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Why Biden Will Not Get Soft with China

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by Martina Bernardini

President-Elect Joe Biden, then in his capacity of Vice President, walks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, shortly after his arrival at Andrews Air Force Base during a 2015 visit to the United States (Image credit: AP Photo/Carolyn Kaster)

The election of Joe Biden as President of the United States is meaningful for several reasons, but foreign policy stands out as one of the most important. While the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the subsequent crisis in Transatlantic relations challenged the resilience of U.S. hegemony, the widespread enthusiasm to Biden’s election demonstrates that the U.S. historic allies still want – and require – an engaged United States on their side. Taking the reins of U.S. foreign policy in this particular moment in the history of the international system, however, is not an easy task. The biggest challenge lies in re-affirming the U.S. position in world affairs, a grand strategy that will contribute to building a strict balance between Washington and Beijing, to show that the absolute decline of U.S. power has not occurred.

During his presidential campaign, outgoing U.S. President Donald J. Trump argued that Biden allowed China to become a threat to the United States by supporting China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization in 2001. Such assumption indicated that for Trump, if Biden became President of the United States, he would get soft with China. The recent history of U.S. foreign policy, however, dismisses this thesis. In 2000, in fact, together with eighty-two U.S. Senators and 237 members of the House of Representatives, Joe Biden did vote in favour of the China Trade Bill, which authorised ‘the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations treatment) to the People’s Republic of China, and to establish a framework for relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.’

The approval of such a bill by the U.S. Congress accompanied U.S. support for China’s accession to the WTO. At the dawn of the 21st century, this move represented - at least to U.S. policymakers - China’s official embrace of a world order based on the American-led ideals of free trade and democracy, a trend that was set in motion by President Richard Nixon and George H.W. Bush. China’s entry into the WTO was indeed positively welcomed both by Democrats and Republicans - by Presidents Clinton as well as George W. Bush - because it was seen as the coronation of a grand strategy aimed at bringing China into a pan-American trade regime. Consequently, Biden’s vote in favour of the China Trade Bill does not mean that, as President of the United States, he will adopt a concessionary China policy. Incidentally, the exact reasons for his support of China’s integration into the global trade system increase the probability that Biden’s foreign policy towards China will not be accommodating.

Biden’s vision of the United States in the world reflects the American exceptionalism that drove the United States towards superpower status by spreading the American soft power and democratic ideals abroad from the Spanish-American war (1898) to Obama’s presidency (2008-2016). For Biden, this means that the U.S. has the duty to lead and inspire the other powers of the international system. In this framework, his administration’s foreign policy plan is to lead the United States to re-establish such a relationship with the international community after four years of isolationism under Trump.

This foreign policy approach will consequently bring Sino-American relations back to the Obama years, when Washington recognised that China represented a challenge for U.S. power that had to be addressed firmly, without undermining the bilateral relationship nor the stability of the international system, of which the United States intends to be the guarantor. In the last phase of his presidential campaign, Biden anticipated how he is likely to approach Beijing. For example, he criticized Trump for not having acted on the issue of human rights in the Xinjiang region, but at the same time, he talked about working with China on climate-related matters and the COVID-19 pandemic. That is to say, that open hostilities are unlikely to break out, but Biden will want the U.S. to take a firm stance against China in the key fields where the U.S. leadership among its allies and its great power status are at stake.

The most delicate grounds for Sino-American relations in the near future are two: trade and technology. Biden will inherit the trade war that Trump launched during his years in office as an attempt to reverse the course of the growing U.S. trade deficit with China. When he was Vice President from 2009 to 2017 under Obama, the United States pursued a multilateral economic strategy to reach the goal of re-balancing the U.S. balance of payments with China. Today, this approach is no longer an option, mainly because Biden will face a bipartisan consensus for toughening the U.S. China policy.

As David Shambaugh explained, the Democrats might not have fully agreed on the utility of tariffs for U.S. national security, but they were not against Trump’s tough China policy overall. A cross-party general indisposition and the willingness to take effective action towards China have risen in U.S. Congress because China challenges the U.S. power on many fronts, and exactly because Biden recognised the need of rebalancing the economic relations with China already during his Vice-Presidency, he is expected to be determined to reach such goal. For now, Phase One of the Economic and Trade Agreement between the U.S. and China that was signed this year remains in place, and Biden declared that he is not intentioned to cancel such agreement, at least not immediately. The first step for the Biden administration’s China policy will thus be to get a sense of where the historical U.S. foreign policy partners stand vis-à-vis their commercial relations with China.

Alliances are likely to be the starting point for a firm stance on the technology front as well. ‘The United States does need to get tough with China. If China has its way, it will keep robbing the United States and American companies of their technology and intellectual property,’ Biden wrote in Foreign Affairs last spring, adding that the best way to confront the Chinese technological challenge is to build a ‘united front’ with allies. Much has been said about the U.S. semiconductor sector as at risk of being exploited by China, which led the U.S. Department of Defense to finally add Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) - the largest chipmaker in China - to the U.S. Entity List on December 18, 2020.

The list in question, which is run by the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, contains the names of foreign persons, governmental organisations, and companies that are subject to specific license requirements for the import of items from American suppliers. Consequently, any operation held with one of the subjects present in the Entity List is considered at risk by the U.S. government, and will therefore be closely monitored. The move comes as the final act of the most vigorous measures that the outgoing Trump administration implemented towards Beijing before Biden takes office on January 20, 2021, fearful that the incoming administration would soften the line.

This, however, is not likely to happen, because Biden’s vision of the U.S. in the world will merge with the clear bipartisan support of a hard line with China coming from Congress. The incoming Biden administration will thus aim to bring the tensions on the commercial and technological fronts to a higher strategic level especially by working on reinvigorating Transatlantic relations. Biden’s overall approach to foreign policy will be guided by his vision of the U.S. in the world, which, on the one hand, is strictly related to the historical conception of American exceptionalism, but, on the other hand, must resiliently adapt to the shape of the 21st Century’s international system, which demands a cooperative approach on climate change, migration, and global health. This means that the world will not enter a ‘new Cold War’ – a misleading term that is very often overused to describe Sino-American relations – but that Biden’s foreign policy towards Beijing will contribute to a redefinition of the terms of great power competition in a globalised world, which is not necessarily an easier scenario.

Martina is a PhD Candidate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. She has been awarded the Leverhulme Scholarship ‘Interrogating Visions of a Post-Western World: Interdisciplinary and Interregional Perspectives on the Future in a Changing International Order.’ Her research focuses on the history of U.S. foreign policy towards China, particularly on the role of China in U.S. President George H.W. Bush’s Grand Strategy for a post-Cold War World Order. She is an alumna of the School of Politics founded by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, and she holds a first-class honors Master’s degree in International Studies from Roma Tre University, where she also completed her BA in Political Science and International Relations.

Whither America First: A New US Foreign Policy under Biden?

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by Owen Saunders

Joseph R. Biden (D) and Donald J. Trump (R), the candidates in the 2020 US Presidential Race (Image credit: BBC)

After a long election cycle, the US Presidential Election is almost concluded. In January, Joe Biden will become the 46th President of the United States. Whilst Democrats managed to retain control of the House of Representatives, the Republican Party looks likely to hold their Senate majority. The Senate has an important role to play in the ratification of treaties negotiated by the President and, thus, the successful execution of his foreign policy. Just as Trump’s foreign policy offered a break with the Obama-era, the question is now what change will Biden bring: a return to the goals of his former running mate, or a new unique path? As of 20 January 2021, a new foreign policy dynamic will be in place. The legacy of Trump’s ‘America First’ approach, however, may limit Biden’s ability to restore US leadership globally.

On environmental issues, Donald Trump had repeatedly criticised the Obama administration’s engagement in the 2015 Paris Agreement, arguing that the accord would unduly impact rustbelt states and American sovereignty. Consequently, last year Trump announced the formal withdrawal of the United States, a decision coming into effect the day after the election. Joe Biden has promised to rejoin the accord and can do so without Senate ratification. The problem sits with the Senate, who again must approve many of the measures required to meet the goals of the accord. Former President Bill Clinton experienced similar resistance in regard to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.

In the course of his presidency, Trump has also repeatedly turned a blind eye to human rights abuses, most recently in the case of China’s Uighur Muslim minority. He has refused to condemn or sanction China over the issue because it would threaten ongoing trade negotiations. The Biden campaign, in comparison, repeatedly called the treatment of the Uighur population ‘genocide’. Similarly, China has imposed national security legislation in Hong Kong, restricting freedoms and denying Hong Kongers of their sovereignty. In reaction, Trump signed an Executive Order in July of 2020 calling for “Hong Kong Normalization.” Biden, like Obama, can be expected to outwardly condemn these actions.

Bilateral and multilateral trade arrangements have been heavily criticised by Trump as damaging for American economic interests. One of Trump’s first foreign policy decisions was to withdraw from the Transpacific Partnership negotiated by Obama (TPP). Biden will presumably attempt to resuscitate the pact, though he will need Congressional approval and Senate ratification. Further, Trump successfully re-negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which he had repeatedly lamented for undermining the US auto-manufacturing industries. The new agreement, the Canada United States Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), was mainly a cosmetic change, however, it does enforce greater percentages of steel and aluminum produced in the US to be integrated in automobiles. Changes to CUSMA are unlikely under a Biden administration. Early on, Trump imposed trade tariffs on Chinese goods to force a better trade deal, but these initiatives largely failed to address trade disputes. Preliminary agreements to reduce tariffs had been reached by early 2020 but then the COVID-19 pandemic took hold. Biden has argued that the tariffs have only hurt US businesses and consumers and will likely pursue less confrontational methods of negotiation.

Regarding bilateral relations, Trump is boastful of his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, though the minutes of their five meetings are unrecorded. Russia has proven to be a central threat in the spread of misinformation across the United States and Trump has often been reluctant to criticize them. Given Russia’s role in the 2016 election and Biden’s criticism throughout the campaign of Trump’s “unknown diplomacy” with Russia, Biden will likely take a tough stance against Putin, including on the occupation of the Crimea. Similarly, despite Biden’s criticisms of Trump’s legitimising of North Korea,’ his administration would continue negotiations with North Korea on nuclear issues. Finally, the Anglo-American Special Relationship may be impacted by Biden’s election. While Trump remains an advocate for Brexit and a quick trade deal with the UK, Biden opposed Brexit and his administration will only approve a new deal if Brexit does not threaten the Good Friday Agreement.

The Trump administration has repeatedly criticised Western security alliances and agreements. As a result, the Trump administration abandoned the Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2018 and imposed new economic sanctions on Iran. Under a Biden presidency, removing those sanctions is a real possibility that could open re-engagement with Iran and lower bilateral tensions. A Senate approval of two-thirds vote is required for a new agreement or re-entry into the old one, which may prove difficult to achieve. Trump has also not been shy to criticize the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), mainly as European members fail to meet obligations to spend 2% of GDP on defense. The Biden administration will undoubtedly re-engage with and vigorously support the organization, as he championed the Obama administration’s commitments to the security alliance.

Regarding public health, Trump has repeatedly blamed China for the COVID-19 virus. In September 2020, announcing that the US would withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO), blaming the multilateral institution for the failure to recognize and react to the virus adequately. Under Biden, Trump’s commitment to withdraw from the WHO would not be honored.

President-elect Biden has a great deal of work to do in repairing damaged bilateral and multilateral organisations and relationships around the world. Although not every foreign policy decision made under the Trump administration is noted here, the evidence of an ‘America First’ policy is strong. Nonetheless, Trump himself is not the problem, he is a symbol of sentiments within the United States that are anti-trade, anti-immigration and pro-isolationism. Although Biden’s foreign policy will likely be a continuation of the Obama administration, which itself was not perfect, Biden is likely to be limited in his efforts to return American foreign policy towards multilateralism and globalization.

Despite the popularity of ‘America First’ casting a long shadow, Biden will continue seeking re-engagement with the world, despite the domestic political difficulties at home. President Biden can do so by focusing on re-entering environmental agreements and security deals, upholding human rights, and restoring the reputation of the United States as a leader of the liberal international order. Through bi-partisan negotiation, the undoing of President Trump’s executive orders, and the implementation of new executive orders himself; any successes will depend to a great extent on working with other states in regaining more effective US diplomacy and leadership in the world.

Owen is pursuing his MA in International Peace and Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. His interest in researching this topic developed from a US Foreign Policy graduate course thought by Dr. David G. Haglund, Department of Political Studies, at Queen’s University in Canada. Find him on Twitter @owensaunders26

Book Review: Bremmer, Ian (2015), Superpower: Three Choices for America’s Role in the World

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Reviewed by: Alexandria Reid

Bremmer, I. Superpower: Three Choices for America’s Role in the World, ( London: Portfolio Penguin), 2015. ISBN:978 0 24121 677 4

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In his latest book, written with America’s 2016 election in mind, policy pundit and LinkedIn favourite Ian Bremmer laid out three competing visions of America’s future role in the world. Deliberately written in layman’s terms, he asked Americans to consider foreign policy when casting their vote. To aid this process, he included what one reviewer dubbed the kind of multiple choice quiz that belongs in an issue of Cosmo at the start of the book. [1] It is the kind of quiz that might be used to assess your personality and tell you which moisturiser to buy accordingly, except instead of your star sign, he wants to know your views on China’s threat to America, the concept of American leadership and ‘America’s biggest problem in the Middle East’. [2]

Offering an unforgiving portrait of Obama’s foreign policy strategy - or lack thereof - Bremmer argues that today’s ‘Question Mark America’ is causing allies and enemies alike to take unnecessary and destabilising geopolitical risks. America is not yet fully in decline, he diagnoses, but Obama’s foreign policy improvisation threatened to change that. Published before anyone had seriously toyed with the previously unfathomable rise of Donald Trump, Bremmer wanted the electorate to put an end to the indecision of America’s post-Cold War presidents by demanding a clear foreign policy strategy from the 2016 candidates. With Trump’s populist foreign policy revealed, perhaps now he regrets ever asking?

Bremmer’s diagnosis of a declining America is deceptively simple, instinctively appealing and therefore utterly convincing at first glance. Whether addressing an elusive threshold for intervention in Syria in 2013, or a once-sovereign border in Crimea and Ukraine, the ambiguous nature of U.S. intentions leaves other players unsure where to locate America’s increasingly retrenched line in the sand. Simultaneously, he projects an America that is overstretched, burdened with leadership and receiving none of the benefits that justify taking the risk. Bremmer’s overarching message is that American foreign policy today jeopardises both domestic and international security. Worse still, it’s leading to America’s preventable decline. The prognosis almost goads people to demand not just an outline of a foreign policy strategy, but one which will Make America Great Again.

The remedy for American decline is an informed choice on foreign policy. Once you’ve completed your quiz, Bremmer handily lays out three options to choose from: ‘Indispensable America’, ‘Moneyball America’ and ‘Independent America’.

Indispensable, the most familiar of the three, is in essence a proposal for the reclamation of the post-1945 American leadership role that has been half-abandoned in America’s recent incertitude. Embodying Neoconservative ideals, but deliberately avoiding the pejorative connotations that come with the use of the label, Indispensable America continues to police world order whilst exporting its liberal values. Why should America bear the burden of making the world safe for democracy? Here, Bremmer could have easily answered in the words of Franklin D. Roosevelt; isolationism would lead America to become ‘a lone island in a world dominated by the philosophy of force.’ [3]

Moneyball, by contrast, sees this approach to world affairs as prohibitively expensive in both blood and treasure, and instead advocates ‘a cold-blooded, interest-driven’ strategy akin to that of the Oakland A’s manager Billy Beane after whom Michael Lewis wrote the book ‘Moneyball’. Moneyball America’s interests are defined narrowly, epitomised by the key phrase ‘America’s value, not its values’. Accordingly, its finite resources must be efficiently invested in strategic partnerships, predominantly with China, even at the expense of failing to support democracy abroad or relationship commitments in regions including Europe and the Middle East.

Independent America’s world outlook differs from both alternatives. In one of the more memorable lines of the book Bremmer suggests that ‘[i]t’s time for a new declaration of independence—a proclamation of emancipation from the responsibility to solve everyone else’s problems.’ [4] Much effort is expended to assure the reader that this is not a return to the disastrous isolationism of the 1930s, rather, it is about adopting an unambiguous stance of non-interventionism and leading by example. By making others take responsibility for their own security at last, America can focus on its own values by ‘perfecting democracy at home’, rebuilding American infrastructure and keeping more money in the taxpayers’ pockets. America cannot afford the exceptional role of policing the world, nor should it, because it forces the nation to compromise the liberal constitutional values that made it exceptional in the first place.

Only at the very end does Bremmer reveal that he prefers a foreign policy strategy that delivers an Independent America. Employing the Goldilocks method of decision-making, Bremmer infers that if Indispensable is too expensive and can no longer attract domestic support, and if Moneyball is too secular for a society which still believes in their own exceptionalism, then, in his eyes, Independent America is just right. Picking the option that most resembles a dangerous isolationism might come as a surprise to those who know Bremmer as the founder and President of the Eurasia Group, the world’s leading political risk consultancy.

Bremmer’s personal choice aside, it is the way in which he approaches the debate that should concern anyone reading Superpower. The debate the book hopes to incite is an important one, and candidate and voter alike would benefit from a meaningful and accessible discussion about foreign policy in America today. Yet, this is not what Bremmer offers. Instead, he provides a deeply flawed book which infantilises the reader under the guise of accessibility. This does the reader a disservice because it fails to provide them with the tools of analysis to judge whether Trump or Clinton are capable of actually delivering an Independent or Indispensable America with their outlined policies.

Bremmer’s book might help you decide what you want if you were not sure in the first place, but it will not help you make a reasonable choice about how to get it. By offering three mutually exclusive and easily recognisable categories, Bremmer seeks to eliminate the essence of the grand strategic conundrum that has seen America oscillate between policy characteristic of both Indispensable and Independent America since the end of the Cold War. It is the same conundrum that has left many people to wonder if there has been an ‘Obama Doctrine’, or merely a series of post-hoc rationalisations for a reactionary foreign policy. [5] Yet to an unrealistic degree, Bremmer’s discussion mutes the importance of feasible policy in American grand strategy. This is where Trump’s politics triumph. They promise the unattainable in the pursuit of ‘America first’, exercising flagrant disregard for the constraints of domestic and international politics. [6] Both Trump and Bremmer’s vision of the American domestic project is built on the foundations of a liberal international order that demands American proactivity in ways that contradict their foreign policy analysis. Bremmer’s book encourages the reader to demand what they rightly consider to be their national interests, but offers no roadmap for how to reasonably achieve them in a dynamic and multipolar context.

 

 

Alexandria Reid is a recent graduate of War Studies at King’s College London and recipient of the Sir Michael Howard Award for Best Graduate in BA War Studies. Alex currently works for Strife as a Social Media Coordinator, and as a research assistant for Dr. John Bew. In September she will begin her Master’s education as a Conflict, Security and Development student at KCL. Twitter: @AlexHREID.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] Boyes, Roger (27 June 2015), ‘Superpower Three Choices for America’s Role in the World by Ian Bremmer’, The Times, Accessed 5/08/2016, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/arts/books/non-fiction/article4479814.ece

[2] Bremmer, Ian (2015), Superpower: Three Choices for America’s Role in the World (Penguin), pp.1-4

[3] Franklin D. Roosevelt (10 June 1940), ‘Address at the University of Virginia’, Accessed 5/08/2016: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15965

[4] Bremmer (2015), p.50

[5] See, McCoy, Alfred (15 September 2015), ‘The Quiet Grand Strategy of Barack Obama’, The American Conservative, available at: http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-quiet-grand-strategy-of-barack-obama/ and Drezner, Daniel (2011), ‘Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4, pp.57-68, available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-06-17/does-obama-have-grand-strategy

[6] McCurry, Justin (21 July 2016), ‘Trump says US may not automatically defend Nato allies under attack’, The Guardian, Accessed 5/08/2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/21/donald-trump-america-automatically-nato-allies-under-attack

Image Credit: http://www.wsj.com/video/ian-bremmer-geopolitics-in-an-unstable-world/6FA80445-CFF1-4437-B7BC-E6AE2A9A028D.html

 

 

 

 

Book review: 'America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam' by Christopher Lawrence

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Reviewed by: Cheng Lai Ki

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Christopher Lawrence. America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam. Oxford, UK. Casemate Publishers, 2015. ISBN: 978-1612002781. Hardcover. £19.99

Compared to other countries around the world, the United States military possesses the largest expenditure rate in the world of around $640,221million, according to a study conducted by the Brookings in 2014.[1] Within the last century, the United States has proven its military capabilities in multiple conflicts. The rise of advanced warfare tactics through technological developments (i.e. Unmanned Combat Vehicles) has allowed distancing from direct confrontation or engagement in hostiles. The increased distance from the battlefield and development of new combat tactics avoiding confrontation makes the determination of conflict victories increasingly elusive. Despite the existence of multiple detailed and comprehensive studies on insurgency and counterinsurgency, most are limited to specific cases or conflicts. Adding complexity to the phenomenon of insurgencies, the lack of detailed (and accurate) information ultimately inhibits the understanding and formation of effective counterinsurgency strategies.

In America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam, Christopher Lawrence offers a more systematic, quantitative approach towards the subject of insurgency and counterinsurgency. This was accomplished utilising resources obtained from his role at The Dupuy Institute (TDI), a non-profit organisation focused on academic research and studies around historical data associated to armed conflicts and acclaimed resolutions. TDI has collaborated in the past with the governmental agencies. Between 2002 – 2004, TDI produced three annual reports developed for the United States Department of the Army regarding the combat effectiveness within cities.[2] Through extremely comprehensive quantitative studies, the book critically examines the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam wars to determine the various elements and factors supporting the ultimate outcome of each conflict.

Studies and publication conducted by TDI revolve around the examination of historical resources. This academic and research discipline allows for evidentiary based analyses to be conducted. Ergo, Lawrence was able to conduct an extremely comprehensive strategic analysis and its outcomes of several conflicts where United States played a significant role. The book begins with TDI outlining their casualty estimate for the United States government agencies. Impressed by their statistical collection methodologies supporting their estimates, other agencies ultimately expanded their contracts with the institution for additional data collection and subsequent studies. Over the course of the Iraq War, Lawrence coordinated multiple projects involving quantitative researchers. TDI’s relationship with various department within the United States government has thus allowed its researchers access to the extensive material available from internal departments and centers (i.e. United States Army Center of Military History). As an individual, Lawrence has also published several papers and monographs for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation in addition to an amalgamation of assessments for the Department of Defense.[3] The book fundamentally centres upon quantitative variables of indigenous and intervening government typologies, insurgency motivations, insurgency structure, typology of counterinsurgency waged, rules of engagement and the nature of the conflict’s resolution.

Throughout the book, Lawrence identifies several correlations between variables that could be applied consistently throughout the three major wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam. His analysis revealed a correlation between force ratios and insurgent motivations. Comparing his discoveries towards conventional counterinsurgency assessments and studies, Lawrence has quantifiably identified that although overwhelming force ratios (between counterinsurgents and insurgents) are not required for counterinsurgency success, it is larger fighting forces that ultimately yields counterinsurgency victory. Within the analysis, Lawrence also suggests several other variables that might influence the outcome of counterinsurgencies. However, it would appear from the text that limited statistical emphasis or research was placed into these considerations. Throughout the book, Lawrence develops several statistical models to describe and analyse the dynamics of the counterinsurgency campaigns that essentially defined the Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam wars. However, acclaimed to examine the three modern wars of the United States has devoted a considerable amount of focus on the Iraq and Afghan War in contrast to Vietnam. Any book of this scope often focuses on specific reader categories. Therefore, the following section briefly addresses overarching benefits and limitations of the book for two main categories of readers: Academics and Practitioners.

With multiple elements within warfare categorically quantified within the book, academics could find the level of depth significantly beneficial to their studies. This book is an invaluable resource that both analyses and summarizes – with statistical support – three counterinsurgencies fought by the United States. For example, in Iraq, Lawrence argues that the counterinsurgency by the United States (Coalition) and the Iraqi Government was a success due to the generation of an overwhelming force-ratio compared to the insurgents. Given the nature of academia, criticism/rebuttal against his assentation is a given, as some would question the true definition of successfulness of the United States during Iraq, given its current state-of-affairs.[4] Its limitations reside in its dense and hyper-focus upon statistical analysis; how the ‘numbers’ reflect reality could be (at times) difficult to understand and internalise – let alone contextualise against other theories within security studies.

Practitioners on the other hand might be initially overwhelmed by the sheer amount of quantitative/statistical data Lawrence goes into. However, it does not remove the quantitative benefits of the book for individuals within military domains. Providing an extremely comprehensive statistical analysis of the three counterinsurgencies, policy-makers would also benefit from this source of information. Fundamentally taking a historic approach, reflective analysis of the book can be a valuable resource for strategists to evaluate the effectiveness of American decisions during the wars. However, limitations of the book arguably depend heavily on the statistical knowledge (and interest) of the reader; especially when addressing practitioners. Regardless, to practitioners, the book is an invaluable resource to expand their horizon and understanding of United States activities during the three counterinsurgencies. The professional data collection and analytics compiled into this singular source makes America’s Modern Wars a valuable resource to understand (quantifiably) elements that can influence the outcome of counterinsurgencies.

Despite the sheer depth of statistical analysis into the elements within counterinsurgencies, Lawrence’s analysis places significant value on available (and accessible) information. America’s Modern Wars is unlikely to end any debates regarding the effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategies used in the three campaigns – as it may prove controversial should any such claim be made. It is commendable that Lawrence acknowledges the propensity for analyses to be revised in light of new data. The analysis does, however, provide an interesting perspective for practitioners and academics focusing on security issues associated to the activities of the United States. This source of analysis that utilises quantifiable information is a useful source – especially to practitioners drafting approval papers/plans. However, there remains a widespread belief that the complexity of warfare (and more importantly insurgencies) cannot be categorised or exclusively studied solely through quantifiable research. Regardless, Lawrence does manage to quantifiably identify one of the largest flaws of the United States strategies in the three conflicts, which is their inherent misunderstanding of counterinsurgency.[v] Nonetheless, America’s Modern Wars is still recommended for anyone aiming to obtain a comprehensive quantitative understanding of United States strategies in Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam.

Formerly with the Singapore Armed Forces, Cheng holds a Bachelor’s Honors degree in Criminology. During his military service, he was a senior tactical and operational instructor for the Armour Formation. He is currently reading for an MA in International Intelligence and Security at King’s where his academic specialties revolve around proxy strategies such as private military security companies, drones and cyber-warfare. In May 2016, he published an article on the vulnerabilities of transatlantic submarine cables in IHS Jane’s.

Notes:

[1] Dews, F. ‘Charts: U.S. Army size and defense expenditures relative to other nations’, Brookings [Online], (Oct 14 2015), Available from: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2015/10/charts-us-army-size-defense-expenditures, (Accessed May 21 2016)

[2] ‘Publications’, The Dupuy Institute [Online], Available from: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipubs.htm, (Accessed May 21 2016)

[3] Lawrence, C.A. ‘President Obama’s Casualty Estimates’, Mystics & Statistics [Online], (Dec 27 2015); Available from: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2015/12/27/president-obamas-casualty-estimates/ (Accessed Jan 2016)

[4] Cordesman, A.H., ‘American Strategic and Tactical Failures in Iraq: An Update’, Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [Online], (Aug 8 2006); Available from: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060808_iraqfailures.pdf, (Accessed Dec 2015).

[5]Ubaldi, J. ‘Why Civil Military Operations will be a Combat Multiplier in Counterinsurgency Operations’, SmallWarsJournal.org [Online], (2009).

The Libya Complex: From International Interference to Impotence

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By: Laura Hawkes

Source: The New York Times (February 19, 2016)

When attempting to formulate an effective international response to conflicts the crucial question looms: what comes first, diplomacy or eliminating an insurgency? In the context of Libya, this inevitable question has haunted the international community, causing stalled reactions rendering their positions weak. In the aftermath of the 2011 Libyan revolution which saw the removal of a forty-two year long authoritarian regime under Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the U.S. and other powers have been reluctant to intervene in Libyan political or security affairs.

However, on February 19th 2016, in a delayed attempt to combat the Islamic State (IS) insurgency in Libya, U.S. warplanes targeted an IS compound near the western coastal city of Sabrata. The airstrike killed at least forty-one suspected IS fighters. This included the intended target, Noureddine Chouchane, a Tunisian national, believed to be responsible for the two fatal attacks against foreigners in Tunisia last year. The Pentagon’s Press Secretary Peter Cook announced with optimism:

‘Destruction of the camp and Chouchane’s removal will eliminate an experienced facilitator and is expected to have an immediate impact on ISIL’s ability to facilitate its activities in Libya, including recruiting new ISIL members, establishing bases in Libya, and potentially planning external attacks on U.S. interest in the region.’[1]

However, the effect on relations with local ground actors in Libya, as well as the potential impact this strike would have on the protracted Libyan diplomatic process were not accounted for. The February 19th strike restored relative global faith in the U.S.’s military power, yet it also added fuel to the already bipolar sentiment amongst Libyans with respect to foreign involvement. Libya’s internationally recognised government, the House of Representatives (HoR) condemned the U.S. for failing to coordinate with Libyan authorities in advance of the strike, labelling it ‘a clear and flagrant violation of [the] sovereignty of the Libyan state.[2] This is also not the first example of U.S. military action against IS in Libya as they targeted the extremist group’s alleged leader, Wissam Najm Abd Zayd Al-Zubaydi, also known by his nom de guerre, Abu Nabil, in the south-eastern city of Derna on November 13th 2015. In June 2014, a US airstrike against a compound in close proximity to Ajdabiya killed at least seven Al-Qaeda affiliated militants, including Mokhtar Belmokhtar who is of Algerian citizenship. Belmokhtar has a history of membership in several prominent jihadi groups and was also reportedly a former senior figure in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).[3] It is now, more than ever, abundantly clear that if the US or any other country or international entity attempts aerial or ground campaigns in Libya, it will serve to further antagonize the country’s already vulnerable political and security situation.

The IS Threat

The American and European powers, however, cannot simply turn a blind eye to IS expansion in North Africa and hope it will disappear on its own. In order to establish an effective counterinsurgency strategy, it is imperative that the threat IS presence in North Africa poses to the international community be understood through a pragmatic lens. Firstly, to group IS in Libya with their counterparts in the Levant is an understandable, yet costly mistake. The geopolitical threat posed by IS affiliated militants in Libya is unique due to the strategic location of the country as the gateway to Europe and Africa. IS’s stronghold in Sirte lies just 348 miles southeast of Malta, and over the past year a massive influx of migrants fleeing Libya have arrived on European shores raising fears amongst regional governments, Intel agencies and the general public that IS members may be amongst those escaping persecution.[4] This concern is largely fuelled by the chaos and lack of security in Libya, which has resulted in a void with respect to coastal and border security. IS’s foothold in Libya also allows the easy transition of arms and foreign fighters to and from affiliate groups, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria.[5] Additionally, unlike in Syria and Iraq, there are no obstacles preventing reinforcements and new recruits from reaching IS in Libya.

Furthermore, the rapid expansion of IS in Libya is less a result of their strong military capabilities, and rather due to the organizations ability to exploit the security vacuum in civil war conflict zones. The modus operandi of the organization is division of its enemies. This potent tool has solidified the group’s position against opposing and fractured militias on both sides of the political spectrum in Libya. A unified response from Libyan actors should be essential begin to mitigate the threat, as a key difference between the situation in Syria and Iraq, compared to Libya is that the former have one political leader. Unfortunately, at the moment Libya has no central regime to work with or against, and UN initiatives to create a single unity government have thus far been unsuccessful due to split support from rival factions.[6]

Source: USA Today

International Approaches in Libya

Considering the alarming rate of IS expansion in the Libya, and given its geostrategic significance, it is puzzling that no unified domestic or foreign initiatives have been formed to combat the insurgency. Given the international community’s relative inaction towards IS in Syria and Iraq, their hesitance towards Libya comes as no real surprise. The hope and optimism of the Arab spring that swept across the Middle East in 2011 has been replaced by fear and frustration. A relatively cohesive push to oust Colonel Gaddafi, which unified Libyans during the revolution, has since produced a fractured Libyan society. A dire power struggle has ensued as historic tribal tensions, militia fighting and political differences have been resurrected and amplified. The international community must tread carefully not to upset the fragile peace process whilst also eradicating IS presence in Libya and other areas of the Middle East. Adding to this challenge for the international community is the fact that at present, many Libyans on the ground as well as in both rival governments seem to regard western intervention as a bigger enemy than IS and would rather leave them to expand than unify to combat them. In this regard, the ‘War on Terror’ and its subsequent encroachment by Bush have engrained in Arab psyche an anti-western military stance.

In the absence of widespread ground support, international responses can be split into two fields: either clandestine social initiatives or overt military force. The former approach suggests foreign powers could seek to exploit IS’s social weaknesses. First, unlike most conventional insurgencies, IS shows little concern for ‘winning the hearts and minds of the people’ and instead opts for strict punishments in accordance with their hard-line interpretation of Islamic law (Sharia). Moreover, a more nuanced and covert approach could be the best means for fracturing IS from within. Since the U.S. airstrike last week various reports have emerged claiming the surge in numbers of new IS members, which US intelligence sources state is approximately 5,000, has created divisions within the group.[7] According to the Washington Post, “Three Libyans who said they had joined the Islamic State group told AP that they see most of the new recruits as lacking skills and as opportunists, looking to gain property and money confiscated from IS opponents in Sirte.”[8] This could mark a positive step in the internal erosion of IS, as until now the group’s cohesion has given them a stark advantage over its splintered opponents. Exemplified by militia groups affiliated with the Tripoli based General National Congress and the eastern internationally recognised government, the HoR have routinely experienced internal divisions causing disruptions and resulting in staggered responses to political and security developments.

The second approach advocates for a stronger emphasis on combating IS presence immediately, and turning to political dialogue at a later date. The reverse approach has thus far produced neither a unity government nor a stronger security apparatus. It seems western powers are still struggling to devise a suitable strategy in light of a series of failed efforts during the past fifteen years. Intervention is regarded as interfering, yet inaction allows insurgency to blossom. An attempted top-down diplomatic resolution cannot be representative of Libyan society as a whole or even stabilize a temporary unity government incorporating the most powerful militias and politicians. To deal with the expansion of IS in North Africa, the international community’s response needs to be ‘enemy-centric’ and target the foremost and imminent threat of IS. Only then can the political process resume.

 

 

Laura Hawkes is a Libyan political and security analyst, who is currently pursuing her MA in Terrorism, Security and Society from King’s College London. Hawkes is also a research intern at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence based in London, where she focuses on foreign fighters.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] ‘Statement from Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on Libya Airstrike’, U.S. Department of Defense, (February 19, 2016)

[2] ‘Recognised Libya govt condemns US strike on jihadists’, Yahoo News, (February 20, 2016)

[3] ‘Mokhtar Belmokhtar: Top Islamist ‘killed’ in US strike’, BBC News, (June 14, 2015)

[4] Dearden, L. ‘Isis plans to use immigrant boats from Libya to cause terror in Europe and close shipping routes’, The Independent, (February 18, 2015)

[5] Charbonneau, ‘Arms from Libya could reach Boko Haram, al Qaeda: U.N.’, Reuters, (January 26, 2012)

[6] Murray, R. ‘Libya: A tale of two governments’, Al Jazeera, (April 04, 2015)

[7] El Amrani, I. ‘How Much of Libya Does the Islamic State Control?’, Foreign Policy, (February 18, 2016)

[8] Musa, R. & Keath, L. ‘Libya becoming new front in fight against Islamic State’, Washington Post, (February 20, 2016)