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Policing and counterinsurgency: A case from Manchester

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By Alex Calvo:

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Photo by Oggy Roberts.

On 07 August 2013, Greater Manchester Police posted a note on Facebook describing a sexual assault in the city centre two days earlier.[1] It explained that a 27-year-old woman had been sexually assaulted at knife-point at about 0245 on a ‘night out with her friends’ after she ‘became detached from the group’. As she walked, ‘she noticed a black man… who followed her’ and who later ‘shouted to attract her attention and then produced a flick knife, grabbing her by the wrist and leading her down an alleyway at the side of the bar’. He then proceeded to sexually assault her while he ‘continued to hold the knife to her neck’ but was ‘distracted by a passing car, which prompted the man to run off.’ The post described the attack as ‘an isolated incident’ and asked ‘people to remain on their guard while out and, where possible, try to stick together in groups and to well-lit and well-populated areas’.

 

Although the post by the police only provides an outline of the incident, the following conclusions may be tentatively drawn:

1. The assailant did not seem to have been aiming at any victim in particular, but rather seemed to be on the lookout for vulnerable targets.

2. The victim was seen as vulnerable because she had been separated from the group she was originally in.

3. In addition, although this is not stated, she may have been intoxicated, or at least under some degree of influence of alcohol or drugs, thus compounding her vulnerability.[2]

4. The aggressor took her to somewhere dark and hidden:, an alleyway. He did not initiate the sexual assault until he was someplace he considered ‘safe’.

This latter point prompts the question of how to prevent the use of such spaces for criminal activity, with some possible alternatives being:

  1.  Closing them, so that they cannot be used to commit crimes.
  2.  Lighting them, where there is a direct line of sight from populated areas.
  3.  Overtly monitoring them through CCTV or other ‘electronic intelligence’ [ELINT] means.
  4.  Using them as ‘hunting grounds’, covertly patrolling or monitoring them in real time.

The above alternatives can be compared to similar dilemmas in COIN, for example concerning the night and forested areas. It is easy to see both as favouring action by insurgents, but there is no reason why this should be so. Often the difference is rather psychological. Counterinsurgents tend to see the night and the forest as favouring the insurgent, allowing him to hide. Looking at it objectively, however, the counterinsurgent can take advantage of vegetation and darkness in the same way, if he stops seeing them as his enemy and starts seeing them as his ally.

However, taking advantage of the night, for example, demands changes in the way operations are conducted. Whereas fixed day patrols allow insurgents to either control the population at night (a common pattern in, for example, Vietnam) or to attack counterinsurgents at will, the latter can hunt down guerrillas in the dark if they stop seeing it as their enemy, and benefit from their technological superiority and even better partner with the local population.[3]
The night as such is neutral, but if seen as an enemy then it will actually become one.

A conventional operations example from WWII of the kind of mentality change necessary is provided by the allied experience in the South-East Asian theatre, where the Japanese were initially seen as particularly adept at jungle fighting but such perception gradually gave way, as training proceeded, to the view that allied troops could master the techniques necessary and even bring them to a greater degree of perfection than the enemy. General Slim succeeded in getting soldiers to view the jungle not as an enemy but instead as a friend. [4]

On the other hand, the second approach was the driving force behind the deforestation program in Vietnam, where instead of mastering combat in the jungle the strategy was partly to eradicate wide swathes of that terrain, in order to more easily locate and destroy the enemy.[5] Just like lightning dark areas, the idea was to make the enemy visible. Both darkness and the jungle, though, can hide attacker and defender, having no natural affinity for either.

Although criminality and insurgency cannot simply be equated, and we have to be careful in not simply uncritically translating concepts from one to the other,[6] they share a number of traits in common, making comparative studies worthwhile. One of them is that they cannot take place far away from the population, while, at the same time, they need safe havens (sometimes in the midst of the population, sometimes in isolated, remote areas, ‘isolated and remote’ not always in the literal meaning of the words). Thus, the presence of dark, unused alleys, near main streets, is a clear invitation to opportunistic crime. It may be interesting to study and map their use, employing geographical information systems. Both criminals and insurgents need to prey on the population, but at the same time they need to operate far from the eyes of the authorities. We could note how, in the case described, the attacker used the threat of force (in the shape of a knife) on a street, but did not engage in a more serious crime, potentially attracting a much more serious sentence, until he felt he could not be seen by anybody other than the victim. Thus, if caught before getting to his sanctuary, it may have been very difficult for the prosecution to prove that he intended to carry out a sexual assault, rather than a simple robbery or threat.

Another revealing bit of information in the Facebook posting by Greater Manchester Police is the fact that the aggressor ran away when a car passed by. Again, this illustrates how we are probably facing someone looking for an easy way to commit a crime, minimizing the chances of detection and punishment, and preferring to retreat to strike another day when the slightest threat appears on the horizon.

Going back to the four alternatives listed above, the first (closing off potential safe havens) may offer a relatively simple way of diminishing the scope for opportunistic crime. Sometimes this is easy and does not significantly interfere with economic and social activities. An example of this is the proper fencing of building sites, so that criminals may not take their victims into them at night. However, other grounds may not be so easy to seal off without major disruptions or great expense, an example of this being gardens and other green areas. Whereas large gardens are often fenced and closed at night, this is often not the case with smaller green areas, which tend to be unlit and close to streets. In counterinsurgency we often find similar dilemmas, with some areas employed by the enemy declared free-fire zones while others are either too heavily populated or essential in economic terms to be open to such possibility.

This brings us to the third and fourth options discussed above (overt monitoring with CCTV or other ELINT means, and use as hunting grounds). As explained, the night is neutral, and so is darkness and vegetation cover, just like criminals and insurgents can hide in them, so can police officers and counter insurgents. In Vietnam, for example, one of the key elements of the US Marine Corps’ Combined Action Program were night patrols. Those patrols were designed not to be detected by the enemy, that is, to initiate contact, not fight engagements

at the time and place chosen by insurgents, as was rather the rule in day-time patrols. This was important for different reasons, such as fewer casualties (for two reasons: the side initiating a fight tends to enjoy the benefit of surprise and retain the alternative to disengage) and moral ascendancy over the enemy (going from ‘prey’ to ‘hunter’). The night has a further advantage: by day, normal chores by civilians going about their ordinary business means that patrols will surely be detected. Actually one of their purposes is to reassure the civilian population and show that the authorities are present in the area. This reassurance, while essential in a counterinsurgency context (where the population is the ultimate arbiter of success and which is essentially an exercise in nation building) provides the enemy with an information advantage, with civilians often coerced into providing intelligence or just ‘sitting on the fence’, or insurgents disguising as civilians. On the other hand, a curfew provides the chance to ‘leave the fish without the water’ and make it possible to detect insurgents without the risk of inadvertently harming civilians.

There are, though, two key differences between the military and the police in this regard. First of all, while banning movement at night is possible in a counter insurgency scenario, this is not usually the case in a stable area under normal policing operations. In addition to legal and constitutional restrictions, it could have a very negative impact on the local economy, in particular in tourist or leisure areas such as the zone where the described incident took place, where many local businesses make a living precisely at night. Second, while the military may have the option of choosing whether to conduct visible patrols or undetected night patrols, both the applicable law, custom, and citizens expectations tend to restrict such possibility for the police. In most jurisdictions, at least in broad terms, the prevailing approach is reactive, that is officers must wait until a crime is committed to investigate and arrest those allegedly guilty. They may (and this is one of the key purposes of visible patrols) provide a measure of deterrence by ‘showing the flag’, making it clear to potential criminals that they are present in the area, but the circumstances in which they may hide in order to observe the commission of crimes and proceed against those responsible for them tend to be restricted, and often limited to fields such as drug trafficking and organized crime, where infiltration and sting operations are common. In the law of armed conflict, just belonging to the military means you can be killed or made prisoner (subject to the relevant Rules of Engagement), whereas in the criminal law, while belonging to a criminal enterprise is often a crime in and by itself, the rule is that one must carry out at least certain preparatory acts before one can be charged with a crime. Thus, someone walking in a city centre in the early hours, looking for isolated, vulnerable targets, to commit rape, would not generally be considered to be committing a crime. He would, on the other hand, be committing a crime once he employed force, or the threat of force, to move that target to an isolated area, where to conduct a sexual assault,[7] and hence the possibility of monitoring such areas.

A third factor to take into account is that, whereas insurgents will tend to react to patrols by attacking them, with either the authorities finally pushing them out from a given area or refraining from entering it,[8] the same does not apply to opportunistic criminals, who will simply seek a way not to be detected. Their goal is not to master territory and exclude government institutions, but to exploit a portion of the civilian population.

As already noted, and stressed by a number of authors, we have to be careful with analogies between counterinsurgency and policing, and cannot simply automatically translate concepts from one field to another. However, at the same time we can observe some similarities or at least employ the comparative method to shed light on certain key concepts. For example, the reliance by criminals on pre-determined hidden areas where to conduct the acts attracting the heaviest penalties (in the case study considered here an unlit area where to sexually assault a victim dragged at knife point from a street), is to some extent similar to insurgents’ reliance on a ‘logistics nose’. This term denotes the gradual piling up of material in an area chosen to fight a battle, with troops following supplies instead of the other way around, as is the norm with conventional forces.[9] There are different reasons why insurgents may choose to act this way, but one in particular is interesting when it comes to comparing insurgency with crime, namely reducing the likelihood of detection. Once weapons and ammunition are in place, troops, disguised as civilians, can travel to the hidden depots and if challenged claim that they are simply civilians, otherwise they can take up arms, conduct an attack, and then go back to being civilians.[10] Furthermore, insurgents have the initiative, by choosing when to move into the areas where their weapons and other supplies are awaiting them. Similarly, a criminal who has pre-selected a spot where to commit his crime, but who is awaiting in another area, may look to all intents and purposes as an ordinary citizen. Even if his behaviour is suspicious, it may be difficult to prove that he intends to commit a crime, or at least the more serious crime he has in mind. Thus, in the case described, the author first followed the victim, then threatened her, and did not commit the more serious crime (sexual assault) until he had forced her to move to the area he had previously chosen and which he thought was away from prying eyes.

Concerning his weapon, he may have been carrying it from home, but it is also possible that he had hidden it nearby and only took it once he detected a vulnerable target. That way, if challenged by the police, no weapon would have been found on him.

Finally, with regard to the advice provided by the police in their Facebook note, namely to ‘stick together in groups and to well-lit and well-populated areas’, we can also find analogies in counterinsurgency, where often authorities will seek to concentrate the population, or restrict its movements, to more effectively protect it, as done by US forces in the Philippine-American War. However, one of the key distinctions between policing and counterinsurgency is the degree of coercion allowed, clear from the fact that the Greater Manchester Police are only advising people to stick together and remain in well illuminated areas where others are present, having no legal powers to compel citizens to do so. This difference, however, may be just one of degree, as the limited success or even backfiring of mandatory policies such as the Strategic Hamlets Program in Vietnam shows, although a similar approach worked in the Malayan Emergency. In practice, authorities in both policing and COIN scenarios may be forced to rely on persuasion, rather than coercion, in order to bring about the social changes necessary to deprive criminals and insurgents of the social milieu from which they pray. In the case of rural insurgency, for example, the introduction of new technologies and improvements to transportation infrastructure, or a wider social and economic trend towards urbanization, may provide an incentive for the population to re-concentrate out of their own volition, thus making it easier to provide security. In the case of policing, the development of new leisure and entertainment models[11] may reduce the scope for the kind of opportunistic sexual crime described in the note by Greater Manchester Police.

Conclusions: As noted by different authors, we have to be careful not to confuse policing
with COIN and carelessly apply concepts and lessons from one field to the other. However, at the same time, we have to be aware of some overlapping notions which at the very least may facilitate both scholarship and practice. Greater Manchester Police has explained to the public a case which shows some of this overlap and which can be the basis to discuss some of the strategies that may be used in both policing and counterinsurgency..

From the outline of the case, it seems that the aggressor was on the lookout for vulnerable targets, the two key criteria being isolation and (perhaps) intoxication. Once he located one, he used the threat of force to take her to a dark alleyway, where he hoped to be able to assault her at no risk of detection.

This brings up the issue of how to prevent the use of such spaces, a concern in both the fight against crime and insurgency. Four possible alternatives are closing them to the public, illuminating them permanently, monitoring them continuously and overtly by electronic means, and doing so covertly (or patrolling them also covertly) thus turning them into hunting grounds. In examining these alternatives, similar dilemmas found in COIN are useful, and scholars and practitioners in policing and counterinsurgency may benefit from regular exchanges of views.

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Alex Calvo is a guest Professor at Nagoya University, interested in military history, international law, geopolitics, and defence and security policy. You can follow him on Twitter @Alex__Calvo

 

NOTES

1             Post on the Facebook page of Greater Manchester Police, 7 August 2013, available at https://www.facebook.com/GtrManchesterPolice/posts/375618175841541
2          The issue of intoxicated victims of sexual assault is controversial, a recent campaign by the British National Health Service having attracted criticism by those who considered that it amounted to blaming victims. L. Buchan ‘Cambridge University student Jack May started the petition last week calling for the removal of a Home Office alcohol awareness poster bearing the statement: “One in three reported rapes happens when the victim has been drinking”’, Cambridge News, 31 July, available at http://www.cambridge-news.co.uk/Cambridge/Cambridge-students-petition-against-Home-Office-alcohol-awareness-poster-gains-more-than-23000-signatures-20140731064700.htm#ixzz3AIYiJkbm’
[3]          As done by the US Marine Corps in Vietnam. A. Calvo, “Preventing the Barbarization of Warfare: The USMC CAP Program in Vietnam”, Small Wars Journal, 15 December 2013, available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/preventing-the-barbarization-of-warfare-the-usmc-cap-program-in-vietnam
[4]         R. Lyman, Slim, Master of War, (London: Robinson, 2004), p. 143.
[5]          As well as its food supplies, this tool being controversial right from the start due to the risk of alienating peasants. G. A. Cosmas, MACV: the joint command in the years of escalation, 1962–1967, (United States Army in Vietnam) (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2006), p. 90.
[6]         ‘At first glance, counterinsurgency (at least the “soft,” population-centric American version) bears a fair amount of resemblance to community policing: It’s all about changing the dynamic in the communities where insurgents operate, encouraging troops to “walk the beat” and bringing in social services. And many of the tools of the modern counterinsurgent — forensic exploitation, pattern analysis and social-network diagramming — would be familiar to any detective. (The Law Enforcement Professionals program for combating roadside bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan even called on retired agents from the FBI, the DEA, and the ATF to help take down insurgent networks.) … But to the COINdinistas I would say: Be careful what you wish for. Counterinsurgency is still a tool for dealing with political emergencies, and it involves a heavy degree of population control. And at home, it’s a bridge too far. “Policing can be informed by counterinsurgency – and they are in fact similar at some points,” said John P. Sullivan, a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department and an expert on transnational gangs. “But at others they really diverge. So you need to be very, very careful.”’, N. Hodge ‘”Counterinsurgency” to Fight U.S. Crime? No, Thanks’, Wired, 24 November 2009, available at http://www.wired.com/2009/11/counterinsurgency-to-fight-us-crime-no-thanks/
[7]        Which raises another operational and ethical question: if the police detected such an incident, should they intervene before the victim was assaulted, thus sparing her the ordeal but probably failing to secure a substantial conviction against the aggressor, or wait until he initiated the assault, raising the chances of conviction and diminishing the likelihood of future attacks but subjecting the victim to much greater harm?
[8]       ‘Patrolling demonstrates dominance. A patrol is an affront that challenges the manhood of the local insurgents, who will strike back. … One of two outcomes follows. Either the patrols persist until the insurgent shooters are killed or forced to flee. Or the patrols cease going to those areas where they are persistently shot at.’ B. West, The Wrong War: grit, strategy, and the way out of Afghanistan, (New York: Random House, 2011), pp. 151-152.
[9]         L. Sorley, A Better War, (Orlando: Harcourt Books, 1999), p. 21.
[10]          ‘They drive up on their cycles without weapons, so we can’t shoot. Twenty minutes later, they hit us from across the canal with AKs and a few RPGs.’ B. West, The Wrong War: grit, strategy, and the way out of Afghanistan, (New York: Random House, 2011), p. 232.
[11]         A historical example of social change putting an end to a form of crime may be the spread of sports, summer camps, cinema, and lads’ clubs in late XIX Century Manchester and Salford, contributing to the decline in ‘scuttling’. A. Davies, The Gangs of Manchester, (Preston: Milo Books, 2008), pp. 337-342 and 353-354

The paradox of Brazil’s militarised public security

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By Christoph Harig:

POST - Harig_The Paradox of Brazil's Militarised Public Security
President Dilma Rousseff visiting the military ‘Pacification Force’ in Rio’s Complexo do Alemão, 2011.

Brazilian politicians have promised that the country would inherit lasting improvements from the World Cup. Among the many contested possible legacies, it is almost certain that the Armed Forces further enhanced their capability of performing domestic missions. About 57,000 soldiers took part in the 150,000-strong security force – the largest in the tournament´s and Brazil´s history – and primarily carried out tasks such as protecting critical infrastructure or preventing terrorism.[1] The military attracted significant investments for this purpose and are meant to prepare for large upcoming events, such as the Olympic Games.[2] As the police failed to deter protestors from blocking the bus of Brazil´s squad shortly before the tournament, the government swiftly resorted to a ´contingency force´ of 21,000 soldiers, planned to be on-call in case the police were on strike or otherwise not able to guarantee public order.[3] Troops were then protecting airports, hotels and streets used by football teams, foreign government officials as well as the heads of FIFA. For the duration of the tournament, the government therefore issued a ´preventive´ Guaranteeing Law and Order (GLO) measure,[4] which enables the military to take over the operational control of the police.[5] Using Armed Forces instead of, or in addition to, an arguably unreliable police, however, is not confined to large events. It is a recurring pattern and democratic ´leftist´ Brazilian governments have even trivialised internal missions in recent years.

Since the end of the military regime in 1985, troops have not only protected elections, the Carnival in Rio de Janeiro, the UN Earth Summit in 1992 and the visits of different popes, but also repressed strikes as well as manifestations and kept the landless movement from invading the farm of President Cardoso´s sons.[6] The on-going pacification programme and associated occupations of favelas in Rio de Janeiro is just one among many cases of a military-backed fight against crime. Praised for its innovativeness, Rio´s pacification strategy largely just repeats prior approaches: the idea of expelling criminals and occupying favelas with force as well as the ensuing intent to develop stronger ties between communities and the police dates back to the 1980s;[7] around 1,500 soldiers invaded as well as occupied more than 50 favelas in 1994.[8]

What is actually new about military engagements during pacification and large events is the juridical framework which has been adjusted to the Armed Forces´ demands for legal security and a wide room for manoeuvre. According to the 1988 Constitution, it is a secondary role of the military to guarantee law and order when asked to do so by any of the constitutional powers. However, detailed regulations were missing and the legal situation of internal deployments in the 1990s has often been uncertain. Today, the decision-making process has been clarified and troops have certain legal security for possible cases of ´collateral damage´.

Despite having given up their interventionism of former times, the Armed Forces still exert significant influence in this respect. Their political power does not only derive from the transitional pact that safeguarded military interests in the new democracy; there is also a lack of political will and civilian interest that grants them enormous autonomy in core institutional affairs. The fact that it took over 25 years of democracy until the government banned the Armed Forces from publicly commemorating the coup of 1964[9] – which they still call ´Democratic Revolution´ – anecdotally highlights some issues in civil-military relations.

One would expect that former regime opponents Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula da Silva, or particularly the torture victim and ex-guerrilla Dilma Rousseff would be inclined to reduce the domestic significance of the Armed Forces once in presidential power. Yet, in the midst of some successful and other failed attempts to cut back military prerogatives, their respective tenures have strikingly increased the legal support and the scope of internal military actions.[10] In 2001, Cardoso decreed that the Army had the right to arrest suspects during GLO operations.[11] Furthermore, he empowered the military command to take over the operational control of state police forces in GLO operations.[12] Lula later extended the right of arrest to Navy and Air Force.[13] During the tenure of Rousseff, whose current re-election explicitly refers to her imprisonment under military rule,[14] the first draft of a framework for GLO operations sparked heavy criticism for including protestors and social movements as possible ´opponents´. Some polemical formulations were deleted in the second draft in 2014, but the Ministry of Defence made clear that only semantic alterations were to be done.[15] Blurry definitions now allow a plethora of internal military missions,[16] arguably even more than the first draft.

Yet, why do former opponents of military rule intensify the domestic use of the Armed Forces? A serious security problem is part of this paradox. 2012 figures indicate 29 intentional homicides per 100,000 Brazilian inhabitants.[17] As a comparison: in Haiti, where the Brazilian military´s experience in domestic issues and urban conflict is used prominently in a peacekeeping operation,[18] the figure usually oscillates between 5.1 and 6.9.[19] This is combined with a severe problem of policing. Worst of all, police forces are major perpetrators of violence and have been responsible for killing many citizens.[20] State-level Polícia Civil (responsible for criminal investigations) and Polícia Militar (used for patrols, arrests and control of public order) suffer from corruption, bad education and poor salaries. As a legacy of the last military regime, the Polícia Militar is intimately linked to the Armed Forces in terms of ethos, guidelines, and education, which many commentators see as a major reason for their violent misbehaviour.[21] Nevertheless, police-military relations are tense as governments frequently send the Army to stand in during the many constitutionally forbidden police strikes,[22] or eventually to end them by violent means.[23] Brazilian governments have tried to increase their influence on security issues by circumventing state authorities, e.g. by creating the Força Nacional that follows federal commands. However, constitutional issues as well as numerous veto players are a huge impediment in this regard.[24]

Federal administrations are thus in a dilemma over how to tackle the security problem. In spite of undertaking an admittedly complex, but necessary police reform, they pragmatically opt for the regular use of Armed Forces. This may even appeal to voters, as the public perceives the military much better than the police: Figures for 2013 show that 70 percent of Brazilians distrust the police, while over 65 percent do trust the Armed Forces.[25] Still, it is highly questionable whether the further militarisation of public security is going to solve Brazil´s problem of policing, not to speak of crime: the military is aware that not all soldiers may be immune to corruption, and troops are usually not trained for police tasks such as collecting evidence. It is particularly troublesome that GLO operations fall under military jurisdiction.[26] As military courts in Brazil usually ´protect police and military personnel accused of human rights abuses against civilians´[27], impunity is one of the major problems in the relationship between police and population. GLO operations are therefore prone to the same accountability issue. Be that as it may, the Armed Forces adjust to their ´semi-permanent´ role in public security.[28] The Army´s dedicated training centre for GLO operations was due to be extended in order to satisfy the high demand and is likely going to host plenty of soldiers in the years to come.[29]

 

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Christoph Harig is a PhD student at King’s Brazil Institute at King’s College London. He is researching the militarisation of public security and the consequences of police tasks carried out by Brazilian troops in peacekeeping and internal pacification missions.

 

NOTES

[1]MercoPress. 2014. “Ejército blinda Brasil con 150.000 hombres, fragatas, radares y misiles antiaéreos.” MercoPress. Notícias del Atlántico Sur. 12.06.2014. http://es.mercopress.com/2014/06/12/ejercito-blinda-brasil-con-150.000-hombres-fragatas-radares-y-misiles-antiaereos (04.07.2014).
[2]Ministério da Defesa do Brasil. “O Ministério da Defesa na Copa do Mundo FIFA 2014.”
[3]Naddeo, André. 2014. “Hotel e ônibus da seleção são cercados por manifestantes.” Terra Networks Brasil. 26.05.2014. http://esportes.terra.com.br/futebol/copa-2014/hotel-e-onibus-da-selecao-sao-cercados-por-manifestantes,e231c706cb836410VgnVCM3000009af154d0RCRD.html (09.07.2014).
[4]Werneck, Antônio. 2014. “Militares também vão atuar nos centros de treinamento da Copa.” O Globo. 28.05.2014. http://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/militares-tambem-vao-atuar-nos-centros-de-treinamento-da-copa-12641634 (July 4, 2014).
[5]Centro de Estudos Estratégicos do Exército. 2007. “As Forças Armadas e a Segurança Pública.” Coleção Meira Mattos – Revista das Ciências Militares 15: 20–40, p.33.
[6]Mathias, Suzeley Kalil, and Andre Cavaller Guzzi. 2010. “Autonomia na Lei: As Forças Armadas nas constituições nacionais.” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 25(73): 41–57, p.53; Zaverucha, Jorge. 2008. “The «Guaranteeing Law and Order Doctrine» and the increased role of the Brazilian Army in activities of public security.” Nueva Sociedad (213).
[7]Moulin Aguiar, Carolina, and Ludmila Mendonca Lopes Ribeiro. 2013. Old Problems and Old Solutions: An analysis of Rio de Janeiro ’s public safety policy and its impact. Rio de Janeiro: HASOW – Humanitarian Action in Situations other than War, Discussion Paper 7, p.27.
[8]Bertazzo, Juliana. 2012. “Brazilian security and defence policy under President Dilma Rousseff: transition and initial challenges.” Critical Sociology 38(6): 809–21, p.814; Reames, Benjamin Nelson. 2007. “Neofeudal aspects of Brazil’s public security.” In Comparative Policing: The Struggle for Democratization, eds. M R Haberfeld and Ibrahim Cerrah. London: SAGE, 61–95, p.73.
[9]Bertazzo, Juliana. 2012. p.817.
[10]Macaulay, Fiona. 2012. “Deepening the federative pact? The Dilma government’s approach to crime, justice and policing.” Critical Sociology 38(6): 823–34, p.830.
[11]Bertazzo, Juliana. 2012. p.814.
[12]Centro de Estudos Estratégicos do Exército. 2007. p. 33.
[13]Zaverucha, Jorge. 2005. FHC, Forças Armadas e Polícia. Entre o autoritarismo e a democracia (1999-2002). Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, p. 150.
[14]In the video to campaign song “Dilma Coração Valente”, the mug shot of Dilma´s arrest as well as other pictures of her imprisonment are shown. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3k8YQCSs8es (04.07.2014).
[15]Cantanhêde, Eliane. 2014. “Após críticas, Defesa irá alterar manual para tropas.” Folha de São Paulo. 14.02.2014.http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/01/1402694-apos-criticas-defe (04.07.2014).
[16]Ministério da Defesa do Brasil. 2014. “Garantia da Lei e da Ordem.”
[17]Waiselfisz, Julio Jacobo. 2014. Prévia do “Mapa da Violência 2014. Os jovens do Brasil.” Rio de Janeiro: FLACSO Brasil.
[18]Kenkel, Kai Michael. 2010. “South America’s emerging power: Brazil as peacekeeper.” International Peacekeeping 17(5): 644–61, p. 653.
[19]United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2012. “Intentional homicide, number and rate per 100,000 population.” http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=UNODC&f=tableCode:1 (05.04.2014).
[20]The police have long been accused of being responsible for a high number of extralegal killings, particularly of young, male and black favela dwellers (Perlman, Janice. 2009. “Megacity´s violence and its consequences in Rio de Janeiro.” In Megacities: The Politics of Urban Exclusion and Violence in the Global South, eds. Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt. London: Zed Books, 52–68, p.54.). Between 2007 and 2012, Brazilian police annually killed between 1,729 and 2,031 people. In the same time the USA, with a similar number of inhabitants, has between 378 and 414 fatal victims of confrontation with the police (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública. 2013. Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública. São Paulo, p. 125).
[21]Costa, Arthur Trinidade Maranhão. 2011. “Police brutality in Brazil: authoritarian legacy or institutional weakness?” Latin American Perspectives 38(5): 19–32; Da Silva, Jorge. 2000. “The favelados in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.” Policing and Society 10(1): 121–30.
[22]Zaverucha, Jorge, and Flavio da Cunha Rezende. 2009. “How the military competes for expenditure in Brazilian democracy: arguments for an outlier.” International Political Science Review 30(4): 1–23, p. 17.
[23]Gosman, Eleonora. 2012. “Sube la tensión en Brasil: choques en Bahía entre militares y policías en huelga.” Clarin. 06.02.2012. http://www.clarin.com/mundo/Sube-Brasil-disturbios-Bahia-militares_0_641336016.html (04.04.2013)
[24]Constitutionally, the role of the Força Nacional is inconsistent with single states´ large authority in issues of policing (Pereira, Gerson da Rosa. 2008. “A constitucionalidade da Força Nacional e o papel das Forças Armadas na Segurança Pública.” Faculdade de Direito de Santa Maria). A proposal for a constitutional amendment (PEC 195/2012) has been designed to change Article 144 and to establish the Força Nacional as one of the regular security forces. If approved, the Força Nacional would be trained and maintained by federal authorities and would no longer depend on significant co-operation of different states (Barros, Ciro. 2014. “Pela Ordem.” A Publica. http://apublica.org/2014/04/pela-ordem/ (May 31, 2014)). However, it is unclear whether and when PEC 195 is going to be approved, as PECs require a lengthy legislative process and broad majorities in both chambers of Congress. Due to Brazil´s federal institutional structure, any reform of the security architecture depends on many stake-holders and veto-players, e.g. the military, state politicians, state police forces (Macaulay, Fiona. 2012. p.826) and politicians are particularly aware of the large voting potential of police unions (Wells, Miriam. 2013. “Why do Brazilian police kill ?” InSightCrime. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/why-do-brazilian-police-kill (10.07.2014)).
[25]Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública. 2013. Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública. São Paulo, p.104. Since the return to democracy, Brazilian levels of trust have been much higher in the military than in the police. In general, Brazilian trust in the military is among the highest in the whole of Latin America and is accompanied by very positive attitudes towards military interventions in politics (Harig, Christoph. 2012. “Die zivile Kontrolle der Streitkräfte in Argentinien und Brasilien.” Die Friedens-Warte 87(2-3): 89–110, p.105).Even favela residents that experienced the pacification process show significantly more trust in the military than in the police (Brähler, Verena. 2014. “Oligopoly of Security Providers in Rio de Janeiro.” Presentation at LINKSCK Conference, 19.06.2014, Brussels).
[26]Brasil. Presidência da República. 2010. Lei Complementar N° 136. Brasília: Casa Civil. Subchefia para Assuntos Jurídicos.
[27]Pereira, Anthony W. 2001. “Virtual legality: authoritarian legacies and the reform of military justice in Brazil, the Southern Cone, and Mexico.” Comparative Political Studies 34(5): 555–74, p. 561.
[28]Speech of Army General Alberto Mendes Cardoso in 2003, cited in Klinguelfus Mendes, Carlos Alberto. 2012. “Considerações sobre a Força de Pacificação empregada no Rio de Janeiro.” Military Review (Julho-Agosto): 19–27, p. 19.
[29]Stochero, Tahiane. 2012. “Para Exército, ocupar Alemão é mais difícil que guerra e missão no Haiti.” G1 Globo. 15.08.2012. http://g1.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2012/08/para-exercito-ocupar-alemao-e-mais-dificil-que-%20guerra-e-missao-no-haiti.html (23.01.2014).

 

 

 

"On the real terms of equality"

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By Jill S. Russell:

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Surveying the landscape of current news stories on women is grim. There were the raped and lynched Indian girls, the stoned pregnant Pakistani woman, Farzana Parveen, a victim of honour killing and the 270 kidnapped Nigerian schoolgirls. The list continues with threats to lash Iranian actress Leila Hatami; the pregnant Merium Ibrahim, a Sudanese slated for execution for marrying a Christian; Iraqi child brides, everything in Saudi Arabia, the too many women everywhere who are cut,[1] trafficked across the globe for sex, and the question of whether women should serve across all functions in the armed forces of leading Western liberal democracies. Worse than they appear in detail, they seem to share a common thread regarding the place and state of women in the world, which is the assumption that women’s choices can and should be decided for by others. Whether by family, neighbours, society, culture or governance, any aspect of our behaviour, dress, feelings or actions are at the whim of others.

I cannot speak to much of these problems from personal experience, although I hope others will. But in my small corner of the world, I am deeply concerned with the political issues regarding women and military service and what it represents about our place in society and governance. Some will balk at my inclusion of the matter of service in combat roles in this rogue’s roll call, but it is wholly representative of the principle. The presumption being against them, women must argue FOR inclusion, the decision about which will be made by others. On the basis of zero empirical evidence regarding military effectiveness, women were excluded, and now that bizarre historical anomaly has assumed the status of wisdom. Sorry, it’s not, contort yourself all you want. What passes for evidence now too often boils down to the pull-ups and arguments of cohesion that are based in fluff. The fate of the western world will not be decided by a single exercise – to exclude women for the pull-up is so silly on its face I do not understand how it can be argued seriously. More pointedly, the latter hew and cry over cohesion neglects the absolute raw truth that cohesion is forged in shared experience, so true that it almost invariably breaks down every seeming established structure of distrust.[2] There’s more on women in the military, combat, and war, but these are the worst examples of illogic which man the barriers to integration. Of greatest importance, however, the prohibition is odious for its betrayal of the political beliefs of the system we like to hold out to others. We are not all equal under the law. It is both tragic and a bit frightening – if my rights can be constrained in this matter on the basis of my biology, then what is to stop the state in other areas? And if the liberal west cannot throw off the shackles of this moribund ideology of inequality then there is little hope.

None of this is about being against men. I am a woman in military history and contemporary security affairs, I don’t have a problem with men. Quite the contrary, having grown up playing sports with boys, I find men generally rather easy and pleasant to get on with. Throughout my adulthood I have eschewed the title of feminist – on principle I am earnestly and fervently a humanist, we are all the same. I would prefer to keep to my own work in logistics and public order, and out of this debate. But I am well and truly distressed that this sentiment, this assumed sovereignty of one half of the population over the other, because they were born cloven and not cleft,[3] has such vigour in the world.

If hell hath no fury like a woman scorned, imagine what happens when she knows military strategy? You only have to take a real look at international security and war studies to see the ladies are on the rise. I’m not certain at what point I would be driven to become She Guevara, and I won’t speak for the rest, but at some point this becomes intolerable. I’m not certain how many more photos of girls hanging from trees or similar I am willing to abide.

As I said, though, I prefer to get on with my own work.

 

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Jill S. Russell is a regular contributor to Strife, Kings of War and Small Wars. She is currently writing her doctoral dissertation on American military logistics and strategic culture, with a side project in the London Riots of 2011. You can follow her on Twitter @jsargentr. 

 

NOTES

[1] This is the term chosen by a woman who was the subject of what we refer to here as FGM. I shall respect her wishes on how she would like the practice to be described.
[2] This may be the better explanation for Stockholm Syndrome, that the experience of shared dramatic events or time creates cohesion notwithstanding the matter of formal antagonism between individuals.
[3] Paraphrasing my mother, who unleashed ‘had been born cleft and not cloven’ upon a school principal when he mentioned that my sister’s language was not appropriate for a young lady, her point being that she was none too pleased to hear that had her child been a young man he would not have been in trouble. She’s a corporate litigator by profession. You don’t ever want to be deposed by her. Ever.

Syria, foreign fighters and the Met's new campaign

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In response to the April 24th launch of a national campaign aimed at starting the conversation about protecting young people from the dangers of travelling to Syria by the Metropolitan Police, Jill S. Russell discusses the role of academia in such initiatives, while Joana Cook analyses the implications of focusing on women.

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Not the wrong people for Counter-Radicalisation and British Jihad

By Jill S. Russell:

The Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism policing, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, MPS, Helen Ball unveiled an effort to enlist the support of female family members to stem the flow of British fighters to Syria. Within minutes of the announcement, our own Shiraz Maher critiqued the policy in an interview on BBC Radio 4, noting that the police were “the wrong people to be launching this type of campaign.” Citing concerns regarding community fears of criminalisation and the legacy of previous aggressive approaches by the police on this issue, he argued instead that this should be a matter for community and government leaders. While I understand the concerns, and I have no illusions regarding the tensions in Police-Community (“Po-Co”) relations in the target audience, to make the first and most quotable response to this effort a ringing negative serves little policy purpose.

Many areas of academia enjoy the luxury of operating beyond the constraints of real life requirements. However, in War Studies, particularly as it is so broadly conceived here at King’s, the relationship with policy and policymakers is a critical component of our work.

As I watched the news of this effort emerge this morning I was intrigued. I have speculated with colleagues regarding Po-Co relations generally that an appeal to the female community structures – mothers, aunts, grandmothers, sisters – and the development of trust between them and the police could serve well to counter many areas of criminality, particular amongst at-risk youth. As I see it, such an approach would provide a more productive, less confrontational means to interact with the community to the benefit of all in the reduction of violence and crime. And so, for policing I think this is a useful first step. More than that, I appreciate the philosophy that stands behind such efforts. In a world where responses to crime, violence and the use of force are increasingly forceful and kinetic in their own right, policies and tactics which rely upon alternative foundations, which eschew escalation, which are cognizant of the alienation caused by “robust responses,” are as valuable as they are rare.

I do not doubt that the details of the critique are correct. I agree that the police will have struggle to implement the policy. And hence it is our responsibility as scholars, as keen and intelligent observers of these issues and events, to offer not simply a critique of the efforts of the institutions with which our work is associated. Rather, if we are not to be ivory tower naifs and empty critics, then we must consider our commentary wisely and correctly. If the police have not quite perfected the implementation of the current tactic – and I suspect that it is entirely true – then we should offer our own insights in remedy. I also worry that to highlight the distance between the police and community as a reason not to pursue the effort simply hardens the divide. Thus, to dismiss the entire effort because of its defects serves little purpose, except perhaps to alienate the police from academia.

British policing has taken an interesting and innovative step today. It is a possible bridge to improved relations between the authorities and critical communities. We in academia could offer much in the way of expertise to improve the likelihood the effort to succeed, which would serve not only the direct security needs but also the more general issue of how the police interact with society. Unless our purpose is to maintain the discord and distrust, then it is incumbent upon those of us in relevant scholarly endeavours to offer our wisdom in support.

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Jill S. Russell is a regular contributor to Strife, Kings of War and Small Wars. She is currently a doctoral candidate at King’s College London, researching military history. You can follow her on Twitter @jsargentr. 

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What’s in a word? How the Mets appeal falls short

By Joana Cook:

Today the Metropolitan Police announced a new appeal in its counterterrorism focus, which urges women to dissuade family members from travelling to Syria. What this appeal has acknowledged is the important role that women can play in this, and why they should be part of the broader security conversation. Where the initiative has failed however, is by framing women as unique actors separate from those in the family or wider community as opposed to integral actors within, and excluding the roles that women may have in this extremism itself.

The Met’s announcement (in unspoken terms) acknowledges that there are unique, complex threats emerging, and that traditional, law enforcement methods previously engaged to counter extremism and terrorism are not enough. Gone are the days when threats could be seen and dealt with as emanating from abroad, amongst those of different unfamiliar backgrounds and value systems, rather than from our own (families) backyards. The issue of foreign fighters is more personal and is being demonstrated and appealed to by the police in a much more familiar way as the language engaged shows by tying this issue to our everyday lives. This is a ‘proactive measure to keep families together’. They are ‘idealistic young people not would-be terrorists’ who, if they travel to Syria even for humanitarian reasons ‘risk being preyed on by terrorist groups’ and ‘we are trying to protect them’. We are ‘encouraging women to take an active part in their child’s lives’. This is as personal as targeted messaging gets.

The efforts that the Met are taking have both positive and negative ramifications. They humanize and personalize those (our children, our husbands) who may become foreign fighters and indeed threaten our safety, and appeal to the different ways we may be involved in preventing this. They engage us as citizens in the security process as well as positively target early stage intervention, showing an understanding that motivations to become involved in certain activities may be carried out under misguided youthful ambitions (even if for the right reasons), and proactive actions can prevent future tragedies and more reactive, serious consequences which may face these individuals we care about in the future. However, what the Met risks doing by specifically targeting women as mothers and wives in the Muslim community and appealing to their roles as intimate family members, endangers alienating the important roles that others may play in this same process. It also suggests that it is only young men which should be focussed on in these efforts.

When singling out certain groups (women, Muslims) and focusing on their capacity in the family, the Met risk reducing the roles that women may play to the private sphere and ignores others they may play as, for example, teachers or community leaders who may also have influence over these youths lives. Without stating in the same breath that all family members, including fathers, husbands and brothers, also have a critical stake in this as well, may unintentionally delegate these figures to seemingly less significant, impactful roles. By pointing out that the nurturing and safeguarding roles that mothers can play in preventing their sons (and daughters) from becoming foreign fighters risks side-lining other components that are present in this radicalisation process which families may also have a stake in, some of which may not be solved simply by a mother’s love.

The impacts of foreign fighters from Syria have been said to last the next decade and have the potential to cause severe security implications throughout. What today’s initiative has acknowledged is that this is an issue we should all be concerned about and have an interest in addressing.

Women, as mothers, sisters and wives, have important roles to play in this. What should not be forgotten however, is that not only can these same women we are appealing to in fact support or carry out these extremist activities themselves as recent cases have shown, but both men and women, Muslim and non-Muslim, within the family and community, all have positive and varied roles in countering this. These should not necessarily be singled out as disparate and the language used in such initiatives should reflect this.

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Joana Cook is a PhD student at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London  researching the role and agency of women in counter-terrorism in Yemen.  She is also a researcher at the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS). You can follow her on Twitter @Joana_Cook

Women Maoists in India face harassment and torture in rebel ranks and mainstream culture

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By Daphne Holmes:

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Maoist women in India face a sexism double whammy: in mainstream Indian culture, and within the alternative Maosit culture to which they have dedicated their lives. All too many women join rebel Maoist groups to help overthrow India’s semi-colonial, semi-feudal government only to discover that they have jumped out of the frying pan and into the fire.

Life has never been easy for most women in India. Relentless and grinding poverty, and widespread displacement of locals from their land by big-business interests, are problems that hit women as hard as or harder than they do men. But women also suffer from the gender inequality that is inherent in Indian culture. So it is little wonder that many women have joined the effort to create a better world through a ‘people’s war’.

For many of India’s women Maoists, however, life in the ranks of the rebel forces can mean physical abuse, sexual exploitation and harassment and, in some cases, torture. Even worse, some women, upon surrendering to authorities, find they get no sympathy, just more exploitation. Some have allegedly been gang-raped by police while in custody.

In the news

In recent years there have been several news stories about atrocities against women and girls within the Maoist rebel groups. These experiences have persuaded many women to give up fighting the ‘good fight’ and return to mainstream society.

For instance, back in March of 2010 two female Maoist cadres, who surrendered in the Keonjhar district of Orissa, alleged mental and physical abuse by their seniors. Police officials reported that the two had told them that other women cadres were being tortured. and that Maoist forces molested women and girls during their raids in villages in the night.

More recently, two women Maoists surrendered to Malkangiri district police, claiming they had been harassed and tortured by senior ultras. They had originally been persuaded to join the Maoist organisation by leaders who were impressed by their social and creative skills. The women put those skills to use attracting others into the organisation through cultural activities. Women are often used for these purposes, though many are fully trained in weapons and tactical maneuvers as well.

It seems that women just can’t catch a break. Furthermore, a November 2013 BBC News India piece quoted a former rebel commander from the eastern state of Bihar: ‘We had women from 16 to 40 years of age in our group. Almost all those I knew had experienced some form of sexual abuse or exploitation when they had stepped outside their homes to work or at the hands of security forces.’ The former commander noted that, although the women had originally joined the Maoist organisations to seek revenge against abuses in mainstream society, many had become disillusioned and were leaving the ranks – in large part because of abuse by their organisations’ male leaders.

Women’s growing role as insurgents and counter-insurgents

India’s Maoists are sometimes also known as ‘Naxalites’, a reference to the Naxalbari insurrection conducted by radical Maoist peasants in West Bengal in 1967. The present Communist Party of India was founded in September of 2004, a merger of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People’s War (People’s War Group), and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI). They operate mostly in India’s central and eastern regions, demanding land and jobs for the poor. Ultimately the Maoists want to establish a communist society by overthrowing the Indian government. Not surprisingly they are officially designated by various governing bodies of India as a ‘terrorist organisation’ and an ‘unlawful association’.

In recent years an increasing number of women have joined ‘the movement’; a phenomenon that most analysts attribute to the worsening conditions in rural India. In fact female commanders have come to constitute almost half of the armed cadre of Maoists. And, although it is difficult to get a head count of the women killed in encounters, it’s safe to say that as their participation grows, more female casualties are likely.

But despite their bravery in battle and their willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice for the cause, women still have difficulty getting respect from their fellow fighters, or from the authorities to whom some surrender when life as a rebel becomes unbearable.

Of course women aren’t the only ones who are brutalised when Maoists clash with law enforcement. In fact, attempts are being made to alleviate some of the problems, such as hiring women police officers to help address some of the human rights violations in Maoist-affected areas. Recently a survey was conducted in 322 locations across India, for the purpose of assessing public perception of women police officers. The results were presented in February 2014 during a conference held in Guwahati by the director who noted that there had been multiple complaints against “rude policemen who participate in human rights abuses”. Survey respondents indicated that they believed a female officer could handle any situation in a better manner than a man, and could also communicate more effectively with locals.

That’s just a drop in the bucket. It fails to address the problems that women rebels face within their organisations, and does not even begin to tackle the deep-seated problems that gave rise to the rebellions in the first place.

It could happen anywhere

Much of the world remains unaware of the suffering faced by India’s female Maoist rebels. It’s an issue that makes the news only occasionally and doesn’t capture worldwide headlines, as much as genocide or natural disasters or even celebrity sex scandals. Moreover, many people are unsympathetic to the Maoist political ideology as well as the rebels’ tactics, so Maoist women in India may not present as the most sympathetic victims in the eyes of many people.

Yet the fact remains that India, the world’s largest democracy, has serious internal problems that won’t be fixed easily, rebels or no rebels. A female Maoist being raped or tortured in India – whether at the hands of her fellow freedom fighters or by mainstream law enforcement – cannot simply be dismissed as “someone else’s problem”. What happens to her can and does happen everywhere in the world.

 

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This guest post was contributed by Daphne Holmes. Daphne is a writer from Arrest Records.com based out of Dallas, Texas who writes on crime, violence and bullying. You can reach her at daphneholmes9@gmail.com.