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When global warming goes to war

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By Adriano Mancinelli

We used to think about climate change as a global issue in itself, separated from more traditional security threats such as military and strategic issues. However, this assumption has to be challenged. As a matter of fact, climate change is already a driver of violence.

On October 24th I attended a public lecture at LSE; the host, Professor Christian Parenti, presenting his book ‘Tropic of Chaos‘, edited in 2011. The core thesis of his work is that climate change and its effects have a growing importance in explaining the causes of violence in the developing world: global warming is not a direct cause of conflict, but it exacerbates the pre-existing root causes for violence and war. In particular, climate change aggravates the problems arising from the legacies of both the cold war  and the neo-liberal economic discourse.

Professor Parenti gave many examples of his claims. Perhaps, the most straightforward case he has studied is Northwest Kenya. The region is affected by periods of chronic drought followed by heavy rains and floods, which have left people without means of survival. They cannot find any relief from government – said Parenti – because of the reduction of the role of the state imposed by World Bank and IMF’s neo-liberal demands and recipes. Furthermore, they are able to procure and purchase cheap guns: after the 1977-78 Ethio-Somali war, a typical proxy war influenced by the confrontation between the US and USSR, the whole region has been inundated by light weapons. The result is what Parenti calls a “catastrophic convergence”: the only solution in order to survive is to conquest more land, attacking the neighbouring villages and triggering a spiral of violence and insecurity that grips the whole region.

Professor Parenti showed how environmental factors, and climate change, are influencing even the war on terror in Afghanistan. When he was there, he asked many farmers the reason why they keep growing poppy flowers. The most recurrent answer was – he reported – that poppy is drought-resistant. In fact, recent decades have seen Afghanistan affected by severe droughts. In such dry an environment, the poppy is one of the most feasible crops, as it uses only 1/6 of the amount of water needed by wheat. Considering that one of the crucial issues that ISAF have been facing in Afghanistan is the eradication of poppy crops, it is quite clear that global warming does matter as a cause of violence, or at least of prolonged violence.

As a solution to all this, Professor Parenti suggested that governments, particularly the US, “take climate science seriously” and start spending money to fund research on global warming and green energy. In his opinion there is still room for action. The problem is, however, that the political discourse in the United States does not seem to be changing, and the global warming subject is still frequently ignored.

I share Professor Parenti’s view on climate change as a driver of violence. I do not share his optimistic conclusions, though. Even if we hope that Obama, if re-elected, would tackle the issue of global warming and green energy in the US, the future appears gloomy. Firstly, it is unclear where to find the money for research and implementation – Parenti appears unjustifiably optimistic as to the location of funds. Secondly, the United States is a polluter, but it is not the only one, and it is uncertain whether China, India, and other developing countries would follow the same path. Finally and perhaps most importantly, even in the happy event of a mitigation of global warming, it would be a long-term victory, whilst the problems caused by the climate change are urgent. This creates a time gap; to address global warming is not to address conflicts caused by the global warming: nobody is going to provide Afghan farmers with drought-resistant wheat in the next few weeks.

Professor Parenti’s lecture has made it clear that global warming represents a serious and pressing challenge, not only because of the threats to the well-being of future generations, but also because it is creating new – and exacerbating old – reasons for violence and instability throughout the developing world. The answer to this challenge is one of the utmost importance and one that the whole international community should commit to. The methods and possibilities are uncertain, and academic research on the subject is still poorly taken into account.

“Remember, Remember” What About the 5th of November?

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By Jill Russell

As the rattle of firecrackers and the roar of bonfires reach their crescendo this evening accompanied by the lilting admonition to “Remember, remember, the 5th of November,” one ought to pause to consider exactly what legacy the events of over 4 centuries ago deserve in contemporary thought, particularly as it pertains to conflict and security.

There are likely many areas of inquiry by which the modern relevance of Guy Fawkes could be considered, but this piece will limit itself to a single issue: Does his character speak to the evil of Osama Bin Laden’s inspired plot against the US (and an opening feint against the west generally), where religious differences have come to define patriotisms and allegiances, and a struggle for survival is played out; or, is he the folk hero of the downtrodden?

An international scene dominated in part by the policies wrought in the aftermath of the more recent religiously inspired attack upon the power centres of another nation gives a new resonance to the cause of the Catholic radical Guy Fawkes and the Gunpowder Plot of 1603. In comparing this event with the attacks of 11 September (or 7 July, for that matter) I do not mean to push the point too far, but on the matter of how to judge the actors the comparison resonates.

First there is the might which can accumulate behind stifled grievances and perceived injustices. Whether they had dark intent with respect to the colour of English governance in the 17th century, the Catholics of England certainly had reason to despair their social and political position. And while there is no real justification for using civilian aircraft as crude smart bombs, reasonable people can take account of the frustrations and anger that arise out of American foreign policies which seem to diminish the rights and values of other cultures around the globe. As the old saw goes, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.

Alternatively, through the prism of religious and cultural confrontations, the historic events from the 17th and 21st centuries offer a cautionary tale on the sources of conflict. One may not go too far in suggesting that modern American or British society has far more to fear from a global struggle with radicalised Islamist than their 17th century forebears faced in the papists. Particularly for Great Britain, the issue of maintaining the proper approach to the religious and cultural other within her shores will certainly shape the future of its domestic security.

Perhaps the hero and villain dichotomy is irrelevant. Whether Guy Fawkes is seen as terrorist or hero is debatable, but in either case it is undisputed that he serves as a model of warning – either of the fury which oppression can unleash or the threat inherent in unreconciled cultural divides. In which case, we are all English today and should certainly “Remember, remember…”

Minority report: Burma's marginalised groups and the path to global respectability

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By Andy Gawthorpe

Southeast Asia has bloody borders.  Over the centuries, groups marginalised by the region’s lowland states have been driven into the hills and inaccessible plateaus that also formed the natural geographical barriers to the states’ expansion and hence settled down into borders.  As nation-states have been consolidated across the region, these groups suddenly found themselves defined as “minorities” in relation to the state’s dominant ethnic groups.  They have henceforth often been dealt with on a spectrum that runs from benign neglect to violent ethnic cleansing, and rebellions have often ensued.

Burma is no exception to this general pattern.  As the country ostensibly moves to end its own decades-long revolt against the norms of the international system, it is being haunted by its own minority problem.  In June of this year, ethnic violence broke out in Burma’s Arakan State, which borders Bangladesh in the country’s north.  Hundreds were killed and tens of thousands displaced, some systematically by the security forces.

In October, the pattern was repeated.  For Burma’s ruling junta, keen to ingratiate themselves with the international community after their brutal response to nationwide anti-government protests in 2007, the violence could not have come at a worst time.  Yet the roots of the violence are deep and solutions obscure.  The Burmese government’s partners in leading its reintegration into the international system – the United States and Britain foremost among them – hence face the tough if not unfamiliar dilemma of whether to let the violence interfere with normalisation.

The facts of the violence in Arakan State are as follows.  Arakan is home to Buddhist and Muslim populations who live on a radically unequal footing.  Most Arakan Muslims – the Rohingya – are seen as illegal immigrants and denied Burmese citizenship, despite the fact their community numbers something like a million people.  The UN views the group as one of the world’s most persecuted minorities, and with good reason: the Burmese denial of citizenship renders the group effectively stateless.  Their consequent lack of rights is graphically illustrated by their treatment by local security forces (Burma’s national army receives higher marks, but seems powerless to prevent periodic outbursts of violence).

Ethnic violence in Arakan State this year had a number of incidental sparks, but at its core was the marginalisation of the Rohingya – not even recognised by the government as one of Burma’s minorities, nor granted the basic rights of citizenship, they are easily targeted by Arakan Buddhists who see their presence in the region as an encroachment on the rights of legitimate citizens.

Quite how deep the problem of the Rohingya’s marginalisation goes becomes obvious when we consider the words of Aung San Suu Kyi, the conscience of Burma.  According to Suu Kyi, violence in Arakan in June was a result of the government’s failure to enforce its immigration policy; asked if the Rohingya should be considered Burmese, she said she “does not know”.  During last month’s violence, she kept her peace, which can be considered an improvement.  But Suu Kyi’s unwillingness to speak up for the Rohingya – no doubt mainly to avoid alienating potential political allies – shows just how far the group have to go before their integration into Burmese society becomes even a respectable suggestion, nevermind a mainstream concern.

It hence seems likely that whatever progress there is in tamping down ethnic violence in northern Burma will be slow.  The Burmese government recently announced its intention to reach a “win-win solution for all stakeholders”, proving at least that the government has been socialised in the international language of meaningless waffle; real solutions seem much more distant.  Even changes in the legal situation such as the extension of citizenship to the Rohingya are unlikely to produce results quickly, given the social and cultural scars that ethnic conflict generates.

All of this leaves western countries who are keen to reintegrate Burma into the international system – witness, for instance, the World Bank’s decision to begin lending to the country for the first time in 25 years – and to cultivate the country as part of a regional counterbalance to China with the dilemma of how to respond.

Clearly normalisation cannot continue without reference to what the junta does, but nor would it be fruitful to abandon the country at the first time of trouble and allow the government to return to a state of isolation where it felt wounded and inclined to give in to its baser instincts.  Not to seize the opportunity to welcome Burma back into the family of nations on acceptable terms would be a tragedy for the region..  The only greater tragedy imaginable would be to do so without using every ounce of leverage to push the Burmese government to do what it can to mitigate ethnic hatred in Arakan State, however slow and perilous the process may be.  That would be a marriage of realism and humanity of which even Ms. Suu Kyi herself could justifiably be proud.

Is “war” in Mali “inevitable”?

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By Melisa Tezcan

A military coup earlier this year saw the northern region of Mali fall into the hands of Islamic and separatist rebels. Eight months on and the rebels have maintained their hold, causing thousands of citizens to flee their homes and sparking an international humanitarian crisis.

Taking back the northern region of Mali from the rebels looks set to result in bloodshed. With the U.N. backing a military intervention and the rebels prepared to retaliate at all costs, commentators have argued that “war” in Mali is now “inevitable”. The assumption here is that the intervention will lead to prolonged and intense violence amongst the rebels.

Arguably, were E.U. and U.N. countries willing to deploy troops, and Algeria willing to offer military assistance, the intervention would be considerably more effective and the risk of sustained conflict significantly reduced. Increased military presence in the region may provoke settlement negotiations with some rebel groups, whilst bolstering the chance of success against others. According to Gregory Mann, Mali commentator and professor at Columbia University, “If the military skill set and political willpower is there… it would not be enormously difficult to remove the[se] Islamist fighters”.

At this stage however, policy makers are limited in both these regards. Mali itself is politically fragile. The government infrastructure rests upon a tentative coalition between the military and the executive. Both factions are relatively unpopular and lack political clout. Given this, the U.N deemed that strategic responsibility for the intervention should lie with the wider regional group ECOWAS (The Economic Community of West African States).

This in itself has proved problematic and reaching a consensus has not been easy. According to ECOWAS director for external relations, Abdel Fatau Musah, there are a number of “stakeholders” whose values need to be reflected in the policy, namely those of neighbouring countries, Algeria and Mauritania, the former of which is particularly opposed to any form of military intervention.

Furthermore, even if a policy is devised within ECOWAS, it may be met with scepticism on the grounds that the organisation does not have a sound human rights record when it comes to the deployment of troops. If it is to gather the support of the international community, and thereby swift implementation, accountability must be built into the proposal.

Looking to the military component, there are additional limitations that need to be considered. As previously mentioned, Western nations including France and U.S will not be offering support in the form of military personnel.  These constituents will come directly from Mali and its regional allies in ECOWAS; around 6000 troops in total. When we consider the vast terrain of northern Mali, around the size of Texas, together with thousands of miles of borderland – this military provision is relatively underwhelming. Looking at these figures in relation to the number of rebel recruits thought to be in the region, there is certainly cause for concern.

Furthermore, the military infrastructure itself is flawed. There are deep fissures between military ranks that need to be reformed before deployment can take place. Many troops remain disillusioned with the central government, and the possibility of their defection remains high. Policy makers need to be wary of the dangers that heavily armed, yet unprincipled, personnel may pose, as there is a risk that these individuals will disperse and leave their weapons in the hands of the rebels.

At this stage, we can be relatively certain that a military intervention in northern Mali is on the cards. What is still up for debate is whether or not this will lead to an outright conflict. Certainly, according to some rebel leaders, intervention means war. Hamaha, head of security for rebel group MUJAO, has threatened retaliation: “If an international or Malian military force attacks us, we will take Bamako in 24 hours…the international community is slow to strike because it knows that if it does, it will spark a worldwide jihad”.

In order to minimise the likelihood and potency of these threats, the intervention itself would need to be swift, well managed and properly equipped. As it stands, with Algeria withholding its resources, the West withholding its troops and the Malian military in tatters, the intervention may serve only to ignite a spark that it is unable to put out.

Runaway train: Can developing countries catch up with the modern world?

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By Justyna Maciejczak

Have you ever wondered what the magical threshold that a developing country has to cross is if it aspires to become a part of the industrialised world? Is it possible that one day the majority of today’s developing countries will eventually be recognised by industrialised nations as their equals? Dear idealists and believers in social progress, sorry to burst your bubble, but this might never happen. The reasons for this are as follows.

The problem with development is that we concentrate our attention on the underdeveloped regions, forgetting that the process of development takes place in the industrialised world as well. What is more, if you compare the rates of development of the Third World countries  and the West, you will see that the industrialised nations, being able to capitalise on previous discoveries in the area of science and technology, are moving forward at a much faster pace than the rest of the world.

To illustrate this dilemma of development, imagine two trains heading the same direction but following two separate tracks. Western civilisation is moving forward at breakneck speed, reaping the fruits of progress that had its origin in the Industrial Revolution and, relatively unhindered, continues today. Developing countries occupy the second train, which is moving forward, but, being burdened with colonial baggage, can’t accelerate its pace and stays behind.

This image is additionally complicated by the fact that there is no specific destination that both trains are trying to reach. If there was one, it would be called “the ultimate state of development”, but we all know that such thing does not exist.

It is true, that some countries are in a better situation than others. China, India and Brazil have made a huge progress towards development in recent decades. But let’s be honest, not every Asian, African or Latin American country has enough potential (be it human or natural resources, geographic location etc.) to enter the path of accelerated development. In fact, the perspective for developing world looks rather gloomy.

A paradox of development is this: as industrialised nations evolve, they also change their perception of what is “modern” and what is “obsolete”. Along with the change of perception, comes the change of standards applied in order to draw a distinction between “old” and “new”, “developed” and “backward”.

Today the common criteria used to evaluate a country’s stage of development are economic indicators and standard of living (HDI). But have you ever wondered how these criteria would look like in 20, 50 or 70 years? What if in 2050 the list of indicators of development will include criteria such as: quantity of notebooks owned by family, hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) used by nation or ability of the country to send their own satellite into space? How are today’s developing countries supposed to reach these standards? At this rate of development taking place in the industrialised countries, the South will never catch up with the North and will be always seen as a “backward” region.

This is one of the reasons why the friction between North and South continues. Many developing countries are struggling to enhance their economic and political performance, and as many indicators suggest, are quite successful in their attempts (for more information on African growth read “Africa’s hopeful economies: The sun shines bright”, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21541008). However, their success is overshadowed by a Western narrative, which, with its focus on country’s failures and unresolved problems, is predominantly negative.

In other words, no matter how much has been done to accelerate growth and stabilise situation in developing countries, it is never enough to match Western standards of development. Once country has been labeled as “developing”, it remains “developing” no matter its actual progress. This is a virtual “development trap”, an issue which should be given proper consideration if one wants to deal with the development gap.