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“Pakistanis: Divided we stand”

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by Zoha Waseem

On the evening of 25 November 2013 gathered about four hundred people at the London School of Economics facing Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s granddaughter and Benazir Bhutto’s niece, Fatima Bhutto. In the hour-long Q&A session that followed, she presented less her upcoming book, and answered questions pertaining more to the politics and current affairs of Pakistan. Bhutto also honoured the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women by briefly, but vigilantly, mentioning how unfairly Malala Yousufzai has been treated inside Pakistan and must be supported unconditionally, regardless of how certain politicians in the West may be marketing her cause for their own self-interests.

In Miss Bhutto’s words, ‘when you live in Pakistan, politics defines the way you live’. Yet for someone who herself is a product of decades of family politics of one of the leading political parties, the People’s Party of Pakistan (PPP), she treads carefully in wording her political alignment, advocating the right to support people over parties. She was also, like many Pakistanis, weary of defining what the role of the West should be in Pakistan, expressing the need for less foreign intervention, an argument in line with Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf’s chairman, Imran Khan, who has succeeded in temporarily blocking NATO supply routes to Afghanistan to protest recent drone strikes in the country. That one of these strikes took out one of the most despicable terrorists, Pakistani Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud, and that the closure of these routes economically impedes both Pakistan and Afghanistan, are apparently other matters. They were also, surprisingly, not discussed by Bhutto even though drone attacks affect most specifically the tribal areas of Waziristan that happen to be the setting of her latest literary work.

In an interview given to a local newspaper, London Evening Standard, earlier this month, Miss Bhutto presented her image of the country’s largest city with remarkable amnesia. Gravely exaggerating that one could not walk in Karachi without the likelihood of being mugged, molested or murdered, she refrained from mentioning that the creation of such an environment in the city is the by-product of the country’s turbulent political culture, a good chunk of which was designed at the hands of her own family members, where once her father, the late Mir Murtaza Bhutto (mysteriously gunned down in Karachi during Benazir’s prime ministerial term) was notorious for traversing the streets of Karachi with armed gunmen spilling out of his vehicles and creating terror.

‘Pakistan’s struggle has to be fought by Pakistanis’, argued Fatima Bhutto, ‘and be led by Pakistanis as well’. Herein lay the inherent memory loss and selective denial that have been increasingly gripping the youth of the country. The argument begs the question: which Pakistanis? As a people, tragically, Pakistanis are not unified. Not only are internal and external borders sources of major contentions defining identities, a majority of the people identify themselves on religious, or ethnic, or linguistic, or tribal lines. Post-colonial Pakistan has never really had a strong grip on nationalism. Political narratives and discourses range from religious nationalism to ethnic nationalism, further dividing themselves into sub-categories of Pashtun nationalism or Muhajir nationalism. The list goes on.

November this year falls on the month of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic calendar which also commemorates the Battle of Karbala fought in 680 AD between Imam Hussian (the Prophet Ali’s son) and the army of Yazid in present-day Iraq. The battle was to forever divide Shias and Sunnis for centuries on. Shias consider Muharram to be the month of mourning and it reflects most strongly the divides within Pakistani Muslims, some of whom resort to extreme violence against Shias. The latest Sunni-Shia clashes sparked as a result of pre-meditated rioting and bloodshed in Rawalpindi, just minutes away from the capital, Islamabad, demonstrate how quickly and vehemently some people within the country can be incited into turning on each other following religious and sectarian sermons.

So, while one can sympathise with Miss Bhutto’s bitterness towards the chaos engrained in Pakistani politics today, one finds it difficult to overlook the divisions created within societies for the sake of Pakistan’s coming into being. As a people, Pakistanis cannot even agree upon the vision Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder and first leader of Pakistan, had for the country he created. One can only assume it was not this.

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Zoha Waseem is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. You can follower her on Twitter @ZohaWaseem.

The land of hypocrisy?

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by Thomas Colley

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Both the Wikileaks spying scandal and the recent revelations of US phone-tapping of European politicians such as Angela Merkel have significantly damaged American soft power in recent weeks. In a thought-provoking article for Foreign Policy, Henry Farrell and Martha Finnemore contend that the main effect of these revelations has not been to undermine national security, but actually to reduce America’s ability to act hypocritically. The authors claim that hypocrisy is integral to both US policy and its soft power. In an effort to mitigate the controversy of their argument, the researchers claim that US hypocrisy is to some extent accidental, suggesting optimistically that American political elites do not realise how two-faced their country sometimes is. Whilst there may be some truth in this, cynics across the world would disagree. Either way, resentment of perceived American hypocrisy is actually far more widespread problem than even the above authors have realised.

For America’s detractors, a cursory reflection on US foreign policy reveals a litany of hypocrisy. Recent drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan and the human rights violations of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib provide ample evidence of unforgivable hypocrisy from a state projecting itself as the land of freedom. American involvement in the supposedly humanitarian campaign to oust the Gaddafi regime in Libya was lambasted as hypocritical since simultaneous government violence against civilians in Bahrain was ignored. Of course not even America can intervene everywhere, and it is not the only hypocritical actor on the world stage (Libya was a NATO operation). But America champions itself as the paragon of democracy, freedom and liberty. To espouse such humanitarian virtues and then uphold them selectively is to appear hypocritical.

Such are the constraints of realpolitik. Acting in one’s self-interest is only hypocritical if one pretends that one is not. Bismarck understood this, and there was no pretention in his infamously dismissive statement that the Balkans were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. One might say the same about the American view of Syria today; that over 100,000 Syrian deaths, by bullet, shell or gas, are not worth the life of one American soldier. The difference, though, is that Bismarck did not claim that he was acting as an exemplar of liberty and human rights. There are good reasons not to intervene in Syria now; although it must be remembered that tens of thousands of Syrians died long before Al-Qaeda-linked extremists predominated in opposition forces. Yet, by not intervening, it is hard to imagine how America could ever justify future interventions on humanitarian grounds having stood by and watched so many Syrians die. One is left wondering which has a more radicalising influence: resentment at American hypocrisy in failing to intervene, or anger at collateral damage and civilian casualties when they do act. To some extent American political elites are damned if they do and damned if they don’t.

The situation is the same for America’s global espionage revelations. One can only imagine the furore if the American government had failed to undertake surveillance that could lead to a major terrorist attack. Surely Al-Shabaab’s attack on the Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi spectacularly demonstrates the danger of inadequate surveillance and intelligence? Such threats make extensive surveillance inevitable, but since intelligence practitioners cannot definitively predict who is a certain threat, then it is unavoidable that in casting the intelligence net they will include the innocent. Some will argue against this Orwellian infringement of civil liberties on principle. However, the issue is not engaging in surveillance or espionage per se, it is the fact that the US has engaged in this whilst promoting itself as the epitome of individual freedom. The population of China strains under a far more oppressive espionage regime, as did many states in which the US has intervened in recent years. However, it is the powerful narrative of American moral exceptionalism that invites such vehement opposition when it appears to contradict its principles.

So where next for US foreign and domestic policy? There is no doubt that US soft power has taken a significant hit in recent weeks. As Farrell and Finnemore argue, America would do well to return to realpolitik as a guiding principle, although this might compromise the liberal values that are integral to America’s global status. American strategic communications policy emphasises being ‘first with the truth’. As the US reassesses its position in the world, more openness and honesty about its intentions would certainly help others better understand the land of freedom. Toning down its exceptionalist rhetoric would also reduce the ammunition for those seeking any reason to criticise the world’s most influential state.

The TTP and peace talks after Hakimullah Mehsud

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by Maryyum Mehmood

Pakistani forces captured Baine Baba Ziarat, the highest point in Swat valley
(courtesy of Al Jazeera English)

Following the killing of Hakimullah Mehsud, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leadership has come under the control of Mullah Fazlullah. In the past week since the decision was announced, much analysis has been made of this in both the domestic Pakistani and international press, painting a mixed picture for the future of this already tumultuous region. This piece seeks to briefly assess the effect of Fazlullah’s induction on the TTP’s internal structure, and the wider implications this will have on the Pakistani government’s security policy and ultimately, the prospects of the already long-stalled peace talks.

38 year old Fazlullah, like the overwhelming majority of his TTP comrades, has had no formal education. A one time ski-lift operator in his native Swat valley, Fazlullah was notorious for his fervent hate speeches directed towards the Pakistani state, which were broadcast around local villages through the interception of private radio stations. Fazlullah flourished under the leadership of Sufi Muhammad, founder of the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a banned outfit whose aim it was to coerce the Pakistani state into implementing a violent, tribal-brand of Sharia law to govern the whole of Pakistan. It was here that Fazlullah’s role as Sufi’s right-hand man enabled the TNSM to wreck havoc in the once quaint Valley of Swat. Soon after, this relationship was cemented with familial ties, with Fazlullah marrying one of his leader’s daughters. Fazlullah took complete control of the Swat region, in February 2009, when the Pakistani government appeased the TNSM, by signing a pact which would restrict the activities of the Taliban to Swat alone. It was not long before Fazlullah broke the established ceasefire, leading to the Pakistani army operation Rah-e Rast (Right Path) in May 2009. While countless TNSM members were captured during the operation, the near-fatally wounded Fazlulluah, managed to escape across the border to Afghanistan.

Interestingly, in the four years since the operation, Fazlullah has established strong connections inside of Afghanistan, where he has set up bases in both the Nuristan and Kunar provinces. Despite this, alarmingly, Karzai and Afghan authorities seem unconcerned and will most likely be willing to engage in talks with Fazlullah. Moreover, this shift in the locus of power from North Waziristan, Pakistan to the Eastern provinces of Afghanistan would have grave repercussions for the TTP. If he decides to hold base in Afghanistan, while it means that Fazlullah would evade the Pakistani army, the physical absence of an authoritative leader could mean the weakening and eventual collapse of the outfit as we know it. Furthermore, Fazlullah’s reign might be short-lived considering that he is the TTP’s first leader selected from outside the Mehsud tribal clan, from which the majority of its members belong. This again, might give way for inter-group rivalry and signal a split within the TTP, causing it to disperse into smaller (and weaker) factions.

Fazlullah’s propulsion into the forefront of the TTP must give the Pakistani government a sense of déjà vu. Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N led government will, like its PPP predecessor, defiantly call for the halt of drone strikes, demanding that Pakistan can defeat the TTP menace on its own accord. However, Sharif‘s government will probably be less keen to call for army action in the region of Waziristan, in a similar operation that we saw in Swat (2009). Military action seems a highly unlikely move at this moment in time, not just because of the fragile situation, but also because Sharif is not one to make such risky moves until he is driven to the brink. The events of past few weeks have certainly put a dampener on the already slow-paced ‘peace talks’ that were set to be negotiated between the Pakistan government and the TTP under Hakimullah Mehsud. Unlike the TTP’s founder Baitullah, Hakimullah hinted at the possibility of non-violent engagement, by declaring his interest in conducting peace talks with the Pakistani government, just days before his killing. With the entrance of Fazlullah, it appears that peace talks are again back to square one and the Pakistani government has been put back into an-all-too-familiar stalemate situation.

How to help? Political chaos and poaching in Zimbabwe and Malawi

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by Alister Wedderburn

This summer, just over a fortnight after his landslide victory in Zimbabwe’s presidential elections, and a matter of days after the subsequent announcement that Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC party would legally contest the results, Robert Mugabe touched down in Lilongwe. His presence, along with that of the region’s other leaders, was required at the Heads of State or Government Summit of the Southern African Development Commission (SADC). It was an opportunity for scrutiny and challenge that, inevitably, went begging. On August 8, Malawian state broadcaster MBC reported that president and incoming SADC chair Joyce Banda had wired a message of congratulations to Harare. The SADC’s own report on the Zimbabwean election, meanwhile, claimed ‘general adherence’ to its rigorously worded in-house set of guidelines, a ‘procedural and transparent’ counting process, and congratulated the country on opening ‘a new chapter in the process of consolidation of democracy in the Republic of Zimbabwe.’ Multiple Zimbabwean and South African news sources reported that the SADC attempted to persuade Tsvangirai to withdraw from the election as close to polling day as June.

Written in that confrontational, buck-balled tone seemingly universal to all the world’s outsider governments, official Zimbabwean reports trumpeted each congratulatory message received, mostly from SADC allies. They also boldly claimed the election to be a ‘crushing’ answer to ‘more than a decade of sustained assault by the western powers that [have] sought to depose [Mugabe].’ In other words: the neighbours don’t mind, so hands off. The statement given by Foreign Secretary William Hague shortly after the election was firm in timbre, but gave no indication of any alteration to the current diplomatic arrangement, a precarious but durable structure built primarily out of sanctions and fist-waving.

The current provincial elections – some of which have been cancelled – have, if anything, made matters worse, opening up factions within Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party regarding the medium-to-long term future of Zimbabwe’s ruling cabal. It is unclear what contingencies ZANU-PF have in place for the 89-year old president’s eventual death, but what the presidential election made clear (and the provincial elections are confirming) is that change is unlikely to come from without, and is likely to be messy. But how to help? Zimbabwe’s obvious present dysfunction and the weakness of the SADC’s response to Mugabe’s intransigence throws clearly into focus the fraught moral and political complexity that laces not only past but also present and future western activity in this part of the world.

A hundred and twenty miles north of Lilongwe, in Kasungu National Park, I sit atop Black Rock. It is a protrusion of some several hundred metres that offers views across a county-sized expanse of mostly forested land that is almost entirely uninhabited by people. The sun, the colour of a lit fag-end, is just coming up.

Fifteen years ago, there were two thousand elephants in the park; the number now is less than two hundred. The story is familiar: the combination of a large Asian-centric demand for ivory, local poverty and a lack of governmental police resources creates fertile conditions for poaching. Except, I am told, the Malawians almost certainly camping somewhere in the expanse beneath us are unlikely to see a huge amount: each stands to make little more than fifty dollars or so for a tusk that will most likely be sold in China for tens of thousands. Ivory seems to be making no-one very rich except for a few shadowy middlemen, and certainly offers no more than modest rewards to the locals it relies on to do the dirty work.

It’s doubtful whether an emblem for the intricacies of foreign intervention is necessary – its moral and political complexity is the whole point of much the dialogue surrounding it, after all, and symbols have a tendency not only to distort but also to simplify. But here, at 5 in the morning, one unexpectedly presents itself. On the way down from the rock I ask the Belgian ranger Richard[*] if he’s ever had cause to use the rifle he’s cradling confidently in his hands. Twice, he tells me; both times to fire at poachers. I ask about the protocol if he comes across a poacher in the park: does he shoot to kill? Richard’s response is businesslike. ‘That is not the policy in Malawi. It is in some countries. But not here.’ He lights a cigarette; at odds with the otherwise macho figure cut by his khakis and army-issue bovver boots, it is a menthol one. He makes sure I’m looking him in the eye before continuing. ‘But the park is big, and if something happens, nobody will ever know.’

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NOTES

*Name and nationality have been changed.

Why failures in American leadership endanger peace

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by Avram Lytton

The UN Security Council in session
(photo by Pete Souza)

Whether we like it or not, we live in a relatively stable time thanks to the presence of a single hegemonic super-power - the United States. Its political, military and economic power (current political dysfunction aside) remains unrivalled in its totality. It is therefore disheartening to see this power and clout squandered by the current administration in its failures and capitulations over Syria and Iran.

In Syria, what started as a protest movement against the corrupt and oppressive Assad regime has escalated into a chaotic civil war. Rather than attempt to support moderate rebel factions, the Obama administration dithered and misrepresented the extent of aid it was providing. Even worse, it effectively vetoed additional aid from regional powers who, in the absence of a more concerted effort, have had great difficulty coordinating actions or even agreeing on a strategy. The result has been an ever worsening, and widening war that has not only devastated the Syrian state, but has also radicalised the opposition to an alarming degree and provided safe havens for jihadist groups. The Assad regime, with substantial aid from its ally, Iran, has even regained the momentum it was once thought to have lost.

When the Assad regime began using chemical weapons on a small scale, the Obama administration did nothing. When it deployed those weapons on a larger scale on August 21, it seemed that, at last, the President would respond to the crossing of his ‘red line’. Instead, the world was treated to a darkly comic series of missteps and blunders. When it appeared that no action would be taken, a deal was brokered by Russia. This deal, however, is not the happy ending it appears for two key reasons. First, as it relies on the Syrians to do most of the work, overseen by personnel from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), it is predicated on the survival of the Assad regime for however long it takes to complete. Secondly, because of the nature of the agreement, it will be relatively easy for the regime to retain some of its CW deterrent through deception. Thus, the United States has been removed as a player in Syria, split from its allies and discredited. Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin has emerged as the world’s leading statesman.

On the Iran front, the United States looks poised (at the time of writing) to strike a bad deal that could see Iran given an economic lifeline while the international community receives nothing meaningful in return. The heart of the problem is that diplomacy relies on there being room for a deal to be made that is acceptable to both sides. The ultimate objective of the international community, in particular Israel and Saudi Arabia, is the cessation and rolling back of the Iranian nuclear program. However, the Iranian regime has made it clear that it will never cease enriching uranium, even if its people suffer for it under sanctions. Negotiations for the sake of negotiations simply obfuscate the issue.

Yet, in all this, it is the Americans who seem the most keen to reach a deal, any kind of deal, as quickly as possible. Sanctions are hurting the regime and, if drawn tighter, may lead to its collapse. The White House, however, seems more interested in removing itself from the region than in regime change and is even opposed to tighter sanctions, lest they hurt diplomacy. To the United States, Iran is a distant and theoretical threat, but to countries in the Middle East it is a very real menace. No wonder then that the Israelis are furious; no wonder that the Saudis, already angered over American inaction in Syria, are threatening to break ties with the United States.

Unending war in Syria and a massive regional mobilisation of radical elements is in no one’s interest. Also unappetising is an advancing Iranian nuclear program, bolstered by better and more numerous centrifuges while the regime is strengthened by weakened sanctions. Let us not forget, that not only does this regime have a long history of sponsoring terrorism in other countries, but it also relies on its hostility to Israel and the West to legitimise its governance. The United States, by negotiating for a compromise with Iran and avoiding influencing the proxy war in Syria, is simply punting these security issues to the next administration.

None of the above is leadership; it is risk avoidance. War is a last resort, to be sure; it is a last resort in Syria, not least because of the greatly uncertain outcome, and it is a last resort with regards to the Iranian nuclear program. However, broadcasting one’s lack of seriousness about the use of force, whether through an evaporating red line or through a rushed and dubious deal with the untrustworthy Iranian regime, does not avoid war. Indeed, by horse trading with Iran rather than dictating, the international community has given the regime in Tehran a legitimacy it does not deserve and a sense of power it has not earned. It has also left the final say to a number of regional powers who feel far more threatened than Washington does, and may not feel as restrained when they react to that threat.

Approaching the 100th anniversary of an infamous act of terrorism in the Balkans, one should reflect on what events a small power can set in motion when tensions are left to simmer in a multi-polar environment. It is the power of the United States that underwrites and maintains the current international system and restrains the behaviour of the smaller powers. If the US is retreating from its position as de facto world policeman, then I fear that the peace we enjoy may soon disappear with it.