• Skip to primary navigation
  • Skip to main content
  • Skip to footer
  • Home
  • About
    • Editorial Staff
      • Bryan Strawser, Editor in Chief, Strife
      • Dr Anna B. Plunkett, Founder, Women in Writing
      • Strife Journal Editors
      • Strife Blog Editors
      • Strife Communications Team
      • Senior Editors
      • Series Editors
      • Copy Editors
      • Strife Writing Fellows
      • Commissioning Editors
      • War Studies @ 60 Project Team
      • Web Team
    • Publication Ethics
    • Open Access Statement
  • Archive
  • Series
  • Strife Journal
  • Strife Policy Papers
    • Strife Policy Papers: Submission Guidelines
    • Vol 1, Issue 1 (June 2022): Perils in Plain Sight
  • Contact us
  • Submit to Strife!

Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

  • Announcements
  • Articles
  • Book Reviews
  • Call for Papers
  • Features
  • Interviews
  • Strife Policy Papers
    • Strife Policy Papers: Submission Guidelines
    • Vol 1, Issue 1 (June 2022): Perils in Plain Sight
You are here: Home / Archives for asean

asean

Sino-ASEAN relations: a marriage in crisis?

June 14, 2021 by Carlotta Rinaudo

The 18th ASEAN-China Summit in Kuala Lumpur, November 2015 , Licensed via Creative Commons

The partnership between China and ASEAN countries has seen its ups and downs.

The period between 2003 and 2013 was hailed as a “Golden Decade” of Sino-ASEAN relations, where the two parties built political trust and strong economic ties. Concurrently, the decade between 2014 and 2024 was optimistically introduced as the “Diamond Decade”, with ambitions to further promote partnership and friendship between the two. However, events did not proceed as either had hoped. Instead, during the so-called Diamond Decade, the once prosperous relationship has become a rocky marriage. Geographical neighbors with an ongoing territorial dispute in the South China Sea, China and ASEAN nations have recently grown mutually suspicious and, after the harmony of the Golden Decade, the Diamond Decade seems to have ended in a vicious cycle of distrust.

Dialogue between ASEAN and China began in 1991. By 2002 the two began to work towards a free trade agreement. Eventually established in 2010, today the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) is the world’s largest FTA by population, and the third largest by economic size, after the North American Free-Trade Area (USMCA) and the European Union (EU). China and ASEAN countries have also proved highly complementary in energy cooperation, with ASEAN countries richness in natural resources met by China’s insatiable demand for enormous amounts of energy to power its economic machine. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei are abundant in oil and gas, while Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar boast hydropower resources. China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and Sinopec, have participated in oil and gas production since the 1990s in countries like Indonesia, from land and shallow water to deep sea. Thus, where ASEAN countries lack proper infrastructure, China provides oil and gas exploration technology.

Unfortunately for both sides, economic cooperation is not enough to tie together a geopolitical relationship. Over recent years, having become the dominant regional power, China has implemented a “Push and Pull Strategy” towards ASEAN countries. Through the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, China “pushes” and advances its position at the expenses of ASEAN interests, displaying growing assertiveness. While, on the other side, China “pulls” ASEAN countries towards its orbit, using massive development projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Thus, in the eyes of ASEAN countries, Beijing today represents an emerging threat while remaining a key trading partner – a source of opportunities, and a source of challenges. The union between China and ASEAN countries continues, yet in the Diamond Decade the spectre of doubt starts to creep in.

The US Navy, US Coast Guard, Royal Malaysian Navy, and Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency are sailing side-by-side in the Strait of Malacca. Photo Credit: US Pacific Fleet, licensed via Creative Commons

The intervention of major powers in the region has added a new layer of complexity to the situation, dividing the region even further. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the Quad, has recently been revitalized, as anti-Chinese sentiments have hardened not only in the United States, but also in Australia, India, and Japan. Additionally, the navies of France, Germany, UK, and the Netherlands are deploying naval forces to the South China Sea to support Quad activity. Recently, the warships of India, Japan, Australia and the US have been exercising near the Strait of Malacca, which is a key waterway for Beijing, with 80% of its oil supply passing through it. If tensions in the region were to escalate, this narrow passage could be strangled by China’s rivals, affecting Beijing’s energy security, a possibility that former Chinese President Hu Jintao branded the “Malacca Dilemma”. In order to reduce its dependence on the Strait, today China is searching for new land routes for its energy imports, especially through its Belt and Road Initiative. To achieve this, Beijing has turned to ASEAN countries, planning huge investments in Southeast Asian infrastructure. Myanmar, for example, will host the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a section of the Belt and Road Initiative that is intended to connect the oil trade from the Indian Ocean to China via Myanmar, thus reducing Chinese dependence on the Strait of Malacca.

“Don’t force us to choose”, ASEAN countries have repeatedly asked. Unfortunately, as US-China tensions flare up time and again, neutrality doesn’t seem a viable option. The bloc seems to follow an ambivalent policy. Some of the 10 member states, like Cambodia, Laos, and the Philippines, opted to stay in the Chinese orbit, hungry for economic gains. Others, like Vietnam and Singapore, appear more interested in Western protection against a rising China, and tend to align with Washington. Although these positions are likely to shift over time, the only certainty is that ASEAN is now trapped in the middle of a power struggle. However, there might be a way for Southeast Asian countries to escape the trap. ASEAN nations could choose to collaborate with middle powers such as Australia and Japan, thus creating middle-power agency and reducing the need of a binary choice between the US and China. They could therefore keep their security ties with the US, while at the same time maintaining their economic relations with China.

ASEAN originally emerged as a response to the tensions of the Cold War, when a confrontation between capitalism and communism could threaten the balance of the newly independent states of Southeast Asia. Quite ironically, today the ASEAN region, and the South China Sea in particular, are again becoming a proxy for great power competition. This could split ASEAN countries along different ideological lines once again, just as happened during the first Cold War. Trapped in the power struggle of the 21st century, they now find themselves walking a tightrope. Unlike the Golden Decade, the Diamond decade seems to be one of uncertainty, where the union between China and ASEAN nations is increasingly vulnerable to the forces of geopolitics.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: ACFTA, asean, Carlotta Rinaudo, China, Free Trade, United States, us, USA

Perception and Misperception in the Asia-Pacific

February 9, 2017 by Jaki Nurhasya

By: Jaki Nurhasya

The Asia-Pacific region has a lot at stakes in perceiving President Trump’s future policy trajectories

Presidential inauguration speeches in the United States of America matter a lot to the global world. It portrays the way in which the President, as one of the world’s democratic leaders, projects the pathways that it would take on strategic issues. As history illustrates, notable speeches such as Roosevelt’s call upon the US to become a great power in 1905 or Kennedy’s pledge for peace in 1961 became a solid basis for future policy trajectory analysis. Indeed, inauguration speeches offer the world a glimpse on a US leadership’s foreign policy trajectory.

Realizing the importance of the particular momentum, one can assume that hundreds of country representatives rushed to write reports and policy recommendations on President Donald J. Trump’s inauguration speech. Each report and policy advice created will try very hard to dissect and analyze every policy implication the speech may impact on their respective country’s dynamics with the United States. Each report will also have to take into account current international dynamics, be it the uncertain security situation in Syria, European surge of nationalism, or the climate change question, all have their dimension and perception with regards to the US’ current leader’s policy options.

In general, many observers have mentioned President Trump’s inauguration speech as a much more nationalistic and populist policy trajectory, intended to secure US interests first. In Trump’s own word: “From this day forward, it’s going to be only America first, America first”, a notion that America will now not be hiding to declare publicly that it will put its interest first, a rather different approach from the past administration’s international cooperation and global interest goals.

As a region in which the US can be considered as a hegemonic power, the Asia-Pacific region has a lot at stakes in perceiving President Trump’s future policy trajectories. Undeniably, US presence in the region has an impact on tilting the regional balance and puts emerging powers in check. The possibility of a power vacuum in the region has been voiced numerous times, especially with the US’ current shifts in military assets. In lieu with these developments, the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his congratulatory message to President Trump iterated the urgency of taking note the increasing severity of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

PM Abe’s message of concern is not without reasoning. In Trump’s words in his speech: “We have defended other nations’ borders while refusing to defend our own.” Aside from its clear reference towards the proposed US-Mexican border enforcement (which may or may not include the US building a massive wall and have the Mexican Government pay for it), the statement can also be interpreted as a clear message toward the US allies’ burden-sharing problem. As Japan and South Korea relies heavily on the US’ security and nuclear umbrella, Trump’s past suggestion of those two countries defending themselves (and even including a nuclear weapon trajectory arming option to be approved by the US) should be a concern given the region’s current dynamic.

The Asia-Pacific region is also a home for emerging world powers, and one of them is even being said will soon take over world leadership responsibilities on several strategic issues. As a Chinese Foreign Ministry senior official recently mentioned, China had no intention of seeking a leadership role, but would not deny its responsibilities once the front-runners stepped back. Arguably, China is already at the current forefront of the global climate change issue. As the new US administration deleted all climate change references from the government’s website, China stepped up its game and allocated resources to improve its status as a power player on climate change issues. As radical as it sounds, this fact shows that policies can radically change even if in a previous time those policies were bolstered as a vital national interest. Arguably, the same is applicable toward security alliances.

There are at least three strategic issues in which the new administration should be taking into account when formulating a new policy framework for Asia-Pacific security.

Firstly, the US alliance has been perceived as one of the cornerstones for the region’s balance of power. A perception that the US will let their most important allies in the region – Japan and South Korea – to be more active in defending itself and develop its military strength will undeniably create rifts in the Asia-Pacific’s current dynamics, especially by taking into account the historical animosity and the webs of border disputes happening between the countries at play.

Secondly, the region’s maritime security dimension has always been perceived as a US strategic interest. A perception that the US will put fewer resources in the region’s maritime security problem will put the dynamics of maritime arms development at risk. The problem is even more worrying; by taking into account current dynamics in the South China Sea problem and China’s ongoing aggressive military expansion maneuvers.

Lastly, regional organizations such as ASEAN rely heavily on U.S. involvement to keep regional powers in check. A perception that the U.S. will be less involved will arguably have an impact on the organization’s cohesion and decision-making process on urgent issues. As has been showed by Manila’s recent maneuvers between superpowers, this is also a crucial dimension of the region needed to be taken care of.

President Trump’s inauguration speech may provide a perception and misperception of risks to the Asia-Pacific’s future security dynamics. As foreign policy is a game of perception and misperception, possibilities of foreign policy hints (such as in the famed series of tweets by the President) will only add to the risk of misperception. Undeniably, time is ticking, and the new US administration will have to race with the possibility of misperception as consequences for Asia Pacific countries.


Jaki Nurhasya is a Master’s candidate in the Science and Security program with the War Studies Department at King’s College London. He is a junior diplomat with the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an FCO 2016/17 Chevening Scholar from Indonesia. The article was originally published in the Jakarta Post. The views expressed are his own.


Image source: http://asean.org/category/asean-statement-communiques/

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: asean, feature, Indonesia

Footer

Contact

The Strife Blog & Journal

King’s College London
Department of War Studies
Strand Campus
London
WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

blog@strifeblog.org

 

Recent Posts

  • Climate-Change and Conflict Prevention: Integrating Climate and Conflict Early Warning Systems
  • Preventing Coup d’Étas: Lessons on Coup-Proofing from Gabon
  • The Struggle for National Memory in Contemporary Nigeria
  • How UN Support for Insider Mediation Could Be a Breakthrough in the Kivu Conflict
  • Strife Series: Modern Conflict & Atrocity Prevention in Africa – Introduction

Tags

Afghanistan Africa Brexit China Climate Change conflict counterterrorism COVID-19 Cybersecurity Cyber Security Diplomacy Donald Trump drones Elections EU feature France India intelligence Iran Iraq ISIL ISIS Israel ma Myanmar NATO North Korea nuclear Pakistan Politics Russia security strategy Strife series Syria terrorism Turkey UK Ukraine United States us USA women Yemen

Licensed under Creative Commons (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivatives) | Proudly powered by Wordpress & the Genesis Framework