%, and 48.9% of the UK’s, the US’, and France’s populations respectively have accepted at least one shot of a vaccine.

Second, Russians’ vaccine hesitancy is compounded and made more likely by the behaviour of the government. Not only was Russia’s flagship vaccine, Sputnik V, developed and administered before the completion of routine mass trials to assess its efficacy (it is considered safe by experts now), the government has mismanaged its promotion. President Vladimir Putin’s own vaccination was shrouded in secrecy as he refused to be pictured during it and initially he did not reveal which shot he had received (in the end it transpired to be Sputnik V), forfeiting a PR opportunity taken by many other world leaders to demonstrate to the public the safety of Covid vaccines. There have additionally been reports that Russians were given a different vaccine to the one they were informed they were receiving, while lockdowns have generally been ‘eschewed’ by the government. The Kremlin has also taken a highly nationalist approach to the utilisation of its vaccine. Sputnik V has become a tool in the Russian government’s foreign policy, offering it to African countries to boost Moscow’s standing. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has simultaneously promoted conspiracy theories regarding vaccines developed in other countries in order to lift the profile of its own. The combined effect has been to worsen public confidence in the best line of defence against the increasingly rampant virus.

Yet third, and most fundamental of all, is that the above factors are symptoms of the longer-term illness which undermines the effectiveness of Russia’s governance: the poor health of its democracy and civil society. It is not so much that Russians do not trust vaccine itself. Rather, they do not have faith in the government that provides the vaccine. The Russian state already interferes in the daily lives of citizens to sometimes intolerable degrees, which provokes cynicism towards any government scheme. Despite the vaccine’s necessity, it is seen as just another untrustworthy authoritarian measure that the state is trying to enforce on the population.

Russia’s Covid crisis is a lesson in the ills of autocracy. Having long lost the trust of millions of Russians, the state cannot not rely on voluntary uptake of the vaccine, meaning further unpopular mandatory measures may be necessary, regardless of the fact Putin said he hoped there would be no need for a new lockdown at 2021’s Direct Line session, a public relations event where the Russian President fields questions from ostensibly ‘typical’ Russians over videocall. The regime also plans to use the elections as an opportunity to ‘refresh its legitimacy’ and Covid will take careful management in order to avoid any upsets for the ruling but increasingly unpopular United Russia party. For now, though, the Russian government remains on the back foot.

The failings of Regionalism: SAARC and its struggle to thrive.

by

Following the growing tensions between India and Pakistan, the 2014 summit was the last where all member states participated. Photo Credit: President Mahinda Rajapaksa, licensed with CC BY-NC 2.0.

The ongoing COVID crisis has exacerbated the disparity between states whilst also creating a new opportunity for regional cooperation. In South Asia, a region characterized by political disharmony and strategic schism, regionalism, though entrenched, hasn’t been able to prosper as possibilities of further integration and cooperation look uncertain.

Regional cooperation and interaction have become an important feature of the international order. The increasingly globalised and liberalised world that calls for interaction between all states has witnessed a regional reaction with states striving to keep their regional linkages intact. In South Asia, this need for interconnectedness has long been recognised and multiple attempts to create a spirit of pan-Asian cooperation were championed in various conferences like the Asian Relations Conference and Bandung Conference. However, these attempts at cooperation and integration failed as newly independent countries began to prioritise national security and development over regional cooperation. Subsequently, this led to more sub-regional cooperation as this offered a more viable and manageable option for the newly independent states.

The formation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985, was a regionalist project aimed at promoting cohesion in the South Asian region. With, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Maldives as founding members, and Afghanistan joining in 2007, SAARC was the first of its kind in the region. It was established with the aim of promoting social cohesion, economic and cultural cooperation, as well as encouraging self-reliance, mutual assurance and collaboration within the region.

South Asia is a critical geostrategic area bordered by China, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, with the nations bound together by ‘geographical proximity’ over cultural or economic proximity. Cooperation between the nations in South Asia is vital to ensure holistic development in the region as large disparities remain between states.

However, over recent years, SAARC has been at stalemate and has struggled to make progress as compared with other regional organisations. Owing to a long history of colonialism and disjointed power structures in the area, attempts at region building haven’t yielded positive outcomes. The competing power struggles that emerged after the end of colonialism and the violent cartographies which arbitrarily demarcated nascent states created significant international tensions, with each nation concerned about the expansionism of the others.

One of the many reasons that hinders multilateral cooperation between South Asian nations is that the region is comprised of unequal partners. Identified as one of the poorest, most socially complex and underdeveloped areas in terms of trained human resources the region struggles to maintain cohesion and cooperation. Of the many nations, India has emerged as a prominent power in the region whilst most countries like Nepal still fall under the rubric of “less developed country”. The rise of India as a prominent global power has also exacerbated tensions within the region creating an apprehensive atmosphere about its influence in South Asia.

Furthermore, many of the participating SAARC nations have competing power interests and are deadlocked in geopolitical stalemate. The most prominent nations, India and Pakistan have been in a protracted state of pseudo-conflict over border disputes since their inception. Similarly, there exists a similar border issue with Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as India and Nepal. The cartographic issues coupled with insurgencies and cross-border conflicts often exacerbate the differences between the countries.

Various attempts at regional economic cooperation have also suffered at the behest of different economic policies and power relations between the countries. In 2004, the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) agreement was signed with the aim of establishing a free-trade area amongst the countries by 2016 to facilitate holistic economic development. However, this initiative failed due to the hostile relationship between India and Pakistan. The strategic rivalry between the countries has led to the breakdown of multiple initiatives.

In 2017, India launched a satellite to ensure better communication in the South Asian region and all members of the SAARC welcomed it though Pakistan refrained from taking part in the venture. Events and agreements like these promoting cooperation between regional nations have often been stymied by political manoeuvring leaving little chance for mutually advantageous cooperation.

The increasing anxiety between the states in the region has led to more sub-regional cooperation activities becoming viable options for smaller nations. These have led to the formation of organisations like Bangladesh, Bhutan India Nepal Initiative (BBIN) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) for the coordination of trade and economic agreements. Similarly, as the hegemon in the region, India continues to pursue a strategy of reaching out to broader cooperative organisations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to further its growth strategy, thereby antagonising smaller South Asian regional players who may feel left behind.

Owing to the asymmetric and divided nations left by colonial rule, the South Asian region still struggles to create a cooperative environment in the region. The disintegrated cooperation between the nations coupled with their divergent political interests in the region will only create a stalemate that will disrupt chances of regional development and cooperation. It is essential that all member states work towards tackling their competing political interests and differences to ensure the revival of regionalism in South Asia.

Peace in the time of Pandemic

by

Coronavirus, Source: istockphoto

While the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has affected professional and personal travel plans across the world, what happens when these plans can have a direct impact on cessation of hostilities in a conflict zone? What happens when a state or group may have an interest in allowing – or denying – individual travel in order to further their political aims?

Taking into consideration the current Afghan Peace Talks[1], as well as the ongoing political negotiations in Yemen, this article outlines how the pandemic has a potentially far-reaching impact on humanitarian assistance operations in conflict zones, and more broadly on peace.

Operational Environment

The pandemic has severely impacted the ability of aid actors to deliver assistance, including in countries facing enormous need. Beyond peace negotiations, humanitarian and development operations are also critical to providing security and opportunity to citizens in conflict zones. In Yemen, COVID-19 is yet another health challenge to a population already battling hunger, medicine and vaccine shortages, and diseases that have been long eliminated in other countries[2], all within a struggling medical system.

Afghanistan faces similar issues, where health clinics are already inaccessible for many citizens, especially women, and where scepticism concerning the virus further complicates limited medical capacity to treat it. At the same time, COVID-19 has not forced a break in fighting in the lead-up to the peace negotiations discussed below, with clear Taliban resistance to ceasefire attempts or a UN call for a humanitarian pause.

How does this affect peace and stability? While aid agencies struggle with their own operational limitations, they also operate in countries where they may not be popular with both governments and armed groups due to perceived ties with Western powers, and where securing access may already be a challenge. The pandemic is being wielded as an excuse to further deny access, travel, and movement to aid workers in areas where assistance is greatly needed. As such, this pandemic could deepen humanitarian crises, and threaten greater instability. This has been seen in Yemen and Afghanistan, but also in parts of Iraq, Syria, Somalia, and elsewhere. In Yemen in particular, Houthis have used the pandemic to not only restrict access to the country, but also to exert greater control on needs assessments, aid distributions, and any potential involvement of international actors in political process[3], all by holding a firm grip on permitted operations. These limitations can threaten the fair distribution of aid to the most vulnerable.

Beyond access under COVID-19, aid agencies also face a great challenge to their duty of care and best use of their resources. They must determine how much risk they are willing to take in sending their staff to field sites potentially exposed to conflict as well as severe health issues, possibly requiring medical evacuation. While organisations improve their understanding of the degree of risk posed by the pandemic to staff health and movements, many UN agencies and other NGOs[4] have responded with variations on a reduced footprint. Some are keeping staff in compounds (creating its own risk for staff due to the impossibility of social distancing) rather than sending them to more remote field sites. As familiarity with pandemic realities have increased and additional medical resources have been mobilized to treat sick staff, operational capacity has also increased – but humanitarians can still be denied access to their areas of intervention, with the perfect justification: it is for their own safety.

Pandemic Peace talks - Strategy and Logistics

This unique opportunity for affecting operational contexts neatly extends to peace talks, as the challenging logistics of bringing together warring sides to negotiate settlements in a third host country are intensified under pandemic conditions. In September 2020, discussions between Houthis and the Yemeni government over the release of Houthi prisoners moved forward in Switzerland. The Houthi and Yemeni delegations utilized UN Special Envoy planes departing from Saudi-controlled airspace to reach Switzerland and secured exceptions for diplomatic travel when no other movement was permitted, even as the Houthis themselves closed airports in Yemen and restricted movement for aid actors – including UN agencies. The Swiss government worked around national pandemic restrictions to allow representatives to speak directly to one another and to maintain their negotiations schedule.

The ongoing Afghan Peace Talks in Doha have been similarly impacted by logistical issues, with strategic implications. Under normal conditions, countries compete to host peace negotiations to protect their interests, ensure they are part of the conversation, and bolster their reputations as key geopolitical players. This confluence of actors and interests can pressure a negotiation and complicate participants’ calculations. However, during the pandemic, countries that might typically host peace negotiations become more focused on their urgent domestic needs and give less attention and resources to peace delegates. Where many great powers and actors may have competed to hold the Afghan talks prior to the pandemic, fewer countries are currently willing to assume the risk of hosting such an event. As such, the pandemic favours wealthy, autocratic systems such as Qatar’s that do not have to justify their decisions and risk-taking to their public. Also, a second round of talks is unlikely due to these logistical concerns[5], so Qatar’s willingness to host prolonged talks amid few alternative options creates pressure to conclude discussions during this round.

Qatar’s hosting has additional advantages: a strong Qatari national health authority able to handle testing and tracing, combined with the ability to indefinitely block off a 5-star hotel for talks, to mobilize private jets for transport, and to offer luxury accommodations for Taliban representatives and their families, all as representatives arrive from high-risk countries and are granted entrance health waivers for indefinite stays. This pandemic then serves Doha’s goals: they are at the centre of peace talks, ensuring international – including American – support despite being in a hostile neighbourhood. Senior diplomats leverage personal relationships with Qatari officials to get clearance to enter, while others less favoured find that their travel has ‘accidentally’ not been cleared. While externally entrenching their centrality to the negotiations, internally Qatari actors are also using their roles to leveraging power against one another. At the same time, Doha is a relatively less experienced host[6], which has opened the way for interested third parties to establish strong support groups and facilitate consultative, collaborative assistance to the talks to protect their interests.

Actors at the margins also lose; with COVID-19 travel restrictions in place, meetings on the margins – for example, side events on gender, minority rights and protections – are less likely to happen. Participation of civil society in peace talks becomes more tenuous, and inclusive representation at peace negotiations, which are already often seen as elite-driven or elite-bargaining processes, also suffer. When citizens do not have the opportunity to directly challenge leadership, it becomes more difficult to ensure that a range of views are accounted for in a potential settlement. In Doha, conference organizers fought to secure access for 30 Afghan journalists to attend the opening ceremony of the talks, allowing for some interaction between national press and the Taliban. This benefits the overall objective of the talks – with fewer sideline attractions, attention can be focused on the single outcome of reaching agreement – but inclusivity can suffer.

Another key difference in the current climate is that peace negotiations are commonly preceded by (secret) pre-negotiation discussions where key agenda items, red lines, and starting positions can be clarified on both sides. These have the advantage of accelerating formal talks once they begin but can also create tension should personalities or political positions combust from the start. Partly due to the pandemic, parties have arrived at the Afghan talks without pre-existing personal relationships, resulting in increased caution on both sides when interacting with one another, but also creating an opportunity to focus discussions free from personal distractions.

While it is too early to make comprehensive conclusions, the COVID-19 pandemic directly affects peace. It is being used as a justification to exert greater control over humanitarian activities in fractious contexts, further complicating operations in already difficult environments. The direction and execution of peace talks are being similarly constrained, resulting both in more concentrated but also less inclusive events. Whether these factors will increase chances for resolution remains to be seen. It is clear, however, that lessons drawn from this unique time can offer insights to practitioners once the post-pandemic chapter begins.

[1] Formally, the Intra-Afghan Peace Talks.

[2] Such diseases include measles, cholera, diphtheria, tuberculosis, and polio.

[3] Interview with UN official, UN OCHA, Yemen, 11 November 2020.

[4] Interview with UN official, UN OCHA, 11 November 2020.

Interview with NGO worker, Afghanistan, 15 November 2020.

[5] Six months ago, at least 4 rounds of talks in Qatar, Germany, Norway, and Uzbekistan were envisioned, with all but Doha ultimately being scrapped.

[6] Capacity to properly address protocol and logistics are also a concern, for example with Doha releasing press statements concerning the talks without first clearing them on both sides, or releasing invitations and agendas to participants that are only available in Arabic (Dari and Pashto being the official languages of Afghanistan).

Constance Wilhelm is a Senior Editor for the Strife Journal, and a doctoral researcher with the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where she focuses on approaches to the return and prosecution of the European women that have joined Daesh. She is also an experienced researcher and Public and Humanitarian Policy consultant, specialising in conflict-affected areas and fragile states. She has worked with think tanks at Princeton University and New York University, with the Afghan Mission to the UN in New York, the OECD in Paris, humanitarian and international development organisations and consulting firms in Lebanon (leading teams in Syria), in Jordan (leading teams in Yemen), in Afghanistan, in Libya, as well as across both the Horn of Africa and the Sahel-Lake Chad region. Constance has an MA in Conflict Management and International Economics from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a BA from McGill University.

COVID-19, Immigration, and the Media in Britain

by

by Harry Sanders

A long history of immigration runs through Britain’s healthcare sector (Image credit: Meager/Fox Photos/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

The coronavirus pandemic’s global impact has left few unaffected. Perhaps the only silver lining of this pandemic is its highlighting of the essential work of migrants in the NHS and other healthcare services. While for years migrants have been the scapegoat of the UK’s many problems and have been the subject of immense prejudice and abuse; the positive impact of their contributions to society has finally started to come to light. Though the gushing affection and appreciation for our migrant healthcare staff are abundant on Facebook, Twitter, and other social media, it is important to consider if the same shift in tone has been present in our traditional media sources.

Prior to the outbreak of the coronavirus, the British press was notoriously - and at times unashamedly - opposed to immigration in its general stance. Following the election of David Cameron’s Conservative government in 2010, the number of news articles mentioning ‘migration’ or ‘immigration’ has been growing at a steady rate year-on-year, coinciding with Conservative immigration policy which aimed to reduce net migration to the tens of thousands. Throughout all of these articles written between 2006 and 2015, the most common modifier used to describe immigration was ‘mass’, followed closely by ‘net’, ‘illegal’, and ‘European’. The vast majority of these articles have been crafted with the specific aim of colouring all migration with the brush of illegal immigration, thereby characterising entire nationalities as criminals and aliens.

This is even more unjust when one considers that many of the articles emphasising illegality are covering the plight of refugees; individuals whose right to be in the UK is enshrined in both national and international law. If the last decade of British politics is anything to go by, this narrative has been highly effective in influencing the opinions of their readership.

Anti-immigrant sentiment can still be seen in articles written immediately before the outbreak of coronavirus. This article from the Daily Mail, for example, reported on the Prime Minister’s pledge to restrict EU migrants earning less than £23,000 from entering the country and to move to an ‘Australian-style points-based immigration system’. The article’s discussion of ‘slashing’ the number of low skilled workers, and its quotation of a Downing Street spokesman as having heralded the ‘return [of] democratic control of immigration to the British people’, evokes a sense of pride and achievement at the prospect of losing half of Britain’s migrant workforce. ‘Slashing’ has a rhetorical effect here; its emphatic quality is designed to trigger an emotional response in the reader by highlighting the government’s merciless approach to cutting immigration. One must presume that the critical eye has wandered far from the details of this announcement, as little consideration is given to the economic implications of restricting any workers earning less than £23,000 – a salary far in excess of the national minimum wage.

Whilst it is important to recognise the clear ideological stance embedded into the article, it is perhaps unsurprising given the political affiliation of the publication. The Daily Mail is well-known as a right-wing newspaper, and as a result, an anti-immigration narrative can be seen as them simply catering to the views of their readership. By the same token, it would be unsurprising to see The Guardian taking a more tolerant view of immigration, in light of its left-leaning readership and left-wing editorial stance. The article discussed above is very much typical of the right-wing press’ pre-pandemic approach to migration; as a result, the key question concerns the extent to which the coronavirus has reconfigured the discourse. Has the public’s positive outlook on migrant healthcare staff influenced reportage, or is the enmity still very much present?

A ‘mixed bag’ would perhaps be the aptest description. Reporting on an asylum seeker’s ‘stabbing spree’ in Glasgow in June, the Daily Mail exhibited a surprising change in tone. Citing the asylum seeker’s mental state and the negative impact of lockdown in triggering post-traumatic stress, the Mail in this instance considered the socio-economic and psychological stresses which he faced and how they may have contributed to the incident. Remarkably the most noticeable used pejorative in the article, ‘hordes’ – so often reserved especially for immigrants – was instead used to describe the emergency services which responded to the incident. Rather than mindlessly painting a black and white picture of a man with a knife, a victim, and the heroic response of the police, fair consideration is given to the causes which led to the incident and – perhaps most importantly of all – it is framed as a wholly preventable event which was allowed to happen due to a lack of sufficient resources for social services.

A further immigration story to emerge during the coronavirus pandemic was the route to British citizenship offered to British National Overseas citizens in Hong Kong due to China’s imposition of a new security law. This prompted uncharacteristic coverage from a number of typically right-wing publications; the Daily Telegraph, for example, ran the headline ‘Giving British citizenship to 300,000 Hong Kongers will boost the economy’, a reversal of the cliched trope peddled in right-wing media that immigration leads to economic demise. Published in the midst of lockdown (29 May), it may be that this more balanced approach was borne out of the wider uptick in appreciation for what migrants contribute to the UK.

Immigration also entered the discourse when eastern Europeans were flown into the UK to help save the June harvest. This triggered media coverage verging on the satirical, with the Daily Mail- a publication with an entrenched opposition to Romanian migrants - running the headline ‘Romanians to the Rescue’. Given the travel restrictions that were in place at the time, a demonstration of support for immigration of any kind- let alone that of Romanian economic migrants- is hugely noteworthy; it communicates an awareness of how indispensably important immigration is to the UK.

Has the UK media U-turned on its deep-rooted prejudice against migrants and immigration? Not quite, though it is nevertheless important to note the positive impact which our migrant healthcare workers have had on public opinion and on the press. The Daily Mail is not the only publication guilty of such reporting as has been exhibited pre-lockdown, and sure enough in recent articles, the Daily Express has persisted in the trope of reporting the scale of immigration rather than its legality. It is also key to consider that many will see headlines such as ‘Gangs using coronavirus crisis to send migrants to the UK’ and share that information irrespective of the article’s content. Whether this article highlights the perceived threat of immigrants to the UK or the plight of the trafficked migrants is a moot point to anyone who will form an opinion before opening the link and preach their opinion on the issues as unchallenged gospel.

Whilst it is encouraging to see flickers of journalistic integrity return to the British press, our media, and the way in which we consume it, must change a great deal to begin reporting on political issues such as this in an unbiased and factual manner. Recent weeks have made it impossible to dispute the fact that migrants do in fact contribute massively to the UK, and rather than inflicting harm upon public services, are actually a key cornerstone upon which our public services stand. Going forward, it should be facts, not polarised opinions, that form the basis of immigration coverage.

Harry Sanders is a content writer for the Immigration Advice Service, an organisation of immigration solicitors.

Deadly Dynamics: Crime and the Coronavirus in Latin America

by

by Leah Grace

Security forces around the world have taken on new duties amid the crisis of the coronavirus pandemic (Image credit: Gerd Altmann/Pixabay)

 

The COVID-19 pandemic not only represents a global public health crisis but has also created serious political and security challenges. In Latin America, legal and illicit economies alike have been hit hard by a massive slowdown in global production and consumption, leaving most organised crime groups unusually vulnerable and exposed. These conditions offer opportunities for governments to deal a considerable blow to these criminal networks that wield enormous amounts of power in their territories. Examples include the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) in Mexico, the Columbian guerilla group the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Barrio 18 street gang, which operates throughout Central America. However, evidence from the region shows that criminal are rapidly adapting to the challenges of the pandemic and are in fact taking advantage of the overwhelmed state authorities to consolidate their power.

As the lockdown of several national economies brings businesses to a halt and threatens the livelihoods of billions of employees, it also has significant repercussions for transnational drug trade and other illicit flows. Drug cartels across Latin America have seen their access to major markets and supply chains curbed by border closures and the shutdown of transatlantic travel. A reliance on imported chemicals from China has negatively impacted the production of fentanyl and methamphetamine in Mexico. In Colombia, narcotraffickers are struggling to transport their cocaine supply to European markets due to a grounding of air traffic. In countries such as Nicaragua, where many people live from day to day, selling drugs locally has also become a challenge as local populations can no longer afford to buy the commodity.

In Europe and the United States, drug shortages at street level caused by both the disruption of supply and transportation chains and the imposition of national lockdown measures, which forced sellers and consumers to remain indoors, has led to a sharp increase in prices. As drug-dealers demonstrate their adaptability by adopting unorthodox strategies, such as delivering drugs in takeaway orders, they reap the rewards of these price inflations. In the long-term, however, restrictions on mobility and the continued closure of entertainment and hospitality venues are likely to deal a significant blow to drug markets.

As local businesses close, criminal groups face challenges in collecting their routine extortion payments. Some Central American gangs, such as the Barrio 18 Revolucionarios in San Salvador, have announced that they will waive extortion payments from informal vendors due to the massive decrease in earnings caused by lockdown measures. Others, however, have been less understanding. Mexican and Guatemalan cartels continue to harass and intimidate local businesses despite the pandemic. Since extortion constitutes the main important source of income for many criminal groups and street gangs, it is likely that even the more lenient ones will resort to increasingly violent measures to collect their fees.

Lockdowns and border closures have also created new illicit business opportunities. The closing of borders on key migration routes has increased the demand for human smuggling services – and their profitability. Before the most recent border closure on March 14 due to Covid-19, over 50,000 Venezuelans legally crossed into Colombia each day. Now, people rely solely on illegal border crossings (trochas), controlled by criminal groups such as Los Rastrojos, who charge fees for use of the route. In Central America, the sealing of borders has forced migrants to depend even more heavily on smugglers, who have seized the opportunity to charge $200 dollars per person for “safe” passage from El Salvador and Honduras to Guatemala.

Violence and insecurity

Lockdown measures have led to a general reduction in street crime and robbery as criminals become more conspicuous and their targets more scarce. El Salvador, the country with the highest homicide rate in the world, reported two days without murders immediately following the imposition of obligatory quarantine measures.

However, violence has intensified in many other countries due to the diversion of armed security forces to pandemic-related issues. Data from Brazil suggests an increase in lethal crime and homicide during the lockdown as gangs and other criminal groups continue to engage in turf wars and violent confrontations. In Colombia, both departments on the Pacific coast and frontier regions with Venezuela, an area with a long history of state absence and illegal activity by armed groups, have witnessed violent clashes between criminal gangs and the guerilla group ELN. Targeted civilian murders have also increased in the country. In the week that cities introduced quarantine measures, three community leaders were killed. Fellow activists cited the disruption to normal security protocols as putting social leaders, often targeted due to their work against lucrative illegal businesses, in positions of heightened vulnerability.

The pandemic’s dominance in minds and media across the world has also provided cover for crime groups to act with impunity, consolidating their power as they do so. Militia groups in Rio de Janeiro, who count former police officers as members and enjoy the support of some local politicians, have seized upon this distraction to increase their political influence in the city.

Criminal governance

The current pandemic is exacerbating socioeconomic stresses. As frustrations and fear grow, ineffective government responses are likely to erode trust in state institutions. Non-state actors are already stepping up to fill the gaps of state presence and provision. As Brazilian president, Jair Bolsonaro, continues to play down the severity of the pandemic, drug-dealing gangs in some of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas have imposed their own curfews and hygiene measures to help combat the spread of the virus in the overcrowded and unsanitary conditions of the slums. Such forms of informal criminal governance are likely to benefit the gangs by securing their power and legitimacy in local communities.

In El Salvador, cells of the Barrio 18 gang wielded their influence over local populations first to defy and then to enforce government lockdown orders. Initially, they ensured that markets in the capital city continued to operate, as these are a vital source of livelihood for many Salvadorans and provide a constant flow of extortion payments. They later changed tactics and began enforcing lockdown measures at gunpoint.

In San Luis Potosí and Tamaulipas, Mexico, the CJNG and Golfo cartels handed out food parcels to communities in boxes emblazoned with their groups’ insignia. Such deliveries are both a means to gain support from local populations and a challenge to local gangs, especially when made in disputed territories or in areas outside normal zones of operation.

A golden opportunity?

Criminal non-state armed groups across Latin America have demonstrated their influence, adaptability, and resilience in the face of COVID-19. However, even they are not immune to the impact of the pandemic, which will continue to hinder their business opportunities and restrict their ability to work undetected. Now is the time for governments to strike in a regionally coordinated effort to take out organised crime networks whilst they are at their most vulnerable. Missing such an opportunity could further bolster the power of these groups and limited the capacity of the state to deal with the region’s already severe problem of organised crime in the future.

However, the exploitation of security gaps by Latin American criminal organisation due to the diversion of resources and attention to the global health crisis may prove too much for overwhelmed states. Criminal networks are likely to bounce back from the current crisis, possibly with strengthened support bases and additional areas under their control.

Leah is an MA student in Conflict, Security and Development at the King’s War Studies Department. Her main research interests include war-to-peace transitions, organised crime, and urban violence. She primarily works on conflict-affected countries in Latin America and Central Africa.