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Carlotta Rinaudo

Italy’s Anti-Vaxxers: how victimhood is portrayed through the holocaust

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Recent Vaccine Protest in Roma. Photo Credit: Flickr, licensed via Creative Commons.

In her diary, Anne Frank immerses the reader in her daily life as a Jew in early 1940s Amsterdam, providing an intimate glimpse into the atrocities of racial segregation. In one particular extract from June 1942, Anne describes the systematic imposition of anti-Jewish laws by Nazis in an effort to exclude them from Dutch society:

Jews were forbidden to be out on the streets between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.; Jews were forbidden to go to theatres, cinemas, or any other forms of entertainment; Jews were forbidden to use swimming pools, tennis courts, hockey fields or any other athletic fields; You couldn’t do this and you couldn’t do that, but life went on...”

Seventy-nine years later, in the midst of a global pandemic, Anne’s words have been wrenched back into focus in an unexpected context. On the encrypted messaging app Telegram, the Italian group “Basta Dittatura” (“Stop the Dictatorship”) shared Anne’s extract, adding in a prophetic tone:

“History is repeating itself. Italy’s Green Pass will bring us back to the Holocaust.”

After Italy imposed the controversial “Green Pass” restrictions on non-vaccinated people on August 6, prohibiting them from sitting in indoor restaurants, cinemas, stadiums, and other public places, absurd historical parallels with the Holocaust have been drawn.

Above, the controversial message on the Telegram group “Basta Dittatura.”

As thousands of people took to the streets to demonstrate against the implementation of the Green Pass, some protestors wore a yellow Star of David badge reading “Not Vaccinated.” The Italian anti-Green Pass movement is therefore instrumentalizing the Holocaust in a grotesque effort to distort reality and fuel a sense of victimhood among the non-vaccinated population. In their view the Green Pass would be a direct assault on individual liberties: if in the past Jews could not go to cinemas and theatres, today non-vaccinated people are suffering just the same fate.

“They are madness, gestures in poor taste that intersect with ignorance,” commented Italian senator Liliana Segre, who is also a 90-year-old Holocaust survivor, “it is such a time for ignorance, for violence, that it is not even repressed anymore, that has become ripe for these distortions.”

Italy’s protests are instrumentalizing Jewish discrimination. (Credit: Riccardo De Luca, Times of Israel)

Although the Green Pass has been an overall successful endeavor, with vaccine rates rapidly increasing, anti-vax resistance still remains strong, with 80.000 people taking to the streets in the last weekend of July. In a typical snowball effect, the anti-Green Pass movement has also quickly incorporated many conspiracy theorists, libertarians, far-right movements.

On the same weekend, neighboring France counted 230.000 protestors, with some of them also wearing the yellow David stars.

“I wore the star, I know what it is, I still have it in my flesh,” said Joseph Szwarc, a French Holocaust survivor, “it is everyone’s duty to not allow this outrageous, antisemitic, racist wave to pass over us.”

Meanwhile, Italy’s healthcare system has also been hit by the worst ransomware attack it has ever experienced. In early August a group of unknown hackers penetrated the IT system of the health department of the Lazio region and blocked its COVID19 vaccination booking system. This attack substantially delayed the vaccination campaign, forcing people to queue outside of the facilities and medical staff to write patients’ medical information with pen and paper. As hackers are demanding a ransom payment, investigations on their identity are still ongoing. Yet, on social media, Italian people have been quick to draw conclusions. With many suggesting, “it must have been a group of anti-vaccine hackers.”

The latest demonstrations are the symptom of a troubling trend. The outrageous comparison to the Holocaust not only represents an insult to the past, but it is also an indicator of a disturbing phenomenon that perhaps calls for some national soul-searching. On one side, the developing world has been facing severe vaccine shortages – in July 2021, Africa delivered only 4 vaccines per 100 people. On the other side, the developed world sees an abundance of vaccines, with European governments introducing coercive measure to encourage their citizens to get inoculated. Yet, a substantial portion of those citizens are now waging a noisy campaign against those same governments. Drawing absurd parallels with the Holocaust, these citizens are seeking a victim status, fueling a sense of injustice that could easily become a breeding ground for violence and chaos. Exploiting the suffering of the Holocaust to serve an anti-vaccine agenda is a misplaced and insulting move – one that has the audacity to claim that being encouraged to get a vaccine during a global pandemic would be just as brutal as the ethnic cleansing of almost 6 million Jews.

The Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: a distorted reality

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2000 years ago, two great civilizations dominated each ends of the ancient Silk Road.

At its most Eastern point was China’s Han dynasty, which knew very little of the other mysterious empire that controlled the Silk Road’s Western tip. Chinese people referred to this empire as “Da Qin,” and they thought of it as a sort of “counter-China” which sat at the other end of the world. Today we know that what the Chinese people called “Da Qin” was in fact nothing but the mighty Roman Empire. The story goes that in the year 97 A.D., Chinese ambassador Kan Ying embarked on a journey through the arid steppes of Central Asia to pay a visit to Rome, carrying lavish gifts for its Roman rulers.

Today, that ancient Silk Road has been revived under the name of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced his intention to build a modern-day adaptation of these trade routes, giving life to a network of railways, ports, pipelines, power grids and highways that will once again carry goods and ideas between East and West. In this vision, China and Italy could once again become the two powers sitting at the opposite ends of the Silk Road.

In March 2019, President Xi embarked on a three-day state visit to Italy, which today is less a Mediterranean spanning empire and more of a fatigued country saddled with massive debt. In addition, unlike Chinese ambassador Kan Ying, this time President Xi Jinping did not carry lavish gifts for the Roman rulers, but a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Italy to join the Belt and Road Initiative. This was officially signed on March 23.

Chinese President Xi Jinping. Photo Credit: Flickr, licensed under Creative Commons

That Italy, a member of the G7 and a founding member of both the EU and NATO, embraced China’s Belt and Road Initiative was perceived as a major blow to its traditional Western allies. At a time when the US and China were locked in a bitter trade war which saw Washington and Beijing imposing tit-for-tat tariffs and EU leaders emphasizing the need for a common strategy towards China, Rome’s formal endorsement for the BRI raised concerns that Italy could become the entry point for Chinese influence in Europe.

Various media outlets claimed that Italy “was playing with fire”, and the US depicted the country as “the European weak link in the power struggle with China”. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also warned that Beijing would take advantage of Rome, recalling the common assumption that the BRI only plays in China’s favor, and that countries that will be unable to repay generous Chinese loans will eventually fall into the so-called “debt trap”. And, because the MoU would grant a Chinese state-owned company access to various Italian ports, including Genova and Trieste, in 2019 many claimed that Italy would eventually cede its national assets to Beijing.

An article from The New York Times quickly inflated this narrative and painted a stark picture of Trieste being “invaded” by an army of deep-pocketed Chinese people: “To walk through Trieste is to witness how the city has already opened to China” – the article reads in a prophetic tone – “Chinese tourists shop for the city’s trademark Illy coffee and take pictures with their Huawei phones of the elegant Caffé Degli Specchi”. As the article continues, “most significant, construction workers in scuba gear have been laying foundations near the site where a new pier is expected to become China’s home in the industrial port.” In the imaginary of the Times, the idea that China could soon control major Italian national assets loomed large. Yet, two years since the controversial signing of the MoU, the obvious question is: have these prophecies come about? The answer is no.

First, it should be noted that most of the agreements signed by Italy and China were largely expressions of intention, which never really came to reality.

After March 2019 Beijing had to learn a hard lesson: dealing with Italy’s schizophrenic, unpredictable, and unreliable political system is no easy task. When the MoU for the BRI was first signed, Italy was governed by the Five-Star Movement (5SM) and the far-right League, a dysfunctional and populist coalition that favored a new partnership with Beijing. This coalition also rejected Italy’s traditional Western alliances and was largely anti-EU and anti-establishment. However, this government was quickly replaced by a new coalition that re-positioned Italy back into its traditional alliance system. This approach was then reinforced by yet another change of government in 2021, when Prime Minister Mario Draghi emphasized that his new administration was “strongly pro-European and Atlanticist.” This political roller coaster essentially proved that Rome’s position towards the BRI can virtually change at any time.

In addition, the continuing US-China trade war and the growing tension around Italy’s endorsement for the BRI in 2019 might have eventually influenced Italy’s decision-makers, prompting them to choose different partners. In Trieste, where, according to the New York Times, to walk through the city is “to witness how the city has already opened to China,” the port infrastructure project was eventually contracted not by China Communication Construction Company (CCCC), but by Germany’s Hafen and Logistik.

It is also important to highlight that many concerns on Italy falling into a “debt trap” had little supporting evidence. Both Italian and European legal frameworks limit the ability of foreign companies to acquire assets in country’s vital sectors. In particular, the Italian government can also appeal to the so-called “Golden Power” regulation, a special rule introduced in 2012 and reviewed in 2020 by which the Italian government can decide to stop foreign direct investment when it goes against the national interest. This means that there was virtually no possibility to cede control of Italian ports to a Chinese organisation.

Finally, what is often ignored is that Chinese investment would have been limited to very specific projects: China’s collaboration would not be focused directly on the entire ports of Genova and Trieste – rather, in Genova, CCCC would have invested in the construction of a new breakwater dam, while in Trieste the company would have been involved in the construction of railway stations and rail connections. These considerations seem to suggest that fears over Chinese investments in Italian infrastructure have often been exaggerated by media outlets and political figures. Also, they stemmed from a general mistrust towards China’s BRI, rather than from any thorough analysis. Stating that “to walk through Trieste is to witness how the city has already opened to China” is a form of sensationalism that actively distorts reality.

Military Mayhem in Myanmar: the end of a democratic experiment

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A group of monks walk in the streets of Yangoon, Myanmar’s largest city. Photo Credit: Flickr, licensed under Creative Commons.

On February 1st 2021 a coup d’état ended Myanmar’s decade-long experiment with democracy, ushering back in the ruthless military rule of the Tatmadaw. Since then, the “lady of Myanmar,” Aung San Suu Kyi, who became an icon for democracy after spending 15 years under house arrest, has been detained in an unknown location. She now faces various charges, including the possession of illegal walkie-talkies – an obvious pretext intended to keep her away from Myanmar’s political scene. Meanwhile, under the blazing sun of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw has re-established its reign of terror. Security forces have killed hundreds of opponents and injured thousands more. Authorities have also suspended most television programs and blocked access to Facebook and other social media sites.

Myanmar’s coup d’état has significant domestic and regional implications. Internally, historical ethnic divisions have seemingly softened, and formerly divided actors are now uniting against a common foe – the Tatmadaw. Regionally, the coup is sowing uncertainty throughout Myanmar’s neighboring countries, with serious consequences in two particular domains: first, the ASEAN bloc; second, China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Ethnic minorities and the Bamar majority

 Squeezed between India and China, Myanmar is a melting pot of cultures that counts more than 135 ethnic groups within its territory, with Buddhism being the dominant religion.
Since 1962, Myanmar’s ethnic division was cleverly exploited by Tatmadaw military forces as a tool to legitimize their rule. According to their distorted narrative, a military regime is necessary to defend Myanmar from the enemies of the nation, which consist of a cabal of ethnic minorities claiming autonomy and undermining national unity. Thus, in the Tatmadaw’s words, the military forces are the real guardians of the Buddhist nation of Myanmar.

The reality is quite different. The military rule has merely instrumentalized Myanmar’s ethnic diversity in order to cling to power. The mastermind of the February coup, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, is widely known for commanding the extermination of entire villages belonging to various ethnic minority groups such as the Shan and the Kokang, and for authorizing the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims. In such a fragmented reality, the Tatmadaw has always feared an alliance between the Bamar majority, which mainly inhabits the country’s heartlands, and ethnic minority groups, who largely inhabit border areas. Such an alliance could in fact lead the civilian population to unite against the military, undermining their rule.

Today, in the mountainous periphery of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw’s worst nightmare is coming true.

In the frontier regions, groups of armed ethnic minorities have been fighting for autonomy for decades, for them, the military brutality that Bamar anti-coup protesters have experienced since February is nothing but a continuation of the same oppression they have been enduring for decades. In this sense, ethnic minorities provide important insights on the best tactics to fight against the Tatmadaw. Thus, since February, anti-coup protesters, namely members of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), have fled to the mountainous periphery of Myanmar to collaborate with ethnic armed groups. Thousands of activists are now learning from these resistance groups how to load a rifle, throw hand grenades, and assemble firebombs, de facto transforming into a guerrilla force.

People like Nerdah Bo Mya, a member of the Karen National Union (KNU) – the oldest rebel group which protects the Karen ethnic minority – are showing their solidarity to Bamar anti-coup protesters. “We have heart for these kind of people, because we have gone through this ourselves and we know what kind of pain, what kind of suffering… what kind of atrocities they’re going through, so we can put ourselves in their shoes”, said Nerdah. Similarly, many among the Bamar population are now apologizing on social media for not acknowledging the minorities’ experience of repression over the past years. The military coup has now clearly revealed to the Bamar population the real extent of Tatmadaw’s brutality, leading Myanmar’s majority to soul-search and change their perspective towards ethnic minorities.

Thus, for now, the Bamar population and ethnic minorities are united against the military regime, with both parties applying the principle of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” leaving aside old tensions to fight against a common foe. However, looking to the future, doubts arise. Although this newly-emerged unity represents a great leap forward in Myanmar’s fractured social reality, the Bamar majority and the ethnic minorities seemingly have different plans for Myanmar’s future. Anti-coup protestors want democracy under Suu Kyi, while minorities want self-determination and autonomy, thereby leaving many questions unanswered.

A Kayan woman, a sub-group of the Karen people. Women are known for wearing neck rings as part of their cultural identity. Photo Credit: Flickr, licensed under Creative Commons.

The ASEAN bloc

At a regional level, the reaction to the military coup appears slow and limited. Like never before, Myanmar’s crisis has exposed an uncomfortable truth about ASEAN: the bloc is unable to reach a cohesive response to any common problem.

On one side, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have criticized the use of violence against Myanmar’s civil society. On the other side, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam have remained largely silent, which does not come as a surprise, considering that Thailand’s prime minister himself gained power after a coup in 2014. Even worse, ASEAN recently invited the mastermind of the coup itself, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, to their official summit in Jakarta. Thus, not only did ASEAN not show any effective response, such as suspending Myanmar’s membership, but it also indirectly legitimized Myanmar’s brutal generals. In addition, after Western states applied several sanctions on trade to punish the military regime, ASEAN members undermined these efforts by continuing to trade with Myanmar. Injecting billions of dollars of investment into Tatmadaw’s business empire, they are helping to cement a de facto military-oligarchic ruling class. Paralyzed in a permanent state of indecision, ASEAN is now facing the prospect of a civil war in one of its member countries, with the potential of a disastrous regional spillover effect. And on top of this, its coordinating power is inevitably losing credibility in front of the international community.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative

The military coup has also posed serious threats to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Before, Beijing had closely collaborated with Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratic parliament, signing various contracts for future projects in Myanmar. In 2017, the two governments agreed to the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor agreement (CMED), which included various infrastructure projects that were intended to revitalize Myanmar’s economy, while providing China with a land route to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar. This would diminish Beijing’s over-reliance on the Strait of Malacca for oil and gas imports. Now, some analysts believe that these projects will be delayed due to Myanmar’s instability.

Conclusion

Only time will tell what the future holds for Myanmar. But there is no doubt that the military coup has unleashed a sequence of effects that will have impacts not only inside the country but also across the region. On one side, the coup offers opportunities for domestic social cohesion. On the other side, it represents a testing time for the ASEAN bloc and significant instability for China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Economically isolated, North Korea now turns to Cyberspace

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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un surrounded by military personnel. Photo Source: Flickr, licensed under Creative Commons.

For years, the international community has slapped North Korea with painful economic sanctions aimed at constraining its nuclear ambitions. Trade of arms and military equipment has been prohibited, exports of coals and minerals have been banned, and the assets of North Korean officials have been frozen. To make matters worse, the ongoing Covid19 pandemic has hit Pyongyang harder than any previous sanction. After closing its border with China, trade with Beijing has been reduced by 95%, leading to a scarcity of food and basic necessities such as soybean oil, sugar, and flour. Trains and flights in and out of the country have been stopped since March 2020, thus freezing tourism and labor exports, two major sources of foreign currency. It would therefore be easy to conclude that North Korea has recently been living in total economic isolation, that is, were it not for cyberspace.

In the physical world, a country like North Korea can be forced into isolation. Yet, in cyberspace, Pyongyang is everybody’s neighbor. Often described as the fifth domain of warfare, cyberspace has a low cost of entry while offering a high degree of anonymity. Pyongyang has seemingly exploited this domain to circumvent economic sanctions, raising millions of dollars through ransomware attacks. North Korean hackers have in fact been accused of hacking international financial institutions to steal foreign currency, which is in turn used to finance Pyongyang’s nuclear program. For this reason, they have recently been branded as “the world’s leading bank robbers”. But North Korean hackers might also have been the architects behind a cyber-attack directed against Sony Pictures Entertainment back in 2014. The entertainment company was about to release “The Interview”, a comedy that portrayed two journalists assassinating Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang. North Korea’s requests to cease the production of the movie had largely been ignored, then, in November, Sony’s employees entered their office and found images of red skeletons on their computers. “We’ve obtained all your internal data, including your secrets and top secrets”, said a message on the screens, “if you don’t obey us, we’ll release the data shown below to the world.” This makes North Korea a rare cyber-creature: a country which is using cyberattacks not only for espionage, but also to fund its own operations, and – even more strangely – to punish comedic depictions of its leader.

In 2017, the Trump administration accused North Korea of being responsible for the WannaCry malicious software, which blocked computers in more than 150 countries. In response, Pyongyang denied any responsibility and declared “we have nothing to do with cyberattacks.” Following the malware intrusion, victims were asked for a ransom payment in exchange for unlocking their systems and data. In two hospitals in Jakarta, the malware blocked patient files, including medication records. In the UK, hospitals had to cancel thousands of medical appointments after losing access to computers. In China, some gas stations had to ask their customers to pay by cash only, after their digital payment system stopped working. In France, the carmaker Renault had to suspend its production in order to stop the spread of the worm. In different ways, the WannaCry computer worm caused unexpected levels of disruption all around the world.

Bitcoin as a new source of income for the Kim regime. Photo Credit: Flickr, licensed under Creative Commons.

Constrained by a set of international sanctions and by the destructive force of the ongoing pandemic, Pyongyang is now searching for new means to ensure its survival in a hostile environment. And cyberspace offers plenty of opportunities. Following the public’s growing interest in digital currencies, North Korean hackers have currently turned their attention to the world of cryptocurrencies. Allegedly, they have built at least nine cryptocurrency apps to trade cryptocurrencies and create digital wallets, such as Ants2Whale, CoinGo, and iCryptoFX, designed with a back door that can provide North Korean hackers with access into computer systems. In August 2020 one of these Apps was used to break into a financial institution in New York to steal $11.8 millions in cryptocurrency. In addition, exchanges that trade Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have fallen victims to North Korean cyberattacks, as these exchanges offer easy access to storage facilities known as “hot wallets”: hot, because they are connected to the Internet, as opposed to the storage method known as offline “cold wallets”. In total, according to a UN report, North Korea might have stolen more than $300 million in cryptocurrencies over recent months, partly in order to support its nuclear program.

In the past, most of North Korea’s criminal operations involved the smuggling of cigarettes, counterfeit money, trading of endangered species, and illegal drugs such as methamphetamine. Today, cyberspace allows conventionally weaker actors to challenge their stronger competitors more easily. North Korea can thus pursue an asymmetric strategy to put pressure on the international community: through cyberattacks, Pyongyang is not only countering its economic isolation, but it is also funding its nuclear program.

It is hard for the international community to find an effective response: retaliation seems highly ineffective, because North Korea has a primitive infrastructure that is less vulnerable to cyberattacks. Imposing further sanctions also appears a non-viable option: many sanctions have already been imposed, and North Korea is becoming increasingly adept at finding workarounds to its economic isolation.

For decades, North Korea has searched for solutions to the same old questions: how to mitigate and instrumentalize its weaknesses to stay relevant in a hostile international system. Now, it seems that cyberspace offers the answers.

Sino-ASEAN relations: a marriage in crisis?

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The 18th ASEAN-China Summit in Kuala Lumpur, November 2015 , Licensed via Creative Commons

The partnership between China and ASEAN countries has seen its ups and downs.

The period between 2003 and 2013 was hailed as a “Golden Decade” of Sino-ASEAN relations, where the two parties built political trust and strong economic ties. Concurrently, the decade between 2014 and 2024 was optimistically introduced as the “Diamond Decade”, with ambitions to further promote partnership and friendship between the two. However, events did not proceed as either had hoped. Instead, during the so-called Diamond Decade, the once prosperous relationship has become a rocky marriage. Geographical neighbors with an ongoing territorial dispute in the South China Sea, China and ASEAN nations have recently grown mutually suspicious and, after the harmony of the Golden Decade, the Diamond Decade seems to have ended in a vicious cycle of distrust.

Dialogue between ASEAN and China began in 1991. By 2002 the two began to work towards a free trade agreement. Eventually established in 2010, today the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) is the world’s largest FTA by population, and the third largest by economic size, after the North American Free-Trade Area (USMCA) and the European Union (EU). China and ASEAN countries have also proved highly complementary in energy cooperation, with ASEAN countries richness in natural resources met by China’s insatiable demand for enormous amounts of energy to power its economic machine. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei are abundant in oil and gas, while Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar boast hydropower resources. China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and Sinopec, have participated in oil and gas production since the 1990s in countries like Indonesia, from land and shallow water to deep sea. Thus, where ASEAN countries lack proper infrastructure, China provides oil and gas exploration technology.

Unfortunately for both sides, economic cooperation is not enough to tie together a geopolitical relationship. Over recent years, having become the dominant regional power, China has implemented a “Push and Pull Strategy” towards ASEAN countries. Through the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, China “pushes” and advances its position at the expenses of ASEAN interests, displaying growing assertiveness. While, on the other side, China “pulls” ASEAN countries towards its orbit, using massive development projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Thus, in the eyes of ASEAN countries, Beijing today represents an emerging threat while remaining a key trading partner – a source of opportunities, and a source of challenges. The union between China and ASEAN countries continues, yet in the Diamond Decade the spectre of doubt starts to creep in.

The US Navy, US Coast Guard, Royal Malaysian Navy, and Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency are sailing side-by-side in the Strait of Malacca. Photo Credit: US Pacific Fleet, licensed via Creative Commons

The intervention of major powers in the region has added a new layer of complexity to the situation, dividing the region even further. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the Quad, has recently been revitalized, as anti-Chinese sentiments have hardened not only in the United States, but also in Australia, India, and Japan. Additionally, the navies of France, Germany, UK, and the Netherlands are deploying naval forces to the South China Sea to support Quad activity. Recently, the warships of India, Japan, Australia and the US have been exercising near the Strait of Malacca, which is a key waterway for Beijing, with 80% of its oil supply passing through it. If tensions in the region were to escalate, this narrow passage could be strangled by China’s rivals, affecting Beijing’s energy security, a possibility that former Chinese President Hu Jintao branded the “Malacca Dilemma”. In order to reduce its dependence on the Strait, today China is searching for new land routes for its energy imports, especially through its Belt and Road Initiative. To achieve this, Beijing has turned to ASEAN countries, planning huge investments in Southeast Asian infrastructure. Myanmar, for example, will host the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a section of the Belt and Road Initiative that is intended to connect the oil trade from the Indian Ocean to China via Myanmar, thus reducing Chinese dependence on the Strait of Malacca.

“Don’t force us to choose”, ASEAN countries have repeatedly asked. Unfortunately, as US-China tensions flare up time and again, neutrality doesn’t seem a viable option. The bloc seems to follow an ambivalent policy. Some of the 10 member states, like Cambodia, Laos, and the Philippines, opted to stay in the Chinese orbit, hungry for economic gains. Others, like Vietnam and Singapore, appear more interested in Western protection against a rising China, and tend to align with Washington. Although these positions are likely to shift over time, the only certainty is that ASEAN is now trapped in the middle of a power struggle. However, there might be a way for Southeast Asian countries to escape the trap. ASEAN nations could choose to collaborate with middle powers such as Australia and Japan, thus creating middle-power agency and reducing the need of a binary choice between the US and China. They could therefore keep their security ties with the US, while at the same time maintaining their economic relations with China.

ASEAN originally emerged as a response to the tensions of the Cold War, when a confrontation between capitalism and communism could threaten the balance of the newly independent states of Southeast Asia. Quite ironically, today the ASEAN region, and the South China Sea in particular, are again becoming a proxy for great power competition. This could split ASEAN countries along different ideological lines once again, just as happened during the first Cold War. Trapped in the power struggle of the 21st century, they now find themselves walking a tightrope. Unlike the Golden Decade, the Diamond decade seems to be one of uncertainty, where the union between China and ASEAN nations is increasingly vulnerable to the forces of geopolitics.