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Parsing the Safe Passage

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by Matthew Ader

“They can’t fight!” by Frederick Burr Opper, January 1896, originally published in Puck. (Image credit: National Archives)

Scholars and policymakers around the world are turning to history to understand how to navigate the onrushing collision between the ailing United States of America and an increasingly assertive China. The most famous example, expounded upon at length in Graham Allison’s Destined for War, is the clash between Sparta and Athens as documented by Thucydides. However, the most recent hegemonic transition, that of Britain to the United States, deserves significant attention – it is well-sourced, exhaustively documented, and involves national actors still relevant today. That makes it a valuable case study.

However, little work has yet been done to model this period in a way, which would allow the clean transfer of lessons learnt to the modern context. Even Kori Schake’s Safe Passage, written explicitly with the intent of informing Sino-American competition, is an excellent history before it is a work of political science. The relative paucity of overarching models means that policymakers must either fall back on heuristics or delve into intricate historical details.

This article attempts to split the difference by deriving a broader model of hegemonic transition from the circumstances of the Anglo-American case, with the hope that it will ease comparative work between the historical and contemporary situations.

I argue that the transition can be broken down into five distinct phases:

  1. Potential for competition (1756 – 1823) – the United States begins to grow in capability, but Britain is not yet aware of the potential threat.
  2. Recognition (1823) – Britain recognises the United States as a potential threat.
  3. The window of opportunity (1823 – 1914) – Britain conducts policy to (in most cases) conciliate the United States as the two nations move towards parity.
  4. Moment of transition (1916) – the United States surpasses Britain, as a result of British losses and American industrial growth during the First World War.
  5. Settling into a new order (1917 onwards) – the United States becomes the new global rule-setter, and Britain adjusts its position accordingly.

The United States’ growth in power began before the American Revolution, with the Seven Years War and American independence, but a combination of internal weakness and British distraction with eastern conquests and ambitious Corsicans – not to mention America’s poor performance in the War of 1812 – meant that it took until the 1820s for senior British officials to directly recognise the future potential of the United States as a major disruptive influence. Notably, and seemingly uniquely in terms of hegemonic transitions, this was recognised long before the United States even began to approach military parity with Britain. This may be due to traditional British lack of confidence in its own power, and also the naval character of said power – as Lord Palmerston observed in 1858, the simple reality of American geography rendered it invulnerable to British domination even in the absence of a major US force.

Given that Britain recognised the potential for competition relatively early, they had a large window of opportunity to apply policy. Instead of launching a preventive war, which would have been ineffective given the fact that Britain could not achieve lasting dominance over the United States, they pursued a consistent policy of conciliation. During the Oregon boundary dispute (1846), the Trent Affair (1861), and the Venezuelan Debt Crisis (1895), among other crises, Britain de-escalated even when it held the upper hand in coercive force. British bankers and merchants were encouraged to invest in the United States, even as propaganda about a joint Anglo-American destiny, linked by shared Anglo-Saxon heritage, percolated into American culture.

This was sagacious policy and was enabled in large part by the early recognition of the potential threat the United States posed and subsequently extensive window of opportunity. Given 80 years, most diplomatic relationships can be transformed in major ways – this is much less viable over shorter time frames. The result was that at the moment of transition, towards the end of the First World War – as British policymakers acknowledged that American industrial power so outmatched their own that America held the upper hand in any interaction, as was evidenced by the Paris Peace Conference and the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty – the United States looked on Britain not as a weakened rival, but as a culturally, economically, and at least somewhat strategically aligned partner. Debate persists, however, on the specifics of the Anglo-American transition of power, with many scholars placing it in 1945. However, I would argue that the passage happened in 1916 and was already visible at Versailles. Nevertheless, Britain continued to play a global role arguably disproportionate to its means. The USA, in turn, did not emerge as a hegemon until after the Second World War.

Why A Model?

Given that the historical record exists, why would a model of that transition be helpful? Principally because it allows clearer comparative analysis and the codification of lessons learnt.

First, in terms of comparative analysis, we can transfer this model to Sino-American relations relatively clearly. The potential for competition existed throughout the 1990s and 2000s as China grew in power, but the distracted United States only recognised the threat in 2009 with the Pivot/Rebalance to Asia. Others would argue that this recognition came even later, with the American declaration of China as a near-peer competitor. The United States is now in the window of opportunity vis a vis China, as the relative gap between the powers narrows, and must implement policy to forestall or cushion its decline. If current trends continue unabated, there will be a moment of transition, either when China peacefully surpasses American power; or when its aggressive moves run into a mutual red line.

Rather than attempting to draw difficult comparisons based on historical events in the Anglo-American relationship, the existence of the model allows references to history without getting lost in the details. Similarly, the model allows a clearer discussion of lessons learnt. British success stemmed in large part, I would argue, from early recognition of the American potential as a competitor. Others might suggest it was the result of effective policy within the window of opportunity. A model equips us with a common vocabulary to discuss a difficult topic.

This is not, of course, perfect. The model itself is applicable to Anglo-American hegemonic transition, and I believe Sino-American too, but it carries with it the weight of hindsight – assuming as it does that China will at some point fight the United States or move past it in some peaceful yet vital way. Equally plausible is the idea that China may fall short of hegemony, not due to American action within the window of opportunity, but internal socioeconomic weakness. Another possibility not fully incorporated in this model is that the United States and China may reach parity and remain there for a long period, with neither able to act as a hegemon. And, of course, in the general sense, having an avowedly simplifying model often makes things more complex, not less.

Despite that, given the growing importance of hegemonic transition, it is important to ensure rigour and clear communication in debates around it. This model, or something like it, may go some way towards helping in that effort.

Matthew Ader is an undergraduate student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London with an interest in climate change and grand strategy. He tweets occasionally from @AderMatthew.

 

 

COVID-19 and China-US Relations: An Interview with Jia Qingguo

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by Lin Li

Professor Jia Qingguo, former Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University and member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference’s National Committee (Image credit: SCMP)

The global economy, politics, as well as daily life, ground to a halt after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Worldwide, infection rates rose to staggering heights; leaving a striking amount of casualties in its wake. Despite this situation, the chronic rivalry between the US and China continued, with further pessimism on the rise and little hope of cooperation anytime soon. As is now usual, Lin Li virtually met with Professor Jia Qingguo for an interview on US-China relations during and after the pandemic. Originally conducted in Chinese, the interview, and its subsequent translation are made by the interviewer.

The failure to cooperate against COVID-19

At the outbreak of the pandemic, the world expected China and the United States to work together in stemming its spread. However, the opposite is true. Instead, the mutual suspicion between the two countries escalated further from an initial trade war to become a war on all but the kinetic front; with little hope of such rivalry diminishing in the near future. The reasons for this situation, Jia Qingguo believes, is because the political environment in the United States sustains a highly emotional consensus on the government’s tough stance towards China. Such sentiment led to the ideological and political differences between these nations to become more pronounced. As a result, the population of each country tends to see the one as the polar opposite of the other.

‘After the outbreak of COVID-19, the US government poorly implemented measures against its spread. Out of domestic political considerations, it tried to pass the buck to China, which led to more negative interactions between the two countries. Moreover, in the heat of the U.S. presidential election, both sides of the campaign intend to play tough on all matters related to China. This situation is not beneficial for the bilateral relationship. Of course, that does not mean there is no room for improvement. Domestically, consensus on China is based on very particular perceptions of the country,’ Professor Jia argued. ‘These perceptions may not be entirely in line with reality. If China does a good job in explaining itself and adjusts some policies, I think it is still possible to change the American public’s position on China.’

Jia Qingguo believes that, globally, the response to the pandemic has been lacking in leadership. With the US finding itself bogged down in the fight against the pandemic, the virus further exacerbated previously existing suspicions against China. In such a situation, it is difficult to find any grounds for effective cooperation. ‘The Chinese government has been expressing its willingness to cooperate and has made great efforts, actively helping other countries to fight the virus. As President Xi Jinping said recently at the Extraordinary G20 Leaders’ Summit, China believes that the best way to fight the global pandemic is through international cooperation.’

China and the US: more alike than one would think

‘I do not think that China and the United States are that different in nature,’ Professor Jia argued. ‘Although the two countries have different ideologies and political systems; both do advocate democracy and freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy. In fact, these three elements are all listed as China’s official core values, although there is still a big difference in how these values are put in practice. Both China and the United States are also beneficiaries of the existing international order. Both countries hope for stability, peace, and international prosperity. They also advocate free trade and the need to jointly address global challenges such as climate change, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, and international crime. In fact, one could argue that the two countries are more similar than many may believe. If we can emphasise these common values and interests, without focusing on the ideological and institutional differences, the bilateral relationship could well be stabilised again.’

Professor Jia contends that the United States and many Americans remain doubtful about Chinese intentions, indeed in part because of their perceptions about the country. For example, realists assume that when a great power rises, it will expand and challenge the existing power. This so-called Thucydides Trap assumes that, as China rises, the country will challenge the US; thereby provoking a confrontation. Others believe that the United States is able to change China to its liking. This latter group is very disappointed that China has not made the changes they expected it to make.

The effects of COVID-19 on China-US relations

According to Jia Qingguo, the pandemic has both positive and negative effects on China-US relations. Its negative impact is taken by extremists on both sides as an opportunity to vent their discontent and to speculate on the other side’s culpability. Riddled with undertones of a conspiracy, such assessments feature accusations of intentionally creating or spreading the virus, thereby even advocating war.

At the same time, the virus has become the common enemy of the two countries, the fundamental interests of which require cooperation to fight against this enemy together. This mutual fight requires both China and the US to strengthen their information-sharing processes, to enhance bilateral cooperation in the development of medication, to provide anti-epidemic supplies to each other through donation and trade, and finally, to coordinate international cooperation.

Nevertheless, Jia Qingguo believes that the chance for cooperation has been diminishing as a result of negative interactions between the two sides. In the post-pandemic era, both countries should reflect on what the main reasons and factors are for the deterioration of the relations, as a basis upon which to formulate more reasonable policies.

Obstacles for China-US cooperation in fighting the pandemic

‘The two biggest obstacles in China-US Cooperation in fighting the pandemic are psychological and political. Psychologically speaking, both countries are faced with the problem of how to perceive the other properly. In recent years, the mainstream of American foreign policy has taken an increasingly extreme view of China, always interpreting China’s words and deeds from the worst possible angle. China also has some speculations about the intentions of the United States from the perspective of the ideologues and offensive realists. Such mindsets make it difficult for cooperation to be sustained. Politically, and based on the different interests and value orientations, there are people on both sides who deliberately exaggerate the other side’s negative rhetoric and actions; even inciting confrontation as inevitable. In so doing, the level of distrust between the two countries is growing. It is likely that Chinese people have similar views on the United States.’

Under such circumstances, Jia Qingguo continues, people on both sides should objectively and pragmatically assess the China-US relationship and take positive measures to stabilise and promote cooperation. Both countries are stakeholders in the international order and hope for world stability and prosperity. Peaceful coexistence and cooperation are in their best interests and feature as the foundation of this bilateral relationship. China and the US could strengthen their cooperation, for example, by exchanging anti-pandemic experience, collaborate in developing medication, and coordinate economic policies in order to stabilise the global economy. Only through cooperation can the two sides effectively overcome the pandemic and improve the relationship.

The lowest point in the past four decades?

‘Whether it is the lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic ties forty years ago depends on how you measure it.’ Jia Qingguo argues, ‘I think politically and security-wise it certainly is. But when it comes to the economy and other aspects, I think we still made much progress. Nevertheless, a further deterioration of the relationship is in the books. The Trump administration seems determined to stir up some kind of crisis in the relationship in order to improve the President’s chances for a second term. China also has domestic public opinions, so when the United States closed the Houston Consulate, China felt that it had to close the Chengdu Consulate in response. Indeed, if the United States decides to take certain measures, the Chinese government may find it necessary to respond in kind. As a result, the relationship may end up in a disastrous spiral of escalation. I hope that both sides can calm down and handle bilateral relations in a more pragmatic way. It is complicated, but I think both sides should at least make some efforts.’

‘Recently, many people are talking about the possibility of war between China and the US. I think that is still very unlikely. First, the cost of war between China and the US is too high for both countries to bear. It has become an unwritten law that nuclear powers do not fight wars, since there is no winner in such a conflict. As long as leaders of the two countries are rational, they will try their best to avoid war. It is also very hard to persuade their people to fight such a kind of war. The American political system with its checks and balances means that only when most people say yes, could the government go to war with foreign countries, especially with nuclear states.’

If not nuclear, what kind of war?

‘The war on the scientific and technological fronts has begun and will continue. However, there will also be limits. The blocking of Huawei or other Chinese high-tech companies hurts not only China but also the US, because these Chinese companies are important customers of American companies in the high-tech industry as well. If uncontrolled, the war in science and technology will break the existing ecology of the research and development as well as production chains, with a devastating impact on all countries in the world.’

China and the United States are facing a crisis of trust. America’s distrust of China is particularly prominent in its approach to China’s development of high technology like 5G. Because of the high degree of penetration of technology into people’s life and work, trust is needed more than ever. With this in mind, Huawei has offered to release the source code of some of its software, in an attempt to soften concerns on the safety of personal information and its storage. Jia Qingguo argues: ‘In terms of technology, we should have more communication and take necessary measures to reassure each other. The Americans also have a responsibility to reassure China that Microsoft and Google will not harm China’s national security. Both sides must make a lot of effort to rebuild some trust for the future of our relationship. However, I do not believe the Trump Administration will do so. I hope the next government can.’

‘The possibility of a financial war cannot be ruled out either. But this will bring even more harm to the US. Unless the two countries become extremely confrontational, it will be difficult for the United States to make such a decision.’ Trump’s views on the international economy remain those of the 19th century. For example, the American President thinks that the United States has suffered a great loss in trade with China because it runs a large deficit with the country. In fact, many products exported from China to the United States include parts, services, or patented technologies from other countries, including the US. Trump assumes the goods exported from one country to another are 100 per cent made in this country. It is simply not true.

‘Some people are wondering what happens if the United States refuses to honor the U.S. Treasury bonds purchased by China. I think the chance for that to happen is very low, because such action may trash the credibility of the US. Some people say that the United States will forcibly terminate its financial exchanges with China, which is even less likely, for the same reason that this will cause great harm to the US, and other countries will not agree either.’

Therefore, whether it is to fight a war of science or technology or finance or trade, the costs are likely to be prohibitive. The Trump administration may not rational but in the end, people in the United States may stop it.

In conclusion, Jia Qingguo argues that in the long run, China and the US have to find a way to coexist peacefully and cooperate when needed because their interests and survival demand it. ‘As stakeholders in peace and prosperity, China and the US have many things in common, and that hasn’t changed despite the recent round of conflicts.’

Lin Li is a doctoral researcher at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London and a Senior Editor at Strife. Lin completed her BA in Law at the School of International Studies, Peking University in Beijing; her MA in Geopolitics, Territory and Security at Department of Geography, KCL; and her MA in History of War, War Studies, also KCL. Lin previously worked as Teaching Assistant for the School of International Studies and a Research Assistant for the Institute of International and Strategic Studies of Peking University, as well as Program Manager for Peking University’s Office of International Affairs. Lin is an Observer of the PKU Youth Think Tank since 2018. A Chinese Zheng musician, Lin has published concerto CDs with the Chinese Film Symphony Orchestra and held a series of concerts internationally. 

 

 

 

 

Militarization and Accountability on the United States-Mexico Border

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By Carly Greenfield

28 December 2018

A U.S. Border Patrol agent stands near a section of the U.S.- Mexico border fence while on patrol in La Joya, Texas. (John Moore/Getty Images)

 

On 21 November, a jury in Arizona found Border Patrol Agent Lonnie Swartz not guilty in the involuntary manslaughter of José Antonio Elena Rodríguez, a Mexican teenager shot and killed by Swartz in October of 2012. Swartz fired from the United States side of the border in Nogales, Arizona, into Nogales, Mexico, killing 16-year-old Elena Rodríguez. Elena Rodríguez is not the first teenager to be killed by U.S. law enforcement along the border; a similar situation occurred with another Mexican national, 15-year-old Sergio Hernández Guereca. When he was killed in 2010, however, his killing did not result in a lawsuit. Both cases raise questions surrounding authority in border zones.

While the majority of shootings along the border have been by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents, the military has also been involved in a similar incident. The killing of 18-year-old U.S. citizen Esequiel Hernández by U.S. marines deployed to the border in 1997, which resulted in no indictments for the marines involved, remains a blight on military involvement along the border. As active-duty troops are set to be deployed through the new year, the decades old case continues to inform military engagement in the region. The Elena Rodríguez case is not isolated, and the lack of clarity over who is responsible to whom in a national and joint-authority international space like the U.S.-Mexico border, now with both law enforcement and military bodies present, should bring considerable disquietude.

The role of the military on the border

In the wake of President Trump’s deployment of over 5,000 active-duty troops to the U.S.-Mexico border at the end of October, many pundits and commentators started mulling over the legality of the order in reference to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. This act is a misunderstood and largely non-enforced doctrine that enshrines, in the minds of many Americans, the separation between military and law-enforcement roles within U.S. territory.[i] The act itself, however, has many exceptions, and a 1981 reform further restricted its application. For starters, the law initially only applied to the Army, as it was created as a means to remove the Army from its role in the post-Reconstruction South.[ii] A 1956 reform brought the Air Force into the act, and a 1992 Department of Defense regulation folded in the Navy and the Marine Corps.[iii] The Posse Comitatus Act still includes allowances for National Guard forces operating under state authority, the role of the Coast Guard in peace time (through which the Navy can play a support role without breaching the Posse Comitatus act) or the Presidential power to use troops pursuant to subduing domestic violence.[iv] All of this to say Posse Comitatus has so many holes, and so few court cases holding up its authority, that it has had little influence on the use of the military in the interior.

The reform in 1981, called the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Officials Act, was in many ways a death knell for the Posse Comitatus Act as it relates to border security.[v] The 1981 act created space for the military to cooperate with law enforcement as it related to the growing ‘War on Drugs.’ This quickly ballooned into aiding enforcement or supplying intelligence as it relates to immigration and customs offenses.[vi]

However, the myth persists that this act keeps the military from taking part in law enforcement roles like border security management and enforcement. A New York Times piece ran last month concluded that ‘[t]he Posse Comitatus Act, a Reconstruction-era law, prevents active-duty troops from engaging in law enforcement activities within the United States.’ This is patently false — or else the 1997 killing of Esequiel Hernández by active-duty marines, sent to patrol the border as part of an anti-narcotics mission, would have raised further consequences past the shooting of an American. The U.S. military has the legal and historical precedent to support law enforcement missions on the U.S.-Mexico border. The larger query is whether or not these deployments are effective; due to the 1997 case, most troops are unarmed and aid in constructing barriers. The purpose of their current deployment on the border, then, remains in question, as they are instructed not to come into contact with migrants or patrol with Border Patrol agents. Journalists have noted that while troops were rapidly deployed prior to the midterm elections in ‘Operation Faithful Patriot,’ the name surreptitiously changed to the much less inflammatory ‘border support’ post-election, reinforcing critics claims of performed militarization and misuse of the military. The politically fraught nature of their presence contributes to a hyper-charged environment along the border, which adds to the misconception of a crisis on the U.S.-Mexico border. This ‘crisis’ perception makes violence, including fatalities, all the more likely, and easier to justify.

The U.S.-Mexico border as a non-combat zone

Active duty troops currently deployed on the U.S.-Mexico border are not receiving combat pay as they are not taking part in a combat mission. As mentioned, the rules of engagement for the deployed troops have resulted in most soldiers and marines not carrying weapons and instead taking part primarily in constructing additional security barriers. Yet the border continues to be militarized even without armed, active military missions. Of the nearly 20,000 border patrol agents employed in fiscal year 2017, more than 16,000 served on the southern border,[vii] compared to fewer than 5,000 agents in the entire agency in 1992.[viii]  Notwithstanding, CBP is a civilian law enforcement agency, meaning they are meant to be held to account in the U.S. civilian court system, which handles cases involving U.S. agents on U.S. land. This is complicated when dealing with the area between the U.S. and Mexican fences and the distance a bullet can travel — namely, across a border.

The ramifications of an agency accountable to the U.S. government shooting and killing non-nationals on non-U.S. territory, then, remain unclear. In June 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the case of Sergio Hernández Guereca, the Mexican 15-year-old killed on Mexican territory by a border patrol agent,  upholding the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that the teenager’s parents did not have a right to pursue the case in U.S. courts.[ix] This contrasts with the decision made in the case of Elena Rodríguez, where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Elena Rodríguez’s mother did have the right to sue. The conflicting decisions create an uneven application of the law at the border, one that recognizes U.S. responsibility in some cases and not others.

Rights of non-Americans on non-American soil

In the oral arguments made in Hernández Guereca’s case before the Supreme Court in February 2017, the petitioners’ lawyer Robert Hilliard claimed that the case was meant to:

‘(…) address the ongoing problem along the southwest border that has resulted in at least ten cross-border shootings and six Mexican national deaths. And every time the Constitution, according to the government, turns off at the border, even though all the conduct happens in the United States.’[x]

The justices, however, were skeptical of extending Constitutional rights to someone shot and killed on non-U.S. soil as it would cloud understanding over who has access to Constitutional protections.[xi] The conversation reached into hypotheticals comparing the space between the U.S. and Mexico border fences to Guantanamo Bay, the piloting of a drone strike from U.S. soil, or whether the case would be distinct if a military officer had shot and killed Hernández Guereca. This reveals the military and foreign policy implications for border shooting decisions, even if CBP is officially a civilian law enforcement agency. Ultimately, with Hernández Guereca’s case dismissed, the uneven application of the law stands.

It should also be noted that the agent involved was charged in Mexico for Hernández Guereca’s death — yet the U.S. government refused to extradite him, even with extradition agreements in place between the U.S. and Mexico.[xii]

So if the Constitution does not apply beyond U.S. international borders, and the U.S. government refuses to extradite border patrol agents charged in Mexico for the shootings, then what options do victims’ families in Mexico have to access a fair day in court? In the current system, very few.

Law enforcement accountability

The implications for allowing a case against border patrol agents into U.S. courts reach past border enforcement and risk granting victims of U.S. military missions abroad access to Constitutional rights in lands far beyond U.S. control. Still, the militarization of the border does not aid in preventing such cases— there continue to be border deaths with little recourse for border patrol agents. Like in other parts of the United States, calls for law enforcement accountability are occurring along the border, too. But since the population in question is primarily non-American and border patrol agents oftentimes work in barren areas with few possible witnesses, change is slow. The route to justice continues to be hazy as appeals drag on and cases are unable to move forward in Mexico.

What develops on the border has significance beyond the border — for military missions, Constitutional rights, and U.S.-Mexico relations. The dynamics of the U.S.-Mexico border raise large questions around how militarization contributes to violence and a lack of accountability for border patrol agents. When President Trump and the government espouse unfounded levels of fear around border work, agents are more likely to respond to incidences lethally and then be protected from prosecution by their government. The current dynamics should remind Americans that the armed forces are not required to militarize a space, and that tragic situations ensue on the border even when media attention is not focused on it. With President Trump escalating the rhetoric and looking to recruit more border patrol agents, the shared U.S.-Mexico border will likely become deadlier and hold less consequence for those who patrol it.

Carly Greenfield is a Dual Degree masters candidate between Sciences Po and the London School of Economics, currently studying international security at Sciences Po. She completed her BA in International Relations at King’s College London and is a former BA Representative for Strife. Her research focuses on securitization, migration, and the conceptualization of borders, particularly in the Americas. You can follow her on Twitter @carlygreenpeel.

Notes:

[i] Lindsey P. Cohn, “Come What May,” Bombshell, Podcast Audio, 20 November 2018: https://warontherocks.com/2018/11/bombshell-come-what-may/.

[ii] Charles Doyle, “The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law,” Congressional Research Service, (1 June 2000).

[iii] Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters, “Appendix D: Overview of the Posse Comitatus Act,” from Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security, (2001): RAND Corporation.

[iv] Nathan Canestaro, “Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for Posse Comitatus,” Washington University Journal of Law & Policy Vol. 12, (January 2003).

[v] Paul Jackson Rice, “New Laws and Insights Encircle the Posse Comitatus Act,” Individual Study Project, U.S. Army War College, (26 May 1983).

[vi] Richter H. Moore, “Posse Comitatus revisited: The use of the military in civil law enforcement,” Journal of Criminal Justice Vol. 15, (1987).

[vii] United States Border Patrol “Border Patrol Agent Nationwide Staffing by Fiscal Year,” Customs and Border Protection, (2017).

[viii] Christine Stenglein, “Struggling to hang on to 20K officers, Border Patrol looks to hire 5K more,” Brookings Institution, (7 July 2017): https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/07/07/struggling-to-hang-on-to-20k-officers-border-patrol-looks-to-hire-5k-more/.

[ix] U.S. Supreme Court, “582 U. S. Hernandez v. Mesa,” Slip Opinion (2017).

[x] U.S. Supreme Court, “No.15-118 Hernandez v. Mesa,” Oral Arguments (2017).

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] “Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States,” (25 January 1980).

Image source: http://www.powerhousebooks.com/books/undocumented-immigration-and-the-militarization-of-the-u-s-mexico-border/

On Why General Mattis Should Decline

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By: Jill R. Russell

AL ASAD, Iraq – Lt. Gen. James Mattis, the commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command, speaks to Marines with Marine Wing Support Group 27, May 6. Mattis explained how things in Iraq have gotten better since the first time Marines came to Iraq.
AL ASAD, Iraq – Lt. Gen. James Mattis, the commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command (Wikimedia Commons)

 

I wrote the piece “With Rifle and Bilbliography” referenced yesterday in Tom Ricks’ Foreign Policy article on the merits of a possible selection of General James Mattis as Secretary of Defense. Reflecting on what led to that blog piece, my long observation of the man’s career, and thoughts on the current and future prospects of American politics, I cannot measure any merits nearly as weighty as the case against. Although the anecdotes below are of a personal nature, they are of the sort I would find in research of historical generals and against which I would judge their character.

 

It has been 21 years since I first got to know General Mattis. Like most, my initial impression was the stuff of legend. He was a Colonel then, CO of 7th Marines and its associated Regimental Combat Team (RCT). 3d Battalion, 11th Marines (3/11) was RCT-7’s artillery unit in their hideaway paradise of 29 Palms. As it was told to me, as the commanding officer Mattis had an interesting way of greeting new officers. He would get them ‘oo-rahed’ up and promise to take them to war. Sounds proper Mattis, right? Here is the thing: that man has character, and there was no way he would have chosen to take them to war, knowing it would mean letters to the spouses and parents of those officers or Marines. Not a chance. But I suspect he understood if he said that to the officers, they would be motivated to train hard year round in some pretty challenging conditions.

3/11, to give you a sense of the training tempo at the time, spent over two hundred days in the field per year, between artillery, combined arms, and other supporting exercises. Live fire, though, so they did enjoy that part. In addition to the discipline borne of usual Marine Corps standards, RCT-7 was in those days on the front burner for rapid deployment – I believe they started shrink wrapping the goods a couple of times in his tenure. Mattis needed the Marines to be prepared, and more so the officers to be at their best for the worst. I saw RCT-7 at the time, they were prepared. (I had the honour to meet the famed Raymond G. Davis and the Marines of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, from the Chosin Campaign, I know what quality looks like). The over enthusiasm he might engender he could control, as necessary, according to the best ethics and leadership of Marines. An equally storied, if less well known Colonel, Ed Lesnowicz, had taught me that about Marines and good officers.

That impression was the first of several I formed over more than two decades, that, like the one above, speaks to Mattis’ character. It is a view of him that is less discussed amid the “Mad Dog” din. It is one which argues against service now.

 

Any Colonel who will trot outside to chat with you…

I met Mattis at the 1st Marine Division Ball in 1995. I was standing outside after dinner, smoking cigars – as you do – and chatting with the Executive Officer (XO) of 7th Marines. I mentioned that I had just been at SAIS with Ed, so we were sharing stories about him. I mentioned that he said if I ever had the chance to meet Mattis, I should, I would like him. Ever faithful, with not even a request, the XO jogged off to get Mattis, and we had a nice ten or fifteen-minute chat. At the time I agreed with Ed, and as Mattis continued his rise I recognised how it reflected the depths of his respectful and gracious characteristics.

 

Any General who will engage your critique…

As you can see in the Strife piece, although diplomatic, I did respond to his email unrequested with a bit of critique and correction. In this day and age of social media vitriol, the common courtesy to examine the comment and engage with it intelligently should not be lost as a lesson in that piece. If the worst attribute of a leader is hubris, humility is the best.

 

Any retired General who will happily support your publication of his email… and engage in the most fascinating conversation, too…

I’m a historian, of course I kept those emails.

I thought to place them with Strife because I wanted to put this thinking Marine General in front of an audience who lacked an easy opportunity to access these insights. We Americans don’t always show our best side to the world. When I wrote to him to ask his permission and discuss what I was going to say in the piece, we ended up exchanging several emails discussing recent history. If I could share those with you… but until I am allowed to, let me just say that he doesn’t triangulate by bumper sticker either.

 

…doesn’t belong in such a troubled Administration.

Not one single example of any of the characteristics Mattis demonstrated so easily has been on display by our President elect, or any of his Cabinet selections or supporters. Please, show me one example of care or ethics, of graciousness and respect, humility not hubris, or the willingness to think broadly. That is a problem for Mattis, because no matter the strength of his character, the environment will be corrosive.

I understand Mattis’ desire to serve, and I fervently hope he will, but not now. It will leave its mark, and we will need leadership and candidates for a future, principled conservative movement.

 

Dr. Jill S. Russell is a regular contributor to Strife, Kings of War and Small Wars. Her doctoral dissertation was on American military logistics and strategic culture. Dr. Russell is currently teaching at the Joint Services Command and Staff College at Shrivenham. You can follow her on Twitter @jsargentr.

 

 

Book review: 'America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam' by Christopher Lawrence

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Reviewed by: Cheng Lai Ki

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Christopher Lawrence. America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam. Oxford, UK. Casemate Publishers, 2015. ISBN: 978-1612002781. Hardcover. £19.99

Compared to other countries around the world, the United States military possesses the largest expenditure rate in the world of around $640,221million, according to a study conducted by the Brookings in 2014.[1] Within the last century, the United States has proven its military capabilities in multiple conflicts. The rise of advanced warfare tactics through technological developments (i.e. Unmanned Combat Vehicles) has allowed distancing from direct confrontation or engagement in hostiles. The increased distance from the battlefield and development of new combat tactics avoiding confrontation makes the determination of conflict victories increasingly elusive. Despite the existence of multiple detailed and comprehensive studies on insurgency and counterinsurgency, most are limited to specific cases or conflicts. Adding complexity to the phenomenon of insurgencies, the lack of detailed (and accurate) information ultimately inhibits the understanding and formation of effective counterinsurgency strategies.

In America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam, Christopher Lawrence offers a more systematic, quantitative approach towards the subject of insurgency and counterinsurgency. This was accomplished utilising resources obtained from his role at The Dupuy Institute (TDI), a non-profit organisation focused on academic research and studies around historical data associated to armed conflicts and acclaimed resolutions. TDI has collaborated in the past with the governmental agencies. Between 2002 – 2004, TDI produced three annual reports developed for the United States Department of the Army regarding the combat effectiveness within cities.[2] Through extremely comprehensive quantitative studies, the book critically examines the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam wars to determine the various elements and factors supporting the ultimate outcome of each conflict.

Studies and publication conducted by TDI revolve around the examination of historical resources. This academic and research discipline allows for evidentiary based analyses to be conducted. Ergo, Lawrence was able to conduct an extremely comprehensive strategic analysis and its outcomes of several conflicts where United States played a significant role. The book begins with TDI outlining their casualty estimate for the United States government agencies. Impressed by their statistical collection methodologies supporting their estimates, other agencies ultimately expanded their contracts with the institution for additional data collection and subsequent studies. Over the course of the Iraq War, Lawrence coordinated multiple projects involving quantitative researchers. TDI’s relationship with various department within the United States government has thus allowed its researchers access to the extensive material available from internal departments and centers (i.e. United States Army Center of Military History). As an individual, Lawrence has also published several papers and monographs for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation in addition to an amalgamation of assessments for the Department of Defense.[3] The book fundamentally centres upon quantitative variables of indigenous and intervening government typologies, insurgency motivations, insurgency structure, typology of counterinsurgency waged, rules of engagement and the nature of the conflict’s resolution.

Throughout the book, Lawrence identifies several correlations between variables that could be applied consistently throughout the three major wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam. His analysis revealed a correlation between force ratios and insurgent motivations. Comparing his discoveries towards conventional counterinsurgency assessments and studies, Lawrence has quantifiably identified that although overwhelming force ratios (between counterinsurgents and insurgents) are not required for counterinsurgency success, it is larger fighting forces that ultimately yields counterinsurgency victory. Within the analysis, Lawrence also suggests several other variables that might influence the outcome of counterinsurgencies. However, it would appear from the text that limited statistical emphasis or research was placed into these considerations. Throughout the book, Lawrence develops several statistical models to describe and analyse the dynamics of the counterinsurgency campaigns that essentially defined the Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam wars. However, acclaimed to examine the three modern wars of the United States has devoted a considerable amount of focus on the Iraq and Afghan War in contrast to Vietnam. Any book of this scope often focuses on specific reader categories. Therefore, the following section briefly addresses overarching benefits and limitations of the book for two main categories of readers: Academics and Practitioners.

With multiple elements within warfare categorically quantified within the book, academics could find the level of depth significantly beneficial to their studies. This book is an invaluable resource that both analyses and summarizes – with statistical support – three counterinsurgencies fought by the United States. For example, in Iraq, Lawrence argues that the counterinsurgency by the United States (Coalition) and the Iraqi Government was a success due to the generation of an overwhelming force-ratio compared to the insurgents. Given the nature of academia, criticism/rebuttal against his assentation is a given, as some would question the true definition of successfulness of the United States during Iraq, given its current state-of-affairs.[4]  Its limitations reside in its dense and hyper-focus upon statistical analysis; how the ‘numbers’ reflect reality could be (at times) difficult to understand and internalise – let alone contextualise against other theories within security studies.

Practitioners on the other hand might be initially overwhelmed by the sheer amount of quantitative/statistical data Lawrence goes into. However, it does not remove the quantitative benefits of the book for individuals within military domains. Providing an extremely comprehensive statistical analysis of the three counterinsurgencies, policy-makers would also benefit from this source of information. Fundamentally taking a historic approach, reflective analysis of the book can be a valuable resource for strategists to evaluate the effectiveness of American decisions during the wars. However, limitations of the book arguably depend heavily on the statistical knowledge (and interest) of the reader; especially when addressing practitioners. Regardless, to practitioners, the book is an invaluable resource to expand their horizon and understanding of United States activities during the three counterinsurgencies. The professional data collection and analytics compiled into this singular source makes America’s Modern Wars a valuable resource to understand (quantifiably) elements that can influence the outcome of counterinsurgencies.

Despite the sheer depth of statistical analysis into the elements within counterinsurgencies, Lawrence’s analysis places significant value on available (and accessible) information. America’s Modern Wars is unlikely to end any debates regarding the effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategies used in the three campaigns – as it may prove controversial should any such claim be made. It is commendable that Lawrence acknowledges the propensity for analyses to be revised in light of new data. The analysis does, however, provide an interesting perspective for practitioners and academics focusing on security issues associated to the activities of the United States. This source of analysis that utilises quantifiable information is a useful source – especially to practitioners drafting approval papers/plans. However, there remains a widespread belief that the complexity of warfare (and more importantly insurgencies) cannot be categorised or exclusively studied solely through quantifiable research. Regardless, Lawrence does manage to quantifiably identify one of the largest flaws of the United States strategies in the three conflicts, which is their inherent misunderstanding of counterinsurgency.[v] Nonetheless, America’s Modern Wars is still recommended for anyone aiming to obtain a comprehensive quantitative understanding of United States strategies in Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam.

Formerly with the Singapore Armed Forces, Cheng holds a Bachelor’s Honors degree in Criminology. During his military service, he was a senior tactical and operational instructor for the Armour Formation. He is currently reading for an MA in International Intelligence and Security at King’s where his academic specialties revolve around proxy strategies such as private military security companies, drones and cyber-warfare. In May 2016, he published an article on the vulnerabilities of transatlantic submarine cables in IHS Jane’s.

Notes:

[1] Dews, F. ‘Charts: U.S. Army size and defense expenditures relative to other nations’, Brookings [Online], (Oct 14 2015), Available from: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2015/10/charts-us-army-size-defense-expenditures, (Accessed May 21 2016)

[2] ‘Publications’, The Dupuy Institute [Online], Available from: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipubs.htm, (Accessed May 21 2016)

[3] Lawrence, C.A. ‘President Obama’s Casualty Estimates’, Mystics & Statistics [Online], (Dec 27 2015); Available from: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2015/12/27/president-obamas-casualty-estimates/ (Accessed Jan 2016)

[4] Cordesman, A.H., ‘American Strategic and Tactical Failures in Iraq: An Update’, Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [Online], (Aug 8 2006); Available from: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060808_iraqfailures.pdf, (Accessed Dec 2015).

[5]Ubaldi, J. ‘Why Civil Military Operations will be a Combat Multiplier in Counterinsurgency Operations’, SmallWarsJournal.org [Online], (2009).