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Russia’s battle with COVID: One Step Forwards, Three Steps Back

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Russia continues to struggle against the Covid-19 pandemic as cases and deaths increase each day (by focusonmore.com; licensed under CC BY 2.0)

Russia was the first country to approve a vaccine to treat the SARS-CoV-2 virus, its Sputnik V jab, which has since been complemented by the development of two other homegrown vaccines, CoviVac and EpiVacCorona. Moscow also directs a national vaccination program which is free and accessible to all Russian citizens who wish to receive a shot. Russia ought to be well on its way to achieving a high-level of immunity in its population, with the government repeatedly claiming ‘victory’ over the deadly coronavirus.

Yet any claims of victory are false. The country’s Covid defence is in a poor position relative to other large nations. As of July 21 Russia has a paltry 14.38% of its population fully vaccinated; 54.3% are fully vaccinated in the UK by contrast. Meanwhile, cases and deaths multiply at alarming rates each day, with 24,098 infections and 711 fatalities recorded on 20 July. Though democracies are also still struggling to defeat the virus, especially the highly transmissible Delta variant, responsibility for Russia’s poor performance in managing the pandemic largely falls at the feet of Vladimir Putin and his authoritarianism.

Rather than properly getting to grips with the pandemic, the severity of which the Kremlin has sought to downplay, the government has instead often prioritised its shady political objectives, carrying out a comprehensive crackdown against civil society following Alexei Navalny’s imprisonment and preparing for the upcoming elections to the State Duma, Russia’s parliament, scheduled to happen this year on 19 September. Meanwhile a combination of a historic lack of trust in the state among Russians, government disinformation about vaccines produced outside Russia, and lack of adherence to proper development standards in the production of Russia’s vaccines has seen the Russian population largely shun vaccination and remain vulnerable to the third wave of Covid. The authorities, when they do try to mitigate the virus’ effects, are increasingly being forced to impose restrictions which are widely unpopular with the public, including the enforcement of mandatory vaccinations and infringements on everyday life such as requiring proof of vaccination status to visit cafés and restaurants, which has led to a thriving black market in fake QR codes and vaccination certificates.

Putin has repeatedly expressed confidence about beating the virus but his government continues to lag behind in terms of its response (World Economic Forum; licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

Russia’s continued covid-crisis has three main causes: vaccine hesitancy and mismanagement, disinformation, and an undemocratic political system. Firstly, vaccine hestitancy is widespread among the Russian population. While this is also an issue in many other countries, including democracies, it is a problem which is particularly pronounced in Russia. Data collected by a poll conducted by the Levada Centre, Russia’s largest polling agency, revealed that 54% of respondents were unwilling to be vaccinated, 25% were willing, and 19% reported that they had already received the vaccine; 69.4%, 68.6%, and 48.9% of the UK’s, the US’, and France’s populations respectively have accepted at least one shot of a vaccine.

Second, Russians’ vaccine hesitancy is compounded and made more likely by the behaviour of the government. Not only was Russia’s flagship vaccine, Sputnik V, developed and administered before the completion of routine mass trials to assess its efficacy (it is considered safe by experts now), the government has mismanaged its promotion. President Vladimir Putin’s own vaccination was shrouded in secrecy as he refused to be pictured during it and initially he did not reveal which shot he had received (in the end it transpired to be Sputnik V), forfeiting a PR opportunity taken by many other world leaders to demonstrate to the public the safety of Covid vaccines. There have additionally been reports that Russians were given a different vaccine to the one they were informed they were receiving, while lockdowns have generally been ‘eschewed’ by the government. The Kremlin has also taken a highly nationalist approach to the utilisation of its vaccine. Sputnik V has become a tool in the Russian government’s foreign policy, offering it to African countries to boost Moscow’s standing. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has simultaneously promoted conspiracy theories regarding vaccines developed in other countries in order to lift the profile of its own. The combined effect has been to worsen public confidence in the best line of defence against the increasingly rampant virus.

Yet third, and most fundamental of all, is that the above factors are symptoms of the longer-term illness which undermines the effectiveness of Russia’s governance: the poor health of its democracy and civil society. It is not so much that Russians do not trust vaccine itself. Rather, they do not have faith in the government that provides the vaccine. The Russian state already interferes in the daily lives of citizens to sometimes intolerable degrees, which provokes cynicism towards any government scheme. Despite the vaccine’s necessity, it is seen as just another untrustworthy authoritarian measure that the state is trying to enforce on the population.

Russia’s Covid crisis is a lesson in the ills of autocracy. Having long lost the trust of millions of Russians, the state cannot not rely on voluntary uptake of the vaccine, meaning further unpopular mandatory measures may be necessary, regardless of the fact Putin said he hoped there would be no need for a new lockdown at 2021’s Direct Line session, a public relations event where the Russian President fields questions from ostensibly ‘typical’ Russians over videocall. The regime also plans to use the elections as an opportunity to ‘refresh its legitimacy’ and Covid will take careful management in order to avoid any upsets for the ruling but increasingly unpopular United Russia party. For now, though, the Russian government remains on the back foot.

How Covid-19 kills debate in Germany

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Demonstrations against the pandemic restrictions take place regularly in Germany. Photo Credit: Leonhard Lenz, licensed under Creative Commons.

Germany has a historically sensitive relationship to the freedom of the individual and the Grundgesetz, its constitution, granting the freedom of speech. The terror of the Third Reich, and the GDR (German Democratic Republic )has left scars on the people living in Germany today. Now, the Covid-19 crisis and the restrictive change of public life triggered the fear of a restriction of personal freedom and speech for some again.

Right from the start of the pandemic, disagreement with the measurements taken by the government pushed the people onto the streets. The protests, however, are heterogenic: they not only attract concerned citizens but anti-vaxxer and esoterics, and they are also a haven for conspiracy theorists and representatives of the far-right and far-left scenes.

The German public and authorities are especially worried about the presence of some well-known right-extremist. While this is a legitimate reason to worry about, the protests during the pandemic and their perception in the public are a devastating symptom of change of German culture of debate, which has worsened over the last years. In times of crisis, the ground for discussion and consensus among people seems to diminish even more. Even though the majority of the German population had supported the restrictions or had even argued for their tougher enforcement, the voices shouting that politicians robbed the citizens of their constitutional rights are loud and picked up by the media. The dissent about the Covid-19 restrictions has made someone of another opinion your enemy.

The extreme division of opinion, the shrinking of a common ground that would allow a debate, is not a new phenomenon – neither in Western democracies nor in Germany. In the federal republic, however, it can be connected to some key challenges Germany had to tackle in the last ten years. Above all is the refugee crisis in Europe: Around one million refugees sought asylum in Germany in 2015. Chancellor Angela Merkel decided to admit them, and her slogan “we can do this” became famous – for some as a motivational quote, while for others as a misjudgment of reality. In the German public, there was no wider range of opinion anymore; one either clearly supported Merkels’ politics or not. It was during this time that the Alternative for Germany party (AfD) established itself as right-wing force with populistic slogans and gained great support among the voters.

The party contributed to a new discourse that divides society deeply now: A debate about the question to what extend the usage of so-called politically correct terms was a limitation of the freedom of expression; especially with regard to foreigners coming to Germany but also regarding gendering nouns in the German language. The AfD and their supporters claim that there are some things you are ‘not allowed to say any more’ due to a growing left- and green ideological thinking in society.

However, one could identify the transformation of what is said and socially accepted as a sign of a progressive society – be it through gendering nouns in the German language or the exclusion of vocabulary that is discriminatory to foreigners. But the representatives of the right-wing see this development of language as proof of the decline of their democratic right to speak freely. By negating and criticizing this development, they pushed the norms of what can be said in public further to the right instead. Consequently, this is met with heavy criticism in and outside the Bundestag. Even though this is the only right reaction to a party undermining democracies (or put differently: You can not argue with right-wing extremists) the consequence of the political landscape changing the way of dialogue in the public sphere shouldn’t be underestimated in its effects on our culture of debate which slowly seems to diminish.

This development has reached another peak with regard to the protests during the pandemic. Because of the instrumentalisation of the protests by right-wing representatives who had opposed all restrictions with all means possible, the protests quickly lost their former purpose of criticizing the political measures taken against the pandemic. The people who wanted to make use of their democratic right of protesting and criticizing the government were quickly made allies to right-wing tendencies by the public. The ground on which some express their concerns regarding the restrictive measures by the government is shared with right-wing extremists. A moral dilemma exists here: every critique seems to be a taunt working at the front of healthcare, or potentially supports tendencies that want to ‘delegitimize the state’. On the other hand, the ones who are supporting the government are blamed to be ‘Schlafschafe’ (‘sleeping sheep’) who believed anything by the government critics.

This generalization has shrunken the room for critique within society has shrunk. Just recently this dilemma reached a new level of escalation. 53 German actors released videos in which they satirically criticized the Covid-19 restrictions, Angela Merkel, and the work of the press during the pandemic. Their contributions differed in their level of critique: while some addressed the media, others wanted to raise attention to the devastating economic situation of the art and entertainment scene. Nevertheless, the backlash was intense. The media raged – within hours the videos were retweeted by representatives of the far-right and eventually labeled as members of the ‘Querdenker’-movement which is under observation by the German Intelligence service due to its right-wing extremist tendencies. While some of the actors could be proven to be close to the movement, others could not. Some have tried to distance themselves from the statements made, part of their reputation seems lost. Should they have known better?

The heated discussion shows how differentiated and framed an opinion must be in order to not be torn apart. The interaction between the two camps has lost common ground in terms of opinion and behavior: Online hate speech and extreme polarization in social media are at the core of the discussion fueling its heating further.

What is granted by constitutional law – the freedom of speech – does not necessarily apply to the climate in society. This development entails a profound issue: when extremist views within society are canceled, it has the side-effect that similar, but less extreme views are silenced too. The scale of opinion is thus shrunken. People are more careful about what they say – even if it is just a more conservative or more liberal viewpoint – awaiting to be excluded from some debates. The relation between the freedom of speech, the rise of sensitivity within society for its protection, and the progressive change of norms within language is tense.

The debate about the correct political action taken in the Covid-19 crisis has followed a curve of escalation, making it more about the fundamental allocation to the right or left political camp than about the factual discussion of pandemic necessity. The corona crisis in Germany has damaged the culture of debate in Germany even more. With five more state elections happening this year and the retirement of longstanding chancellor Merkel in September, the federal election will be a game-changer. If the outcome of the elections or the way of life in post-pandemic times will change the culture of debate in Germany is not clear but full of hope.

Dutch tolerance: reality, myth, or something in between?

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Dutch police forces preparing for more riots. Photo by Ben Koorengevel on Unsplash

If you ask Dutch secondary school students to describe the Netherlands in one word, they will probably answer: tolerant. The principle of tolerance – or rather being tolerant – is deeply embedded in Dutch history and culture. It finds its origin in the 80 years’ war (1568-1648) and the Dutch ‘Golden Age’ (17th century). After years of bloodshed between Protestants and Catholics, tolerance became the norm in the Republic of the United Netherlands. According to school books, tolerance allowed the Dutch to become leaders in world trade and attract enlightened thinkers from all over the world, such as René Descartes and Baruch Spinoza. Dutch tolerance has evolved over the centuries. The Netherlands was the first country to allow gay marriage and has highly liberal views on contentious topics such as prostitution and soft drugs. Tolerance is also reflected in the way the Dutch run their daily lives and national politics. In decision-making processes, tolerance is embodied in the so-called ‘poldermodel:’ a system of negotiation that focusses on consensus instead of confrontation. ‘Polderen’ is present in all layers of Dutch society and requires people to compromise and cooperate, all while tolerating opposing views.

The precious national value of tolerance, however, is not invincible. The country is no utopia; racism, sexism, and homophobia are, unfortunately, systemic issues many Dutch face daily. Furthermore, recently the Dutch ‘poldermodel’ has faced serious challenges, too. The aggressive riots that followed the introduction of the national curfew, ‘De Avondklokrellen’ (curfew riots, 23-26 January 2021), stand in stark contrast to the Dutch culture of consensus and compromise. This article investigates how these riots came to be and whether they should be considered an outlier or a severe crack in the Dutch idea of tolerance.

The Curfew Riots of January 2021

One might argue that the curfew riots are merely a product of the unique situation we find ourselves in, a global pandemic, and the resultant measures that have had to be implemented. Historically, many claim that riots are a common if not normal reaction to government-enforced quarantines. Riots, for instance, broke out in England and Russia during the 19th-century cholera pandemic. Last year, protests against governments’ COVID-19 measures were widespread and occurred in states like the US and Germany. Moreover, 2020 saw a general surge of protest movements challenging racism, sexism, and government corruption. This atmosphere of protest combined with the widespread use of social media on an (inter)national level by those involved might have led to a diffusion of these protests.

The Netherlands, however, has never before experienced such massive riots in reaction to global pandemics. Furthermore, during other crises, like the Second World War, there were few significant acts of public protest in the Netherlands. Additionally, there is also plenty of evidence to suggest that people will not necessarily react angrily or panicked during a crisis but will try to be cooperative and supportive of one another. So although these riots might be part of an international wave of protest, it is questionable whether it would be justified to name the pandemic the sole cause of the riots. Therefore, it remains unclear why so many Dutch recently took to the streets and whether this is ‘un-Dutch’ like many historians and criminologists claim.

It would be wrong to pretend the Dutch are the best students in the class. Indeed, they do not have a legacy of public protest like the French, but despite the poldermodel, protests occur in the Netherlands. This is not to say that all acts of Dutch public protest oppose the poldermodel. On the contrary, many public demonstrations are often used as starting point for new negotiations. Symbolic was, for instance, the meeting of Prime Minister Mark Rutte with the so-called ‘yellow vests’ protesters, which according to one of the attendees, led to ‘a little bit of hope.’ By focussing on conversation, not conflict, protests can thus be de-escalated. Still, famous Dutch historian and terrorism expert Beatrice de Graaf rejects the view that riots and mass protests are uncharacteristic of Dutch culture and society. Instead she argues that the Dutch have a long history of public protests that escalate into riots. Famous is the ‘eel riot’ (palingoproer) that occurred in Amsterdam in 1886. After a group of people played the forbidden game of ‘eel pulling’ as an act of protest (palingtrekken, a game in which people had to pull an eel from a rope while in a boat), the police intervened. This escalated into a riot during which twenty-five people died. There are even cases in which public protest does not proceed the riot. The Project X riots in Haren, 2012 are such an example. These riots started after a sixteen-year-old girl’s Facebook birthday invitation was accidentally shared with thousands of people. In response, many flocked to the small town, intending to cause significant damage. These examples show that the Curfew Riots might not be so ‘un-Dutch’ as some claim.

De Graaf, however, argues that the recent curfew riots can be separated from previous riots because they had a strong political motive. This is unique since the last significant riots (partially) driven by a political reason were the squatters’ riots (krakersrellen) in the 70s and 80s. However, whilst these past riots were predominantly supported by the political left, the recent curfew riots of the 2020s saw support from the (extreme) right. The leader of the right-wing populist party Forum voor Democratie, Thierry Baudet, called upon the people to ‘resist’ the curfew. Although he disapproved of the violence, many politicians and scholars claimed that he was guilty of sedition. Some went as far as to compare Baudet’s statements to the speech Donald Trump held before the storming of the Capitol. According to many, Baudet’s words showed no intention of de-escalating the violence. The political motive of the attacks can also be derived from the targets of the rioters. Although many rioters looted local supermarkets and tobacco stores, hospitals and train stations were also attacked. In the town of Urk, protesters went as far as to burn a COVID-19 test location to the ground. According to Dutch sociologists, attacking these governmental institutions symbolises a direct and violent attack against the Dutch government.

The question arises then, do these political riots represent the beginning of the end for the Dutch culture of tolerance and compromise? Is the ‘poldermodel’ on its way out? Any answer cannot realistically be garnered from one act of deviancy, as it would be wrong to dismiss years of faith in these norms and values. However, it might be time for the Dutch to look in the mirror and recognise that the perception of Dutch tolerance does not match reality. In short, the Dutch are not as tolerant as they always claim to be.

The Dutch can prevent their precious value of tolerance from going downhill. To do so, the deeper sociological causes of the riots must be comprehended. Shortly after the riots occurred, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte referred to the rioters as ‘scum’ that need to be locked away, preferring to contain the problem rather than discuss the causes of it. Of course, those who committed crimes need to face justice. However, according to sociological experts, Covid-19 only acted as the catalyst of the riots. They believe a research committee should investigate the real motivations, which are likely to be much more complex, systemic, and diverse. Neglecting the underlying causes of the rioters’ behaviour will not help to prevent future riots. Therefore, the Dutch need to continue ‘poldering’ with those they disagree with to prevent people from abandoning dialogue and resorting to violent forms of protest. The poldermodel, just like the polders themselves, is essential to Dutch society. Without polders, the country would not exist.

The failings of Regionalism: SAARC and its struggle to thrive.

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Following the growing tensions between India and Pakistan, the 2014 summit was the last where all member states participated. Photo Credit: President Mahinda Rajapaksa, licensed with CC BY-NC 2.0.

The ongoing COVID crisis has exacerbated the disparity between states whilst also creating a new opportunity for regional cooperation. In South Asia, a region characterized by political disharmony and strategic schism, regionalism, though entrenched, hasn’t been able to prosper as possibilities of further integration and cooperation look uncertain.

Regional cooperation and interaction have become an important feature of the international order. The increasingly globalised and liberalised world that calls for interaction between all states has witnessed a regional reaction with states striving to keep their regional linkages intact. In South Asia, this need for interconnectedness has long been recognised and multiple attempts to create a spirit of pan-Asian cooperation were championed in various conferences like the Asian Relations Conference and Bandung Conference. However, these attempts at cooperation and integration failed as newly independent countries began to prioritise national security and development over regional cooperation. Subsequently, this led to more sub-regional cooperation as this offered a more viable and manageable option for the newly independent states.

The formation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985, was a regionalist project aimed at promoting cohesion in the South Asian region. With, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Maldives as founding members, and Afghanistan joining in 2007, SAARC was the first of its kind in the region. It was established with the aim of promoting social cohesion, economic and cultural cooperation, as well as encouraging self-reliance, mutual assurance and collaboration within the region.

South Asia is a critical geostrategic area bordered by China, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, with the nations bound together by ‘geographical proximity’ over cultural or economic proximity. Cooperation between the nations in South Asia is vital to ensure holistic development in the region as large disparities remain between states.

However, over recent years, SAARC has been at stalemate and has struggled to make progress as compared with other regional organisations. Owing to a long history of colonialism and disjointed power structures in the area, attempts at region building haven’t yielded positive outcomes. The competing power struggles that emerged after the end of colonialism and the violent cartographies which arbitrarily demarcated nascent states created significant international tensions, with each nation concerned about the expansionism of the others.

One of the many reasons that hinders multilateral cooperation between South Asian nations is that the region is comprised of unequal partners. Identified as one of the poorest, most socially complex and underdeveloped areas in terms of trained human resources the region struggles to maintain cohesion and cooperation. Of the many nations, India has emerged as a prominent power in the region whilst most countries like Nepal still fall under the rubric of “less developed country”. The rise of India as a prominent global power has also exacerbated tensions within the region creating an apprehensive atmosphere about its influence in South Asia.

Furthermore, many of the participating SAARC nations have competing power interests and are deadlocked in geopolitical stalemate. The most prominent nations, India and Pakistan have been in a protracted state of pseudo-conflict over border disputes since their inception. Similarly, there exists a similar border issue with Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as India and Nepal. The cartographic issues coupled with insurgencies and cross-border conflicts often exacerbate the differences between the countries.

Various attempts at regional economic cooperation have also suffered at the behest of different economic policies and power relations between the countries. In 2004, the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) agreement was signed with the aim of establishing a free-trade area amongst the countries by 2016 to facilitate holistic economic development. However, this initiative failed due to the hostile relationship between India and Pakistan. The strategic rivalry between the countries has led to the breakdown of multiple initiatives.

In 2017, India launched a satellite to ensure better communication in the South Asian region and all members of the SAARC welcomed it though Pakistan refrained from taking part in the venture. Events and agreements like these promoting cooperation between regional nations have often been stymied by political manoeuvring leaving little chance for mutually advantageous cooperation.

The increasing anxiety between the states in the region has led to more sub-regional cooperation activities becoming viable options for smaller nations. These have led to the formation of organisations like Bangladesh, Bhutan India Nepal Initiative (BBIN) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) for the coordination of trade and economic agreements. Similarly, as the hegemon in the region, India continues to pursue a strategy of reaching out to broader cooperative organisations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to further its growth strategy, thereby antagonising smaller South Asian regional players who may feel left behind.

Owing to the asymmetric and divided nations left by colonial rule, the South Asian region still struggles to create a cooperative environment in the region. The disintegrated cooperation between the nations coupled with their divergent political interests in the region will only create a stalemate that will disrupt chances of regional development and cooperation. It is essential that all member states work towards tackling their competing political interests and differences to ensure the revival of regionalism in South Asia.

Challenges to the Rule of Law in Times of Crisis Series: Peace in the Time of Pandemic 2 - A Clash of Rights and Security

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Photo by Martin Sanchez on Unsplash

This article is part of our series on Challenges to the Rule of Law in Times of Crisis. Read the series introduction at this link.

Likely since the creation of the concept of human rights, and certainly in its modern understanding that emerged after the devastation of World War II, protection of human rights has continuously found itself at odds with the security priorities that many scholars would argue are at the centre of what a state is, and what underlies the social contract between citizen and government. Namely, it is easier to ensure strong security for the citizens of a state if they are permitted fewer freedoms, but these freedoms are foundational to many modern – and in particular liberal democratic – states. The COVID-19 pandemic has done much more than complicate our personal and professional lives; it has had a profound impact on our identity as members of a society, and on the social fabric that keeps communities together, precisely because it has intensified this clash of rights and security.

The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), with research support from the UN Special Rapporteur Fionnuala Ní Aoláin[1], have developed the COVID-19 Civic Freedom Tracker. This tracker notes that states of exception, or states of emergency, have been applied in 107 countries due to the pandemic, while 56 countries have enacted measures that affect freedom of expression, 139 countries have enacted measures that affect freedom of assembly, and 59 countries have enacted measures that affect privacy. 31 countries have measures formally enhancing militarization, including through enforcement of public health measures, while many others are de facto using their militaries or increasingly militarized police, in many places hired as a surge force, to enforce measures and in some places to assist with vaccine distribution logistics.

Indeed, in its COVID-19 Guidelines for Law Enforcement, INTERPOL notes not only the significant role of the police in managing this pandemic and addressing a possible increase in criminality, but also highlights the importance of ensuring “the centrality of human rights in shaping the pandemic response” for law enforcement. It notes that the pandemic has led to the adoption and use of “exceptional measures limiting or suspending the full and effective exercise of certain fundamental human rights”, among these freedom of movement and freedom of peaceful assembly. These exceptional measures, according to INTERPOL, are purely taken for the purpose of emergency response, and protecting societal health and well-being.

However, the reality that is emerging is a more threatening one to many societies. Ní Aoláin explains the risk of this intensified securitization and of a generalized adoption of these exceptional measures: that “states and security sector institutions will find emergency powers attractive because they offer shortcuts, and that such powers will, therefore, tend to persist and become permanent.” UN Secretary General António Guterres in fact calls this a “pandemic of human rights abuses”. To be clear, these rights are not a question of the staggering egotism of the anti-mask movement. This is a question of gender equality, in which women are leaving the workforce in huge numbers compared to men, primarily due to lack of support for child care, and which has seen domestic violence against women and girls skyrocket. This is a question of income inequality and poverty, not least as evidenced by vaccine distribution, in which just “10 countries have administered more than 75% of all Covid-19 vaccines. Meanwhile, more than 130 countries have not received a single dose.” (Guterres, as of February 2021) – an inequality that could prolong both the pandemic as well as economic recovery. And, critically, “the virus has been used as a pretext in many countries to crush dissent, criminalise freedoms and silence reporting” (Guterres), all in the name of security. Human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, NGO workers, activists, and even medical professionals “have been detained, prosecuted and subjected to intimidation and surveillance for criticising government responses to the pandemic. Pandemic-related restrictions have been used to subvert electoral processes and weaken opposition voices.” (Guterres)

Of course, to ensure the security – in this case, the health, or human security – of citizens, and to manage public health resources and capacity, some restrictive measures are inevitable to mitigate the risk and potential damage of this pandemic. Even under normal circumstances, human rights necessarily are subject to certain lawful restrictions, in order to respect the rights of others, and public order and health more generally. However, in this context of information manipulation, suppressed freedoms, and the primacy of security, it should perhaps be of no surprise that what has also emerged is increased resistance: protests around key political and social issues have emerged globally and with great force and intensity during a time when a majority of governments are trying to limit, among other rights, freedom of assembly. Some of these protests relate to inequalities arising from the pandemic itself – as King’s College London Professor Funmi Olonisakin argues, in countries where people have experienced great inequality as a result of COVID-19, vocal dissent is “on the rise, and it creates a transnational pattern.” In addition, protests have also emerged in many countries protesting prolonged COVID-19 movement restrictions or pandemic mismanagement.

But other protests, that in many cases are powerful and far-reaching, concern fundamental social and political issues that have crystallised or reached a peak in tension during the pandemic: the Black Lives Matter movement in the U.S., pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong; farmer protests in India; protests against violence against women and sexual assault in Spain, Chile, and the UK; Lebanon’s protests responding to compounding crises; the popular struggle against the military coup in Myanmar; protests against political instability in Peru. Across the world, these all have a key characteristic in common – resistance against violent abuse of power and suppression of freedoms. Even if the pandemic did not start these movements, they have been intensified during this time. This finding is supported by ACLED[2]’s special coverage of COVID-19 Disorder, which has seen an overall increase in demonstrations in 2020 relative to the previous year, and found that “overall, state repression increased around the world” due to the pandemic.

In parallel, others are capitalizing on the social fragmentation resulting from the socio-political issues and inequalities described above – as seen during the Capitol riots on 6 January, where “extremists – including white supremacists and neo-Nazis – have exploited the pandemic to boost their ranks through social polarisation and political and cultural manipulation” (Guterres). All the while, countries like Germany, Argentina, Canada, and Portugal have encouraged (anonymous) citizen denunciation of those breaking COVID-19 restrictions, which will do nothing to improve social and community relations. Conflicts globally have barely if at all been affected, according to the International Crisis Group. At the domestic level, however, “The pandemic has tended to aggravate precisely the factors that were feeding discontent beforehand. In many countries, inequality is more extreme than ever. Living costs are rising. Public resources are scarcer. Middle classes are squeezed. Opportunities for young people, who’ve often sacrificed the most during lockdowns, are fewer. It’s easy to see populists thriving and storms ahead” (ICG). Indeed, Robert Malley, the former President of ICG and current U.S. Envoy to Iran, argues that “if the benefits of the recovery are not more equitably spread out, we are going to go into a much darker period yet”. He warns that if leaders do not try to understand the reasons for the emergence of populism, nativism, and xenophobia that intensified prior to the pandemic, and if recovery strategies do not take these factors into account, then these are going to return “with even greater intensity” in the post-pandemic world. This would present a great threat not just to political orders, but to social ones as well.

And so, while many are already bracing for the expected global economic downturn that may follow the pandemic, we should also be concerned about our state-society relations and, perhaps inevitably, prepare for a renegotiation of our social contract between citizen and government. As Olonisakin argues, the disruption created by COVID is a necessary and welcome opportunity for some leaders, countries, and societies to “rethink their relationships”. The social fabric of many states has been damaged, not just through social isolation and rising discontent, and those that would capitalize upon that polarization, but also through a state-supported fostering of distrust between citizens during this time. In the global prioritization of security during the pandemic, fundamental human rights have been strained, and the way that we view social contact and relationships have been radically altered as we have experienced what Federica Mogherini calls “unforeseeable circumstances, unimaginable for any of us just one year ago.” We must work to ensure that these will not cause lasting damage to the foundation of liberal democratic societies, or cause a slide back to greater repression in places where any gains in rights have been fraught and hard-won. This is especially true as we can now expect new, deadlier pandemics with greater frequency, if significant global environmental and economic reforms, reflecting more equitable economic priorities, are not urgently carried out.

[1] Fionnuala Ní Aoláin’s full title is UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism

[2] ACLED is The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project