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Voices from Strife: Protest if you like, but quietly and out of the way

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2020 Black Lives Matters Protest in London. Photo by James Eades on Unsplash

The recent Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill 2021 has caused some deep concern among some human rights groups, activists, and MPs for the impact it may have on the right to peaceful protest. The Bill sets out plans to “strengthen police powers to tackle non-violent protests that have a significant disruptive effect on the public or on access to Parliament”. This has provoked outrage that what is seen as a fundamental democratic right is being threatened. Unfortunately for those not involved, protest involves significant disruption. If it didn’t, it would probably be a discussion or a local meeting between like-minded people. Just as people are inconvenienced by strikes, people are inconvenienced by protests.

When we think about the biggest protest movements, we think of Black Lives Matter, Extinction Rebellion, and then, going further back in our protest history, the right to equal pay for women and the right for women to vote. One of the commonalities that links them is their refusal to remain quiet on issues that are felt to be unjust, unfair, and unequal. Protest isn’t quiet and it shouldn’t be quiet – how else will protestors be heard? Change doesn’t come because those in power think it would be nice and fair to grant others power. Change comes when power is fought for and won; change doesn’t come from staying quiet. Today, equal rights for women in pay and voting rights is considered obvious, but this right had to be fought for and the prevailing attitudes had to be contended. Today’s Black Lives Matter and Extinction Rebellion may well be viewed in the same way in another 100 years’ time, but we have to hear them out now.

While accepting that protest will be disruptive, there are things that protest organisers need to consider when planning their methods in order to lessen harmful impacts of disruption. They do need to work with the police to ensure that emergency service access can be ensured, that protestors are warned that the protest is peaceful and that violence will not be tolerated, and that the risks do not exceed acceptable levels, but those risks should be to the safety of those involved – not political.

A police presence at any large event – protest or otherwise – should be there for the safety and security of all involved. We know that there is always a small minority who look to large events as opportunities to commit crime: to pick pockets or to pick fights, but this is surely true of any other large event such as a festival. These are the cohort that the police should be targeting. The police should not be present to prevent democratic rights from being exercised. The police should uphold the law and protect the legal right to protest peacefully.

Protests that are seen in Russia – with riot police beating protestors and arresting them, merely for their presence – must not be allowed to become the norm in the UK. When protestors are demonised in the political sphere, in the newspapers, it is not long before phrases like “they had it coming” and “well, they shouldn’t have been protesting” might start being bandied about. People with jobs, people with children, people with other responsibilities stop protesting the things they believe in for fear of repercussions; the right to protest is dampened by people’s own self-censorship.

During a recent debate on 22 April in the House of Lords on the topic of Alexei Navalny’s imprisonment, several Lords and Baronesses suggested increasing the number of individuals among President Putin’s allies who are being sanctioned as well as speeding up the process by which recommendations set out in the Russia Report are implemented. The clear implication being that the imprisonment of an opposition leader is unacceptable and that the UK must stand up for the rights of democratic protest. The debate was ended by the Conservative Peer, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, with the line, “It is about time the Russians listened not only to the international community but to their own citizens.” Well, quite. The Conservatives in the Commons could perhaps do with some of the same advice.

The problem with the ideas that seem to be presented by this Bill is that they are not designed with protecting the democratic right to peacefully protest in mind. They are designed to restrict the democratic right to peacefully protest. I personally happen to think that protesting outside Westminster is one of the places where it must always be allowed to protest; inside are our lawmakers and representatives and they have to listen. The UK Government has said time and again since that exiting the European Union means that the UK can stand up for democratic values as Global Britain and that our reputation will support us in doing that. We must not let that reputation for fairness and democracy be undermined for the sake of party-political gain.

Has Myanmar’s military overplayed its hand?

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An example of military propaganda. The Tatmadaw has long portrayed itself as the sole protector of Myanmar’s interests. Photo Credit: Immu, Licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

On 27th March, Myanmar’s powerful military (commonly known as the Tatmadaw), killed over 100 civilians protesting its 1st February overthrow of Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratically elected government. The Tatmadaw has reacted forcefully against demonstrators since the start of the protests, and this was not the first time it had killed civilians. However, the crackdown was unprecedented in its brutality. Despite the bloodshed, protestors defied the military by returning to the streets the very next day, and over a month later the protests show no sign of fading away.

The foundations of the chaos in Burma run deep. During colonial rule, the British governed the minority dominated periphery regions as self-governing frontier areas, separate from Burma proper. This divide and rule strategy saw ethnic minorities heavily recruited into the colonial army while the Bamar majority was excluded. The legacy of ethnic division was compounded by the founding of the modern Burmese state, which was largely built around the Bamar dominated army of the Burmese nationalists. The Rohingya crisis of 2015, which saw Suu Kyi, the symbol of Myanmar’s democracy, taking a nationalist line in defence of the Tatmadaw’s campaign of ethnic cleansing, emphasises just how deep ethnic divisions lie in Myanmar. Successive military regimes have exploited this ethnic dimension to remain in power, casting themselves as the defenders of the Bamar majority and promoting ethnic nationalism. Following decades of military rule, the military generals came to see themselves as the only ones who knew what was good for the country. However, the question remains, what prompted the Tatmadaw to seize power this time, and given the widespread public opposition to the coup, has it overplayed its hand?

Why did Myanmar’s military believe a coup was necessary?

The military has denied it carried out a coup and has instead claimed that it acted in defence of democracy, citing fraud and discrepancies in the 2020 general election, although the extent to which it genuinely believes this is debateable. Consequently, there are other theories as to why the Tatmadaw seized power. Its support for the democratic transition has always been contingent upon its ability to retain a high degree of influence in the country’s political system, Myanmar’s constitution reserves 25% of seats in parliament for the military and has a threshold of 75% for any constitutional changes. However, the landslide 2020 election result for Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy was seen as providing a mandate for constitutional reform and increased the pressure on the military not to stand in the way. It is no coincidence that the coup occurred the day the new parliament was due to be sworn in. It has also been suggested that powerful military chief General Min Aung Hlaing was acting to protect his personal interests. The General was due to retire in 2021 and, faced with the potential threat of international prosecution for genocide against the Rohingya, may well have acted to extend his immunity.

Why has the coup faced such resistance?

Myanmar has changed since being put on the path back to civilian rule. Reform has been slow, but Myanmar’s large young population has experienced greater personal freedoms and better access to education, information, and the rest of the world. After experiencing these freedoms, this new generation has little desire to live under the restrictive military rule of previous decades. This attitude can be seen in the prominence of the three-finger salute in images of the protests. The symbolic gesture has been widely used by young activists across South East Asia as a sign of defiance against authoritarianism. Believing it can reimpose military rule as if nothing has changed represents a significant gamble by the Tatmadaw. It is an even greater gamble to do so having just removed a popular democratic government. Aung San Suu Kyi holds a revered status in Myanmar, and further endeared herself to the people by risking her international reputation to defend Myanmar (and by extension the Tatmadaw) against accusations of genocide at the International Court of Justice. This despite her previous long imprisonment at their hands. Suu Kyi’s landslide election victory not only demonstrated her and the NLD’s enduring popularity amongst the people, but also highlighted Myanmar’s growing rejection of the Tatmadaw. The military’s proxy party won only 33 of 476 seats. Even those activists who turned away from the NLD as a result of their inaction over the Rohingya crisis have proven willing to stand alongside them in opposition to the coup.

What does this mean for Myanmar?

In the short term, the Tatmadaw is under increasing pressure from both inside and out. The regime’s initial support from Russia and China, who blocked condemnation of the coup at the UN, has waned as the crackdown has grown increasingly bloody. On 10th March both countries backed a unanimous statement from the UN Security Council denouncing the Tatmadaw’s violent response to protests. ASEAN, the regional group of Myanmar’s neighbours, is divided over the issue. However, Malaysia and Indonesia have been heavily critical, and the group has pressed Min Aung Hlaing to commit to an end to the violence. With the regime increasingly isolated internationally, Western powers have been ratcheting up the pressure. In the days before the recent crackdown, the US and UK imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar’s two vast military conglomerates. These sanctions will hurt, but it is domestically where the military faces a greater reckoning. The coup and the brutal crackdown that followed has tarnished the Tatmadaw’s image. If anger towards the military continues to rise then a growing number of people in Myanmar may begin to aspire to a future without it. Nevertheless, the Tatmadaw is unlikely to change course. For all the pressure it faces, the military has shown itself ready to use force to put down protests, and likely knows that China, although displeased, will not go as far as to abandon it internationally. Therefore, there is a good chance the military can ride out the protests and succeed in its initial objectives. Min Aung Hlaing could delay his retirement and the Tatmadaw avoid the prospect of major constitutional reform which curtails its power.

However, the generals do not appear to have considered the long-term consequences of their actions. For one, by gambling on a coup to improve its position the military has thrown away a political situation which remained immensely favourable to it, and once it reaches its self-imposed deadline for new elections in 2022, it is difficult to envisage a scenario in which it benefits. If it holds a free election, it will almost certainly lose, and face an NLD or unity government which will be empowered and unlikely to compromise following the events of the coup. On the other hand, if it attempts to retain power, it will erode what little respect and legitimacy it has left.

More significantly, by choosing to overthrow Suu Kyi’s popular and increasingly nationalistic government, the Tatmadaw has set itself at odds with its core constituency, Myanmar’s Bamar majority. For an institution which derives a large degree of legitimacy from its role as the protector of the Bamar ethnicity, the brutal suppression of the predominantly Bamar protestors makes such a mantra ring increasingly hollow. The chaos of the protests and widespread disaffection with the military unleashed by the coup has also emboldened and reenergised the country’s various ethnic militias, several of whom have stepped up their offensives, with increasing success. This is not the only way in which the Tatmadaw’s grip on power has been weakened by the effects of the coup. The military takeover and accompanying crackdown have revealed to many Bamar the true extent of the Tatmadaw’s brutality, which has had the effect of facilitating a growing understanding of the plight faced by Myanmar’s minorities. The consequence has been tentative cooperation between the Bamar dominated anti-coup movement and several of the ethnic groups fighting the military. Any reconciliation, even if limited for now, will serve to diminish the Tatmadaw’s ability to divide and rule.

In short, the February coup may well have preserved the Tatmadaw’s immediate political interests, but it has also had several major consequences for the military’s long-term prospects of retaining its entrenched position within Myanmar’s state and society. In fact, by prioritising short-term gain over long-term strategy, the coup has significantly undermined several of the key aspects which make up the Tatmadaw’s claim to legitimacy, and as a result could end up costing it far more than it stood to lose in the first place.

The Iraqi government is hamstrung by the very causes that are driving Iraqis to the streets

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by Gareth Jonas and Tom Webster

Tahrir Square (Liberation Square) with the Freedom Monument in the background – Baghdad, Iraq.
Source: Next Century Foundation

On October 25, thousands of Iraqi protesters mobilised throughout the country to commemorate the October 2019 “Tishreen Revolution,” with huge demonstrations in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, the epicentre of the protest movement. Their latest demands? Much the same as the original grievances that first drew Iraqis to the streets last year: economic reform, and tackling corruption and constitutional change—albeit now with the additional call for justice for the 600 protesters killed by pro-Iran militia groups and security forces since the initial protests. Despite these waves of mass protest, progress continues to be extremely limited with the Iraqi state remaining constrained by pro-Iranian parties, economic crises, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The perpetuation of demonstrations since October 2019 highlights the limited progress made by the Iraqi state to address protester demands. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that further progress will be made anytime soon.

While the original grievances in October 2019 centred around corruption and a lack of economic opportunities, the extensive use of violence against protesters has since made security sector reform the core demand of protests. Yet, justice for the deaths of protesters continues to be absent, magnifying the glaring lack of accountability within the Iraqi security sector. The July raid in which 14 Kataib Hezbollah members were arrested, only to be released days later after threats from the group, underscores the difficulty Prime Minister Mustafa  Al-Kadhimi has in enforcing that accountability. Therefore, though Kadhimi has repeatedly emphasised his support for the protesters and dedication to serving justice for the ‘martyrs’ of the protests, his actions (or lack thereof) suggest that these are empty promises. Protesters’ concerns will be little allayed by the reinstatement of Abdel-Wahab al-Saadi to the head of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service. That was a victory for protesters, but a pyrrhic victory when one considers the death toll of the protests and the much more far-ranging demands to improve public safety. Today, protesters continue to place improved security and justice for the 600 or so killed protesters at the top of their agenda. That this remains the case six months after taking office, combined with the continued assassinations of high-profile activists and intellectuals across the summer, shows the evident lack of progress Kadhimi has been able to make in this area.

On the economy—the original core issue of protesters demands—the picture looks even bleaker. Mass rallies began in October 2019 in Tahrir Square calling for more job opportunities and improved services. One year on, it is hard to point at anything resembling progress as Iraq’s struggle with COVID-19 has only exacerbated its pre-existing economic woes and deprived the government of the resources to combat them. This, combined with the overinflated public sector, has led to a new strain of protests, in which medical workers and employees of the Ministry of Electricity across the country are demanding the disbursement of unpaid wages. It is thus apparent that Kadhimi has even more to contend with economically now than when he entered office.

The government’s greatest success in this area could be said to be the white paper published in October 2020 containing a historical diagnosis of Iraq’s financial woes and a prescription for a way out of it—by diversifying Iraq’s economy away from its dependence on oil whilst providing economic opportunities for Iraqis. It aims to achieve this by following International Monetary Fund guidelines which require spending cuts on basic needs such as health and education, alongside the devaluation of the currency to increase exports. However, the estimated 450 articles of legislation needed to be approved for the implementation of these recommendations are highly unlikely to pass due to opposition from various political parties who were not consulted, and little political will exists to pass them anyhow. As the country continues to teeter on the edge of an economic implosion, most protesters now seem resigned to simply wait out the pandemic until Iraq sees an increase in oil revenues.

There has also been very little progress towards domestic political reform. Calls for early elections and electoral reform to tackle corruption have increased throughout 2020 as protesters seek to do away with sectarian politics. Yet, the Iraqi Parliament is beset with factional infighting along sectarian lines as members of parliament continue to advance their individual and party interests at the cost of political reform. Whilst the recently passed electoral law goes some way towards weakening the dominance of traditional parliamentary blocs by dissolving provincial constituencies into electoral districts, protesters have accused it of dividing constituencies along ethnic and sectarian lines. This has effectively worked to buttress the reviled Muhasasa system; that is, the ethno-sectarian quotas by which cabinet positions are awarded amongst Iraq’s demographics. In addition, whilst early parliamentary elections have been scheduled for June 2021, the continued understaffing of the Independent High Electoral Commission and Federal Supreme Court—necessary to manage the elections and ratify the results—calls into question the current timeline for next year’s elections.

It is thus apparent that the majority of protesters’ demands have yet to be fulfilled, and the opportunity for progress in the short-term appears bleak. However, in considering the evolution of the protest movement’s response to the changing security and economic conditions that Iraq faces, we must acknowledge the limitations which the government faces in trying to meet many of the protesters’ demands. As a caretaker prime minister predominantly intended to navigate Iraq to new elections next year, whilst facing staunch opposition from pro-Iran parties and blocs in Parliament, there is little hard progress which Kadhimi can achieve. Nevertheless, the frustrations behind the protests are deep-set and not going away anytime soon. The antipathy voiced against Kadhimi at Tahrir Square in October was a significant moment in a movement which had hitherto been hesitant to criticise a leader who wants to clamp down on the militias and make progress on security and economy. The patience of protesters is quickly running out, so it seems as though Kadhimi will have to make a better effort in co-opting the energy of the streets if he is to bolster Iraq’s security and drive meaningful change in the lives of millions of Iraqis.

Gareth Jonas is a Regional Security Analyst at Le Beck International. He can be found tweeting about identity, ethnic conflict, and international security at @jonas_gareth.  He is a Senior Editor at Strife.

Tom Webster is a Regional Security Analyst at Le Beck International who has conducted extensive research on the Popular Mobilization Units and their place in Iraqi state-building.

Insurrection and Chaos in the United States: Capitol Crimes at the Centre of Government

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by Owen Saunders

Swarms of Trump supporters storm the U.S. Capitol. Source: Reuters

If there was anyone left following 2020 that still held to T.S. Eliot’s words that the ‘world ends/Not with a bang but with a whimper,’ then the events at the U.S. Capitol on 6 January will have cured them of this misconception. In the course of an unprecedented mayhem, the seat of U.S. representative democracy was assaulted by a violent insurrection of Trump supporters intent on preventing the certification of the 2020 U.S. Presidential election in a bizarre attempt to keep Donald Trump in power. The event will undoubtedly consume the opinion pages in the days to come. It is therefore crucial to provide a clear account of the events as they happened and situate them within their context of the wider U.S. democracy.

What happened

The morning of 6 January 2021  began with all eyes focused on the run-off elections for Georgia’s two Senate seats. As no candidate had succeeded in reaching 50% of the vote in the general election of 3 November 2020, these plebiscites offered Democrats the opportunity to carry on the momentum of a victorious Presidential campaign and secure a Senate majority. Raphael Warnock and Jon Ossoff will be Georgia’s first Democratic Senators in seventeen years, having won by razor-thin margins.

On 6 January, Vice President Mike Pence and members of both Houses of the U.S. Congress began the process of formally certifying electoral college votes. Pence did so in spite of immense pressure from President Trump to reject the outcome of the election, with the President explicitly encouraging him to invalidate the results in the Senate. During the count, soon-to-be Senate Minority Leader, Mitch McConnell and the current Minority Leader Chuck Schumer gave similar speeches defending democracy. However, Schumer warned how some on the Republican side might ‘darken this view of democracy.’ Republicans more recently, according to The Washington Post, are displaying dangerous authoritarian tendencies, including Senator Ted Cruz of Texas who argued his colleagues should not ‘take the easy path‘ and should reject the election’s outcome.

Historically, the United States has transferred power peacefully, even when the opposing party won the election. This is why in a normal election year these counts rarely attract any attention; indeed, in the course of this year, with the rejectionist rhetoric of Trump, there was little widespread significance attached to these proceedings. This changed following the 3 November election as President Trump made increasingly strident calls for Congress to refuse to certify the Electoral College votes after losing over sixty legal cases attempting to overturn the election results

Just as Congress had begun debating a motion to reject the Electoral College votes from the State of Arizona, President Trump concluded a rally on the National Mall by urging his supporters to pressure Congress to reject the Electoral College results, overtly encouraging insurrection. Thousands flocked from the rally towards the Capitol and, upon arriving, were met with a relatively small force of United States Capitol Police – a significantly smaller force in comparison to the National Guard troops deployed in advance of a June 2020 Black Lives Matter protest at the Lincoln Memorial. The assembled Trump supporters eventually overran the security protections and took possession of the United States Capitol for several hours. As a result, the formal process certifying the vote came to an immediate halt.

Though eventually forced out of the building, thousands of protesters remained outside the Capitol, with the precinct formally under lockdown. The decision to deploy the District of Colombia National Guard, was made by Army Secretary Ryan D. McCarthy and Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher C. Miller, and the order was approved by Vice President Mike Pence following multiple requests from the Mayor of Washington and Congressional leaders. Interestingly, Trump as the Commander-in-Chief would have been expected to give this order, however, according to press accounts he failed to do so.

Later that evening, after the 6:00 PM curfew imposed by the DC Mayor that evening, Congress reconvened and voting resumed to certify the outcome of the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election. Other major takeaways from this disruptive day, which ended in the deaths of five people, included the significant delays by the President and Department of Defense to authorize the activation of the DC National Guard, the failure by the United States Capitol Police to adequately plan for an obvious threat, and the stark dissimilarities in the way law enforcement handled this event versus the Black Lives Matter protests in the summer after the death of George Floyd.

How did the United States get here?

The United States has always portrayed itself as a global leader and champion of democratic values, especially after World War II and again after the fall of the Soviet Union, where US power and influence became unparalleled. Over the last decade, however, with global power dynamics in shift, rapid advancements in technology, and the 2008 financial crisis, this position began to witness a dramatic transformation. The ‘Tea Party’ movement, a far-right branch of the Republican party, began to manifest during the Obama administration, notably in 2009 as a backlash to the Affordable Care Act, also known as ‘Obamacare’. The 2010 U.S. elections saw 87 Republicans elected to Congress in what was known as the ‘tea party wave’. They were known for anti-regulation and obstructionist domestic policies, an isolationist foreign policy, and a distinct lack of reverence for many democratic institutions and the role of the state in society.

As Donald Trump came onto the political scene as a serious candidate for President in 2015, he took advantage of what remained of the tea party movement, appropriating their populist rhetoric as his own. Throughout his 2016 campaign, he fed his growing base a populist message that appealed to the far-right elements of the Republican party. Trump’s populist approach, direct criticism of his opponents and President Obama, and self-styled image as a ‘fighter’ proved impossible to beat by his primary opponents or in the general election, Hillary Clinton. His victory represented an accumulation of a number of a number of grievances by Middle America, grievances which he continued to perpetuate and exacerbate throughout his presidency.

President Trump throughout his presidency pushed a narrative that the democratic election processes and institutions could not be trusted, that elections are ‘rigged,’ and that the ‘fake news media’ never reported the facts of his administration accurately. He used his impeachment in early 2020 to reinforce his narrative about the ‘fake news media’ and the alledged persecution of his administration. He set the stage for the post-election turmoil by stating in August 2020 that ‘the only way we’re gonna lose this election is if the election is rigged’.

His supporters have adopted his recent, far more deranged, and unhinged views which were disseminated through his constant stream of disinformation via his now-suspended Twitter account. This included spreading far right media misinformation from QAnon, giving OANN, another far right media outlet,  priority to speak during presidential press conferences, and asking for the Proud Boys to ‘stand back and stand by‘ in the course of the campaign. These actions displayed a blatant disregard of the democratic process by the rejection of facts, the promotion of distrust of the media, and the removal of multiple members within his administration who stood up to his disinformation.

After this incident of domestic terrorism where thousands of Trump supporters, some of whom were armed, stormed the Capitol, Congress was forced to adjourn; the national guard was deployed and five people died. The media, Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, Speaker Nancy Pelosi and others have argued that the 25th amendment should be invoked to have the president removed from office immediately, as his inflammatory rhetoric and disregard for U.S. democracy have made him incapable of fulfilling the duties of his office. The unprecedented incident that unfolded this week is a true test of the more than 200-year-old democracy.

Where does the United States go from here?

The Electoral College vote has been certified but the riots and takeover of the United States Capitol by supporters of the outgoing president will undoubtedly remain as a painful reminder of and stain on his Presidency. The violent incident at the Capitol is but one of the tainted legacies of his administration.

Taking office on 20 January 2021 President-Elect Joe Biden has much to do – and much to undo. His priorities will surely include undoing many Executive Orders from the Trump Administration and working to pass comprehensive legislation for millions of Americans currently experiencing unprecedented losses, restrictions, and economic hardship due to the COVID-19 Pandemic. Most importantly, however, the Biden Administration must also work to repair the distrust, hyper-partisanship and extremism which have steadily spread and intensified throughout the United States over the past four years.

Biden will have to rebuild the reputation of the United States on the international stage, further damaged by the events of this week.  Countries and international organizations around the world have reacted in disbelief and disappointment, releasing statements of shock and condemnation regarding the incident. Specifically, the Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau released a statement saying Canadians were ‘deeply disturbed by the violence that unfolded’, violence he stated that was incited by the president. Prime Minister Boris Johnson of the United Kingdom emphasised that it is ‘vital that there should be a peaceful and orderly transfer of power’.

The United States, the supposed beacon of democracy, the ‘shining city on a hill’ and self-proclaimed ‘leader’ of the free world, largely failed at upholding their promise and self-avowed values.

Trump’s legacy will be one of immeasurable division, an explicit rejection of democratic values and practices, and the denial of rudimentary facts. Unfortunately, these systemic issues will not simply vanish after his term expires on January 20th. Over the next four years, therefore, Biden must work closely with his cabinet, the Congress, Governors, and citizens across the country to undo the unprecedented division, mistrust, and right wing radicalization that Trump has sown and restore unity and trust in democratic institutions and traditions.

The challenge before President-Elect Biden is daunting. He inherits a highly divided country where one side believes he was democratically elected and the other side believes that he is the beneficiary of a stolen election. Finding a way to bridge that divide and heal the wounds created over the past four years will dictate the trajectory and prosperity of the United States and its place in the world for years to come.

Owen is an MA student in International Peace and Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He has taken advanced courses on U.S. Foreign Policy with Professors David Haglund and Joel Sokolsky during his time in Political Studies at Queen’s.

For Latin America, Enough is Enough

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by Leah Grace

Protesters in Plaza Baquedano, Santiago, Chile on 22 October 2019. (Photo Credit: Carlos Figueroa)

A wave of anti-government protests is sweeping across the globe. From Hong Kong to Lebanon, France to Iraq, Pakistan to Haiti, people have taken to the streets en masse to express a wide array of frustrations and demands. Nowhere, perhaps, has this discontent been more acute than in Latin America where, over the past six months, mass demonstrations have erupted throughout the region, leaving political chaos, social upheaval and countless human casualties in their wake.

These dramatic outbursts have garnered international attention, with many struggling to comprehend, for example, how a four percent rise in metro fare in Chile could spark months of protest with millions of participants. Yet, what we are witnessing today is not new. Rather, it is the boiling over of economic, political and social discontent that has been bubbling furiously beneath the surface for many years.

The final straw

The initial causes of protests in Haiti, Honduras, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia and Colombia are remarkably varied. They include the removal of fuel subsidies, minor increases to transport costs, corruption scandals, alleged electoral fraud, and inadequate labour rights. These issues served to push societies already on the brink over the edge. The subsequent social explosions shattered the veneer of many apparently functioning and stable countries, revealing deeply polarised and unequal societies.

In Chile and Ecuador, anger over relatively minor increases in transport and fuel costs became a catalyst for wider protests regarding social and economic inequalities and indigenous rights. In Colombia, a planned strike by labour unions ballooned into a much wider movement against the right-wing government of President Iván Duque. Among other complaints, protesters denounced the indifference, and in some cases alleged complicity, of the state regarding the murders of 727 social leaders and 173 demobilised fighters in the past three years.

In Bolivia, long-standing tensions finally reached breaking point this October. The fourteen-year rule of socialist leader Evo Morales, the country’s first indigenous president, came to a bitter and violent end when the president claimed victory in highly dubious elections to maintain power for a fourth term. The ensuing clashes between Morales supporters and opponents revealed a highly fragmented Bolivian society. Morales supporters condemn his removal as a coup and fear the reversal of his social policies that benefited the poor and indigenous. His opponents celebrate the same events as the restoration of democracy. With both sides resisting compromise, divisions are likely to deepen, and the immediate future of Bolivia seems highly uncertain and volatile.

Us against them

Repressive official responses to the social unrest have fuelled further protests and exacerbated public anger across Latin America. Chilean president Sebastián Piñera announced that “we are at war against a powerful enemy” after the first day of protests in Santiago. As in Ecuador and Colombia, the government deployed the army to the streets and imposed curfews in major cities. The use of excessive force to contain protests demonstrates the failure of governments to engage with their populations to address the underlying causes of social unrest.

Human Rights Watch found compelling evidence that police in Chile committed serious human rights violations in response to protests. At least 26 people have died since the outbreak of protests on 18 October 2019, including three protesters allegedly fatally shot by military forces using live ammunition. A call for police reforms has been added to the list of protestors’ demands. In Colombia, an eighteen-year-old student died after being shot in the head by a police projectile whilst participating in a peaceful protest. This sparked calls for the dismantling of the country’s riot police and widespread condemnation of state-sanctioned violence.

With protests persisting in both countries, heavy-handed tactics and superficial solutions will only exacerbate problems in the long-term. Initial government responses have served only to heighten the perceived division between the political elite and the rest of society. Like many countries in the region, both Chile and Colombia have troubled and violent histories. Governments must do their utmost to build more trusting and constructive relationships with citizens instead of invoking legacies of repressive authoritarian rule and brutal armed conflict. State security crackdowns seem to be a knee jerk response to popular unrest, but they are only adding fuel to the fire of Latin American discontent.

What’s next?

The recent social unrest comes at a high cost. Thousands of people have been injured and hundreds have died across the region. The destruction of infrastructure and disruption to business have severely damaged already fragile economies. People’s daily lives are on hold as schools close, workers go on strike, and streets clog with marchers. But these mobilisations also offer the prospect of dialogue and real change. Despite the diverse reasons for global protest movements, there is a powerful sense of solidarity amongst demonstrators across countries, facilitated by the mass diffusion of images and interviews on social media. People have felt ignored by politicians for too long. On the streets, at last, they are beginning to regain their voices.

The longer-term outcomes of these social movements are uncertain. Protestors’ demands will not be satisfied overnight, but it is also unlikely that they will simply give up in frustration. The scale and persistence of the mobilisations require engaged and committed responses from those in power. The global protest movement may be explained in part as a chain reaction, with one country after another toppling over into mass social unrest. However, this should not obscure the specific demands of protesters in each country, and thus the different pathways to regain stability.

In Bolivia, perhaps the most volatile situation, measured responses and compromise from both sides are crucial if further violence is to be avoided. The interim government’s priority must be the facilitation of credible and inclusive elections within the next three months. In Ecuador, the government should work with social and indigenous leaders, not against them, to reduce discontent. In Chile and Colombia, political leaders must take seriously the demands of their people and implement significant political, economic and social reforms. The immediate future remains uncertain for Latin American countries, but if governments opt for superficial, short-term solutions to paper over discontent, or resort to repressive force, we will undoubtedly see renewed and intensified social explosions in the not-so-distant future.

Leah Grace is an MA student in Conflict, Security and Development at the King’s War Studies Department. Her main research interests include war-to-peace transitions, local participation in peace processes, and urban violence. She primarily works on conflict-affected countries in Latin America and Central Africa. Prior to joining King’s, she worked as a research assistant at the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation in Colombia where she worked on projects relating to the reintegration of former combatants and the impacts of stigmatisation on this process. She also coordinated several community projects with a local NGO focused on violence prevention and the promotion of human rights. Leah Grace holds a BA in French and Spanish from the University of Cambridge.