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You are here: Home / Archives for security

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After Ukraine, Part III - Polish security & Russian aggression: the return of old fears?

May 12, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Andrzej Kozłowski:

A  Leopard II tank from the Polish Army during  Exercise Steadfast Jazz, a joint training operation for NATO forces, November 2013. Photo: Cpl. Madis Veltman / Estonian army (CC 2.0)
A Polish Leopard II tank takes up a position during Exercise Steadfast Jazz, a joint training operation for NATO forces, November 2013. Photo: Cpl. Madis Veltman / Estonian army (CC 2.0)

A history of difficult relations

Polish-Russian history is one of the most complex and difficult among all nations in the world. Polish troops were some of the only troops to have captured and occupied Moscow - in 1610 – and the day of ousting them from the Kremlin is celebrated as a national holiday in Moscow. Poland itself was occupied by Tsarist Russians for 123 years from 1795, and then again after 1945, when Poland was ruled by the puppet communist government controlled by Moscow.

This heavy historical burden has been reflected in bilateral relations since the beginning of the 1990s, primarily because both sides have used history for political purposes.

After the collapse of the USSR, Poland feared Moscow revisionism and warned against it. Even joining NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004 did not change this attitude. Because of this stance it was commonly viewed as the most anti-Russian country in both NATO and the EU.

This situation was eventually addressed by the Civic Platform, which won election in 2007; one of the main points of foreign policy of its Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski was rapprochement with Russia. They made several political gestures to show their changing attitude. Sikorski also announced a new doctrine of foreign policy, more focused on joining the EU leadership and less focused on an active role in Eastern Europe. He even claimed that Russia could join NATO.

They ignored the signs from Moscow that it was not going to abandon its aggressive foreign policy, like the military drills in 2009 that simulated an invasion of Poland, which was imagined as the ‘aggressor’, or Russia’s failure to properly investigate the plane crash that killed the Polish President in 2010 over Smolensk.

Indeed, the Polish military and defense experts stopped seeing Moscow as a threat. In “Vision of Polish Armed Forces in 2030”, published in 2008, they concluded that in 20-25 years there would be no possibility of military aggression of one country against another in Central-Eastern Europe[i]. These opinions were repeated in Poland’s White Book of National Security, where again the authors suggested that the main challenge in Central-Eastern Europe would come from the non-military threats[ii]. At the same time, Poland ended conscription and focused on a small, professional army with a strength of 100,000 soldiers, aimed at conducting interventions abroad but not sufficiently strong to defend its own territory. These political and military movements have now been recognised as great mistakes in the wake of the Ukraine crisis.

Poland as peacemaker

Since the beginning of the Maidan clashes, Poland has been among the most active countries engaged in the Ukraine crisis. Politicians from both the ruling party and the opposition travelled to Kiev to support protestors and find a compromise between the Victor Yanukovych Regime and the opposition. Polish citizens were also involved in supporting those people protesting against the Ukrainian President at Maidan and in other Ukrainian cities. They sent packages with medicine, food and other necessary things.

What’s more, young people from Poland and Ukraine created a human chain on the Polish-Ukrainian border checkpoint to show their support for the signing of an association agreement with the EU. Eventually Radosław Sikorski took part in negotiating a deal between the opposition and the Ukrainian President, which finished with Yanukovych’s escape.

But what seemed to be the end of the crisis turned out to be just the beginning. The Russian Federation reacted aggressively to the change of government in Kiev and accused Western countries, among them Poland, of training the opposition. The aftermath of the annexation of Crimea was then hybrid warfare in Eastern Ukraine.

At the same time Russia increased the frequency of its military exercises and their rhetoric became much more aggressive. The Ukraine crisis started to be perceived as a potential threat to Polish security, which, according to the authors of the previously mentioned strategic document, was almost unimaginable.

Changes in security policy after Crimea

The Polish authorities had two main tasks in the wake of the crisis in Ukraine. The first was to increase the military power of its army. The second was to guarantee that members of NATO would fulfill their obligations in case of an armed attack. This was at a time when more and more people were becoming skeptical about the readiness of the Alliance to defend Poland.[iii] The best option to gain security assurance was to persuade its allies to send their military forces to Poland.

To increase the military power of its army Poland adopted a New National Security Strategy, which described Russia and its unpredictable behavior as a key danger for Europe and stated that regional conflicts could not be excluded. These changes have also been made in the minds of the main policymakers. The Head of the National Security Bureau, Generał Koziej, clearly warned against the hybrid warfare conducted by Russia. Also, according to survey polls done by all-Poland research center Ariadna, more than half the population feared Russian invasion. This perceived threat has allowed the government to increase military expenditure and buy new equipment without significant opposition.

Poland started a 10-year program of army modernization (2013–2022) worth $35 billion USD and has already bought JASMM cruise-missiles to have an ability to reach Russian bases in Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast. The next purchases covered 32 new attack helicopters, 70 medium-lift utility helicopters, 97 drones, new tanks and armored vehicles, three submarines and an anti-missile system.[iv] Poland also contacted the United States to inquire about buying Tomahawk cruise missiles[v].

Polish authorities have considered different options to try to increase the number of people who have military training, given their concerns over the small size of their army and their inability to create a reserve system.

One option is compulsory military service, although there is little chance this will be restored. The idea is still unpopular in Poland and, with presidential elections this month, followed in 5 months by parliamentary elections, politicians will be wary of such bold reforms.

Yet 600,000 Poles have received military training in volunteer paramilitary organizations. Indeed, the private sector has expressed an interest in this issue and has announced that 100 companies are ready and eager to set up their own paramilitary organizations; half of them have also declared an eagerness to fund the creation of volunteer fighting groups.[vi]

Since it first joined NATO, Poland has tried to persuade the other members to set up military bases on Polish soil. However, limited by the agreements with Russia from 1997[vii] and afraid of provoking Moscow, Poland’s proposals were rejected. In the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, Poland strengthened diplomatic pressure on its partners; it even invoked Article 4 of the Washington Treaty[viii] for only the fourth time in NATO’s history.

The result was not what Poland were after: instead of setting up permanent military structures on Polish territory, NATO decided to send additional airplanes, organized more military drills, and setup a rotational presence of ground forces until the end of the crisis. The United States also organized a march of its cavalry brigade to show solidarity with the citizens of the Eastern Flank of NATO.

The results of the NATO Wales Summit also left Poland somewhat disappointed, although the decision to create a spearhead headquarters in Poland was acclaimed by experts and politicians. In fact, it seems that NATO, and particularly the United States, took Poland’s anxiety seriously and have made several steps to assure Poland that it can count on NATO in case of an attack.

Conclusion

The Ukrainian crisis was profoundly significant for Poland and its security. It is a reminder of the darkest part of Polish history, when Russia attacked and captured Poland. It also shows that Polish rapprochement with Moscow has collapsed completely. The changes in military expenditure and the increasing pace of military buildup only confirm that Polish politicians and society do care about their own security and remember their own history. The only question is whether it is too late for such military reforms.

Poland still has time. Russia has cooled its activity in Ukraine and, even if it decides to continue the offensive, the next probable target would be the Baltic States. More importantly, no one in NATO will now claim that Polish demands to strengthen the military presence of the Alliance in Poland stem from Polish Russophobia. The policymakers in NATO have slowly come to accept this reality. The Ukraine crisis may ultimately contribute to increasing the security of Poland by resulting in a significant NATO presence on Polish soil.


Andrzej Kozlowski is a PhD candidate at the Department of Transatlantic Studies and Mass Media in the Faculty of International and Political Studies at the University of Lodz. He is an expert at Polish think-thanks Kosciuszko Institute, the foundation of Aleksander Kwaśniewski Amicus Europae, and The Casimir Pulaski Foundation. He is vice-chair of the Security Section in the Polish newspaper “Stosunki Międzynarodowe” (International Relations). His area of interests include cybersecurity, the South Caucasus region, and the foreign and security policy of the United States. He was an intern in the European Parliament, the Polish embassy at the Hague, the National Security Bureau, and the Polish Institute of International Affairs.

This article is part of a Strife series entitled ‘Russia and the World following Ukraine’. The series has examined the global reaction to the crisis in the Ukraine. In the last part of the Series, Sebastian Åsberg will examine the debate regarding NATO membership in neutral Sweden and Finland, which has intensified significantly as a result of the war in Ukraine. In the first article of the series, Mike Jones discussed Britain’s handling of the Ukraine crisis and why it has not received more attention in the UK. In the second article, Conradin Weindl looked into the relationship between the European Union and Russia in the wake of the war in Ukraine.

NOTES

[i]Vision of Polish Armed Forces 2030 , p. 10,

[ii]The White Book of National Security of Republic of Poland Polish Security, November 2013,p. 7 – 17.

[iii] More than 30% of people claims that NATO will not help Poland.

[iv]Details of this program you will find in this article.

[v] The only country, which is using this weapon expect the United States is Great Britain.

[vi]More on this issue in this article.

[vii] On the basic of NATO Russia Founding Act in 1997 NATO pledged not to deploy significant military forces to former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union members.

[viii] „The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened”-The North Atlantic Treaty.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: NATO, Poland, Russia, security, Ukraine

Boko Haram in Cameroon: A timely wakeup call?

August 22, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Awah Leonide Azah:

Boko Haram and Cameroon

Cameroon, Central Africa’s largest economy, has over the years gained a reputation for being a relatively peaceful and stable country in an increasingly insecure region. Conflicts and violent extremism have plagued Cameroon’s neighbors, especially in light of recent conflicts in Mali, Chad, and Central African Republic, as well as of terrorist attacks in northern Nigeria. Cameroon’s relative peace and stability has meant that it has attracted less attention than its neighbours in international and regional security debates. However, the militant group Boko Haram seems determined to alter this situation as they have recently stepped up cross-border attacks into the northern region of Cameroon, unleashing terror on the local population and turning the area into a combat zone. Cameroon’s response to the crisis seems to follow the narrative that frames it as an external problem with little mention of any other solution to the crises besides military intervention.

The recent Boko Haram attacks on Cameroon require further national and international scrutiny as this situation, if not properly tackled, may have profound implications on peace and security in Cameroon and the wider region.

Boko Haram, the Islamist militant group that has for year’s sown terror throughout Nigeria’s north-eastern region has in the past weeks stepped up cross-border attacks into northern Cameroon. The group which gained international notoriety after abducting more than 200 schoolgirls from Chibok in northern Nigeria in April 2014, now seeks to gain a foothold in Cameroon’s poor rural north and has stepped up cross-border attacks into the region. The most recent attack took place in the village of Zigague in remote northern Cameroon on 6 August in which eleven people were killed including two soldiers.[1] This attack came on the heels of a 27 July attack on the residence of Cameroon’s vice Prime Minister Amadou Ali during which three people were killed and his wife and sister in law abducted.[2] The level of brutality and the targeted nature of these latest assaults clearly indicate to the Cameroonian authorities the scale of the problem Boko Haram poses to the country and the entire region. This episode has been a wakeup call to the Cameroonian authorities to step up regional co-operation with its neighbours and to become more pro-active in the fight against Boko Haram.

However, Cameroon’s response to the Boko Haram crisis seems to follow the narrative that frames it as an external issue, ie. not Cameroon’s problem. Cameroon’s minister of information Isa Tchiroma stated in an interview on 27 July that Cameroon was a ‘collateral victim’ of aggression that is unfortunately spilling over.[3] Granted, the Boko Haram menace began in Northern Nigeria, but the Islamist group has gained root in the wider Sahel region that spans into Northern Cameroon and Niger. With Cameroon playing the victim and regarding the Boko Haram menace as an external crisis, the authorities miss the valid lesson to be drawn from this episode – that the current level of peace and stability in Cameroon is more or less relative, and not absolute. The Islamist group is only tapping into pre-existing grievances driven by governance failures, corruption and non-accountability already present in the country. These grievances could be seen for example in the 2008 transport strike, which was sparked by the increase in fuel prices but ended up degenerating into urban violence nationwide as a result of Cameroonian’s frustration and exasperation with the regime.[4] Cameroonian’s will largely acknowledge the existence of a range of social conflicts present within the country but the narrative at the macro level still remains that Cameroon is a haven of peace and stability. There seems to be a gross disconnect between state security and human security.

It is absolutely essential for the authorities to ask valid questions and seek long-term solutions to this crisis. The Boko Haram menace may just be a manifestation of more profound threats to peace and security in Cameroon. The vulnerability of Cameroon’s northern region to violent extremism is due to the region’s long history of neglect, marginalization, poverty and social exclusion. It is for this reason that the militant group Boko Haram has been able to penetrate these communities and radicalise, recruit and train young people whom it is now using to perpetrate terror in their own communities. The ease with which the perpetrators of the most recent attacks moved within the town of Kolofata and the precision with which they attacked the homes of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Sultan reinforce the belief amongst eye witnesses that some Cameroonians were in their ranks.[5]

It is worth noting that, Boko Haram’s attacks in Cameroon’s northern region date back as far as 2012 when raids and abductions were recorded in Fotokol, Makary and Kousseri Dabanga, but cited as ‘isolated incidents’. The Cameroonian authorities treated the crises as an external problem which ought to be handled by those directly concerned such as Nigeria; ‘Our main challenge is safeguarding our borders so that we don’t import the Boko Haram problem’, stated an official in charge of economic and socio-cultural affairs at the Far North governor’s office.[6] While Cameroon treated these as an external problem, its Nigerian counterpart’s response to the crises was, and still largely remains, military, while the political will to do more than that appears entirely lacking.[7]

With the recent wave of attacks in Northern Cameroon, the response of the Cameroonian authorities seemingly mirrors that of Nigeria. In reaction to the recent mounting violence, Cameroon’s President Paul Biya fired two high-ranking military officials who were responsible for security in the region and sent his army chief to the north of the country to beef up security. Approximately 3,000 soldiers have been deployed to the north, including troops of the elite Rapid Intervention Battalion.[8] This military response is commendable as the authorities need to ensure that an iron curtain of resistance is put up to counter any further attacks by Boko Haram.

However, as can be reflected from the Nigerian experience, a military solution alone will only provide brief pauses to the crisis. As Issa Tchiroma, the Cameroonian Minister of Communication, noted during his recent interview with Voice of America, the battle against Boko Haram is asymmetrical because no one is quite certain who the members of Boko Haram are, as they have infiltrated the community. Able to move quite freely, these groups are unlikely to ever be completely suppressed militarily, unless, in addition to military efforts, the government wins local hearts and minds by implementing fundamental political reforms to address the many grievances that are at the base of this continued violence.

The recent attacks on Cameroon are not only a tragedy in themselves, but a timely reminder of the need to access the security situation of the country. Fighting Boko Haram is a long-term endeavour that requires not only military force but a robust effort to nurture the resilience of communities through measures that promote economic development and social cohesion. Also, given the porous nature of the border between Cameroon and Nigeria, and the level of cross border interaction which takes place between the borderland communities, there is need to step up regional cooperation through harmonized security laws. All stakeholders in Cameroon, including the government, civil society and local authorities should use this as a wakeup call to focus on a human security approach which focuses on an integrated framework appropriate to address this conflict.
____________________

Awah Leonide is a legal scholar and a research assistant at the African Leadership Center in Nairobi, Kenya. Her research interests amongst others include the France-Africa relationship and its impact on security and development in francophone Africa. You can follow her on Twitter @ AwahLeonide

 

NOTES

[1] Cameroon Radio and Television News, ‘Situation dans l’Extrême-Nord: Paul Biya rassure’ Source PRC 2 August 2014. http://www.crtv.cm/cont/nouvelles/nouvelles_sola_fr.php?idField=13580&table=nouvelles&sub=national
[2] Cameroon Radio and Television News, ‘Des assaillants lourdement armés attaquent la localité de Kolofata.’ 27 July 2014. http://www.crtv.cm/cont/nouvelles/nouvelles_sola_fr.php?idField=13580&table=nouvelles&sub=national
[3] Peter Clottery, ‘Cameroon Reviewing Military Strategy after Boko Haram Attacks’. Voice of America, 27 July 2014. http://www.voafanti.com/gate/big5/www.voanews.com/articleprintview/1966165.html
[4] International Crisis Group, ‘Cameroon: The dangers of a fracturing regime’. Africa Report,161, Brussels, 24 June 2010. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/cameroon/161%20CAMEROON%20dangers%20of%20a%20fracturing%20regime%20ENGLISH.pdf
[5] BBC News, ‘Boko Haram’ abducts Cameroon Politician’s wife’. 27 July 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28509530
[6] IRIN, ‘Cameroon takes steps against Boko Haram’. 27 December 2013. http://www.irinnews.org/report/99396/cameroon-takes-steps-against-boko-haram
[7] International Crises Group, ‘Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram insurgency’. African Report, 216, Brussels, 3 April 2014. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.aspx
[8] Reuters, ‘Cameroon fires two army officers after Boko Haram raids’. 29 July 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/29/us-nigeria-violence-cameroon-idUSKBN0FY26E20140729

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Boko Haram, Cameroon, peace, security

Managing an epidemic: Security implications of the Ebola outbreak. Interview with Edwin Trevathan M.D., M.P.H.

August 19, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Joana Cook, Managing Editor, Strife
Interview conducted on 19 August 2014

Trevathan-1 copy

Edwin Trevathan, M.D., M.P.H. is Dean of the College for Public Health and Social Justice at Saint Louis University (SLU), and Director of the Institute for Global Health and Wellbeing, where he is also Professor of Epidemiology, Pediatrics, and Neurology. He was Director of the National Center on Birth Defects and Developmental Disabilities at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, where he was responsible for many of the CDC’s activities in areas of maternal and child health as well as neurological, developmental, and genetic disorders. Under his leadership, the CDC engaged in several productive collaborations in China, Latin America and Africa. He was the CDC’s Strategic Lead for the pediatric response to the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic, and was a senior investigator for epidemic investigations of Nodding Syndrome in Uganda. Dr. Trevathan was previously Professor and Director of the Division of Pediatric and Developmental Neurology at Washington University in St. Louis, and Neurologist-in-Chief at St. Louis Children’s Hospital. He has published widely in public health, epidemiology, neurological and developmental disabilities, multi-center clinical trials, and child health. His new research interest, working under experts at King’s College London, focuses on Global Health Diplomacy in conflict-affected countries. You can follow Edwin Trevathan at @edwintrevathan.

* * *

Joana Cook: What would you suggest are the key security implications related to the Ebola epidemic for international actors, in particular, governments around the world?*

Dr. Trevathan: There have been more deaths from other ‘expected’ causes (malaria, malnutrition, childhood diarrheal diseases) than from Ebola in theses poor countries of West Africa over the past several months. However, Ebola poses a risk of becoming more widespread, disrupting the life of a city, closing borders, and provoking unrest. Ebola uncovers the weakness of public health systems, which will need to be addressed; a disease-specific approach to control will not be sufficient.

In your view, have global health bodies like the WHO been able to coordinate with affected countries in an adequate fashion?

The coordination of epidemic responses is often most difficult in epidemics that cross borders of resource poor countries, or poor countries that simultaneously are involved in armed conflict. One of the great challenges in these responses is the often poor coordination between the local health authorities and the national Ministry of Health of these developing countries. Poor in-country coordination delays requests by the national Ministry of Health (MOH) for assistance from the World Health Organization (WHO) and organizations like the U.S. Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). These problems of coordination within countries are further exacerbated when disease outbreaks occur in rural areas in border regions, as occurred in this Ebola outbreak, and then extend into densely populated cities.

Why has the international response been so seemingly slow?

It is always difficult to analyze a response to an epidemic in the middle of a response. After control of this outbreak, there will certainly be investigations that will lead to recommendations for future action. These are some preliminary thoughts.

Although some of the initial response may have been somewhat delayed by poor in-country coordination, I do not perceive that the response has been significantly slower than previous outbreaks (i.e., Uganda, South Sudan, Eastern DR Congo). However, the efforts to control spread of Ebola have been less effective for a variety of reasons, primarily related to the local efforts of health workers. These reasons include:

  • The local authorities and health systems have been less well-equipped to prevent disease spread. For example, some local healthcare providers to not even have access to basic hygiene measures such as rubber gloves.
  • The local tradition of handling the bodies during funerals (large numbers of people embracing the body and kissing the bodies) has amplified the spread of Ebola in some areas.

International NGO responses seem to have been relatively rapid. Yet by the time they set up their response teams the disease has spread further for reasons more related to inadequate local initial responses.

Can you comment on the health system responses from the countries most affected by Ebola?

A few thoughts:

  • The outbreak has occurred in an area of relatively high population density close to borders, but with low density of physicians and other healthcare workers trained in how to recognize Ebola and use basic methods (gloves, gowns) to prevent disease spread when in contact with patients who may potentially have Ebola.
  • People with the initial symptoms of Ebola look much like the other people in the community with malaria or other diseases. Traditional management of these other infectious diseases in communities do not include measures to prevent transmission of Ebola.
  • Local health officials and public health officials have not implemented infectious disease precautions (“universal precautions”) in routine care before the diagnosis has been confirmed.
  • The prior Ebola outbreaks were easier to control because of remote and rural nature of the communities that were impacted, and by the local health authorities more coordinated response while working within a single country.

Have we seen previous Ebola outbreaks of this scale before?

No.

Is the US worried about the potential threat posed to its security by Ebola?

Ebola should not be a threat to the health of residents in the U.S. Universal disease precautions in hospitals and clinics should be effective in preventing disease spread. The security of the U.S. and of Europe is indirectly threatened by Ebola-exacerbated threats to security in West Africa.

Do you think Obama’s initiative to set up an African Centre for Disease Control is useful in responding to diseases such as Ebola?

Yes. The establishment of the China CDC has been very helpful in responding to epidemics in Asia. Most importantly, the nations of Africa will need to focus on epidemic and pandemic preparedness in order to best equip their countries to deal with Ebola and other emerging infectious disease threats.

Thank you very much.

____________________

* The recent Ebola epidemic has thus far caused a recorded 1,069 deaths and infected 1,975 others around the world, with victims largely from West Africa, but these numbers are stated to ‘vastly underestimate the magnitude of the outbreak’. Ebola has a fatality rate of up to 90% and though Canada has now sent 1,500 doses of a new, experimental vaccine, there remains no proven cure.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Uncategorized Tagged With: Africa, Ebola, epidemic, health, outbreak, security, us

"On the real terms of equality"

May 30, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Jill S. Russell:

military-women copy

Surveying the landscape of current news stories on women is grim. There were the raped and lynched Indian girls, the stoned pregnant Pakistani woman, Farzana Parveen, a victim of honour killing and the 270 kidnapped Nigerian schoolgirls. The list continues with threats to lash Iranian actress Leila Hatami; the pregnant Merium Ibrahim, a Sudanese slated for execution for marrying a Christian; Iraqi child brides, everything in Saudi Arabia, the too many women everywhere who are cut,[1] trafficked across the globe for sex, and the question of whether women should serve across all functions in the armed forces of leading Western liberal democracies. Worse than they appear in detail, they seem to share a common thread regarding the place and state of women in the world, which is the assumption that women’s choices can and should be decided for by others. Whether by family, neighbours, society, culture or governance, any aspect of our behaviour, dress, feelings or actions are at the whim of others.

I cannot speak to much of these problems from personal experience, although I hope others will. But in my small corner of the world, I am deeply concerned with the political issues regarding women and military service and what it represents about our place in society and governance. Some will balk at my inclusion of the matter of service in combat roles in this rogue’s roll call, but it is wholly representative of the principle. The presumption being against them, women must argue FOR inclusion, the decision about which will be made by others. On the basis of zero empirical evidence regarding military effectiveness, women were excluded, and now that bizarre historical anomaly has assumed the status of wisdom. Sorry, it’s not, contort yourself all you want. What passes for evidence now too often boils down to the pull-ups and arguments of cohesion that are based in fluff. The fate of the western world will not be decided by a single exercise – to exclude women for the pull-up is so silly on its face I do not understand how it can be argued seriously. More pointedly, the latter hew and cry over cohesion neglects the absolute raw truth that cohesion is forged in shared experience, so true that it almost invariably breaks down every seeming established structure of distrust.[2] There’s more on women in the military, combat, and war, but these are the worst examples of illogic which man the barriers to integration. Of greatest importance, however, the prohibition is odious for its betrayal of the political beliefs of the system we like to hold out to others. We are not all equal under the law. It is both tragic and a bit frightening - if my rights can be constrained in this matter on the basis of my biology, then what is to stop the state in other areas? And if the liberal west cannot throw off the shackles of this moribund ideology of inequality then there is little hope.

None of this is about being against men. I am a woman in military history and contemporary security affairs, I don’t have a problem with men. Quite the contrary, having grown up playing sports with boys, I find men generally rather easy and pleasant to get on with. Throughout my adulthood I have eschewed the title of feminist - on principle I am earnestly and fervently a humanist, we are all the same. I would prefer to keep to my own work in logistics and public order, and out of this debate. But I am well and truly distressed that this sentiment, this assumed sovereignty of one half of the population over the other, because they were born cloven and not cleft,[3] has such vigour in the world.

If hell hath no fury like a woman scorned, imagine what happens when she knows military strategy? You only have to take a real look at international security and war studies to see the ladies are on the rise. I’m not certain at what point I would be driven to become She Guevara, and I won’t speak for the rest, but at some point this becomes intolerable. I’m not certain how many more photos of girls hanging from trees or similar I am willing to abide.

As I said, though, I prefer to get on with my own work.

 

__________________

Jill S. Russell is a regular contributor to Strife, Kings of War and Small Wars. She is currently writing her doctoral dissertation on American military logistics and strategic culture, with a side project in the London Riots of 2011. You can follow her on Twitter @jsargentr.

 

NOTES

[1] This is the term chosen by a woman who was the subject of what we refer to here as FGM. I shall respect her wishes on how she would like the practice to be described.
[2] This may be the better explanation for Stockholm Syndrome, that the experience of shared dramatic events or time creates cohesion notwithstanding the matter of formal antagonism between individuals.
[3] Paraphrasing my mother, who unleashed ‘had been born cleft and not cloven’ upon a school principal when he mentioned that my sister’s language was not appropriate for a young lady, her point being that she was none too pleased to hear that had her child been a young man he would not have been in trouble. She’s a corporate litigator by profession. You don’t ever want to be deposed by her. Ever.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: India, Iran, military, Pakistan, police, security, Sudan, women

Can digital currencies challenge the status quo?

April 16, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Michael Jefferson:

Bitcoin_'challenge_coin'

Increasing international trade, multi-currency holding, public distrust in the banking system and a regulatory barriers that are seen to hinder the free-flow of capital. All of these suggest that a global digital currency, one that is not linked to a particular sovereign state or the fortunes of a company, is a natural development as we move towards a more inter-connected and easier to access global economy. Currencies such as the dollar, euro, pound or yen are internationally traded floating currencies that are a token of the underlying assets and economic power of it’s a sovereign nation (or in the case of the euro group of sovereign nations). This allows people to have an understanding of what that token means. Given this what place is there in the financial system for digital currency?

If you look at the most successful digital currency so far, Bitcoin, we have seen vast swings in valuation which has seen it go from under $20 in February 2013 to over $1,100 in November 2013 to around $620 at the time of writing in March 2014. There have also major infrastructure issues around security with the bankruptcy following breaches at one of the main exchanges MtGox. This is on top of high profile coverage of Bitcoin’s possible use for illegal activities on websites such as the Silk Road. These trust and infrastructure issues do not help deliver the confidence in the system that could enable it to build overtime and become a real competitor to the current financial system.

In the case of Bitcoin these issues are perhaps understandable given its origins as an open source currency developed by the anonymous Satoshi Nakamoto which anyone can mine. We are still in the ‘Wild West’ years of digital currencies. Bitcoin only came on the scene in 2009. Everyone is rushing to be involved and the potential gains for speculators seemingly engulf those that see the potential for building something useful and stable. These problems are fixable and as experience grows in the use and security for digital currencies I have no doubt that these concerns will fade away for the users.

Perhaps the bigger question for digital currencies to address is the underlying problems which causes the volatility – what it represents. We know what a dollar is and although we may not think about it in this way it is a token that is backed up by the US government and by extension the biggest economy in the world. Nowhere is the representation of the backstop for a currency more evident than during the 2008/9 financial crisis in the UK. The government stepped into to bail a number of banks including one of the world’s biggest banks at the time, RBS, because of the impact it would have on the pound and UK economy its possible default would have. In the year (March 2008 to March 2009) around the bank bail outs of October 2008 the pound lost almost 30% of its value against the dollar.

Here is your problem in digital currencies – what does is represent and where is the backstop? Digital currencies are an agreement between parties which then is only crystallised in value when exchanged into a currency, there are no economic indicators we can look to for an understating of where this floating currency will head. With digital currencies it is not yet the case and so its success will be valued on its efficiency and integrity in carrying out transactions. The lack of an underlying assets leaves it open to huge swings in value, which make most players nervous. It would be an understandable for a digital currency to grow into the international currency of choice allowing easy transactions and hassle free conversion not dependent on locality, but nations and regulators have vested interests in the status quo which will be a big obstacle in the next stage of development.

 

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Michael Jefferson works in public affairs for an international bank. He has extensive experience in public policy and international relations from his current role as well as from his time working for the UK Government on international trade. He has an MA in Japanese from St Catherine’s College, Oxford specialising in Japanese politics and international relations.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Bitcoin, digital currency, public trust, security, trade, volatility

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