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Voices from Strife: Protest if you like, but quietly and out of the way

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2020 Black Lives Matters Protest in London. Photo by James Eades on Unsplash

The recent Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill 2021 has caused some deep concern among some human rights groups, activists, and MPs for the impact it may have on the right to peaceful protest. The Bill sets out plans to “strengthen police powers to tackle non-violent protests that have a significant disruptive effect on the public or on access to Parliament”. This has provoked outrage that what is seen as a fundamental democratic right is being threatened. Unfortunately for those not involved, protest involves significant disruption. If it didn’t, it would probably be a discussion or a local meeting between like-minded people. Just as people are inconvenienced by strikes, people are inconvenienced by protests.

When we think about the biggest protest movements, we think of Black Lives Matter, Extinction Rebellion, and then, going further back in our protest history, the right to equal pay for women and the right for women to vote. One of the commonalities that links them is their refusal to remain quiet on issues that are felt to be unjust, unfair, and unequal. Protest isn’t quiet and it shouldn’t be quiet – how else will protestors be heard? Change doesn’t come because those in power think it would be nice and fair to grant others power. Change comes when power is fought for and won; change doesn’t come from staying quiet. Today, equal rights for women in pay and voting rights is considered obvious, but this right had to be fought for and the prevailing attitudes had to be contended. Today’s Black Lives Matter and Extinction Rebellion may well be viewed in the same way in another 100 years’ time, but we have to hear them out now.

While accepting that protest will be disruptive, there are things that protest organisers need to consider when planning their methods in order to lessen harmful impacts of disruption. They do need to work with the police to ensure that emergency service access can be ensured, that protestors are warned that the protest is peaceful and that violence will not be tolerated, and that the risks do not exceed acceptable levels, but those risks should be to the safety of those involved – not political.

A police presence at any large event – protest or otherwise – should be there for the safety and security of all involved. We know that there is always a small minority who look to large events as opportunities to commit crime: to pick pockets or to pick fights, but this is surely true of any other large event such as a festival. These are the cohort that the police should be targeting. The police should not be present to prevent democratic rights from being exercised. The police should uphold the law and protect the legal right to protest peacefully.

Protests that are seen in Russia – with riot police beating protestors and arresting them, merely for their presence – must not be allowed to become the norm in the UK. When protestors are demonised in the political sphere, in the newspapers, it is not long before phrases like “they had it coming” and “well, they shouldn’t have been protesting” might start being bandied about. People with jobs, people with children, people with other responsibilities stop protesting the things they believe in for fear of repercussions; the right to protest is dampened by people’s own self-censorship.

During a recent debate on 22 April in the House of Lords on the topic of Alexei Navalny’s imprisonment, several Lords and Baronesses suggested increasing the number of individuals among President Putin’s allies who are being sanctioned as well as speeding up the process by which recommendations set out in the Russia Report are implemented. The clear implication being that the imprisonment of an opposition leader is unacceptable and that the UK must stand up for the rights of democratic protest. The debate was ended by the Conservative Peer, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, with the line, “It is about time the Russians listened not only to the international community but to their own citizens.” Well, quite. The Conservatives in the Commons could perhaps do with some of the same advice.

The problem with the ideas that seem to be presented by this Bill is that they are not designed with protecting the democratic right to peacefully protest in mind. They are designed to restrict the democratic right to peacefully protest. I personally happen to think that protesting outside Westminster is one of the places where it must always be allowed to protest; inside are our lawmakers and representatives and they have to listen. The UK Government has said time and again since that exiting the European Union means that the UK can stand up for democratic values as Global Britain and that our reputation will support us in doing that. We must not let that reputation for fairness and democracy be undermined for the sake of party-political gain.

Troubles Ahead: Will Brexit See a Return of The Troubles in Northern Ireland?

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by Gideon Jones

Forensic experts examining the remains of a car bomb detonated by the New IRA in front of the courthouse in Derry, January 2019 (Image credit: Justin Kernoghan)

Though the Northern Ireland of today is a vastly different place than it was when the Troubles began in 1968, it would be a mistake to assume that those original divisions have completely healed. Despite boasting one of the lowest murder rates in Western Europe, the divisions that led to the conflict are still present, with both the Protestant and Catholic communities still living largely separated from one another, without a strong shared identity to unite them and with the Loyalist and Republican labels remaining salient. Brexit, however, is now threatening to lay bare this sectarian division like no other event ever has. Unfortunately, many are now asking themselves whether the UK leaving the European Union (EU), especially without a deal, will see the return of terrorism in Northern Ireland.

The question of Northern Ireland, and by extension its border with the Republic of Ireland, held only a minor position in the Brexit referendum discourse, some campaigners even denied the very existence of the issue. Regardless, the border has remained a thorn in the side of successive British Prime Ministers. The main concern has been with the economic arrangements that need to be put in place once the UK leaves the EU. What makes this an even more contentious issue in Northern Ireland is that eighty five percent of Catholics voted to remain, whilst sixty percent of Protestants voted to leave. This split along religious lines is concerning to say the least. Britain’s membership in the EU allowed an invisible border to exist between North and South, allowing communities on both sides to remain in close contact, as well as unhindered passage of goods and people. This was a settlement that most in Northern Ireland were happy to keep in place, but Brexit will be seen by many in the Catholic (as well as forty percent of the Protestant) community as being imposed on them by the British against their will.

The prospect of a united Ireland is still an ideal that holds a great deal of weight in the Catholic community, and many persist in rejecting the legitimacy of Westminster (with Sinn Fein still declining to take their seats). Perception matters, and Brexit looks to a great deal of Catholics like a political project of a distant power, meddling in their lives with little to no concern for their needs, or even their consent. If a border and custom checkpoints were to be created through a no-deal scenario, the resentment it would cause amongst Catholics can hardly be understated. Indeed, they would likely become useful recruiting tools for Dissident Republicans, as well as a targets for terrorist attacks.

The threat posed by terrorist and paramilitary groups remains a very real one. Though the Provisional IRA loyalist paramilitaries like the UVF and are unlikely to mount any campaign of violence similar in scale to that of The Troubles, according to a 2015 governmental report, all the main paramilitary groups are still in existence and remain a potential national security threat . The main Republican and Loyalist groups remain committed to achieving their political aims through peaceful means. In contrast, Dissident Republicans continue to carry out an armed campaign to end what they see as British imperialism on the island of Ireland. Dissident Republicans, those republicans who rejected the Good Friday Agreement, are still actively opposing the peace through groups like the New IRA, and have been responsible for several attacks in Northern Ireland, as well as the death of the journalist Lyra McKee. There is a good reason to believe that groups like the New IRA will attempt to capitalise on Brexit and the discontent that it will cause, and may use it as a way to draw many young and disaffected Catholics into their ranks, carrying out further attacks across Northern Ireland.

There is no doubt that Dissident groups would have attempted to carry out attacks with or without Brexit. In fact, it could be argued that Brexit has simply brought into sharp focus the violence they have been carrying out in Northern Ireland for years. The real danger, however, is that Brexit can provide them an opportunity to get back into the spotlight, and to once again legitimise violence as a way of achieving political aims. Brian Kenna, the chairman of Saoradh, a small republican party in Northern Ireland thought to be the political arm of the New IRA, claimed that:

“Brexit is a huge opportunity. It’s not the reason why people would resist British rule but Brexit just gives it focus, gives it a physical picture. It’s a huge help.”

Dissident Republicans will see Brexit, and especially a no-deal, as an opportunity too good to resist passing up - there is a very real chance that they will seek to exploit underlying resentments and take violent action. Though they may receive a bump in support and could feel emboldened by the political landscape, it remains unlikely that we are witnessing the return of The Troubles.

Whilst Northern Ireland’s political landscape may be going through a shift due to Brexit, it is not yet a forgone conclusion that people will give up on democratic means of achieving their political goals. In fact, many non-violent supporters of a united Ireland are feeling more confident of achieving it after Brexit, and believe that, in time, unification will be won through the ballot box.

It is not without some irony that as Northern Ireland approaches its centenary, there is a strong chance that it will have a Catholic majority. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that this will automatically translate into majority support for a united Ireland. Being Catholic no longer equates to being a nationalist, nor does being Protestant mean you are a unionist, with recent polling showing that people are feeling less bound by tribal loyalty and are increasingly neutral on Northern Ireland’s union with the UK. This though does mean that Northern Ireland is no longer the Protestant state for a Protestant people as it was originally envisioned to be - and the state’s ties to Britain will more likely be decided on pragmatism rather than a deep cultural or religious affinity. Republicans are given to feeling that time is on their side, and Brexit may have just sped up the process of reunification. There is moreover a deep feeling within both Protestant and Catholic communities that reunification with Ireland is more a matter of ‘when’, rather than ‘if’, as support for a united Ireland goes up, but also due to a feeling among Unionists that the British people increasingly no longer care if they stay or go.

So, will Brexit bring about a return to the Troubles in Northern Ireland? Dissidents will undoubtedly use it as an opportunity to carry out attacks and increase their own levels of support.

But a return to the Troubles? This is possible, yet highly unlikely. Politics is thankfully still seen as the arena to advance one’s goals, and the ballot box is still seen as more powerful than the bomb.

Gideon Jones is a MA student in Terrorism, Security & Society at the War Studies Department, King’s College London, and completed his BA in History at the University of Warwick.

Coming from Northern Ireland, he has been brought up in a country scarred by the issues of terrorism, conflict, sectarianism, and extremist ideology. Through this experience, he has been given valuable insight into how the legacies of such problems can continue to divide a society decades after the fighting has stopped, and how the issues left unresolved can threaten to upend a fragile peace.

Gideon is a Staff Writer at Strife.

Perceptions of Peaceful Transfer of Power: From the British to the American Empire

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by Mariana Vieira

The Battle of Manila Bay (1898) saw the defeat of the Spanish navy at the hands of the fledging American empire (Image credit: Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.)

The transition from British to American hegemony, a shift that fundamentally shaped the post-1945 world order, is often characterised as peaceful. This is brought about by the choice of terminology and the analytical slippage between hegemony and empire. While there were no direct hostilities between the UK and the US as the former declined and the latter ascended, the study of empire highlights the conflict and violence of the two key processes of transition: the rise of the United States and the decline of Great Britain. Indeed, terminology matters because it enables scholars to consider the interactions and dynamics between metropole, the core territory around which power is centralised, and the extensive periphery of dominated areas.

The transition from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana did not happen immediately and the building blocks leading to it were hardly peaceful. Special mentions include the Spanish-American War (1898), the wars of decolonisation, and both World Wars. The absence of a typical hegemonic war between the dominant power and the rising challenger led experts to believe that a peaceful transition took place sometime in the early-mid twentieth century.

However, in determining a more precise timestamp, the most persuasive dates do follow a conflict that fits with the other main characteristics of hegemonic war: a total conflict involving major states that is unlimited in terms of political, economic, and ideological significance. Here, the Second World War epitomises the decay of the European international political order and the triumph of American power. Moreover, even proponents of the peaceful transition thesis highlight how the US became committed to enforcing order internationally after the ‘cataclysm’ of the Second World War.

US hegemonic ascendency accelerated after the annexation of overseas territories, the spoils of the American victory in the war of 1898. While these territorial acquisitions were unprecedented, the Spanish-American War and its consequences have been argued to represent a ‘logical culmination’ of the major trends in nineteenth-century US foreign policy. In removing Spain from the Western Hemisphere and increasing American’s reach in East Asia, the war was crucial in advancing the US’ status as a world power and a full-fledged member of the imperial club.

Analysing America’s colonial experience during the earlier period of transition as an empire, as opposed to as a hegemon allows for a more complex image that highlights the violence and day-to-day coercion intrinsic to how the American empire was built. Whereas hegemons are strictly concerned with influence over foreign affairs, empires seek to exert control over the political regime of the periphery, thereby encompassing both domestic and foreign policy spheres. As an empire, the US proceeded to transform Cuba into a neo-colonial economy built around cash-crops and closely tied to the US market, while the Philippines witnessed an especially brutal war of ‘benevolent assimilation’ furthered by ideologies of racial difference.

The following period of US hegemonic maturity and UK hegemonic decline was partly engendered by significant changes in the international context. As the US entered a global field that was already mostly colonized, it seemingly maintained international peace – or the existing level of colonial violence – by supporting its European allies and outsourcing territorial control. However, the emergence and proliferation of anticolonial nationalism in the periphery changed the global landscape. As the First World War brought to a boil the decades long-simmering tensions of militarism, alliances, imperialism, and nationalism, its aftermath witnessed the break-up of several empires on the losing side, the weakening of the victorious’ hold on their colonial possessions, and the widespread circulation of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points.

The diffusion of ideas of national self-determination in European colonies resulted in multiple movements against colonial rule, including in Britain. Crucially, the rise of nationalism and the eruption of conflict furthered the British hegemonic decline. The transition from British to American international systems was consolidating as the USA found other means to exert their – informal – influence, while the British could not meet their economic goals without the colonial – formal – dimension.

Partly distracted with crises in the Middle East, East Asia, and South Africa and partly constrained by the importance of American raw materials and markets, the British did not seek to actively oppose America’s rise in the Western Hemisphere. Arguably, if there was a shift from perceptions of competition to cooperation with the US, it was largely a result of British non-peaceful priorities laying elsewhere. The British operated a trading empire based on the exchange of European manufactured goods for the colonies’ foods and minerals, relying on imperialism to maintain its economic supremacy.

However, as empires became increasingly illegitimate, the cumulative effect of peripheral wars of decolonisation and the deterioration of the British industrial base undermined the productivity on which its power hinged. In the metropole, the devastating impact of the two World Wars added a further dimension of resource erosion, this disrupted the imperialist center and left the British Empire dependent on American economic and military power. Consequently, the British hegemonic decline was accelerated by interacting conflicts in the center and in the periphery.

It was not a white dove that brought about a new imperial center, but rather a murder of crows.

Finally, when contending the emergence of a ‘peaceful’ international order based on the convergence of Anglo-Saxon values, a study of empire may point in other directions. Both empires share similarities, as capitalist nation-states with an impulse to act imperialistically in ordering their respective international systems. The US gunboat diplomacy showcased its contempt for ‘lesser’ peoples, thereby placing America in the mainstream of Western imperialism. Here, the American elite followed the debates on empire in Britain, applying notions of racism and the white man’s burden to US expansionist imperatives. In hailing the intellectual, industrial, and moral superiority of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, the sense of sameness legitimised and fueled more violence towards ‘backward’ people and ‘little brown brothers’ in the periphery during the initial phase of transition.

For centuries, the rise and decline of powerful empires characterised world politics and not the world of nation-states that is taken for granted in International Relations (IR). The perception of a peaceful hegemonic transition is based on the Westphalian terms of reference, but the framework of sovereign states occludes and distorts imperial relations.

Careful consideration of British decline and American rise showcases precisely these two antonyms of peace: war, on a global scale, and conflict, within their respective peripheries. In rendering the violence of the processes behind this ‘peaceful’ transition visible, the study of empire warns against Eurocentric celebrations of a successful model that rising – non-Western – powers should follow. It was not a white dove that brought about a new imperial center, but rather a murder of crows.

Mariana Vieira currently works as an Editorial Assistant for Chatham House’s magazine, The World Today. Her research interests span US foreign policy, critical security studies, and empire. After completing her bachelor’s in Politics, Philosophy and Economics at the University of Warwick, she pursued an MS in Empires, Colonialism and Globalisation at LSE, followed by an MA in International Peace and Security at KCL’s War Studies department.

A Nuke-Free UK? A Case Against Unilateral Disarmament

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By Sarah M. Koch

28 January 2019

Protestors march against nuclear weapons in Oxford in 1980. (Photo credit: Kim Traynor)

 

When the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945, a new era of international relations began. As President Truman asserted in his last State of the Union address on January 7, 1953, a nuclear war could ‘destroy the very structure of a civilization that has been slowly and painfully built up through hundreds of generations.’ Decades later, the role of nuclear weapons in international politics and military strategy still inspires heated debate. For some, the risk of nuclear arms proliferation is assumed to be self-evident. Growth in the number of nuclear warheads around the world is inevitably linked to an increase in the likelihood that a nuclear weapon may fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue states.[i] For others, the spread of nuclear weapons could be a powerful force for the maintenance of peace— nuclear-armed nations are forced to become rational actors.[ii] In part, due to this debate, a total of 191 countries have signed the UN Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which includes a commitment to pursuing a nuclear disarmed world. However, as I will argue, using the United Kingdom as an example, a nuclear disarmed world will not be attained through unilateral nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear weapons are not as important to the UK now as they were when the UK was an imperial power. In the current political reality, disarmament could be considered acceptable as long as the UK remains under the American nuclear umbrella.[iii] When the British government began building its nuclear arsenal in the 1950s, it needed to protect its imperial holdings and uphold its status as a first-rate power. For much of the Cold War, the British government strove to build and maintain a nuclear capability that matched that of the US and USSR in quality, if not in size. Though British imperialism has since waned, the UK continues to keep one nuclear-armed submarine on patrol at all times. In the case of complete destruction of the UK’s conventional capabilities, this submarine would be able to launch a catastrophic retaliatory strike. In the post-colonial Britain of 2017, the economic burden of these nuclear weapons may overshadow their value as deterrence tools. According to a 2017 report to Parliament, replacing the current generation of submarines will cost more than thirty billion pounds to ensure that the UK can maintain this nuclear deterrent until the 2060s. Alternatively, the UK could abandon its nuclear operational independence and rely on the US nuclear arsenal to avoid a nuclear strike against Europe.

Despite the financial appeal of this option, it would leave the UK vulnerable and over-dependent on its American allies. Though the US and the UK have maintained a special relationship for decades, the particulars of this relationship have changed with the priorities and personalities of each nation’s leaders.[iv] The security situation in either country has the propensity to change suddenly and dramatically; therefore, complacency and over-dependence on this relationship could prove costly. If the US were to leave the European continent, would the UK rely on France to deter aggression by Russia, Iran, or their successors? Historically, the US has demonstrated the tendency to retreat into periods of isolationism.[v] In such a situation, a non-nuclear UK could be strong-armed by another nuclear power. Despite arguments to the contrary, such as those made by Scott Sagan, minimal evidence exists to support the notion that unilateral nuclear disarmament will thwart or de-incentivise the rise of new nuclear powers.[vi] Only one nation, South Africa, has ever willingly dismantled its nuclear program. Additionally, a nuclear weapons program could be veiled under the guise of peaceful energy research.[vii] Weapons themselves can be easy to transport and conceal.[viii] These concerns about deception and treaty defection make even multilateral disarmament unappealing.

Finally, the relationship between nuclear weapons and international prestige should not be underestimated. The five nations with permanent seats on the UN Security Council [France, US, UK, Russia, and China] are all nuclear-armed states. The possession of nuclear weapons has directly afforded the UK ‘a seat at the table’. Post-colonial Britain would be reduced to international insignificance without its nuclear arsenal. As was discussed earlier, the strategic value of nuclear weapons may have decreased in the UK context. However, nuclear armament still provides the UK with a strong bargaining chip diplomatically in the twenty-first century. Without its imperial holdings, the UK is now an island nation ranked 22nd with respect to population. As Mark Bell wrote in 2015, nuclear weapons are a ‘weapon of the weak’. States with limited conventional capabilities stand to gain the most from nuclear armament.[ix] Nuclear weapons can keep powerful states from asserting their will over smaller, weaker states.[x] For this same reason, T.V. Paul labeled nuclear weapons the ‘great-equalizer’ in 1999.[xi] Though the UK has lost world-power status, the ‘symbolic function’ of its nuclear arsenal forces other nations to take it seriously on the international stage.[xii] Perhaps the most compelling reason for the UK to maintain its nuclear arsenal is prestige — not security.

In conclusion, unilateral disarmament is an ineffective and unrealistic path to a nuclear disarmed world. As demonstrated by the UK’s current situation, it is illogical to assume that a country would dismantle its nuclear program of its own accord without multilateral agreements. Unilateral disarmament would make a powerful, albeit idealistic, statement with respect to a nation’s commitment to counter-proliferation; however, it could also put the state in a strategically perilous and diplomatically precarious situation. Possession of a robust nuclear deterrent can avoid over-dependence on allies, deter strong-arming by other nuclear powers, and garner international respect. To disarm unilaterally would be an ill-advised gamble with clear risks and unclear returns. As long as nations assume that nuclear weapons bring security and influence to those that possess them, this attitude will not only inhibit disarmament but also power proliferation. We can idealise a world at nuclear zero, but few countries — if any — will want to take the first step alone.

Sarah Koch is a Marshall Scholar and a postgraduate student in the War Studies department. She holds an MSc in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Edinburgh and a BA in Middle Eastern Language & Literature from the University of Virginia. She will return to the U.S. Army after graduation.

Notes:

[i] Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, “Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option?” The National Interest, no. 109 (September/October 2010): 88-89; Keith Krause and Andrew Latham, “Constructing Non-Proliferation and Arms Control: The Norms of Western Practice,” Contemporary Security Police 19, no. 1 (1998): 36-39.

[ii] Sagan and Waltz, “Best Option?:” 93-94.

[iii] Nuclear umbrella refers to the assumed protection that nuclear-armed states extend to their allies. Assumed American nuclear protection has been key to NATO defense of the European continent since the Cold War.

[iv] A weakening relationship, at least outwardly, can be seen under the current Trump and May administrations.

[v] After its founding, the US embraced its geographic isolation, and this sentiment endured until the Spanish-American war. These feelings were revived after WWI. The outbreak of WWII gave rise to the America First Committee. Calls for “America first” have returned in the Trump era.

[vi] Sagan and Waltz, “Best Option?:” 88-91.

[vii] Wyn Bowen, Matthew Moran, and Dina Esfandiary, Living on the Edge: Iran and Nuclear Hedging, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 51-59.

[viii] Sagan and Waltz, “Best Option?:” 92.

[ix] Mark S. Bell, “Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy,” International Security 40, no. 1 (2015): 118.

[x] Sagan and Waltz, “Best Option?:” 92.

[xi] T.V. Paul, “Great Equalizers or Agents of Chaos? Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Emerging International Order,” in International Order and the Future of World Politics, ed. Paul and John A. Hall, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 374.

[xii] Scott D. Sagan, “Why do states build nuclear weapons? Three models in search of a bomb,” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97): 75.

Image source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Anti-nuclear_weapons_protest,_UK_1980.JPG#filehistory

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: A Nuke-Free UK? A Case Against Unilateral Disarmament

Author: Sarah M. Koch

Profile: Sarah Koch is a Marshall Scholar and a postgraduate student in the War Studies department. She holds an MSc in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Edinburgh and a BA in Middle Eastern Language & Literature from the University of Virginia. She will return to the U.S. Army after graduation.

Keywords: nuclear, disarmament, United Kingdom

Image caption: A 1980 anti-nuclear weapons march in Oxford

Image source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Anti-nuclear_weapons_protest,_UK_1980.JPG#filehistory

 

Scottish independence: fiscal identities and the wealth of nations

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By Pablo de Orellana and Claire Yorke:

As Scotland goes to the polls tomorrow to determine its future in the United Kingdom, a number of contending identities have been at play in the referendum campaign over the past few weeks. The idea of self-determination is an emotional calling. It speaks of the need to achieve state-level independence, it speaks of freedom, and therefore it also refers to the hope of a better future free from the constraints of a dominant other. The dynamics of identity that make this such an unusual independence campaign should be explored. This analysis argues that claims about national narratives and identities are conspicuous for their absence, and have been replaced by the newly dominant logic of Western politics: fiscal solvency and economic imperatives.

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The debate about the independence of Scotland has been marked by the rationale that dominated of the 2010 UK General Election: fiscal responsibility and sustainability. In keeping with the dominant battlegrounds of British politics since the 2008 financial crash, debates centre on questions about how Britain can “pay her way in the world” and whether the current level of state spending is sustainable or not. Remarkably, arguments based on historical narratives of injustice and emotional appeals to emancipation from repression are mostly absent from the Scottish referendum campaign. The contestable political space has been reduced to only one area worth considering – that of the most effective route to economic success. This, however, is part of a wider trend and an all-British problem.

The dominant narratives that have emerged in the Yes campaign are of a stagnant Westminster that (by intent or accident) is content or incompetent in the face of rising inequality and unable to offer progressive alternatives. Alex Salmond, the head of the Scottish National Party (SNP), speaks of a Scottish desire to progress and protect welfare, redistribute wealth, and adhere to a model of social democracy akin to that found in the Nordic countries. These components form a defining vision of Salmond’s Scotland and Scottish identity - one that can only prosper under independence. Even in 2012 he spoke of Scotland as closer to the Scandinavian countries, sharing a consensus on progressive politics and social democracy that is destined to remain unfulfilled due to Tory recalcitrance. Independence, he argued, is the means ‘by which Scotland can take its rightful place as a responsible member in the world community; and by which the Scottish people can best fulfil their potential and realise their aspirations.’ In short, Salmond posits a narrative of prosperity against stagnation. It is marked that the debates have focused on areas that in other national struggles would appear of lesser importance: the longevity of North Sea oil, the affordability of the NHS, higher education, and business prosperity.

Contrast this to more common discourses of identity at times of emancipation. Examining other claims to independence, comparisons would draw on the Corsican, Breton, Basque or Kurdish experiences. In these cases, each respective group’s native languages are actively repressed or banned from schools –in no case are they considered a first language. Their culture –and by extension a key part of their identity is actively repressed. Mustafa Kemal, the first President of modern-day Turkey, sought to cultivate the belief that Kurds did not exist, they were “Mountain Turks” and as such, were not recognized by the state. In Scotland the bases of Scottish identity and nationality have not been actively repressed in recent history. Indeed, in the last hundred years, they have largely been embraced by the collective identity of the British Isles. Scots can be Scots in Scotland and the UK. This might account for the surprising lack of appeal to historic narratives of repression and resistance in the current campaign.

In the Scottish debate, the identity in danger is not cultural, linguistic or traditional; indeed those aspects of identity can coexist according to Salmond, who proclaimed in his 2012 speech that ‘the social union which binds the people of these islands will endure long after the political union has been ended’. There remains, however a kernel of emancipatory claims; they are, after all, why one would have an independence referendum. The case put forth is that a progressive Scottish political identity (permanently progressive) is stifled by a (permanently conservative, stagnant, unequal) UK political identity.

On the one hand, Salmond is playing within the goalposts of the dominant discourse of British politics since 2008, that financial responsibility is the only major legitimate political game. On the other hand, he is creating the possibility of an independent Scotland that is better off than hitherto, all whilst remaining within the narratives of progressive politics and financial responsibility. This is an identifying characteristic of the Yes campaign – it is empowering and positive, but hardly uniquely Scottish. One reason many Britons are frustrated by this referendum is that these questions apply to all in Britain. Newcastle, Bradford, Leeds, Sheffield, Portsmouth, Cardiff can equally claim that the Tories have left them out in the cold since the 1980s, and that they are marginalised by London elites. This points to concerns regarding the limited redistribution of wealth from the capital to other parts of the country, rather than a need for independence.

The clash of these economic identities does not justify a referendum taken as a business proposition, a divorce that could be either costly or prosperous. There is little passion to be found in financial arguments. Most importantly, these arguments entirely fail to provide a coherent vision beyond the opportunity of breaking free from an economically unequal and unsatisfying state of affairs. To change the plight of so many on this island who no longer or have never ‘had it so good’ is a cause with which many would agree, and would have as a national debate, not a question for which nationalism has an answer.

What the current debate is missing (besides some folklore) is an articulation of how the last three centuries have constituted a new society, brought new opportunities, and benefits, in spite of its problems and past tribulations. The Better Together campaign would have been well advised to celebrate the positive developments enabled by this symbiotic relationship. Finding clear evidence is easy: the Scottish Enlightenment set the tone for Western thought for centuries; it was David Hume that provoked Immanuel Kant into his most famous text. The rise of progressive politics, led by the intellectual revolution of Hume and Adam Smith, was birthed in Edinburgh and nurtured throughout the UK. Scotland’s industrial and engineering past are mythical, with the Clyde producing a vast fraction of world shipping for over a century. Scotland is an undisputed cultural powerhouse, yet the festivals are as British as they are Scottish and benefit and indeed depend on the common political, social and also cultural space provided by the Union. These examples show how difficult it is to separate British achievements over the last three centuries into Scottish and English ones.

Nationalism (of various degrees of hostility) as a response to economic crises is by now a traditional response in European politics to insecurity, poverty, and financial instability. In the late 1800s nationalism helped Bismark’s generation scupper liberal dreams of democracy on the continent by focusing on the birthrights of the mythical Germanic volk. In the 1920s and 30s identities returned as the ultimate mark of segregation between those with rights and those without. National birthright again determined the economic rights of a people. In both cases identity was linked to birth, to a narrative of origin and history, and to claims about the present and future. It is a mistake to return to the concept of a nation and the rights of its children (literally and figuratively in the case of the Yes Campaign) as the basic determinant of economic future.

Instead, this entire island sorely needs political, social, and economic progress. The debate about a better future at the heart of the referendum is one for all the countries of the Union to have. If this referendum can spark a discussion about how Britain can be more fair and prosperous, and can scare all political parties into engaging with the public on this, then this campaign would have served a grand purpose. Let it not be at the expense of a most successful partnership.
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Pablo de Orellana is an Editor at Strife, as well as a Doctoral researcher at the War Studies Department, King’s College London. His interests include diplomacy, critical theory, nationalism, partaking in democracy and contemporary fine art.

Claire Yorke is a Doctoral researcher in the War Studies Department at Kings College London and a member of NATO’s Young Leader’s Working Group. Prior to her PhD Claire was programme manager of the International Security Research Department at Chatham House in London and worked as a Parliamentary Researcher in the House of Commons. You can follow her on Twitter @ClaireYorke.