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How Covid-19 kills debate in Germany

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Demonstrations against the pandemic restrictions take place regularly in Germany. Photo Credit: Leonhard Lenz, licensed under Creative Commons.

Germany has a historically sensitive relationship to the freedom of the individual and the Grundgesetz, its constitution, granting the freedom of speech. The terror of the Third Reich, and the GDR (German Democratic Republic )has left scars on the people living in Germany today. Now, the Covid-19 crisis and the restrictive change of public life triggered the fear of a restriction of personal freedom and speech for some again.

Right from the start of the pandemic, disagreement with the measurements taken by the government pushed the people onto the streets. The protests, however, are heterogenic: they not only attract concerned citizens but anti-vaxxer and esoterics, and they are also a haven for conspiracy theorists and representatives of the far-right and far-left scenes.

The German public and authorities are especially worried about the presence of some well-known right-extremist. While this is a legitimate reason to worry about, the protests during the pandemic and their perception in the public are a devastating symptom of change of German culture of debate, which has worsened over the last years. In times of crisis, the ground for discussion and consensus among people seems to diminish even more. Even though the majority of the German population had supported the restrictions or had even argued for their tougher enforcement, the voices shouting that politicians robbed the citizens of their constitutional rights are loud and picked up by the media. The dissent about the Covid-19 restrictions has made someone of another opinion your enemy.

The extreme division of opinion, the shrinking of a common ground that would allow a debate, is not a new phenomenon – neither in Western democracies nor in Germany. In the federal republic, however, it can be connected to some key challenges Germany had to tackle in the last ten years. Above all is the refugee crisis in Europe: Around one million refugees sought asylum in Germany in 2015. Chancellor Angela Merkel decided to admit them, and her slogan “we can do this” became famous – for some as a motivational quote, while for others as a misjudgment of reality. In the German public, there was no wider range of opinion anymore; one either clearly supported Merkels’ politics or not. It was during this time that the Alternative for Germany party (AfD) established itself as right-wing force with populistic slogans and gained great support among the voters.

The party contributed to a new discourse that divides society deeply now: A debate about the question to what extend the usage of so-called politically correct terms was a limitation of the freedom of expression; especially with regard to foreigners coming to Germany but also regarding gendering nouns in the German language. The AfD and their supporters claim that there are some things you are ‘not allowed to say any more’ due to a growing left- and green ideological thinking in society.

However, one could identify the transformation of what is said and socially accepted as a sign of a progressive society – be it through gendering nouns in the German language or the exclusion of vocabulary that is discriminatory to foreigners. But the representatives of the right-wing see this development of language as proof of the decline of their democratic right to speak freely. By negating and criticizing this development, they pushed the norms of what can be said in public further to the right instead. Consequently, this is met with heavy criticism in and outside the Bundestag. Even though this is the only right reaction to a party undermining democracies (or put differently: You can not argue with right-wing extremists) the consequence of the political landscape changing the way of dialogue in the public sphere shouldn’t be underestimated in its effects on our culture of debate which slowly seems to diminish.

This development has reached another peak with regard to the protests during the pandemic. Because of the instrumentalisation of the protests by right-wing representatives who had opposed all restrictions with all means possible, the protests quickly lost their former purpose of criticizing the political measures taken against the pandemic. The people who wanted to make use of their democratic right of protesting and criticizing the government were quickly made allies to right-wing tendencies by the public. The ground on which some express their concerns regarding the restrictive measures by the government is shared with right-wing extremists. A moral dilemma exists here: every critique seems to be a taunt working at the front of healthcare, or potentially supports tendencies that want to ‘delegitimize the state’. On the other hand, the ones who are supporting the government are blamed to be ‘Schlafschafe’ (‘sleeping sheep’) who believed anything by the government critics.

This generalization has shrunken the room for critique within society has shrunk. Just recently this dilemma reached a new level of escalation. 53 German actors released videos in which they satirically criticized the Covid-19 restrictions, Angela Merkel, and the work of the press during the pandemic. Their contributions differed in their level of critique: while some addressed the media, others wanted to raise attention to the devastating economic situation of the art and entertainment scene. Nevertheless, the backlash was intense. The media raged – within hours the videos were retweeted by representatives of the far-right and eventually labeled as members of the ‘Querdenker’-movement which is under observation by the German Intelligence service due to its right-wing extremist tendencies. While some of the actors could be proven to be close to the movement, others could not. Some have tried to distance themselves from the statements made, part of their reputation seems lost. Should they have known better?

The heated discussion shows how differentiated and framed an opinion must be in order to not be torn apart.  The interaction between the two camps has lost common ground in terms of opinion and behavior: Online hate speech and extreme polarization in social media are at the core of the discussion fueling its heating further.

What is granted by constitutional law – the freedom of speech – does not necessarily apply to the climate in society. This development entails a profound issue: when extremist views within society are canceled, it has the side-effect that similar, but less extreme views are silenced too. The scale of opinion is thus shrunken. People are more careful about what they say – even if it is just a more conservative or more liberal viewpoint – awaiting to be excluded from some debates. The relation between the freedom of speech, the rise of sensitivity within society for its protection, and the progressive change of norms within language is tense.

The debate about the correct political action taken in the Covid-19 crisis has followed a curve of escalation, making it more about the fundamental allocation to the right or left political camp than about the factual discussion of pandemic necessity. The corona crisis in Germany has damaged the culture of debate in Germany even more. With five more state elections happening this year and the retirement of longstanding chancellor Merkel in September, the federal election will be a game-changer. If the outcome of the elections or the way of life in post-pandemic times will change the culture of debate in Germany is not clear but full of hope.

The German Military: Why So Little Bang, For So Much Buck?

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by Michael Trinkwalder

The Kampfpanzer Leopard 2 A5 of the German Army (Image source: Wikimedia)

In its current state, the German Armed Forces, or the Bundeswehr, are neither “structurally capable nor equipped” for the military defence of the NATO alliance. This is the damning verdict of the former German Parliamentary Commissioner of the Armed Forces Hans-Peter Bartels. In recent years, stories about the Bundeswehr’s poor level of readiness have become an all too familiar tale, with at times none of the country’s submarines being operational or Germany having only enough ammunition to arm just four of its Eurofighter aircraft, to name just some of the more egregious examples. Consequently, the current state of the German Armed Forces has not unjustifiably been characterised as “nothing flies, nothing floats, and nothing runs.” What is to blame for the embarrassing state of the German Bundeswehr?

A Funding Problem or an Efficiency Problem?

Internationally, coverage of this issue has mostly focused on Germany’s continued failure to reach the NATO military spending target of two per cent (as measured against the country’s GDP) – and the severe strain this has put on the German-American relationship. However, with the help of COVID-19, Germany’s 2020 defense budget of about €50.4 billion ($55,43 billion) is set to rise to 1.58 percent of its GDP. Even back in 2019 at just 1.36 percent of its GDP, Germany’s military budget exceeded that of every single member of NATO except the United Kingdom and the United States. Yet, for instance, France maintains a larger military, with thousands of troops deployed abroad, a nuclear strike force, etc. – with a defence budget that was €3 billion ($3.5 billion) lower than the German one. So, why does the German military get so little value for its money?

Accordingly, the German military does not just have a funding problem, it has an efficiency problem, with defense reforms and their lack of political direction often being the source rather than the remedy of the Bundeswehr’s problems. Since virtually all of these reforms were aimed at saving cost, with little thought being directed towards the retention of conventional warfighting capabilities. Thus, after reunification, military functions were privatised, conscription was suspended and the Bundeswehr was gradually reduced to its current strength of fewer than 185,000 soldiers.  The German military went from being solely focused on territorial and alliance defence towards an almost exclusive focus on out-of-area missions in Afghanistan, Mali, Iraq, or Syria. Arguably, it was only the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s increasingly belligerent behavior that prevented further cuts. Additionally, the post of the Minister of Defense is infamous for being a graveyard for promising political careers. Indeed, in the last two decades, only a single defense minister has managed to spend more than a single term on the aptly named ‘ejection seat.’ Therefore, those opposed to change could simply wait-out any serious reform attempt.

Bureaucracy Strangling Everything and Everyone?

However, Germany’s military efficiency problem goes beyond half-baked reforms or a frequently changing political leadership. In his recent reports to parliament, Commissioner Bartels blames a culture of overregulation within the Bundeswehr for smothering “everything and everyone” in thousands of self-imposed regulations and rules. It is not as if armament projects of other militaries weren’t also prone to delays and cost overruns, but in Germany the Bundeswehr’s culture of overregulation is compounded by a lack of qualified personnel in its procurement agency the BAAINBw.

As a result, virtually none of Germany’s military lighthouse projects, like the armored personnel carrier Puma, the A400M transport aircraft, or the F125 frigates were completed in time or on budget. Even routine repairs and maintenance is often impossible due to a lack of stored spare parts and the byzantine procurement process. Leading to serious technical problems down the line and forcing soldiers to cannibalize other weapon systems for parts. In fact, the Ministry of Defense estimates that it will take until 2031 to fully equip all of its soldiers – a prediction that is already looking increasingly shaky. Particularly, since the Bundeswehr might be heading for a new round of major budget cuts – courtesy of the COVID-19 recession.

Cause for Optimism?

Nonetheless, there is some reason for optimism, in April a new law went into effect aimed at facilitating the procurement of new equipment. The current Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer has been unwavering in her calls for Germany to meet the two per cent spending commitment – even if only by the year 2031. Arguably just as important is her announcement of a major upcoming reform of military procurement and maintenance that could among other things decentralize parts of the procurement process and return certain maintenance and repair capacities to the different armed services. Additionally, the German military has also distinguished itself in the current health crisis, which could spare the Bundeswehr from bearing the brunt of the coming COVID-19 budget bust-up.

Because of the lengthy time-frame of its military reforms, the German military will have to tackle its efficiency as well as its spending problem simultaneously. Considering, Trump’s plans to withdraw almost 10,000 soldiers from the country, Berlin better figure out how fast.  Germany and NATO can no longer afford a Bundeswehr that is at best only capable of “conditional operationality.”

 

Disclaimer: The author was a civilian employee of the German Armed Forces. The views expressed in the article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the German Armed Forces, the German Government, or the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

Michael Trinkwalder is the 2020 Young Professionals in Foreign Policy Europe Fellow; he is a Research Assistant at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, where he focuses on EU-NATO cooperation, defense innovation, and the implications of the rise of China. He holds an M.A. in International Relations from the KU Eichstätt-Ingolstadt and a B.A. in International Business Studies from the FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg. You can follow him on Twitter: @m_trinkwalder 

 

 

The Role of History in the British and German Army Officer Corps: Training, Attitudes and Identity

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By Dr Sarah Katharina Kayß

 

German soldier of the Gebirgsjägerbataillon 232 (Credit Image: Bundeswehr / Andrea Bienert)

 

“Each nation steps into the future carrying the heritage of its own past. This past leaves its mark on the development of society, and on the way people think, including the way the military staff thinks.”

(Vladimir Rukavishnikov 2007, 24)

 

The Study – the book

In the past few years (during my work at the War Studies Department at King’s College London) I have concerned myself with the significance of history perceptions in the British and German forces. The following article gives you a glimpse insight of the results of the research undertaken and what to expect in my book which was just published by Routledge. The main purpose of my study was to draw attention to under-researched and yet extremely important aspects in military studies, namely: the detection of professional identity in the British and German forces and the role of history within the enlistment process of aspiring officers in both countries. Modern-day Britain and Germany are Western liberal democracies whose armed forces, (which are both NATO members and under civilian control,) recruit professional soldiers and officers for territorial defence and foreign deployment. Despite many cultural similarities, British and German societal perceptions towards their military pasts seem to differ substantially.

History is essential if you want to understand the power of traditions and the building up of the national image and what history can do in a nation’s psyche.

[British officer cadet]

 

The Argument

In the book I argue that officers have a strong relationship with the history of their country because the history of their country is identical to the history of their employer. Consequently, soldiers and officers are inevitably more connected to the history of their country than other professional groups. The data results clearly show that the officer cadets’ decision-making was influenced by their interpretation of their professional role, which in turn was heavily dependent on their understanding of history and alleged lessons learned from the past. The study therefore provides insights into the British and German army officer cadets’ understanding of the world that they were surrounded with, and illustrates how far their understanding of history was influenced by the culture in which they grew up in.

I think history was a huge part of my motivation. Obviously, (…) the whole history of Britain is completely intertwined with its armed forces’ history (…) So it connects to pride joining the British Army, because you are linked towards a history that civilians wouldn’t be.

[British officer cadet]

 

Data and identity studies

The formation of identity, particularly in the field of work identity, has generated a great deal of interest (e.g. Vest 2012; Ben-Shalom and Benbenisty 2016; Franke 2000; Broesder et al. 2014; Pratt et al. 2006; Schott et al. 2016), yet still very little is known about the professional identity formation of army personnel in general and that of officers in particular. I therefore designed a questionnaire covering topics such as the cadets’ motivation to enlist, attitudes towards war and combat, army training and perceptions about the officer profession in the past, present and future. In Britain, 481 British officer cadets who started their training at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 2014 completed the survey. Additionally, 49 of those cadets were interviewed. In Germany, 274 cadets who were going through basic officer training at the Officer School of the Army in Dresden (to proceed with a degree course in Munich or Hamburg) in 2014 filled out the questionnaire. Fifty-four of those cadets were also interviewed.

 

Significance and innovation

Detecting the professional identity of young cadets is important for a multitude of reasons. First and foremost, the cadets’ awareness of their future profession provides information about ideals which the cadets connected to the officer profession. Although not all of those ideals necessarily correspond with reality, they are insights into what the cadets’ expected from their future profession (comp. Wiik 2010: 58; Remley and Herlihy 2005: 22).

The study demonstrates that developing an understanding of how young British and German officers perceive their profession and the world around them provide some indicators on how those officers might act in the future. Additionally, in 1993, Dandeker and Strachan (282-283) requested more research into what army recruits think about the armed forces, their social characteristics and their perceptions of their role within the army as a way of optimising recruitment methods and gaining an overall understanding of future military leaders’ ways of perceiving the world. My book answers this request in two ways: First, it offers insight into the British and German officer cadets’ thinking by analysing their professional identity, and second, it adds a new incentive for enlistment to the field of recruitment studies by introducing history-oriented reasons for enlistment.

As a result of increased multinational military operations after 1990, the British and German armies began working side by side. An intercultural understanding of future officers’ thinking, perceptions and attitudes are undoubtedly vital for effective, functional and successful cooperation in the years to come. It is important to keep in mind that the cadets are not isolated from their respective societies. Consequently, their way of dealing with the past by either approving or rejecting common history narratives within their culture is also likely to be shared with civilian society.

 

The Contents

The overall analysis undertaken in the book enables a rigorous understanding of the preconditions for officer enlistment in Britain and Germany. The examination of the cadets’ motivation to enlist focuses in particular on how cadets have aligned their knowledge of the past with their occupational decision-making. A short introduction into the history of the British and German Army until 2014 and the officer training courses in Britain and Germany at the beginning of the book already demonstrate that many differences go back to a different dealing with the shadows of the past.

The book also deals with the cadets’ social and educational background and points out how different experiences in history have not only led to different military systems in Britain and Germany, but also to different external stimuli which influenced the cadets’ decision to enlist. The sections on the British cadets discuss the impact of heritage and education, linkages between the social and educational background of the cadets and their regimental allocations, preconditioning through funding or cadet training (at British schools and universities) and the cadets’ professional perceptions about the officer profession. The sections on German cadets focus on compulsory and voluntary military service and differences between officer cadets which go back to regimental allocations, their attitudes towards the degree course integrated into the officer training and their professional outlook towards a career in the military. Additionally, the social composition of the British and German army officer corps is contrasted followed by a discussion about whether different training systems in Britain and Germany have led to a certain type of officer. The data results clearly oppose popular statements made by prominent researchers of the military sphere such as Karl Haltiner’s (2003) argument that the British and German (Spartans vs. Athenians) forces employ a different type of soldier as a result of the different army training systems to name just one example.

 

Some results

Along with the two world wars, the British Empire and German reunification stood at the centre of the British and German cadets’ historical awareness. A study from the Swedish National Defence College concluded that historical analogies used by young people usually refer to recent events, or to events that have had a great psychological impact on the individual or the society to which he or she belongs (Brändström et al. 2004: 208). Both the British Empire for the British cadets and German reunification for the German cadets fell into those categories. Although those events vary significantly, they helped a vast majority of the British and German cadets to develop a positive outlook towards history.

The results from the empirical data analysis reveal that the cadets’ perceptions about the British and German armies were incorporated as a part of their professional identity to motivate them in the present by either acknowledging or rejecting what preceding officers in both armies have done. This comparison highlighted many factors which are responsible for most differences between the British and German cadets’ outlook towards their profession. One of those factors was the different dealing with lessons learned from the past and its impact on the military systems in the two countries. Considering that the majority of the British and German cadets were heavily influenced by their perceptions of history – not only in regards to their initial interest in the military and a number of value-related incentives for enlistment, but also in regards to their very decision to serve their countries in the armed forces – clearly demonstrates that history-oriented reasons for enlistment should not take a backseat in future recruitment research.

The study’s results stress that soldiering is not just what one does, but who one is: the professional role identity of the British and German cadets can therefore be seen as a basis from which they will act and respond to their environment during missions in the future (Broesder et al 2014: 522). The officer corps has always been a vital component in the armed forces as it determines the military mind-set and upholds and revises the military ethos (Caforio 2006: 255). Since the surveyed and interviewed cadets are most likely going to impact on all-encompassing developments in all sectors in the British and German armies in the near future, my study has also acted as research on the current military culture in Britain and Germany.

It is important to recognise that the officer intake of 2014 will influence following generations of officer cadets, because it seems likely that the new cadets will identify with the 2014 intake’s thinking more than with the thinking of the older generations. Consequently, the British and German cadets who started their training in 2014 will socialise future generations of officers and transmit their traditions and perceptions of history to them.

Multilateralism and interoperability are deeply engrained in NATO doctrine and both can only function if the forces who work together have at least a basic understanding of each other (comp. Hedlund 2017). Understanding each other on a deeper level will allow officers and soldiers to successfully adapt to external forces and difficulties in their missions to come. The book does therefore not only enable a rigorous understanding of British and German military history and its impact on the training and attitudes of officers in Britain and Germany, it also provides key knowledge for intercultural competence which will be key in the missions to come.

 

Kayß received her PhD at the War Studies Department at King’s College London. For her large-scale study, she conducted more than a hundred interviews and surveyed almost 900 British and German Army Officer Cadets between 2014 – 2015. All research results can be found in her book “Identity, Motivation and Memory: The Role of History in the British and German forces” which has just been published by Routledge (2018): https://www.routledge.com/Identity-Motivation-and-Memory-The-Role-of-History-in-the-British-and/Kayss/p/book/9781138589155. Please feel free to contact Sarah if you require further information about the study and the book at academia.edu: http://kcl.academia.edu/SarahKatharinaKay%C3%9F

Image Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/bundeswehrfoto/22202153424

Literature

 

U. Ben-Shalom; Y. Benbenisty, ‘ Coping Styles and Combat Motivation During Operations: An IDF Case Study’, in Armed Forces & Society 42:4 (2016), 655-674

Brändström, A.; Bynander, F. and ’t Hart, P. (2004): “Governing by looking back: historical analogies and crisis management” in Public Administration 82:1, 191–210.

Broesder, W.A.; Op den Buijs, T.P.; Vogelaar, L.W.; Euwema, M.C. (2014): “Can Soldiers Combine Sword and Ploughshares? The Construction of the Warrior-Peacekeeper Role Identity Survey (WPRIS)” in Armed Forces & Society 41:3, 519-540.

Caforio, G. (2006): “Military Officer Education” in Caforio, G. (ed.), Handbook of the Sociology of the Military. New York: Springer, 255-278.

Dandeker and Strachan 1993 | C. Dandeker; A. Strachan, ‘Soldier Recruitment to the British Army, A Spartial and Social Methodology for Analysis and Monitoring’, in Armed Forces & Society 19:2 (1993), 279-290.

V. C. Franke, ‘Duty, Honor, Country: The Social Identity of West Point Cadets’, in Armed Forces & Society 26:2 (2000), 175-202.

Haltiner, K.W. (2003): „Spartaner oder Athener? Die europäische Offiziersberufsausbildung vor neuen Herausforderungen“ in Collmer, S.; Kümmel, G. (eds): Soldat, Militär, Politik, Gesellschaft, Facetten militärbezogener sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 35-48.

Hedlung, E. (2017): ‘Team Learning and Leadership in Multinational Military Staff Exercises” in Armed Forces & Society 43:3, 459-477.

Kayss, S.K. (2018): Identity, Motivation and Memory: The Role of History in the British and German forces. Oxon/New York: Routledge.

M. G. Pratt; K. W. Rockmann; J. B. Kaufmann, ‘Constructing Professional Identity: the Role of Work and Identity learning Cycles in the Customization of Identity among medical residents’, in Academy of Management Journal 49:2 (2006), 235-262.

Remley and Herlihy 2005 | T. P. Remley; B. Herlihy, Ethical, Legal and Professional Issues in Counseling (New Jersey: Pearson, 2005).

Rukavishnikov, V. (2007): “Challenges of the twenty-first, social science and strategic thinking” in Caforio, G. (ed.): Social Science and the Military, An Interdisciplinary Overview. Oxon: Routledge, 23-45.

C. Schott; D. D. van Kleef; T. P. S. Steen, ‘The combined impact of professional role identity and public service motivation on decision-making in dilemma situations’, in International Review of Administrative Sciences 0 (2016), http://ras.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/04/18/0020852315599589.full.pdf+html?hwshib2=authn%3A1476623981%3A20161015%253A8a3b555a-c418-4f27-8b9d-62aeed75e605%3A0%3A0%3A0%3Ai5de6XBZCZkejVO95MTyKQ%3D%3D (accessed on 15 Oct 2016).

E.g. B. M. Vest, ‘Citizen, Soldier, or Citizen-Soldier? Negotiating Identity in the US National Guard’, in Armed Forces & Society 39:4 (2012), 602-627.

J. Wiik, Journalism in Transition: The Professional Identity of Swedish Journalists, PhD thesis submitted to the Department of Journalism, Media and Communication at the University of Gothenburg 2010.

Grand Coalition Deal: What to Expect from Germany’s next Government in Foreign and Security Policy

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By Felix Manig

German soldier part of the UN-led MINUSMA mission in Mali (Credit image: Michael Kappeler/dpa)

Five months after the September 2017 elections, the ‘grand coalition’ deal between Angela Merkel’s centre-right CDU, her sister-party CSU and the centre-left Social Democrats (SPD) is set to end unprecedented political stalemate in Germany. While the deal hinges on a final approval by the 460,000 members of the SPD base in early March, observers are already examining the negotiation agreement for clues of what to expect from Germany’s next government. Given new geopolitical realities in Europe’s neighbourhood, uncertainty about transatlantic relations, and repeated calls for Berlin to take on a more proactive role in international affairs, what does the new proposal hold for the country’s foreign, security and defence policy? The coalition paper builds on Germany’s latest strategic military document, the so-called “White Paper” of 2016, and places a primary focus on developing an integrated approach to European foreign and security policy, increasing Germany’s commitment to multilateral alliances, and the modernization of its armed forces.

Interestingly, the current paper mandates a sense of urgency and reckoning rarely found among German lawmakers in shaping security and defence policy. (Note: A link to the full version of the coalition proposal will be provided at the end of this article.) Commitments to multilateral approaches to conflict resolution, including mechanisms at the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and along the European Union (EU)’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are recurrent German priorities which appeared in previous coalition deals. However, parties involved in the coalition discussions now describe today’s world as “less secure and less predictable”. The paper identifies geopolitical tensions, climate change, intractable civil conflicts, as well as a new form of aggressive nationalism within and outside of Europe as key threats to international peace, security, and democracy.

 

European Foreign and Security Policy 

Decision-makers in the potential coalition are promoting the clear message that Europe needs a new narrative and must take on more responsibility to ensure its own security. The proposal identifies the need for EU states to adopt an integrated approach in foreign affairs and security issues, and to strengthen existing CSDP mechanisms. The parties’ commitment to the European Defence Union, which would see joint procurement among member states and the establishment of multinational forces within the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) framework, would be an important first step in this direction. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the paper is the call for an “Army of Europeans”, an idea EU members had previously discarded due to the reluctance to cede sovereignty on defence policy.

The potential new government also plans to strengthen German capacities for strategic analysis and communication, both on the military and civilian front. This includes increased funding for the Federal Academy for Security Policy, an education and training institution under guidance of the Ministry of Defence, as well as key German security and foreign policy think tanks such as the German Council on Foreign Relations or the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Furthermore, the coalition suggests the creation of a “European Council on Global Responsibilities”, an independent institution tasked, somewhat vaguely, to promote a European signature on questions of international order.  Equally, there is room for interpretation from what is not mentioned in the paper. While Russian meddling in the US general election continues to make headlines across the Atlantic, the coalition partners appear, at least publicly, less concerned about disinformation campaigns within Germany and its periphery. This omission is likely part of Germany’s strategy to keep wires open to Moscow in order to reach an agreement on Ukraine.

 

International and European Alliances and Partnerships 

Germany continues to view multilateral initiatives and alliances as the best tools for maintaining peace and security. Accordingly, the country is set to expand its role in these forums, harnessing the German government’s forecasts for increasing federal budgetary margins for 2018-2021. These revenues are earmarked to increase defence spending and funding for conflict prevention tools, humanitarian and development aid but also cultural and educational programs abroad. Yet, while the 2016 “White Paper” pledged to reach the NATO target for defence spending of 2% of GDP, this commitment is missing in the new coalition proposal.

As part of NATO’s strategic upgrade in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Germany is also expected to host a new alliance headquarters for troop and equipment transports near the former capital of Bonn. At the UN, Germany is applying for a non-permanent seat at the Security Council for 2019/2020 and advocates for structural reform of the UN organ, which it hopes would pave the way for a permanent seat for the EU. The authors of the coalition proposal also appear willing to increase Germany’s voluntary contributions to various UN programmes, including peacekeeping and crisis management.

 

Modernizing the Bundeswehr 

Germany’s armed forces, the Bundeswehr, have long made negative headlines about equipment shortages and poor performance. Some of these stories seem borderline comical, including reports that a German battalion in 2015 found itself without weapons during a NATO exercise in Norway, leaving soldiers to holster broomsticks to their armoured vehicles. A more recent report characterised the shortfalls as “dramatically hindering combat readiness”. In reality, the Bundeswehr is in desperate need of modernization, something the next government aims to take on.

The coalition proposal highlights digitalisation as a key priority for the armed forces in the coming years. Extra funding from a higher defence budget would be used for optimizing and harmonizing existing equipment, as well as developing new innovative capacities, such as weaponized drone capabilities. To promote technological innovation, the Ministry of Defence also plans to establish an “Agency for Disruptive Innovation in Cybersecurity and Key Technologies”.

The Bundeswehr will continue participating in most existing theatres, most notably the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, as well as the UN-peacekeeping operation MINUSMA in Mali, where Germany has stationed roughly 1,000 troops respectively. Given the recent tactical defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq, the deal sees Germany likely ending its training mission and weapons supplies to the Peshmerga forces operating across the Levant.

 

A Slowly Changing German Self-Image?

It would be far-fetched to characterise the coalition proposal as a complete departure from previous government statements regarding issues of peace and security. The new government will likely continue to place a premium on diplomacy and dialogue, while at the same time strengthening existing institutions and mechanisms in foreign and security policy.

Yet whilst it may be premature to diagnose a paradigm shift in German foreign and security policy, the proposal does contain the underlying narrative of growing European responsibility and posture. This approach will inevitably mean a more active role for Germany in shaping international affairs. At the same time, as any preliminary guiding document, the paper contains vague language and promises that can be walked back on. Bearing in mind that voter support for the SPD and grand coalition have recently dropped to a record low, there is no guarantee that the rank and file members of the Social Democrats will sign off on the coalition pact in the special ballot. If the deal fails, Germany would likely have to hold new general elections, which would plunge the country into a true political crisis.

 

Click here to access the full version of the coalition proposal (in German).

 

Felix Manig is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on global governance, conflict resolution strategies, and cybersecurity. Outside of academia, he is Series Editor at Strife and writes for the Peacekeeping Project at the United Nations Association of Germany. You can follow him on Twitter @felix_manig

Image Source: https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2017/01_en/bilder/2017-01-10-bundeswehr-mali.jpg?__blob=bpaTopmeldung&v=4  

Strife Feature – Spying on Friends

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By Anastasia Beck

In the aftermath of the allegations of the US National Security Agency (NSA) spying on allied states such as Germany, and accusations from the White House concerning alleged spying by Britain’s GCHQ on Donald Trump during his presidential campaign, moral questions have arisen regarding spying on one’s allies. The gravity of these incidents was further underlined by the moral outrage around such aspects by politicians in these countries. However, are such reactions disproportionate and should countries expect this sort of behaviour due to the tumultuous nature of the international stage?

This article will discern whether it is possible to legitimise the action of spying on one’s allies by first looking at the debate through a theoretical lens, using the Just Intelligence Theory. In the corresponding sections, I investigate the nature of ‘alliances’ and follow it up with an assessment of previous examples of friendly spying that underscores how spying on one’s allies is imperative in the current international system.

As part of the Snowden leaks, a presentation slide was released depicting NSA signals intelligence operations around the world which collect data from many countries, even allies.

The Just Intelligence Theory

From a theoretical perspective, states should not spy on each other.  This view stems from the application of the Just Intelligence Theory to friendly espionage.  ‘By using the Just War tradition as a base it is possible to establish a set of just intelligence principles that can limit the harm intelligence collection causes while outlining what circumstances would be required to justify the harm caused.’[1]  The just intelligence principles include: having a just cause, a legitimate authority to sanction the activity, be conducted for the intended purpose, be proportionate, be used as a last resort, and discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets.[2]

The first principle, having a just cause to conduct intelligence, would require there to be a substantial threat to justify any harm caused through the collection of intelligence. As it is the security services’ duty to preserve and maintain national interests, a high-level threat would provide sufficient cause to conduct intelligence activities. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Britain’s secret intelligence service MI6 and USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) utilised a Soviet spy – Oleg Penkovsky – to relay vital information back to the West regarding Soviet intentions and capabilities. The near possibility of total war occurring between the two super powers justified the use of spying against the Soviet Union. However, when one examines intelligence collection on friendly states, it is hard to justify a similar action. Spying on your allies entails that there is no immediate threat, and is instead being conducted because of a general understanding of the targeted state’s nature and not because of an overt provocation.  However, the just intelligence theory, much like the just war theory, ‘is blind to general information about states and information that does not amount to identifying a concrete threat’ can therefore not be used as a justification for intelligence collection against them.[3]  To be clear, general information would surmount to a state’s religion and political position, so for example, if one were at odds with an allied state’s political system that alone does not justify spying on it.  Thus, from a theoretical perspective, spying on one’s allies does not have a just cause, thereby making the whole activity unjust.

Another principle requires sticking to the stated purposes, and not diverge for political, economic or social objectives.  And yet, spying on your allies often does not meet this condition. Once again, a government’s role is to safeguard the interests of the nation, and this would require knowledge around fiscal, foreign or defence policies of allied states. For example, one could argue that, due to rising tensions within the European Union on spending towards Greece, it would seem appropriate for Germany to keep abreast of any changes in Greek fiscal policy – which the Greeks may not wish to openly disclose.[4]

However, this theory is not a legal doctrine and few states would give up vital information on fellow states to follow such stringent rules.  Furthermore, the international system is extremely competitive and anarchic, with state’s wishing to pursue strategies in consonance with their national interests.

What needs to be therefore examined is what it means to be an ally in the international system and whether the true nature of alliances justifies the use of spying on one another.  Alliances and friendly relationships are merely ‘mutual-defence pacts’ between states that often share and adhere to particular norms and practices.[5]  But states are in competition with one another, with allies pursuing their own national interests above that of others.[6]  As a result, trust among states in the international system is fragile due to the uncertainty surrounding the possibility of opposing views of leaders of governments which may affect their positions abroad.[7] It is this uncertainty surrounding intentions, and the possibility of its translation into policy, that may motivate a state to conduct surveillance on the inner debates and workings of partner countries.  It would be foolish to blindly trust their partners. As history has illustrated, allies often diverge and defect from previously agreed upon policies.

Examining transatlantic alliances

“A friend today can become an enemy tomorrow” is a phrase which can be applied quite successfully towards past and present-day alliances. Due to the competitive nature of the international system at large, allies’ interests may diverge, therefore an understanding of such change is required.  A good example of this would be the alliance between Germany and the US.  Many would agree that these two states – both NATO members – have a warm relationship.  Spying on the Germans has had positive outcomes. In the 1970s, at the time of the Cold War, West Germany, a US ally, had discovered that the East Germans had planted a communist spy in West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s inner circle.[8]  When the infiltration was revealed, the damage was NATO-wide, with Brandt having to resign after it was found that his letters to President Nixon had been compromised.[9] However, in modern times, Germany has diverged and disagreed with certain US policies, thus undermining US interests.  In 2011, Obama expressed his desire to intervene militarily in Libya but faced opposition from German Chancellor Angela Merkel.  Had the US intervened in Libya, Merkel could have used her influence to reduce NATO’s participation in the conflict.[10]  Additionally, ‘Washington and Berlin have clashed over how to manage the eurozone crisis, the resolution of which have far-reaching implications for the German and US economies’.[11]   The NSA wiretapping Merkel’s mobile phone may seem personal and invasive, but with the power that Germany has today and its ability to undermine its allies’ interests, it would seem logical to maintain a close eye on any developments within.

Close allies for many years, Germany and the US are arguably facing a particularly frosty relationship after allegations of NSA wiretapping of the Chancellor’s personal mobile.

Another close ally of the US who has expressed outrage of being targeted by NSA spying is France, but once again this European ally has also had a tendency to diverge from US policies. Under Charles de Gaulle, France continually turned its back on the US. De Gaulle announced a ‘national independence policy’ that contained a nuclear plan pertaining to ‘a strategy of defence in all directions’ – which also seemed to suggest that the US may one day become an enemy of France.[12]  Also, the French vetoed Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community – that would later advance to become the European Union – thereby weakening its trans-Atlantic ties. ‘De Gaulle even tried to persuade the leader of Western Germany to loosen his ties with NATO, which would have undermined the US-led coalition and damaged the course of the Cold War.’[13]  Thus, as a result of such history of divergence, it would appear logical for the US to spy on its French ally due to France’s history of divergence.

The US and Britain have long been considered the closest of allies, but even these two friends have been known to spy and conduct espionage against each other.  In 1917, the British government wanted the US to join the fight during the First World War, and on Britain’s side.  ‘The British used a whole range of overt and clandestine methods to gather intelligence and run influence operations’ including one example of ‘the surveillance of a US transatlantic cable’ in which Britain’s foreign intelligence service learned of a dubious German plot to win Mexico’s allegiance by promising the country a chunk of US territory.[14]  Masking the source of the information, British foreign intelligence relayed this intelligence to Washington, thus influencing the US to join the war.  During the Cold War, America’s Venona Project ‘revealed that sensitive documents were being sent to Moscow from the British Embassy in Washington.’[15]  By spying on its closest ally, the US were able to discover that there were two British double agents, Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess, working for the Soviets and had just defected.  These agents were compromising American national security, of which its ally had not been able to detect.  Another example of friendly spying was the Suez crisis in 1956.  Former US President Eisenhower, having been left out of the strategic planning of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, decided that it was imperative to know what his allies were up to.[16]  He utilised his imagery intelligence capabilities through the use of U-2 planes which were sent over British, French and Israeli military sites in the eastern-Mediterranean and the Middle East, and the reconnaisance through the U-2s gave Eisenhower important clues about his allies’ military operations for, and execution of, their invasion of Egypt.[17] From these examples, it is clear that even the closest of allies feel the need to spy on each other for the sake of preserving their own national interests.  Maybe it isn’t so inconceivable that GCHQ wiretapped Trump Tower in the run-up to the presidential elections, considering that he would become the leader of one-half of the “special relationship”.

The relationship between Britain and America has long been considered a close one, but even these two allies have been known to spy on each other.

Spying among friends

If one is caught spying on allies, it is of course damaging. The revelations that the NSA were spying on allied leaders complicated efforts to negotiate a transatlantic trade and investment agreement and gave ‘ammunition to people who are worried about the globalization of information and who would like governments do more to protect privacy and limit governmental data-collection.’[18]  And yet, one must note that when leaders such as the French President François Hollande and Merkel come out in anger against alleged spying, they are often doing so to appease their outraged publics.[19]. The above examples show how volatile and fluctuating alliances can be, thereby justifying why spying on each other is a necessity.

Allies spy on each other so as to know of other’s intentions and changes in policy.  Whilst it may be immoral to conduct espionage on our friends, it would seem damaging not to do so.  If spying has positive outcomes and the interests of a nation, then it is reasonable for a state to pursue such measures.  In light of the above question, one can look to recent developments between Britain and Spain over the long-contested territory of Gibraltar following Britain’s decision to leave the EU.  Spain’s illegal incursion into Gibraltar’s waters is yet another sign that alliances are fragile, with high chances of states undermining another’s sovereign interests, leading to the conclusion that spying can indeed take place amongst friends.

Anastasia Beck is a postgraduate student studying Intelligence and International Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London (KCL).  Anastasia’s research areas include counter-radicalization, the role of intelligence in both peace and conflict, and open-source intelligence.

Notes:

[1] Walt, S. ‘News Flash: States Spy on Each Other’, Foreign Policy, Date accessed: 1st April 2017 http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/01/news-flash-states-spy-on-each-other/

[2] Ibid.

[3] Fisher, Max. ‘Why America spies on its allies’, http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013–present)

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Sims, J. ‘I Spy…’, available here at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-11-06/i-spy

[7] Bucknam, M. ‘The Eisenhower Administration and the Suez Crisis: Spying on Allies and Friends’ National War College (2000) pg. 3

[8] Ibid pg. 5

[9] Bellaby, R. ‘What’s the Harm: The Ethics of Intelligence Collections’ Intelligence and National Security 27:1 (2012) pg. 108

[10] Ibid pg. 109

[11] Bitton, R. ‘The Legitimacy of Spying Among Nations’ American University International Law Review 29:5 (2014) pg. 1020

[12] Stout, M. ‘Can Spying on Allies Be Right?’ War on the Rocks Date accessed 1st April 2017 https://warontherocks.com/2013/11/can-spying-on-allies-be-right/

[13] Colby, E. ‘Why We Must Spy on Our Allies’ The National Interest Date accessed: 29th March 2017 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-we-must-spy-our-allies-9493

[14] Ibid.

[15] Easley, L. ‘Spying on Allies’ Survival 56:4 (2014) pg. 143 DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2014.941545

[16] Fisher, M. ‘Why America spies on its allies (and probably should)’ The Washington Post Date accessed: 1st April 2017 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/10/29/why-america-spies-on-its-allies-and-probably-should/?utm_term=.90f50ccedacc

[17] Ibid.

[18] Sims, J. ‘I Spy…Why Allies Watch Each Other’ Foreign Affairs Date accessed: 20th March 2017 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-11-06/i-spy

[19] Ibid.

Image credits:

Image 3: https://www.pritzkermilitary.org/explore/museum/past-exhibits/american-icons-great-war/side-side-britannia/

Image 2 and Feature: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4325158/Trump-deflects-wiretap-questions-Merkel-news-conference.htm

Image 1: http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013–present)