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Beyond Beijing: Russia in the Indo-Pacific

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Russian Missile Cruiser Varyag. Photo Credit: Phil King, licensed via Creative Commons.

Russia’s military power in the Indo-Pacific is often confined analytically to the Sino-Russian relationship vis-a-vis the U.S. While the extent of that relationship remains heavily debated, Russia’s larger role as a security actor in the Indo-Pacific is ignored, despite possessing military relationships with states in the region, particularly with India and Vietnam. These relationships are underpinned by arms deals, joint exercises, and cooperation on policy, indicating a more complex and fluid position for Russia in the Indo-Pacific than the Sino-Russian relationship alone explains. Russia is a multi-dimensional security actor in the Indo-Pacific region and policy to the end of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” should take this into account.

Russia has always had security interests in the East. The 19th century competition between Tsarist Russia and Great Britain for Afghanistan, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Soviet Union’s defeat of Japan’s Kwantung Army in World War II demonstrate a long history of Russian interest in the Indo-Pacific.[1] Russia has demonstrated interest in the Indo-Pacific when the region has been of geopolitical importance. Though Russia officially rejects the concept of the Indo-Pacific as an artificial American construct, its policy suggests a de facto recognition of the theater. As such, the focus on the region in international politics has influenced the Kremlin’s strategic calculus.

The contested southern Kuril Islands between Russia and Japan serve as one locus of Russian interest in the region.[2] Russia deployed Bal and Bastion anti-ship missile systems and drones to the southern Kuril Islands in 2016 and began plans to construct military facilities on the islands.[3] In August 2021, Defence Minister Shoigu announced that Russia would build “51 more pieces of military infrastructure”[4] on the Kuril Islands. Then, in early October 2021, the Russian and Chinese navies held their first-ever joint patrols in the Sea of Japan.[5] Four days later, Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet’s Submarine Force Command, Rear Admiral Arkady Navarsky, told the Russian News Agency (TASS) that Russia’s Pacific Fleet would be receiving four new submarines.[6] Moscow’s increased investments in its Pacific assets are indicative of its desire to be a proactive and influential player in the region.

During his tenure as Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov laid the groundwork for Russia’s “pivot to Asia” in the mid-1990s by initiating stronger relations with China and India.[7] These two remain the only countries named as security partners in Russia’s 2021 National Security Strategy. Russia seeks with China a “comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction” (всеобъемлющее партнерство и стратегический взаимодействие) and with India, a “particularly privileged strategic partnership” (особо привилегированное стратегическое партнерство). Such specifications suggest Russia’s relationship with these two Asian countries are different in nature, though it remains ambiguous, which ultimately Russia favours.[8] In the Asia-Pacific, Russia aims to contribute to stability and security on a non-aligned basis (на внеблоковой основе).[9]

Russia and India have had a strong but imperfect relationship since the Cold War era, the foundation of which is arms sales.[10] In 2019 India purchased two Admiral Grigorovich class guided-missile frigates for the Indian Navy[11] and in early 2021 India agreed to spend $5.5 billion on the Russian S-400 air defence system, against U.S. wishes.[12] Between 2013-2017 35 percent of Russian arms exports went to India, with only 12 percent going to China.[13] Nor was the relationship limited to arms sales. In September 2021 India participated in the Russian-led ZAPAD 2021 military exercise,[14] a month after the 12th annual Indo-Russian joint military exercise Indra-21 was held in Volgograd.[15] Bala Venkatesh Varma, outgoing Ambassador to Russia, told TASS that the Joint Commission on Technology and Science, and agreements on military technical cooperation and reciprocal defence logistical support are anticipated to be announced later this year.[16]

Much like the Indo-Russian relationship, the Russo-Vietnamese defence relationship dates back to the Cold War and is grounded predominantly in arms sales. Vietnam alone is responsible for 61 percent of Russian arms sales to Southeast Asia over the past two decades.[17] However, like the Indian relationship, more is afoot than simple weapons deals. Indeed, the first ever joint Russian-Vietnamese military exercise was held in December 2019 in the port of Cam Ranh.[18] Prior to said exercise, in June 2021, Shoigu and his Vietnamese counterpart Colonel General Phan Van Giang held a video conference on deepening military and military-technical cooperation.[19] Later that month, Deputy Minister of National Defence Senior Lieutenant Le Huy Vinh hosted Anatoly Chuprynov, the resident representative of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation in Hanoi.[20]

Both India and Vietnam value their security relationships with Russia. The Russia-India bilateral summit in December 2021 is preceded by Russia and India’s first ministerial 2+2 dialogue, a format India previously only used with the U.S., Japan, and Australia. Moreover, India has opted to not only purchase Russian arms but invest in joint military technological development. The BrahMos cruise missile joint production venture[21] and the Joint Commission on Technology and Science are investments that suggest New Delhi views Russia as a serious contributor to India’s long-term defence capabilities. Much like India, Vietnam initiated the June 2021 Shoigu-Van Giang conference and has made its desire to purchase the BrahMos cruise missile well-known.[22] New Delhi and Hanoi are making efforts to sell cooperation with Russia to its domestic audiences, as well. Indian media outlets made note of China’s status as a mere observer to ZAPAD 2021, while India and Russia demonstrated joint operability.[23] Equally, the Vietnamese Communist Party’s party website described strategic cooperation with Russia as the “top priority”[24] of the party and state after Vietnamese Defence Minister Ngo Xuan Lich’s February 2020 Moscow trip.

The seriousness with which New Delhi and Hanoi address their relationships with Moscow is telling—Russia is considered as a possible restraint on growing Chinese military power in the region and as a “third-way” in the U.S.-China competition more generally. Vietnam explicitly pursues a multi-pronged foreign policy that does not give one external power too much influence over the country’s security and like Russia, India favours multipolarity.[25] Both view it as beneficial to keep Russia invested in the region.

The West’s efforts to estrange Moscow and Beijing may be futile if not counterproductive, but there are reasons why the former may choose to distance itself from the latter to the end of its own interests. Both Russian and Chinese authorities reject bipolarity as the present or coming world architecture, though China’s status may no longer be “for China to choose.”[26] An international structure in which China levels with or passes the U.S. in national power is unsatisfactory to Russia because Moscow aims for multipolarity and great power status. It is difficult to imagine China ceding influence to other states if this is achieved. Russia’s ambitions would then be frustrated by Beijing’s power, prompting antagonistic behavior towards China from Moscow.

The Sino-Russian relationship may otherwise weaken gradually as the economic relationship becomes more lopsided, with China eventually halting its purchase of Russian military hardware – in favour of domestically procured items -and climate change reducing the attractiveness of Russia’s fossil fuel reserves.[27] Such conditions incentivise Russia to keep China at arms-length. India and Vietnam are unlikely to cut security ties with Russia, despite pressure from the U.S. to do so, because they view Russia as a counterweight to both China and the U.S., a role it served for these states during the Cold War.[28] Moreover, Russia’s relationships with India and Vietnam do not threaten Russia’s great power ambitions, implying a certain level of durability.

When estimating the extent to which Russia may support China in competition or open conflict with the U.S., Russia’s assorted interests in the Indo-Pacific must be considered. The Sino-Russian relationship is worthy of attention, but there should be greater analytical curiosity regarding Russia’s other Indo-Pacific relationships and how they may affect Moscow’s decision-making, especially if China obfuscates Russia’s strategic end-goal of multipolarity. A scenario in which Russia restrains rather than emboldens China is a very real possibility. Stranger things have happened.

[1] “A Soviet Push Helped Force Japan to Surrender,” The Moscow Times (The Moscow Times, August 8, 2005), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/a-soviet-push-helped-force-japan-to-surrender/210764.html.

[2] Tom Holcombe, “Ending a 60 Year Stalemate: Japan’s Push to Get a Peace Treaty with Russia,” The Interpreter (The Interpreter, January 16, 2018), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ending-60-year-stalemate-japans-push-get-peace-treaty-russia.

[3] “Russia to Beef up Military, Recession Be Damned,” CBS News (CBS Interactive, March 25, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-to-beef-up-military-recession-be-damned/.

[4] Olzhas Auyezov, “Russia Expands Military Construction Plans on Kuril Islands - Report,” Reuters (Reuters, August 9, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russia-expands-military-construction-plans-kuril-islands-report-2021-08-09/.

[5] Polina Devitt, “Russian, Chinese Warships Hold First Joint Patrols in the Pacific,” Reuters (Reuters, October 24, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-chinese-warships-hold-first-joint-patrols-pacific-2021-10-23/.

[6] “Russia’s Pacific Fleet to Receive Four Nuclear Subs in Coming Years, Says Rear Admiral,” TASS (TASS Russian News Agency, October 27, 2021), https://tass.com/defense/1354851.

[7] Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Asia Strategy: Bolstering the Eagle’s Eastern Wing,” Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 94 (2016). https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/russieneivisions/russias-asia-strategy-bolstering-eagles-eastern-wing. 17.

[8] It is important to note that Russia rejected the reframing of the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean as one region, the Indo-Pacific, as a U.S.-made artificial construct. Nevertheless, its balancing act of its relationships to other actors suggests that it seeks to expand its power in the regional framework and not through separate campaigns.

[9] President of the Russian Federation, On the National Security of the Russian Federation, 2021, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202107030001, 44.

[10] Sameer Lalwani et al., “The Influence of Arms: Explaining the Durability of India–Russia Alignment,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, January 15, 2021, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2473328/the-influence-of-arms-explaining-the-durability-of-indiarussia-alignment/#sdendnote169anc.

[11] Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia Kicks off Work on 2 Guided Missile Frigates for Indian Navy,” The Diplomat (The Diplomat, July 15, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/russia-kicks-off-work-on-2-guided-missile-frigates-for-indian-navy/.

[12] Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Russian Arms Sale Clouds U.S.-India Ties,” Foreign Policy (Foreign Policy, March 19, 2021), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/19/russia-india-defense-secretary-lloyd-austin-s-400-china-arms-sales/.

[13] Leon Aron, “Are Russia and China Really Forming an Alliance?” Foreign Affairs (Council on Foreign Relations, April 4, 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-04-04/are-russia-and-china-really-forming-alliance.

[14] “Indian Army to Participate in Multi-Nation Exercise ‘Zapad 2021’ in Russia,” Mint (Mint, September 1, 2021), https://www.livemint.com/news/india/indian-army-to-participate-in-multi-nation-military-exercise-zapad-2021-in-russia-11630511720499.html.

[15] Press Trust of India, “India, Russia to Hold 13-Day Mega Joint Military Exercise from August 1,” NDTV.com (NDTV, July 29, 2021), https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/indra-2021-india-russia-to-hold-13-day-mega-military-exercise-in-volgograd-from-august-1-2498159.

[16] “India’s Envoy to Russia Looks Forward to Inking Defense Deals at December Summit,” TASS (TASS Russian News Agency, November 1, 2021), https://tass.com/defense/1356659.

[17] Ian Storey, “Russia’s Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: A Tenuous Lead in Arms Sales but Lagging in Other Areas,” ISEAS (Yusof Ishak Institute, April 8, 2021), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-33-russias-defence-diplomacy-in-southeast-asia-a-tenuous-lead-in-arms-sales-but-lagging-in-other-areas-by-ian-storey/.

[18] “The joint Russian-Vietnamese exercise to assist a submarine will be held in the port of Cam Ranh,” Press Service of the Eastern Military District (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, December 5, 2019), https://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12265198@egNews.

[19] “Russia’s Defense Chief Vows to Strengthen Military Interaction with Vietnam,” TASS (TASS Russian News Agency, June 11, 2021), https://tass.com/defense/1301681.

[20] “Vietnam, Russia Forge Stronger Military-Technical Ties,” Thông tấn xã Việt Nam (TTXVN) (Vietnam News Agency (VNA), June 23, 2021), https://vnanet.vn/en/anh/vna-photos-1027/vietnam-russia-forge-stronger-military-technical-ties-5514850.html.

[21] “Russian-Indian Joint Venture Brahmos,” NPO Mashinostroyenia, http://www.npomash.ru/cooperation/en/brahmos.htm.

[22] Snehesh Alex Philip, “Rajnath Singh Assures ‘Friend’ Vietnam of Help Modernising Its Armed Forces,” ThePrint (ThePrint, November 27, 2020), https://theprint.in/defence/rajnath-singh-assures-friend-vietnam-of-help-modernising-its-armed-forces/553405/.

[23] Divyanshu Jindal, “India at Zapad-2021: What It Means for Our Ties with Russia & China,” The Quint (The Quint, September 20, 2021), https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-russia-military-exercise-zapad-2021-geopolitical-implications#read-more.

[24] Ralph Jennings, “Vietnam Advancing Ties with Russia to Hedge against China, US,” VOA (Voice of America News, February 21, 2020), https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_vietnam-advancing-ties-russia-hedge-against-china-us/6184625.html.

[25] Elizabeth Roche, “India Supports Multipolar World Order: Shringla,” Mint (Mint, June 23, 2021), https://www.livemint.com/news/world/india-supports-multipolar-world-order-shringla-11624450754028.html.

[26] Zhao Huasheng and Andrey Kortunov, “The Coming Bipolarity and Its Implications: Views from China and Russia,” Russian International Affairs Council (Russian International Affairs Council, November 23, 2020), https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/the-coming-bipolarity-and-its-implications-views-from-china-and-russia/.

[27] Jonathan E. Hillman, “China and Russia: Economic Unequals,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (July 15, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-and-russia-economic-unequals; Interview with Paul Haenle, Dmitri Trenin, Eugene Rumer, Alexander Gabuev, Are China-Russia Relations Getting Too Close for Comfort?, podcast audio, Carnegie Endowment, October 30, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/30/are-china-russia-relations-getting-too-close-for-comfort-pub-80238.

[28] Embassy New Delhi to Department of State, Telegram 026315, October 28, 1985, “Gandhi’s Visit to Moscow,” Carter Presidential Library (accessed November 12, 2021), https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/18128-document-02-ambassador-dean-cable-subject-gandhi.; Stephen J. Morris, “The Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese Triangle in the 1970s: The View from Moscow,” Working Paper No. 25, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (April 1999).

If America is back, the EU must look forward

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Rock Cohen / NATO EUFOR ceremony 31-MARCH-2003 / Licensed under Creative Commons

The role of military force as a deterrent necessitates a forward-looking strategy that breaks free from the logic of legislating for the last crisis.

‘America is back’.

Joe Biden’s tweet on November 24th was meant to symbolise a return to the multilateral system - with the US in the driving seat - on issues ranging from climate change to defence cooperation. The sentiment was hammered home by his speech at the Munich Security Conference, touting the commitment of the US to the western alliance system. His most recent actions - notably signalling a willingness to enter negotiations with Iran brokered by the EU - support the idea of a normalisation of the transatlantic relationship, not least through a diplomatic charm offensive coinciding with the G7 summit.

However, despite the defeat of Trump, the transatlantic military relationship is beset by the legacy of four years of tense relations and is undermined by scepticism about the usefulness of NATO in the 21st century. Media narratives surrounding the willingness of the USA to go to war over the territorial integrity of far-flung countries like Latvia are symbolic of a loss of trust in the ability of NATO to deter military aggression. This is only amplified by long-standing demands for Europeans to shoulder the burden by spending 2% of GDP on defence and Macron’s comments about NATO’s ‘brain death’.

With a resurgent Russia and ascending China, navigating the current global order requires greater transatlantic cooperation - perhaps more than ever before. Yet, the west’s response to threats ranging from increasing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea to Russian aggression in Ukraine and disinformation campaigns throughout Europe risks being stunted by divisions stemming from a security architecture built for the Cold War.

An EU Army?

One way to strengthen European military capacity and potentially rekindle transatlantic cooperation is to create an EU army within NATO structures; a proposal spearheaded by (amongst others) the liberals in the European Parliament and echoed by the Commission’s calls for ‘Strategic Autonomy’.

On the one hand, it would be a way to ensure that the 162 billion euros spent by EU members on defence are invested in a more efficient way. Integrating R&D, procurement and command structures would augment operational capacity whilst lowering the cost per capita. Increased military effectiveness, in turn, enables greater engagement with the USA, lowering the tension surrounding the 2% target.

On the other hand, a European army would encourage the USA to come to the defence of all EU member states, no matter how small, much like other NATO members would come to the defence of an invasion of Alaska. The need for such concrete deterrence vis-à-vis Russia is augmented by the US ‘Pivot to Asia’, formulated by Barack Obama and continued by Biden. The focus on containing an increasingly aggressive China has relegated the European theatre from the US perspective as domestic political attention embraces the narrative of a second Cold War. Importantly, integrating European defence policy would enable greater power projection in contested Asian regions such as the Indo-Pacific.

Despite a broad consensus on the need for a more integrated European defence policy, notably in France and Germany, concrete progress remains a pipe dream held by European federalists in university classrooms. So far, the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has a narrow mandate with a focus on joint humanitarian, peace-keeping and rescue missions. Meanwhile, the activation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017, intended to develop combat-ready European task forces, has been stunted by an inability of Member States to agree on operation parameters due to different risk-appetites and concerns over deployment cost.

So far this may all sound reasonable enough. But why hasn’t it happened until now? What makes cooperation on defence policy so difficult?

Institutional Inertia

One reason for piecemeal EU defence integration is the unanimity requirement for any decision-making in the European Council on related matters. By endowing each of the 27 Member States with an effective veto, policy formulation becomes bogged down in a ‘Joint Decision Trap’ as formulated by Fritz Scharpf. If each decision requires unanimous agreement, the set of outcomes everyone can agree to become small and often non-existent. The result is slow, fractured progress, with many of the benefits of defence integration being watered down by proposals for ‘two-speed’ integration.

Moving away from unanimity by instituting qualified majority voting, whereby at least 55% of Member States representing 66% of the EU’s population can make decisions on behalf of the EU, would be a way to overcome the gridlock. However, such a move would require treaty change which is itself subject to unanimity, enabling fears held by smaller member states about encroachments on national sovereignty to stall reform.

‘Never Waste a Crisis’

Yet despite being beset by institutional inertia, European integration has powered forward in other policy areas, notably monetary and fiscal. One explanation given by scholars highlights the role of crises in forcing decisive action.

An example is the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis, which led to the creation of the European Banking Authority. The role of banks and the European financial system in the Euro crisis necessitated a watchdog that monitored financial institutions on a European level to identify systemic risks before they become critical. The threat of Spanish default forced the German chancellor Merkel to agree to the establishment of such an institution despite long-standing opposition on the grounds of creating moral hazard.

Similarly, the coronavirus pandemic forced previously ‘hawkish’ northern EU Member States to u-turn and agree to the issuance of debt on an EU-level, a huge step towards the creation of a true fiscal union. Fears over a renewed sovereign debt crisis meant that the costs of inaction grew dramatically, shifting veto points and leading to consensus. The increased costs of inaction even led politicians to ignore hostile public opinion, as shown by Germany’s willingness to support Eurobonds despite 65% of the public being opposing the idea.

But is betting on a ‘Europe forged in crisis’, as prophesied by Jean Monnet, a feasible approach for defence integration?

A Defence Crisis

The kind of ‘reactive’ policy-making which may work in economic policy areas - where an already-integrated EU can tweak existing institutions to soothe markets - would not work to react to the type of crisis severe enough to shift veto positions on defence policy.

Firstly, because crises in the defence field are often existential - picture a military invasion of Latvia - waiting for such a crisis to shift positions in favour of an EU army would be ineffective. The role of military force as a deterrent necessitates a forward-looking strategy that breaks free from the logic of legislating for the last crisis.

Even if the nature of military confrontation has changed (as many argue), the type of hybrid warfare pursued by Russia does not shift veto positions sufficiently to inspire substantial reform. Incremental disinformation campaigns, political interference and false flag attacks wrapped up in plausible deniability make any decisive attribution of blame difficult. When compared to the furious reactions to Greek default during the Euro crisis, European responses to Russian activities in Ukraine or Estonia do not even register.

The nature of modern, hybrid military conflicts makes policymaking on the back of a sense of urgency difficult. The fact that the invasion of Ukraine, support of far-right parties throughout Europe and targeted disinformation campaigns seeking to undermine trust in democratic institutions has not led to substantial progress on defence integration speaks for itself.

Member States have an obligation to look beyond the political business cycle to kickstart the long process towards European military integration. A starting point could be developing an ERASMUS scheme for soldiers during training whilst lowering barriers to joint battle group deployment. The French-led operation ‘Barkhani’, aiming to support the government of Mali in fighting Islamist militants, is a promising first step. The time for pre-emptive policymaking is now - by the time the costs of inaction become high enough, it could already be too late.

Sino-ASEAN relations: a marriage in crisis?

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The 18th ASEAN-China Summit in Kuala Lumpur, November 2015 , Licensed via Creative Commons

The partnership between China and ASEAN countries has seen its ups and downs.

The period between 2003 and 2013 was hailed as a “Golden Decade” of Sino-ASEAN relations, where the two parties built political trust and strong economic ties. Concurrently, the decade between 2014 and 2024 was optimistically introduced as the “Diamond Decade”, with ambitions to further promote partnership and friendship between the two. However, events did not proceed as either had hoped. Instead, during the so-called Diamond Decade, the once prosperous relationship has become a rocky marriage. Geographical neighbors with an ongoing territorial dispute in the South China Sea, China and ASEAN nations have recently grown mutually suspicious and, after the harmony of the Golden Decade, the Diamond Decade seems to have ended in a vicious cycle of distrust.

Dialogue between ASEAN and China began in 1991. By 2002 the two began to work towards a free trade agreement. Eventually established in 2010, today the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) is the world’s largest FTA by population, and the third largest by economic size, after the North American Free-Trade Area (USMCA) and the European Union (EU). China and ASEAN countries have also proved highly complementary in energy cooperation, with ASEAN countries richness in natural resources met by China’s insatiable demand for enormous amounts of energy to power its economic machine. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei are abundant in oil and gas, while Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar boast hydropower resources. China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and Sinopec, have participated in oil and gas production since the 1990s in countries like Indonesia, from land and shallow water to deep sea. Thus, where ASEAN countries lack proper infrastructure, China provides oil and gas exploration technology.

Unfortunately for both sides, economic cooperation is not enough to tie together a geopolitical relationship. Over recent years, having become the dominant regional power, China has implemented a “Push and Pull Strategy” towards ASEAN countries. Through the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, China “pushes” and advances its position at the expenses of ASEAN interests, displaying growing assertiveness. While, on the other side, China “pulls” ASEAN countries towards its orbit, using massive development projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Thus, in the eyes of ASEAN countries, Beijing today represents an emerging threat while remaining a key trading partner – a source of opportunities, and a source of challenges. The union between China and ASEAN countries continues, yet in the Diamond Decade the spectre of doubt starts to creep in.

The US Navy, US Coast Guard, Royal Malaysian Navy, and Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency are sailing side-by-side in the Strait of Malacca. Photo Credit: US Pacific Fleet, licensed via Creative Commons

The intervention of major powers in the region has added a new layer of complexity to the situation, dividing the region even further. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the Quad, has recently been revitalized, as anti-Chinese sentiments have hardened not only in the United States, but also in Australia, India, and Japan. Additionally, the navies of France, Germany, UK, and the Netherlands are deploying naval forces to the South China Sea to support Quad activity. Recently, the warships of India, Japan, Australia and the US have been exercising near the Strait of Malacca, which is a key waterway for Beijing, with 80% of its oil supply passing through it. If tensions in the region were to escalate, this narrow passage could be strangled by China’s rivals, affecting Beijing’s energy security, a possibility that former Chinese President Hu Jintao branded the “Malacca Dilemma”. In order to reduce its dependence on the Strait, today China is searching for new land routes for its energy imports, especially through its Belt and Road Initiative. To achieve this, Beijing has turned to ASEAN countries, planning huge investments in Southeast Asian infrastructure. Myanmar, for example, will host the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a section of the Belt and Road Initiative that is intended to connect the oil trade from the Indian Ocean to China via Myanmar, thus reducing Chinese dependence on the Strait of Malacca.

“Don’t force us to choose”, ASEAN countries have repeatedly asked. Unfortunately, as US-China tensions flare up time and again, neutrality doesn’t seem a viable option. The bloc seems to follow an ambivalent policy. Some of the 10 member states, like Cambodia, Laos, and the Philippines, opted to stay in the Chinese orbit, hungry for economic gains. Others, like Vietnam and Singapore, appear more interested in Western protection against a rising China, and tend to align with Washington. Although these positions are likely to shift over time, the only certainty is that ASEAN is now trapped in the middle of a power struggle. However, there might be a way for Southeast Asian countries to escape the trap. ASEAN nations could choose to collaborate with middle powers such as Australia and Japan, thus creating middle-power agency and reducing the need of a binary choice between the US and China. They could therefore keep their security ties with the US, while at the same time maintaining their economic relations with China.

ASEAN originally emerged as a response to the tensions of the Cold War, when a confrontation between capitalism and communism could threaten the balance of the newly independent states of Southeast Asia. Quite ironically, today the ASEAN region, and the South China Sea in particular, are again becoming a proxy for great power competition. This could split ASEAN countries along different ideological lines once again, just as happened during the first Cold War. Trapped in the power struggle of the 21st century, they now find themselves walking a tightrope. Unlike the Golden Decade, the Diamond decade seems to be one of uncertainty, where the union between China and ASEAN nations is increasingly vulnerable to the forces of geopolitics.

U.S. governmental incentives on semiconductors are central to Great Power Competition

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Photo by Laura Ockel on Unsplash

Microchips, also called semiconductors or integrated circuits, can be thinner than a human hair and smaller than a postage stamp, but their power can be immeasurable. They play a significant role in the advancement of the consumer technologies sector and, most importantly, in the development of more sophisticated branches of technology with potentially significant implications for national security, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and quantum computing. Therefore, although domestic and foreign policy might not always be connected, in the case of the U.S. semiconductor industry, domestic decisions are vital both for U.S. national security and for the evolution of great power relations in general, and U.S.-China relations in particular.

The largest chipmaker in China, the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), was added to the U.S. Entity List by the Trump administration in late December 2020 as a final move of the toughest measures taken towards Beijing, fearful that the Biden administration would soften the policy towards China. Biden, however, has not only dismantled such tough decision on the technology front, but his administration is also working on domestic measures around the semiconductor industry that will be central to U.S.-China technological competition.

In September 2020, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (NDAA) came into law, authorising investments in both domestic chips manufacturing incentives and in advanced microelectronics research and development. Soon after Biden took office, the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) followed up by stressing the need for the new U.S. administration to prioritise funding to such provisions. This came in light of the sharp decline in the U.S. share of the global chip manufacturing, which can affect the U.S. ability to produce newly advanced technologies vital to strengthen both U.S. military capabilities and its great power status overall. In fact, although the United States is the currently the global leader in semiconductors, owning around 47% of the global chips market share, U.S. chips manufacturing has been decreasing, and this might affect the American leadership in the sector already in the medium run. According to SIA, while in 1990 the United States accounted for the 37% of the global chip manufacturing, in 2020 this share has fallen to 12%. By contrast, China’s share has increased from 2% to 15% between 1990 and 2020, and it is expected to grow up to 24% in 2030, surpassing both South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. In the same period, the American allotment in global chip manufacturing is expected to decline to 9% if governmental intervention will not be put in place.

This shift is the result of both lower incentives for the U.S. semiconductor sector and tougher measures towards China undertaken under Trump. The Covid-19 pandemic has further aggravated the situation, eventually bringing chips under the spotlight in U.S. government. The high increase in demand for consumer technologies – mainly laptops and smartphones – during the pandemic has led to a critical chips supply shortage in the U.S., leading Biden to sign an executive order that received bipartisan support in Congress in late February. The order authorised the use of $37 billion to foster the American manufacturing of semiconductors, and has furthermore launched a 100-day review on the status of supply chains in four areas that are essential to American competitiveness: semiconductors; key minerals and materials extracted from rare earths; pharmaceuticals; and advanced batteries. The order was signed the day after U.S. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer declared to have directed lawmakers to draft a package of an additional $100 billion as part of a bipartisan bill to implement the NDAA by fostering research and investment in U.S. manufacturing in key high tech areas – not only semiconductors but also Artificial Intelligence and quantum computing - in order “to out-compete China and create new American jobs”.

The crucial passage to rebalance the geopolitics of semiconductors and strengthen American technological competitiveness face to China, thus, lies in American domestic politics. The review launched with Biden’s signature of the executive order is aimed at diversifying and fortifying supply chains, and the SIA insisted particularly upon increasing American chips manufacturing through the mobilisation of federal incentives. About 44% of U.S.- headquartered firms are located in the United States, but the cost to build and operate a front-end fabrication facility (fab) in the U.S. is 25% - 50% more expensive than in other alternative locations. Singapore, for instance, which hosts the majority of U.S. chips fabs based abroad (17%), has introduced hiring credits and a reduced tax rate in the semiconductors manufacturing sector, while American incentives of this kind are almost non-existent. For this reason, the measures announced by Biden and Congress play a very important role in increasing U.S.-made chips and thus fortifying American leadership in the sector by avoiding a shortfall of the U.S. share in the global chip manufacturing at a time when China’s will surely increase as a result of the plan to reach the self-sufficiency in semiconductors outlined in China’s 14th Five Year Plan.

This turn in the American semiconductor policy, however, should not be analysed through a ‘new Cold War’ lens, as China is not only the biggest U.S. competitor in chips manufacturing, but it is also a top costumer of the U.S. semiconductor industry. According to a report from the Boston Consulting Group, prohibiting U.S. chips sales to China could cause the loss of around $80 billion to the U.S. semiconductor industry, compromising the U.S. long-standing leadership position with a loss of about 18% in the American global market share of microchips. For the U.S., the solution to face the challenges posed by China on the high-tech side is found not only in a tougher policy towards Beijing, but in the U.S. semiconductor policy, which will in turn have important side effects on U.S.-China policy. As the Biden administration is likely to adopt a tough but multilateral approach to China – not only on technology but also on a variety of transnational challenges – the oculate application of the resources recently announced by the U.S. government on chips manufacturing can be pivotal both to the maintenance of the U.S. power status and to the re-definition of great power competition.

US Foreign Policy: The impact of the War on Terror on the Uyghur people

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By Carlotta Rinaudo

Flickr, 2009.

In June 2019 former President Donald Trump publicly signed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, imposing sanctions on Chinese officials responsible for the oppression of the Muslim minority in the Xinjiang region. Behind the closed doors of the G-20 summit in Osaka however, Trump seemed to have a different agenda. According to former national security adviser John Bolton, Trump told Chinese leader Xi Jinping that re-educating the Muslim minority “was exactly the right thing to do”. He then allegedly asked Xi Jinping to help him win the elections in 2020.
Unfortunately, this is not the first instance of inconsistent U.S. policy towards the Uyghur people and Central Asia.

For centuries, the Xinjiang region was an arid and sparsely populated land, traversed by a network of lonely trade routes that transported Chinese silk to the Roman world. Its inhabitants, the Uyghurs, were oasis farmers and herders who spoke a Turkic language and practiced Sunni and Sufi Islam, sharing cultural and ethnic ties with the other Turkic tribes of Central Asia.

In 1759 the Xinjiang region was annexed by the Qing Dynasty, while the territories of the other Turkic tribes of Central Asia were slowly absorbed by the Russian Empire, thus becoming known as “Russian Turkestan”.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian Turkestan became what today is called Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and the southern part of Kazakhstan. As the Uyghurs watched their Turkic neighbours achieve self-determination, they too demanded independence. China’s reaction to this has grown increasingly assertive over recent years, sparking a heated debate between Washington and Beijing.

On one side, the Chinese government insisted that Uyghur separatists are engaged in terrorist activities, responsible for various bombings and assassinations, and connected with Chechen rebels, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban. In particular, Beijing focuses on a Uyghur separatist group known as the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). In the 1990s, representatives of ETIM travelled to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and eventually Afghanistan, where they met with Osama Bin Laden in order to gain support for their insurgency in Xinjiang. This framing allowed Beijing to legitimise a massive education program which it claims is necessary to fight terrorism and eradicate extremism in the region.

But where Beijing says there are “vocational education and training centres”, and “de-radicalisation measures”, Washington instead sees “detention camps”, and “cultural genocide”. In particular, the Trump administration accused China of human rights abuses, torture, systematic rape, and forced sterilization against the Uyghur minority.

In this dire situation, however, what’s often overlooked is the United States’ own complicity in the origins of the very repression that it publicly condemns.
Following the 9/11 attacks, Beijing labelled Uyghur separatists as terrorist threats. In response, President George W. Bush said that China should not use the War on Terror as an “excuse to persecute minorities”. However, by 2002, Washington had changed its tune. Seeking China’s support in its invasion of Iraq, the US listed ETIM as a terrorist group, and assisted in having ETIM recognised as a terrorist threat by the Security Council. In addition, since 2002, the US has detained 22 Uyghurs in Guantanamo Bay. Blinded by its own interests in Iraq, Washington favoured the initial international legitimisation of repression against the Uyghur minority – the same repression it today condemns.


Washington’s inconsistent foreign policy extended well beyond the Xinjiang region. Following the 9/11 attacks, President Bush built a strong relation with Islam Karimov, the first President of Uzbekistan, whose secret police regularly persecuted political opponents, torturing them in sound-proof cells with electric shocks, asphyxiation, and food deprivation. Nonetheless, Washington turned a blind eye to such oppressive violence.

Sitting on the Northern border of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan provided in fact an ideal location to establish a military base and a supply route that could support the American invasion of Afghanistan. Washington’s silence was a trade-off for Uzbekistan’s logistical support against Afghanistan. Once again blinded by its own interests, the US called its foreign policy a “policy of strategic patience”, perhaps an euphemism for what in reality was a policy of “strategic complicity”.

Today, Washington accuses Beijing of practices that are very similar to those committed by Karimov in Uzbekistan. The only difference being that China is a rival superpower, while Uzbekistan was an ally that served American interests in the War on Terror.

As a part of its policies in Xinjiang, Beijing has announced a poverty relief plan that aims to lift Uyghurs out of poverty by sending them to work in various factories all over China.
But again, what Beijing calls “promotion of poverty alleviation”, Washington today calls “forced labour.”
Ironically, some factories where such “forced labour” occurs are part of the supply chains of American companies like Apple, Nike, and Coca-Cola. American firms are therefore, consciously or unconsciously, benefitting from the same labour that their government claims to be a form of slavery.

In September 2020, the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act was approved by the House of Representatives, in an attempt to impose stricter controls on goods that could be produced by forced labour. In turn, Beijing claims that Washington is instrumentalising the narrative of “forced labour” to ban Chinese imports amidst a ferocious US-China trade competition. Meanwhile, companies like Nike, Apple, and Coca-Cola have already started to lobby the US Congress in order to weaken the bill. It could undermine their supply chain, they say.

This chaotic situation not only demonstrates that the US and China remain heavily interconnected in their supply network, but it also shed lights on the wide-reaching repercussions of the War on Terror. In 2002, when the US’ enemy number one was Al Qaeda, Washington was ready to label Uyghur separatist groups as terrorist groups, and to justify China’s actions against them. But in 2020, when the US’ primary perceived threat is China itself, Washington has removed that same separatist group from the list, accusing Beijing of human rights abuses.

As the Biden Administration aims to reengage in the defence of human rights, a more consistent policy in Central Asia should be established – one that learns from past mistakes. After all, a global policeman should not be driven by their own agenda, but by the values they claim to protect.

Carlotta is a MA candidate in International Affairs at the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London. After completing her BA in Interpreting and Translation, she moved to the Middle East and developed a strong interest in the MENA region, North Korea, Cybersecurity, and the implications of the rise of China. Carlotta has written on a number of Italian publications on the Hong Kong protests and other forms of political unrest.