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Drop a Billion-Dollar Bomb on Putin! (Figuratively Speaking)

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Vladimir Putin, Chairman of the Government, spoken at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos Municipality, Graubünden Canton on January 28, 2009. Licensed under Creative Commons. Photo Credit: World Economic Forum.

Sounds crazy, right? Until you consider that—unlike Senator Lindsey Graham’s proposed solution of assassination—a framework for the Biden administration to put a one billion dollar bounty on Putin’s head presently exists in the United States Code. Indeed, although it would require a day’s work on the part of the US Congress, there may be a less costly and far more efficient way for President Biden to help bring about an end to the war in Ukraine than by just sending billions of dollars’ worth of additional military equipment to support a fight that appears guaranteed to kill tens of thousands of more people on both sides—unless Putin is promptly brought to justice for the war crimes committed by his regime’s military and mercenaries. Moreover, it might be possible for the Biden administration and Congress to pursue this solution without spending a dime of American taxpayers’ money. Here’s a brief look at how. (To clarify up front:  Designating Putin a Specially Designated Global Terrorist is not part of the proposed approach.)

When it was established in 1984, the United States Department of State’s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program became the premier tool used to bring America’s financial might to bear in efforts to help bring to justice terrorists who either have or have planned to target Americans with attacks. RFJ touts among its ‘Success Stories’ paying a two million dollar reward for information that led to the arrest of 1993 World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef. When you read reports by terrorism experts like Peter Bergen about the FBI advertising multi-million dollar rewards for information that can be used to locate leadership figures in State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) like al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups, FBI is actually amplifying rewards advertised by RFJ (See the fine print about the reward offer in the posters advertising rewards for top al-Qa’ida figures at the Bureau’s website like this one). Indeed, when Toby Harnden similarly wrote in a piece published by The New York Times in 2021 that ‘Sirajuddin Haqqani, the [Taliban’s] acting minister of interior, has a $10 million F.B.I. bounty on his head’, technically, this too was erroneous (See the reward details furnished by FBI here).

An argument can be made—and has been by the author—that RFJ could do a better job of helping to bring to justice most-wanted senior al-Qa’ida figures like Saif al-Adl. Still, it showed its value with the operation that resulted in the death of ISIS’ original so-called ‘caliph’, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Certainly, it was a stroke of nincompoopery par excellence when failed Congressional candidate turned Trump administration-appointed Pentagon Spokesman Jonathan Hoffman remarked that the twenty-five million dollar reward for information that could help bring Baghdadi to justice was ‘going to go to the dog’ that was injured during this operation. Moments earlier, USCENTCOM Commander General Kenneth McKenzie, who clearly understood the seriousness of the matter, had dodged a question about a payout for the RFJ’s twenty-five million dollar reward, claiming, ‘I have no visibility on that’. Although RFJ did not promptly tout this matter among the ‘Success Stories’ on its website, counterterrorism professionals meanwhile understood that the prospects of a large financial reward being issued for information used to put Baghdadi out of business had almost certainly helped quicken the demise of this terrorist leadership figure who had Americans’ blood on his hands—even if a reward was never actually paid. (Based on the author’s first-hand experiences in dealing with RFJ, he contends that it would be unsurprising if a full reward was not paid in this case.)

In more recent years, RFJ has been more aggressively used as an ‘intelligence-driven law enforcement’ resource against a more diverse mix of actors than members and supporters of FTOs. The Biden administration has harnessed the legal framework that manifested in RFJ’s establishment to dangle large financial incentives for information that federal agencies like FBI can use to identify and locate hackers responsible for some of the costliest cybercrimes targeting Americans and critical infrastructure in the US, including elections (See below text found in the US Code). Indeed, on its website, RFJ now lists ‘Malicious Cyber Activity’—in addition to ‘Terrorism’ and ‘North Korea’—among the ‘three broad categories’ of threat sources that it is involved in helping the US Government counter.

RFJ’s growing involvement with the US Government’s responses to this wider array of threats than just international terrorism is not the fruits of creative interpretations of existing laws on the parts of the State Department’s attorneys. In US Code 22, Section 2708, one finds that RFJ’s official purpose has been updated since 1984. It now encompasses the following (both emphasis and underscored emphasis added):  ‘to assist in the prevention of acts of international terrorism, international narcotics trafficking, serious violations of international humanitarian law, foreign election interference, transnational organized crime, and other related criminal acts’.

Certainly, it is encouraging to see Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, beating the drum on more creative and civilized ways to justify putting more pressure on Putin than posturing interest in seeing him assassinated—specifically, by nudging the Biden administration to insist that the State Department designate his regime as a state sponsor of terrorism in response to the ongoing terroristic acts perpetrated by the Russian military and Russian-backed mercenaries in Ukraine. Yet there is already a framework for treating Putin like others who have orchestrated international terrorism campaigns, and without resorting to measures that could prove too clever by half if challenged by a small cadre of seemingly Putin-friendly elements within the US Congress.

Given that President Biden has branded Putin a ‘war criminal’, RFJ could be used to provide a hefty reward for anyone in Russia—or who might be interested in traveling there—to hand Putin over to stand trial for committing ‘serious violations of international humanitarian law’. Indeed, although the US is not a party to the Rome Statute, it is important to consider that Biden has called for a ‘war-crimes trial’ to address the voluminous evidence that can be used to justify charges that Putin is responsible for war crimes perpetrated in Ukraine. Furthermore, as noted by Human Rights Watch in a brief explainer about the US relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC), although the US has not officially acknowledged the ICC’s legitimacy by being a party to the Rome Statute, ‘In 2013, the US Congress expanded its existing war crimes rewards program to provide rewards to people providing information to facilitate the arrest of foreign individuals wanted by an international court or tribunal, including the ICC’. It also points to two prior cases (2012 and 2015) of the US playing a role in the transfer of two suspects to stand trial before the ICC.

Clearly, the Biden administration could point to those precedents to justify a plan to use RFJ to create incentives for Russian officials or oligarchs, perhaps even a group of both—maybe even some enterprising billionaire from a third country who can get close to Putin—to hand Putin over to await such a trial. The only catch in offering a one billion dollar reward for rendering him to another country, from which he could be transferred to the ICC, is twofold:  Firstly, according to US Code 22, Section 2708 (e)(1), which addresses the maximum amount that a Secretary of State may authorize RFJ to reward, there is a cap of ‘up to twice the amount specified in this paragraph’, a reference to the previously stated amount of $25,000,000. Secondly, circumstances contemplated for a Secretary of State to offer up to a $50,000,000 reward entail efforts to obtain information ‘leading to the capture of a leader of a foreign terrorist organization’.

Of course, this is hardly an insurmountable barrier to the proposed measures presented herein. Given the current mood of the country, Congress could quickly amend this to address the previously uncontemplated situation at hand. Indeed, it will surely require a far greater reward to resolve this situation in the manner envisaged herein than seven-figure rewards that may have been offered to help bring to justice warlords who were accused of committing grievous human rights abuses in conflicts on the African continent. In the interim, President Biden could issue an executive order to expedite the advertisement of a potentially game-changing reward for Putin’s capture.

So, if Congress were to do that, how could the Biden administration use the RFJ to advertise a billion-dollar reward to anyone who is willing to hand Putin over to the ICC without spending a dime of American taxpayers’ money?

That is somewhat more complicated than space allows for the author to explain. Meanwhile, it is useful to consider recent commentary by legal studies scholar Jennifer Taub about using the one hundred billion dollars worth of Russian assets frozen by the US Government to equip the Ukrainian military and volunteers who are waging the fight against Putin’s forces in Ukraine. Clearly, there are well-reasoned theories about ways to utilize frozen Putin regime assets to counter Putin’s grand vision—in violation of international laws—to bring valuable, natural resource-rich territories that were once part of the Soviet Union under his control. And even if those proposed solutions are too abstract to easily pursue today, there seems to be a will in Congress to work on devising new laws President Biden can enact that would make those ideas viable tools in the fight to counter Putin’s criminal aims. Again, in the interim, Biden could issue an executive order to accommodate the conversion of Putin regime assets frozen in the US into tools used to counter the Russian dictator’s grand plans.

Certainly, it is important to acknowledge that cases where it can be reasonably assumed the RFJ helped bring to justice some of the world’s most-wanted criminals tend to yield limited impacts. Much as the author assessed would be the case in testimony before a Senate hearing that was chaired by Senator Graham in 2017, as well as in a piece published at Lawfare, Baghdadi’s death has had, at most, a negligible impact on ISIS’ resiliency. However, it is important to consider that it seems like a rather safe bet that Putin’s vision of obliterating Russia’s economy and standing in the world by miring Russia in a war that he cannot hope to win—without resorting to measures that will undoubtedly trigger responses which will yield more catastrophic impacts on Putin’s regime and Russia more broadly—is unlikely to prove a durable cause if Putin is stripped of power.

Already, CIA Director Bill Burns is psychologically conditioning Americans—and the world—to feel unsurprised by a more nightmarish scenario, in which Putin resorts to deploying nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Putin has since animated those very fears by posturing a threat to deploy nuclear weapons against nations that are backing Zelensky. The Biden administration can do more to resolve this situation, and it should not hesitate to more directly utilize either America’s financial might, or even the Putin regime’s assets that are frozen by the US Government, to try to bring about a less deadly conclusion to Putin’s terrorism campaign in Ukraine. One which, it seems CIA now assesses, may easily spiral into a much wider and more impactful war. Advertising a one-billion-dollar reward for anyone who is willing to help hold Putin accountable for the war crimes that are being committed in Ukraine could be the most efficient way to hasten an end to this fast-growing nightmare.

Russia’s battle with COVID: One Step Forwards, Three Steps Back

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Russia continues to struggle against the Covid-19 pandemic as cases and deaths increase each day (by focusonmore.com; licensed under CC BY 2.0)

Russia was the first country to approve a vaccine to treat the SARS-CoV-2 virus, its Sputnik V jab, which has since been complemented by the development of two other homegrown vaccines, CoviVac and EpiVacCorona. Moscow also directs a national vaccination program which is free and accessible to all Russian citizens who wish to receive a shot. Russia ought to be well on its way to achieving a high-level of immunity in its population, with the government repeatedly claiming ‘victory’ over the deadly coronavirus.

Yet any claims of victory are false. The country’s Covid defence is in a poor position relative to other large nations. As of July 21 Russia has a paltry 14.38% of its population fully vaccinated; 54.3% are fully vaccinated in the UK by contrast. Meanwhile, cases and deaths multiply at alarming rates each day, with 24,098 infections and 711 fatalities recorded on 20 July. Though democracies are also still struggling to defeat the virus, especially the highly transmissible Delta variant, responsibility for Russia’s poor performance in managing the pandemic largely falls at the feet of Vladimir Putin and his authoritarianism.

Rather than properly getting to grips with the pandemic, the severity of which the Kremlin has sought to downplay, the government has instead often prioritised its shady political objectives, carrying out a comprehensive crackdown against civil society following Alexei Navalny’s imprisonment and preparing for the upcoming elections to the State Duma, Russia’s parliament, scheduled to happen this year on 19 September. Meanwhile a combination of a historic lack of trust in the state among Russians, government disinformation about vaccines produced outside Russia, and lack of adherence to proper development standards in the production of Russia’s vaccines has seen the Russian population largely shun vaccination and remain vulnerable to the third wave of Covid. The authorities, when they do try to mitigate the virus’ effects, are increasingly being forced to impose restrictions which are widely unpopular with the public, including the enforcement of mandatory vaccinations and infringements on everyday life such as requiring proof of vaccination status to visit cafés and restaurants, which has led to a thriving black market in fake QR codes and vaccination certificates.

Putin has repeatedly expressed confidence about beating the virus but his government continues to lag behind in terms of its response (World Economic Forum; licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

Russia’s continued covid-crisis has three main causes: vaccine hesitancy and mismanagement, disinformation, and an undemocratic political system. Firstly, vaccine hestitancy is widespread among the Russian population. While this is also an issue in many other countries, including democracies, it is a problem which is particularly pronounced in Russia. Data collected by a poll conducted by the Levada Centre, Russia’s largest polling agency, revealed that 54% of respondents were unwilling to be vaccinated, 25% were willing, and 19% reported that they had already received the vaccine; 69.4%, 68.6%, and 48.9% of the UK’s, the US’, and France’s populations respectively have accepted at least one shot of a  vaccine.

Second, Russians’ vaccine hesitancy is compounded and made more likely by the behaviour of the government. Not only was Russia’s flagship vaccine, Sputnik V, developed and administered before the completion of routine mass trials to assess its efficacy (it is considered safe by experts now), the government has mismanaged its promotion. President Vladimir Putin’s own vaccination was shrouded in secrecy as he refused to be pictured during it and initially he did not reveal which shot he had received (in the end it transpired to be Sputnik V), forfeiting a PR opportunity taken by many other world leaders to demonstrate to the public the safety of Covid vaccines. There have additionally been reports that Russians were given a different vaccine to the one they were informed they were receiving, while lockdowns have generally been ‘eschewed’ by the government. The Kremlin has also taken a highly nationalist approach to the utilisation of its vaccine. Sputnik V has become a tool in the Russian government’s foreign policy, offering it to African countries to boost Moscow’s standing. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has simultaneously promoted conspiracy theories regarding vaccines developed in other countries in order to lift the profile of its own. The combined effect has been to worsen public confidence in the best line of defence against the increasingly rampant virus.

Yet third, and most fundamental of all, is that the above factors are symptoms of the longer-term illness which undermines the effectiveness of Russia’s governance: the poor health of its democracy and civil society. It is not so much that Russians do not trust vaccine itself. Rather, they do not have faith in the government that provides the vaccine. The Russian state already interferes in the daily lives of citizens to sometimes intolerable degrees, which provokes cynicism towards any government scheme. Despite the vaccine’s necessity, it is seen as just another untrustworthy authoritarian measure that the state is trying to enforce on the population.

Russia’s Covid crisis is a lesson in the ills of autocracy. Having long lost the trust of millions of Russians, the state cannot not rely on voluntary uptake of the vaccine, meaning further unpopular mandatory measures may be necessary, regardless of the fact Putin said he hoped there would be no need for a new lockdown at 2021’s Direct Line session, a public relations event where the Russian President fields questions from ostensibly ‘typical’ Russians over videocall. The regime also plans to use the elections as an opportunity to ‘refresh its legitimacy’ and Covid will take careful management in order to avoid any upsets for the ruling but increasingly unpopular United Russia party. For now, though, the Russian government remains on the back foot.

Alexei Navalny and the ‘Affair of the Poisons’, à la russe

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by N. Alexander

Falling ill on a plane from Omsk to Moscow, the ex-lawyer and blogger on corruption in Russia, Alexei Navalny was rushed to the hospital after a suspected – and later proven – poisoning (Image credit: Getty Images/AFP/K. Kudrayavtsev)

‘When will Putin learn?’ It is a question now once again asked after the alleged poisoning of Russian politician and anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny. Russian commentators from Navalny’s inner circle, social media news-brokers, as well as Western governments and journalists, lost no time in identifying ‘the perp’ as Russian President Vladimir Putin. After all, is not Navalny ‘the man Vladimir Putin fears most’?

Although German doctors treating Navalny claim to have found traces of a ‘Novichok’-type agent in his system, there is still no conclusive evidence presented publicly, nor is there any viable clue about who Navalny was poisoned by, or why. In such a situation, one would do well to hold out on judgement and to ignore one’s gut feeling. However, the opposite is true. Indeed, why look for certainty, when we already know the answer?

While the theory of Putin’s involvement in the poisoning of his political opponent fits snugly with the flurry of accusations levelled at the Kremlin over the years, a lethal attack against Navalny, in particular, is both unnecessary and harmful to the Russian government. Setting aside the fact that as a method, political assassinations have been employed widely (including by governments which profess the highest of democratic values) such an interpretation fails to take into account both the pattern of Putin’s risk-taking when making political choices, and the level of threat Alexei Navalny actually presents to the Russian President personally, as well as to the political establishment as a whole. This discussion seeks to point to some of the discrepancies which separate the abstractly possible from the eminently probable.

‘No Pain, no Gain’: Putin and Political Risks

Over the years Vladimir Putin amply demonstrated his ability to take risks. However, equally demonstrable is the fact that such risks, with the cost they inevitably carry, also have the potential to bring about enormous dividends. The case of Crimea demonstrates this vividly.

The acquisition of Crimea (unification or annexation, depending on one’s political perspective) carried with it the inevitable risk of an outcry by Russia’s international opponents and antagonists, as well as a high probability of sanctions. Yet manifest as well were the dividends. Crimea might not be of major economic benefit, it might not have oil reserves or uranium deposits, but it is a cultural-ideological ‘trophy’ in a country which puts premium value on history as the bearer of national pride. For a Russian, regardless of personal political views or aspirations, Crimea carries immense historic, ethnic, and national value, and is perceived almost as an element of national identity. For a political leader, the return of Crimea is a manifestation of politics of strength within the context of a historical vision, it is a message of defiance of external pressures in a country particularly sensitive to cultural and political penetration from the outside. In short, Crimea is the example par excellence of Vladimir Putin accepting risks for a particular profit: international outcry for domestic approval, and national sacrifices for his own great Russian vision.[1]

By contrast, the Navalny affair currently unfolding carries no gains, no promises, nor any dividends whatsoever. Putin, his inner circle, ‘the Kremlin’, the ruling elite as a whole gain nothing from Navalny’s potential martyrdom. In fact, they have much to lose from it. Vague and unproven accusations levelled at Russia are already accompanied by threats of sanctions and demands for Russia to open its military research to NATO inspectors.

The Navalny phenomenon

As an anti-corruption blogger, Navalny rose to prominence rather quickly, capitalising on the PR value of high-profile exposés. His investigations, published online for a broad audience, were read widely for years, both by critics of the system and those who, while generally loyal, were critical or suspicious of particular elements of the new ruling elite. Navalny has managed very successfully to give concrete examples to otherwise anecdotal rumours of abuses critics of the system were spreading for years. However, the mere fact of selective dissatisfaction with aspects of the system is not enough to produce active opposition in Russian society. Put plainly, the average Russian citizen can still be loyal to the system and a believer therein, and at the same time find elements to criticise and even resist against. This is one of several key reasons why Navalny’s message has not proven powerful enough to dent the government’s powerbase significantly.

Navalny’s anti-corruption campaign seemed for a time to be the stuff political stars are made of. He has indeed risen from a humble blogger to an organiser of what is seen in the West as mass protests in opposition to the government. Two things, however, have to be pointed out.

First, ‘mass’ is a relative term, and even tens of thousands of city dwellers in a major centre of European Russia are not necessarily representative of a much larger electorate which is generally politically conservative in its outlook.[2] Second, protests, even sizeable ones, although indicative of political awareness, are not evidence of a prominent or permanent change of political perception, as evidenced in the consistently high levels of Vladimir Putin’s popularity. Putin’s approval ratings over the years, even at their lowest, have stayed well above the 50% mark, consistently dwarfing those of even the most prominent Western politicians.

The ineffectiveness of Navalny’s particular brand of activism in augmenting his political capital lies ultimately in its structure. His anti-corruption approach is not unlike that of Putin himself early on in his Presidency when dealing with the oligarchical elite of the 1990s.[3] Like Putin, Navalny consistently focused on high-profile individuals from the socio-political elite, while leaving largely untouched the broader culture of corruption in Russian institutions. The targets of his investigations were prominent enough to generate hype and gossip, but this did not translate into nation-wide opposition. This is because, on the perceptional level, the corruption of the upper strata of a political elite is a given among those who are eager to criticise the political and social status quo. Meaning, Navalny’s main powerbase speaks more to those Russians who are already part of an opposition, rather than attracting a multitude of new political ‘converts’. Furthermore, on the practical level, the exposition of high-level corruption, while excellent headlines material, has little direct effect on the daily life of a population which is harmed much more frequently and harshly by corruption at the lower levels of social organisation – local administration, low-level dispute resolution, police, etc.

In short, while Navalny’s anti-corruption activity has made him well-known as an activist, it has not been enough to make him a political force to appeal widely on a national level, and thus be reckoned with.

Navalny did manage to gather a significant percentage of the vote for mayor of Moscow in the 2013 election. However, it is improbable that his attempts to run for President would have been successful even had they not been thwarted. While a timely conviction and disqualified him from a presidential run in 2018 as an independent candidate, he was not able to gather the necessary signatures to formally register in the first place. Even the 700,000 potential voters he reported as pledged would not have been enough to push him ahead if he was not disqualified.

Since then, Navalny’s political influence has seen a moderate rise on the regional level, where he has sought to ally himself with other opposition parties and groups in order to diminish the dominant influence of United Russia candidates, for example, in the elections for Governor of the St Petersburg region. Yet there is little to suggest that his influence nation-wide is particularly threatening for Putin’s United Russia party.

Off with his head?

The key question is whether Navalny is dangerous enough for it to be necessary to have him taken off the playing field, quite literally. While moderately influential, he is neither a major force on his own nor the leader that would stir the fragmented Russian opposition to and unite around him.

Previously, the Russian authorities have had little trouble blocking Navalny’s various bids for power. They have done so while maintaining a thin veneer of legality, effectively using the various loopholes of the Russian legal system to keep him in check without it being necessary to harm him to achieve this goal. By contrast, an assassination attempt would only reinforce any message that Navalny is carrying, while a fatal outcome could make him into the martyr Boris Nemtsov could never have been.

The usual suspect?

It is, of course, very easy to point the finger at Putin as the usual suspect. It fits into the easily-marketed image of the Russian autocrat, dangerous, unpredictable, and yet oh so transparently evil.[4] Built on a decades-long tradition of mistrust, it is no surprise that criticism of Russia ‘sells’. Often opportunistically self-serving, it is an easy and palatable interpretation, revived as soon as Russia started gaining back its prominence following the collapse of the USSR and a decade of political, ideological and economic crisis.[5]

Yet the truth, perhaps a sad reflection of the modesty of liberal opposition movements in Russia, is that Alexei Navalny, while a man of purpose and a man of recognition, is not dangerous enough for the Kremlin to seek to assassinate him. Doing so, in fact, would create unnecessary complications internationally while bringing no benefit domestically for a leadership which is going through a period of crisis and increased criticism domestically and internationally.

This discussion seeks to point to some of the discrepancies which separate the abstractly possible from the eminently probable.

It is worth, perhaps, remembering that Alexei Navalny has stepped on many toes over the years. The fact that any enemies he has thus made might be part of the political establishment does not immediately substantiate complicity by the Kremlin, particularly as an attack on Navalny would be both unnecessary and harmful to the President and to the Russian Government as a whole. As such,  a variety of possible interpretations present themselves.

At this point, it is difficult to say which of these hold water. The proposition of the Kremlin’s supposed complicity sits very uncomfortably with the lack of a logical justification of such an excessive measure since existing, bloodless alternatives have proven very successful in managing Navalny’s political influence.

Equally implausible is the assumption of a political provocation by the opposition or the West. This has already been aired as a possible scenario by Vyacheslav Volodin, the Chairman of the State Duma, potentially as a rhetorical counter to insinuations in the Western press about government complicity, and to direct threats by the U.S. State Department. Navalny is simply too valuable to both; put bluntly, he is much more valuable alive than dead.

An even more extreme interpretation is that an attack on Navalny is part of a complex coup orchestrated from within government circles seeking to bring Putin down. Dangerously close to a conspiracy theory, this requires extensive corroborating evidence, and possibly also a much more intelligent understanding of the delicate interplay and balance of power in the corridors of the Kremlin.

Perhaps a simpler explanation suggests itself: Navalny’s activism has certainly gained him many powerful enemies, and it is at least as plausible for this attack to be an unsanctioned move for the satisfaction of a personal vendetta. Depending on who the person responsible might be, it is plausible the Kremlin will be forced to save face by covering them up.

Allowing passions, preconceptions, and biases to underpin political opinion, political proclamation, and political resolution has over the past years become more and more the norm. And yet in order to get a more plausible interpretation of events, it is inevitably important to occasionally ask – who benefits?

[1] This polarising issue has resulted in a large outpour of comment and analysis, mostly extremely partisan on both sides of the spectrum. For a balanced overview and assessment, see Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2015), ch. 5.

[2] An indicative, if somewhat indirectly related example which demonstrates the general conservatism of Russian society is the much-reported Pussy Riot controversy. Following the arrest of its members after an alternative protest performance in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow in February 2012, widely condemned as sacrilegious, polls conducted reported that about 80% of widely pooled respondents were in favour of a conviction, whether prison terms (37%), forced labour (26%), or a large fine (20%). See Levada Centre, ‘Rossiyane o dele Pussy Riot’ [‘Russians on the Pussy Riot Case’], online at https://www.levada.ru/2012/07/31/rossiyane-o-dele-pussy-riot/.

[3] Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia’s Choice (London & New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 143-150.

[4] See, for example, Heidi Blake, From Russia with Blood: Putin’s Ruthless Killing Campaign and Secret War on the West (London: William Collins, 2019), and Amy Knight, Orders to Kill: The Putin Regime and Political Murder (Thomas Dunne, 2017). For a more nuanced and balanced recent view, see Richard Sakwa, The Putin Paradox (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2020).

[5] For an overview of the crucial period of the 1990s see Roy A. Medvedev, Post-Soviet Russia: A Journey through the Yeltsin Era (New York & Chichester: Columbia University Press 2000), and Andrew Felkay, Yeltsin’s Russia and the West (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002). For a good overview of the ‘new Cold War’ currently raging, see Richard Sakwa, Russia Against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

N. Alexander a historian teaching at King’s College London and a keen observer of Russian politics.

 

 

 

 

Decrypting the effects of the Russian Presidential Election

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By Jackson Oliver Webster

 

Credit Image: БЕЛАРУССКИЙ ЖУРНАЛ

 

This article is part of a two-part pre- and post-election analysis of the Russian elections and their significance for the country and region going forward. The pre-election break-down can be found here.

 

It came as no surprise that, late in the evening of 18 March 2018, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was announced as the clear winner of Russia’s Presidential Election, with 56,430,712 votes representing 76.69% of participating voters. This result represents more votes in real terms for any president in the history of the Russian Federation. The most important figure for the Kremlin however was not Putin’s score in terms of votes, rather his score in terms of turnout, which fell below the announced target of 70%. The runner up was the Communist Party candidate, billionaire Pavel Grudinin, who won 11.77% of the vote, performing slightly better than expected, possibly as a result of his personal notoriety compared to Putin’s liberal challengers.

This article will outline the performances and reactions of several opposition candidates, as well as the fate of the opposition following the election. The second part will briefly discuss how Putin’s victory and eventual succession might affect Moscow’s foreign policy and defence posture over the coming years.

 

Opposition Candidates

Liberal candidates performed particularly poorly, with Ksenia Sobchak, the self-styled “other choice against all” (“Sobchak protiv vsekh”), winning a whopping 1.68% of the vote, and veteran politician Grigori Yavlinski of the Yabloko Party obtaining only 1.05% of the vote, according to official results. Perhaps the best-performing liberal candidate was Abstention, with turnout rates especially low in the traditionally opposition-leaning city of Yekaterinburg, where, according to the Mayor’s office, only 434,000 of the city’s over 1,300,000 residents participated. Navalny will continue to claim abstaining voters as his own supporters, given his repeated calls to boycott the elections, having changed his campaign hashtag from #Navalny2018 to #NeVybory2018 (“non-elections2018”). Fraud occurred in multiple polling stations, and independent observers including Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) noted less-than-clandestine ballot stuffing on security camera footage. Grigory Melkonyats of the NGO Golos said fraud was “partly in reaction to Navalny’s boycott campaign.” In Chechnya, due to political repression and fraudulent polling, Putin won over 99% of the vote, duplicating his other strong showings in the Autonomous Republic against which he fought a war in 1999, his first action as Russia’s Prime Minister.

During the  vote, Navalny and a campaign manager sat in Navalny Live’s studio with Sobchak and a member of her staff to watch the results roll in on a broadcast later replayed by Dozhd, Russia’s only non-state owned TV network. After it was evident that, to everyone’s surprise, Putin was to emerge the clear winner, Sobchak proposed that she and Navalny’s party form a united opposition for the upcoming State Duma elections. Navalny, in his typically direct style, launched into a speech ultimately condemning Sobchak as part-and-parcel of the system she claims to oppose, saying he wants nothing to do with her ‘opposition’ which he views as ‘permitted’ and ‘selected’ by the Kremlin. Some Russian political commentators have alleged that the Kremlin will begin reorganizing a straw man ‘opposition’ based on an engineered entente between nationalist and ‘liberal’ forces, with caricatures like Zhirinovksy and Sobchak serving as rhetorical punching bags for United Russia. This would be reminiscent of the early days of the Putin presidency, when Kremlin political technologists used rapid party creation and dissolution to engineer a surprise victory for pro-Kremlin factions over the Communist Party, and later reorganised these elements into United Russia. Though your author usually avoids conspiratorial thinking, he would be less than surprised if the Kremlin tapped Sobchak for some sort of role in a post-Putin political order, however this speculation will be left for another, much longer article.

Liberal movements such as Sobchak’s and Navalny’s are caught between a rock and a hard place. Either they follow Navalny’s model and refuse to take part in an unfair election process and exclude themselves; or they participate, thus legitimising an election campaign run by a politicised Federal Electoral Commission and influenced by highly-biased state-run media with rampant voter fraud. The despondent mood of the liberal opposition is best summarised by Yabloko political consultant Max Katz:

“The opponents of Putin have put forward many strategies. And none of them has worked. The boycott hasn’t worked: the turnout is very high and — it seems — will not be artificially propped. The calls to spoil bulletins haven’t worked — there are few of them. Voting for Sobchak hasn’t worked: her score is very low. Voting for Grudinin hasn’t worked . . . his score is lower than Zyuganov’s [the leader of the Communist party] in the last presidential elections. And our calls to vote for Yavlinsky haven’t worked either.”

Navalny for his part is falling back on his “political machines”, the Civic Platform Party and the FBK, to give him and his campaign longevity beyond the presidential election. His YouTube presence has been particularly active since the elections, attacking the government over its handling of a deadly mall fire in Siberia and denouncing the elimination of direct mayoral elections in Yekaterinburg. Most recently, he called for protests on 5 May in a video entitled “Putin is not our Tsar” (“Putin nam ne tsar’”).

 

Consequences

So what can be expected, particularly from a European perspective, in the coming months and years from a reelected Putin?

Before the elections, most Western media were fixated on Putin’s particularly bellicose State of the Federation address. He boasted of all sorts of first-strike, high-tech weapons clearly in development with Western conventional foes in mind: hypersonic intercontinental cruise missiles, underwater tactical nuclear platforms, and other weapons. Many defence analysts have argued that these systems are either not beyond the conceptual stage, and may not provide any significant strategic edge should they become operational. However, the spirit of the address seemed to mark a shift towards openly aggressive rhetoric which may come to define Putin’s fifth term foreign policy.

Russian historian Irina Pavlova argues that Putin’s comments represent his will to “raise the stakes” of his current confrontation with the West. This belligerence is, she continues, a demonstration of Putin’s confidence in his own competence and position relative to his adversaries. She concludes that this assertiveness follows the general framing of Kremlin foreign policy by state media, which sets Russian civilisation against a weak and decadent Western world. It also feeds into Kremlin talking points, namely the framing of the Ukraine conflict in terms of the fight against so-called ‘Ukrainian fascists’. This creates a “modern Stalinist’” confrontation with the West in which Putin himself is the hero. “As for the sanctions the West threatens, they only strengthen this regime above all in the eyes of its own population,” argues Pavlova.

NATO defence planners[1], on the other hand, operate largely under the assumption that succession is, eventually, inevitable, and that this succession period will be extremely unstable. Many Western governments may view the current Russian regime as undesirable, but there is a general respect for the current Kremlin’s competence and strategic rationality. Thus, the key strategic goal for NATO in the east is to raise the cost of miscalculation for Moscow by strengthening Baltic defences. A legitimate concern is that, in the coming years, a succession battle within the Kremlin combined with long-term economic instability may cause Russia —or rather certain powerful actors in Moscow— to lash out in the ‘near-abroad’.

 

Conclusion

Moving forward, the most important developments in Russian politics worth following will be the fate of the ‘liberal’ opposition, in all its various forms, and eventually the succession process. The main question for the opposition is whether or not a united front will form between various factions —old liberals, Navalnyites, nationalists, communists, and so on. As for succession, there are multiple possible outcomes over the next six years. We will either see a reordering of the current elite as Putin steps down from power, or a constitutional amendment abolishing the two-term limit. Regardless, the West can expect an assertive stance from Moscow as Putin attempts to reinforce his domestic credibility in the face of a stagnant economy and shrinking European demand for fossil fuels.

 

Jackson Webster is a graduate of the Department of War Studies, and is currently reading for a master’s in International Security at Sciences Po Paris. His research focuses on Russia, its relationship with Central Europe, and cybersecurity. He is currently working on cybersecurity issues with a legal tech consultancy in Paris.

Notes

[1] Section based on an off-the-record conversation between the author and senior NATO officials.

Image source

http://journalby.com/news/navalnyy-protiv-rossii-rossiya-protiv-evropy-i-sobchak-protiv-vseh-1099 (in Russian)

 

Smoke, Mirrors, Yachts, and Dachas

by

By Jackson Oliver Webster

 

The reality TV run-up to Russia’s presidential elections (Credit Image: Телеканал 360)

This article is part of a two-part pre- and post-election analysis of the Russian elections and their significance for the country and region going forward. 

 

Russia’s elections have been crafted the same way a producer designs the season finale of a reality TV show finale: the illusion of suspense hides a pre-ordained outcome. This is why the Kremlin has allowed the Electoral Commission to grant a record eight candidates the right to run. Candidates range from the centrist urban opposition, to a reality TV presenter, to an oligarch-turned-communist, to a “liberal-democratic” nationalist who wants to outlaw the speaking of foreign languages in public.

Russian political life, unlike what many Western pundits may argue, is not defined by “dictatorship”. Politics in the Federation is better characterized, borrowing a phrase from Peter Pomerantsev, as “Reality TV Russia”. Modern Russia is a militarized kleptocracy whose political discourse is largely dominated by state-run TV stations, and by the producers and “political technologists” who create their content. Debate in Russia is far more open than in one-party states like China, or indeed in many of Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors. Diverse political opinions exist and are discussed, however they’re not given sufficient airtime to reach a general audience, nor are they permitted to converge into an organised, effective opposition. Permitted opposition candidates are generally caricatures. They include nostalgic communists, raving ultra-nationalists, and now, young reality TV presenters with no political experience. In this environment, Putin’s victories are understandable. He truly does represent the best amongst this motley crew, a group selected by the powers-that-be through a politicised Federal Electoral Commission.

There is much to be said about this field of fascinating personalities, about the dramas of the past few months, and the bizarre anecdotes of Russian political life. However, I shall limit my discussion to two figures — Alexei Navalny and Ksenia Sobchak — and finally, briefly, to the President himself and the system he represents.

 

Alexei Navalny 

The first is Alexei Navalny, a lawyer who gained political notoriety by running for Mayor of Moscow in 2013 and coming in a less-distant second than any previous opposition candidate. Navalny created the Fond Borby s Korruptsei (Anti-Corruption Foundation, FBK) in 2011 as a platform for his later political ventures. The Foundation has a popular YouTube channel which publishes video essays and documentaries chronicling the alleged corruption of prominent government officials. It is worth noting that, in contemporary Russia, one of the most effective ways to catalyze a political career, particularly at the local level, is by legitimizing oneself by denouncing corruption. Many of Russia’s more prominent local politicians have begun their campaigns through an anti-corruption platform — Yekaterinburg Mayor Evgeny Roizman provides another good example.

In a March 2017 video entitled “On Vam Ne Dimon” (Don’t Call Him Dimon), Navalny presented an in-depth open-source indictment of Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev’s corrupt lifestyle, followed by a declaration of his own presidential candidacy. This video incited unsanctioned protests in major urban centers nationwide, and Navalny and hundreds of his supporters were arrested. Subsequent protests organized by Navalny — namely in reaction to the Electoral Commission’s rejection of his candidacy — have seen surprisingly innovative responses from Russian authorities. In one instance, the Saint Petersburg city government announced the day before a protest planned on Putin’s birthday that the selected park “needed urgent repairs” and that it would therefore block the protests out of concern for “public health and safety”. In Volgograd, journalists covering a protest were pushed into buses by police and moved away from the protesters, then were returned once the protest had finished.

Navalny’s most notable recent video, released in February 2018, is entitled “Yachts, Oligarchs, and Girls”. It tells the tale of Nastya Rybka, a Belorussian escort and lifestyle blogger. In 2016, Rybka posted a series of pictures of Norwegian villages on her Instagram, followed by a video showing her patron, oligarch Oleg Deripaska, discussing the American presidential elections with a man Navalny identifies as Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Prikhodko, rumoured to be the most influential voice in foreign policy at the Kremlin. The video uses open-source findings and Rybka’s autobiography to assert that the two were meeting to arrange private briefings for Prikhodko with Paul Manafort, then-campaign manager for Donald Trump and former business partner of Deripaska. The accusations have made waves in Russia, with Roskomnadzor, Russia’s internet censor, attempting to force YouTube to take down the videos (YouTube didn’t comply). Rybka is currently in jail in Thailand for illegally co-organizing a sex workshop. She has appealed to the “American media” asking for extradition in return for the “missing pieces of the puzzle” of the Trump campaign’s connections with Russia.

While Navalny’s videos are highly viewed — the exposé on Deripaska has over four million views — the political impact of these videos is limited and highly concentrated. Navalny’s supporters are mostly young, educated liberals living in large cities like Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and Volgograd. The viewers of his videos are likely to be these young Russians, their compatriots living abroad, and Western Russia-watchers (such as this author). This demographic does not normally vote in elections, and with Navalny’s calls to boycott they almost certainly won’t be turning out in droves on March 18. Contrast Navalny’s legal troubles with the President’s stable voter base, combined with the internal strife in Navalny’s Progress Party, and the candidate’s path to future electoral success seems far off if not entirely untenable. Moreover, the effects of these denunciations are likely to be more long-term than March’s election. Igor Eidman of Deutsche Welle suggested that the main reaction among Russians is to ask why a man like Deripaska could be so rich while also being so idiotic as to invite an unstable escort to his illegal private meetings with the Deputy Prime Minister.

Even if Navalny’s popularity and impact are difficult to measure, the perceived threat he poses to the Kremlin is obvious. Navalny and his parry do not represent a fully-fledged “opposition” to the extent that much of the Western media has argued. That said, the Kremlin has gone to rather unsubtle lengths to discredit and disqualify him from political office on multiple occasions, with 2018 constituting but the latest example.

 

Ksenia Sobchak

Despite being presented via the Kremlin-approved press, as the opposition candidate, there isn’t much to say of her campaign. Her political views were vague-to-non-existent prior to the election, and her campaign hasn’t aggressively attacked Putin or United Russia directly, at least not with the same vigor as Navalny or the liberals of Yabloko. Moreover, the Sobchak family’s closeness to Putin is well-known — her father was the Mayor of Saint-Petersburg when Putin was Deputy Mayor, his first political post.

Sobchak’s most drastic departure from the Kremlin party line is her embrace of European-style liberal democracy as a model for political normalcy. She is one of two candidates opposing the annexation of Crimea, refusing to campaign there. This differentiates her from her communist and nationalist counterparts, notably Navalny himself, who positions himself as an ardent Russian patriot and maintains a hard stance against immigration and the influence of Western media in Russia.

 In the opinion of some observers, Sobchak is a spoiler candidate. No candidate can present him or herself without at least tacit acceptance from the state hierarchy. Navalny’s constant legal troubles stem at least partly from the perceived threat he poses to at least some elements of the Kremlin elite. Sobchak, on the other hand, has been characterized as the “approved sparring partner” for President Putin. That said, there is no actual ‘sparring’, as the President has refused to participate in televised debates and is not actively campaigning. I would therefore take this discussion in a slightly different direction. Sobchak’s candidacy fits perfectly into the character of modern Russian political life. In a country dominated by state-owned mass television, a reality TV presenter as a presidential candidate seems more than fitting.

From an electoral standpoint, Sobchak’s candidacy indirectly combats Navalny’s call for a boycott. Her campaign plays to the same urban, progressive youth who Navalny is urging to boycott. By giving these individuals — ultimately a minority electorate — an ‘acceptable alternative’ to voting for Putin, perhaps Sobchak could raise the overall turnout. The counter to this argument comes from Sobchak herself, who acknowledges the charges of spoiling, denies them, and has gone so far as to frequently attack Navalny and his colleagues.

 

Vladimir Putin

The central character of reality TV Russia is President Putin himself. Aside from being the head-of-state and the fulcrum of Russia’s kleptocracy, Putin casts himself as the physical embodiment of the nation. He’s a statesman, soldier, tough-guy, dog-lover, biker, patriot, and diplomat. But more importantly, he is above the tumultuous noise of modern society. The go-to word for Kremlin supporters is “stability”, and with his calm demeanor and straight-faced authority, Putin is the image of the stability his rule has provided.

 For the President, “success” in this election is not defeating his divided and underwhelming opposition; it’s achieving high turnout. Or, at least high enough to give his new mandate an air of legitimacy. This election, Putin is running as an independent, not as a candidate of United Russia, the ruling party. The election is therefore a direct referendum on his presidency and on his popularity.

 

Conclusion 

No one will wake up surprised on March 19. Even in the absence of fraud, Putin will probably enjoy a comfortable majority among likely voters, elevated by relative economic stability and his perceived foreign policy successes, as well as generous welfare provisions for pensioners. However Putin is not simply looking to win this election. He needs to dominate it. Should the incumbent President only be reelected by a plurality of eligible voters, this will have two negative consequences for him. The first is a loss of legitimacy, as he must undertake a difficult constitutional reform process in order to run again in 2024. The second is Navalny, who, as the most prominent figure calling for a boycott, could easily claim abstaining voters were effectively supporting him. As there is no polling data listing Navalny as a candidate, we do not know how his results would compare with overall abstention, were he allowed to run. Early voting prior to the time of writing has also highlighted the possibility that urban Navalny voters will shift to the Communist candidate Pavel Grudinin. This may be because politically engaged voters do not want to abstain, but also do not see Sobchak as a legitimate alternative to Putin given her family background and lack of experience. When I asked an academic contact in Russia why liberal Navalny supporters would vote for a communist candidate instead of Sobchak, he answered “people might want to cast a protest vote, but they’re not idiots.”

 

 

Jackson Webster is a graduate of the Department of War Studies, and is currently reading for a master’s in International Security at Sciences Po Paris. His research focuses on Russia, its relationship with Central Europe, and cybersecurity. He is currently working on cybersecurity issues with a legal tech consultancy in Paris.

Images Sources

Banner: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_presidential_election,_2018#/media/File:President_el_in_Russia_2018.png  Official logo of the election (Credit Image: Wikimedia Commons)

Image 1:  https://360tv.ru/news/vybory/vybory-2018-kak-progolosovat-za-granitsej-dosrochno-ili-iz-doma/  (in Russian)