Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

You are here: Home / Archives for military

military

Brainjacking: The uncomfortable truth of bio-technology

by

By: Cheng Lai Ki

Modular Prosthetic Limb (MPL) was developed as part of a four-year program by the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, along with Walter Reed National Military Medical Center and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. The brain-controlled prosthetic has nearly as much dexterity as a natural limb, and allows independent movement of fingers. (Source: Wikimedia)

On July 25 2013, renowned hacker and information security expert Barnaby Jack was discovered dead at his San Francisco apartment. As a bearer of an implanted device himself, he was known for exposing security vulnerabilities of implanted medical devices, such as in insulin pumps ‘that could be [programmed] to dispense a fatal dose by a hacker 300ft away.’ His exposé has even led some medial companies to review the cybersecurity protocols of their products. Jack’s work has undoubtedly uncovered an important but under-discussed area of cybersecurity: cybernetics and brainjacking.

Cybernetics was coined in 1948 by Norbert Wiener in his book Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine and inspired an entire generation of engineers and technical enthusiasts. More recently, David Mindel defined cybernetics as ‘the study of human/machine interaction guided by the principle that numerous different types of systems can be studied according to principles of feedback, control and communication.’[1] At its core, cybernetics simply represents the interaction between man and machine, a concept elucidated by Thomas Rid in his new book: Rise of the Machines: A Cybernetic History.[2]

As our technological capabilities continue to advance, so too does the importance of cybernetics. While our understanding of cybernetics remains vital within cybersecurity domains, Barnaby’s work emphasized the increasing man-machine merger and the need to review security systems of medical and augmentative devices. Today, medical and defence communities have progressively developed advanced prosthetics through ‘taking advantage of the latest robotic technologies to enable [individuals] injured in battle to lead normal lives [and even regain capabilities] better than the original limb’. With current technology, prosthetics have come to replicate internal biological function (i.e. pacemakers), information-processing functions (i.e. optical implants) and interactive functions (i.e. robotic hands). Fictionally reflected by Robin Williams’s character in the Bicentennial Man (2002), almost all internal organs and external limbs can be technologically replicated. In a prepared brief for the 2013 Black Hat conference, Barnaby Jack wrote: ‘[i]n 2006 approximately 350,000 pacemakers and 173,000 ICDs (Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators) were implanted in the US alone…[t]oday there are well over 3 million pacemakers and over 1.7 million ICD’s in use.’ The fictional idea of the ‘cyborg’ (an entity which is both man and machine) is not looking so fictional anymore.

Currently, most devices and prosthetics do not require a direct neurological connection. Insulin pumps and pacemakers are connected to a small programmable logic controller (PLC) to regulate the dosages of insulin required for optimal organ functionality. The cybersecurity considerations of such devices are similar to those of other PLC dependent systems that also regulate fluids and/or voltages (i.e. hydroelectric dams). While the focus on this category within cybersecurity has been around for a while – especially since the discovery of the StuxNet worm and its effects on the Iranian uranium enrichment facility in Natanz – absent is a greater focus on neuro-linked devices.

According to an article by João Mediros in WIRED, advanced and personalised prosthetics for amputees are becoming more affordable and readily available.[3] Most importantly, as Barnaby’s research has discovered, commercially available prosthetics are becoming increasingly programmable – guided by convenience and marketing ideals. Currently, most prosthetics operate with external sensors. However, technologists have made significant strides in developing ones operated from implanted neurological sensors. For example, the LifeHand2, was developed with a technique called intracortical microstimulation where neuro impulses can be mapped and subsequently used to define the elicitation of body movements depending upon the stimulus, directly relaying real-time information and sensory feedback for the amputee. This exposes augmented humans to a ‘bio-cybersecurity’ issue of human-hacking – in the literal sense.

Technological foundations of the Lifehand2, an advanced prosthetics that can be operated via neurologically implanted sensors to provide functional feedback for amputees. (Source: LifeHand2)

‘Brainjacking’

Termed in a World Neurosurgery article published in August 2016, brainjacking refers to the act of corrupting neurological implants with malicious codes to exert involuntary control of motor functions or impulse control systems within the patient/host. On a technical level, neurological implants convert digitised code into neuro-electric impulses mirroring those fired by neurons (brain cells). If the PLCs within these neuro-implants convert digital code into electric impulses, a carefully outlined line of code could potentially create the right levels of neuro-stimuli that could – in effect – be used to blackmail, control, inhibit or even kill the individual.

A Bio-Cybersecurity Concern?

The cybersecurity community must take steps to ensure that neuromodulation-based platforms are protected on a digital level. As highlighted in Barnaby’s work, wireless and programmable components with prosthetics and medical implants possess their own computer vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious actors. This bio-cybersecurity concern must be addressed when, like most technology throughout human history (i.e. ARPANET – the processor to the Internet), advanced prosthetics are developed for various military projects.

Such projects include DARPA’s Reliable Neural-Interface Technology (RE-NET) program, that are developing high-performance neurological interfaces for advanced prosthetics. Soldiers and other civil-servicemen require the full faculties of their brains in order to carry out their missions – usually in highly stressful and hazardous environments. As such, security and operational ramifications of a faulty prosthesis (and by extension an augmented solider) is no different from that of a faulty transmission signal or virus infection aboard autonomous or remote-controlled platforms (i.e. drones).

Humans have consistently used technology for capability enhancement and augmentation. For individuals who have lost limbs or full-functionality of various bodily components, technological advancements have given rise to adaptive (and upgradable) prosthetics and implanted devices to help them regain full functionality. There is no doubt that advanced prosthetics can significantly improve the lives of individuals who have lost their limbs or have diminished functionality. However, with more platforms being biologically integrated, cybersecurity practitioners and prosthetic technicians are now faced with a hybridised domain of security considerations – both biological and technological. Within the increasing number of bio-technological devices, biologists and technical specialists need to collectively address the uncomfortable possibilities potentially afflicting an ever growing cyborg community – before it’s too late.

 

 

 

Cheng served as an Amour Officer and Training Instructor at the Armour Training Institute (ATI) in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and now possesses reservist status. His master’s research revolves around security considerations within the Asia-Pacific Region and more specifically around areas of Cybersecurity, Maritime Security and Intelligence Studies. His Master’s thesis explores the characteristics and trends defining China’s emerging cybersecurity and cyberwarfare capabilities. He participated in the April 2016 9/12 Cyber Student Challenge in Geneva and was published in IHS Janes’s Intelligence Review in May 2016. You can follow him on Twitter @LK_Cheng

Notes:

[1] Mindel, D.A. ‘Cybernetics: Knowledge domains in Engineering Systems’, MIT, Available from: http://web.mit.edu/esd.83/www/notebook/Cybernetics.PDF, (Fall, 2000)

[2] Rid, T. Rise of the Machines: A Cybernetic History, (W.W. Norton & Company: New York), 2016.

[3] Mediros, J. ‘Humans Becoming Bionic: The next generation of prosthetics will be bespoke, adaptable – even desirable’, The WIRED World in 2016, (2016), pp. 55 – 56

Image Source [1]: United States Navy, ‘Modular Prosthetic Limb’, Available from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flickr_-_Official_U.S._Navy_Imagery_-_The_Modular_Prosthetic_Limb_(MPL)..jpg (Mar 23 2012)

Image Source [2]: LifeHand2, http://www.discovery-zone.com/technology-amputee-feels-real-time-bionic-hand/ (Oct 1 2016)

Turkey’s President Erdoğan counter-coup cleanup

by

By: Kyle R. Brady

SAMSUNG CAMERA PICTURES
A night view of Istanbul, Turkey.

Is President Erdoğan ignoring the lessons of the Iraq War at his peril?

Following the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey[1] — wherein factions within the Turkish military and government allegedly conspired to depose President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan[2] — the government of Erdoğan now faces a serious and growing threat: a potential insurgency found within the thousands of Turkish citizens formerly employed by the government, military, or public sector.

In the post-coup period, Erdoğan has not only retained his position but has also undergone[3] a multi-step[4] process of substantially[5] consolidating his power[6] within the country[7]. After formally blaming Fethullah Gülen[8] — a Turkish man and moderate Muslim reformer in self-imposed exile in the United States[9] — for orchestrating the coup, Erdoğan has proceeded to purge the government and military of anyone accused of supporting or sympathizing with Gülen. This effort has resulted in the removal of thousands of bureaucrats, government officials, judges, teachers, and members of the military from their positions, simply as a result of the allegations of the government — a government that increasingly answers solely to Erdoğan.

In the process of undertaking this purge, Erdoğan has ensured a number of outcomes for the immediate future. The first, and most evident, outcome has been the transformation of Turkish democracy into a democracy in name only, as it is incrementally replaced with a loyalist and increasingly autocratic structure that answers more to its leader than the state’s underlying principles or the well-defined rule of law. Second, the civilian-controlled[10] and structurally weakened[11] Turkish military is no longer seen as the defender of the people and the democracy, despite their decades-long status as such[12]. Third, Turkey’s member status within NATO is likely to come into question[13], particularly as Erdoğan’s state increases formal ties with President Putin’s Russia[14]. Lastly, as a result of Erdoğan’s response to the coup, the Turkish government now has greater control over their own anti-terrorist efforts and, by nature of the newly loyalist government, freedom[15] to swiftly[16] pursue any individuals or groups they deem to be terrorists[17], including members of minority or separatist groups that have long troubled Erdoğan[18].

In addition to the clear outcomes of Erdoğan’s post-coup maneuvers — the subject of much discussion by journalists, academics, foreign policy professionals, and others within the field — there exists another distinct problem that has received scant, if any, attention: the group of well-trained, disaffected, and now-subjugated Turkish citizens who have had their lives upended.

One of the most widely acknowledged mistakes of the Iraq War was the swift disbanding of the state’s military and police forces[19]. With this simple act, the United States and its allies created an entire group of individuals who no longer had a source of income or personal pride, but were well-trained in their field, motivated to serve their fellow Iraqis, and fight for what they believed in. This substantially contributed to the extraordinarily difficult problem of insurgency within Iraq — and, eventually, helped to birth ISIS — as many of those who were trained in various aspects of fighting, training, and organizing applied their talents to a familiar purpose and in opposition to those who had deposed them.

This is, precisely, a problem that Erdoğan may soon face: thousands of Turkish citizens who are well-trained in the arts of war, education, and government but have been removed from their posts, stand accused of treason, and are disaffected at the hands of the state they formerly served. It seems unlikely that Erdoğan has yet to realize his potentially grave mistake, nor is he likely to ever do so, given the increasingly loyalist nature of his government. Instead, as he continues to remove citizens of all kinds from their positions, he may be creating the foundation for a widespread insurgency that is entirely unrelated to Turkey’s longstanding problems — both real and perceived — with terrorists, separatists, minorities, and nationalists. Moreover, should he continue down this path, Erdoğan may alienate himself from the general population and create the conditions for his own removal through a populist uprising, rather than a military coup.

It would, therefore, be advisable for Erdoğan to understand and apply the lessons of the Iraq War to his country, his interest in power, and his reforming of government: those who are relied upon to maintain order and function should not be disavowed or disbanded en masse, lest they band together to focus their talent and training on a newer, emerging threat found much closer to home.

Any opinions expressed are directly and expressly the author’s own; they do not represent — unless stated — his employers (past, present, or future) or associated/affiliated institutions.

 

 

 

Kyle R. Brady is an imminent postgraduate student at King’s College London in the Department of War Studies, holds a Masters in Homeland Security from Pennsylvania State University, and has primary interests in terrorism, law enforcement, and contextualizing security concerns. Previously, he graduated with Departmental Honors from San Jose State University’s undergraduate Political Science program, where he focused on both international relations and political theory. You can follow Kyle on Twitter: @KyleBradyOnline and his personal blog at http://blog.kyle-brady.com. He can be reached through email via: [email protected].

Notes:

[1] http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/15/world/turkey-military-coup-what-we-know/

[2] http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/what-caused-the-turkish-coup-attempt-214057

[3] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-idUSKCN0ZX07S

[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/world/europe/turkey-prisoners-erdogan.html

[5] http://www.wsj.com/articles/erdogan-convenes-emergency-security-summit-over-coup-attempt-1469015066

[6] http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/turkey-erdogan-coup-future/491696/

[7] http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/08/06/turkey-chooses-erdogan/

[8] http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/11/politics/turkey-us-fethullah-gulen-ultimatum/

[9] ibid.

[10] https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2016/07/31/decree-tightens-civilian-control-over-turkish-military/qSdjjrhmpHRuCUKpwQLTwM/story.html

[11] http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/20/middleeast/turkey-military-failed-coup/

[12] http://www.vox.com/2016/7/19/12225564/conspiracy-turkey-military-coup

[13] http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/turkey-military-coup/analysis-erdogan-s-purge-coup-proof-turkey-s-military-may-n630791

[14] http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/09/world/turkey-russia-erdogan-putin-meeting/

[15] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/02/the-west-is-supporting-terrorism-against-turkey-claims-erdogan

[16] http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/how-erdogan-made-turkey-authoritarian-again/492374/

[17] https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/24/in-erdogans-turkey-everyone-is-a-terrorist-kurds-pkk-terrorism/

[18] http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-struggles-to-fight-war-on-two-fronts-1458174473

[19] http://time.com/3900753/isis-iraq-syria-army-united-states-military/

Image Source: https://www.pexels.com/photo/city-bridge-cityscape-istanbul-45189/

UK Defence Analysis: Reduced capabilities amid growing threats

by

By Dan Zamansky & Hugh Pickering-Carter:

An RAF Typhoon FGR4 refuels from a Voyager tanker aircraft. Photo: MoD, Cpl Neil Bryden RAF.

This article summarises the changes in British military capabilities compared with their state in 1985, whilst also discussing their relevance to the current security context; focusing upon the threat of terrorism, Iran’s nuclear weapons programme and Russia’s military involvement in the Ukraine. The article makes two main arguments: first, British military capabilities have declined, in some cases very seriously; second, the world is in practice more dangerous now than it was in 1985, with the threat now confronting Britain much greater than it was thirty years ago. It is suggested that an urgent improvement in military capabilities is therefore required.

The 2015 Military Balance identified various capabilities as being in high demand: “strategic transport aircraft and fast-jet fleets, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms”[1]. Given that these components of air power have been the first resort of the Government in numerous military operations, they are likely to remain a vital element of British force projection in the future. The relevant figures for these categories are summarised in the table below:

1985 2015
Transports 20 (converted airliners) 19 (10 converted airliners and 9 dedicated heavy-lift)[2]
Fast Jets 485 203 [3]
ISR Aircraft 30 (6 dedicated and 24 pod-equipped) 30 (12 dedicated ISR aircraft, 8 pod-equipped and 10 Reaper UAVs) [4]

Clearly, the RAF’s strategic transport fleet has increased compared with 1985, largely due to the adoption of heavy transport aircraft, especially the C-17. Nevertheless, airframe numbers remain constant, even as the need to transport forces long-distance has increased dramatically, both for ongoing operations in the Middle East and the deployment of British troops to Eastern Europe with NATO’s High Readiness Joint Task Force.

Furthermore, fast jets have fallen by more than half. This comes at a time when RAF aircraft are continually involved in operations abroad, unlike 1985. In ISR assets, which have been the focus of procurement since the beginning of the war on terrorism in 2001, the RAF is somewhat better served. Nevertheless, there remains a significant capability gap, since the three electronic intelligence Nimrods are being replaced only gradually, with just one Rivet Joint aircraft available at present. The pressure on this particular capability is demonstrated by the fact that the second airframe will be deployed operationally immediately following delivery. The overall picture for air capability is that of a limited improvement in the fields of transport and ISR, which has not kept pace with increased commitments, and a very sharp decline in strike capability.

2015: An uncertain strategic environment

The deficiencies in capabilities are particularly significant in the context of a highly uncertain strategic environment, much changed from 1985. In that year, the Armed Forces had some 9,000 men deployed in Northern Ireland, supported by 6,500 men of the Ulster Defence Regiment.[5] This was the only deployment which involved an ongoing risk of casualties from hostile action, taking place at a time when the bulk of Britain’s forward-deployed military force was concentrated in Germany as part of NATO’s Cold War organisation.

The fall of the Berlin Wall witnessed the force number deployed in Germany reduce from 70,000 to just 12,300.[6] The 38-year Operation ‘Banner’ in Northern Ireland finally came to an end in July 2007, another way in which the old certainties are dissipating. The current operational deployments are much smaller, but take place in much more uncertain circumstances; 300 personnel remain in Afghanistan, where British forces have suffered 453 fatalities since 2001[7]. The casualty rates of the Afghan security services and civilian population rose to record levels in the year of 2014, signalling increased danger to British advisory forces.

The other active combat deployment, the Operation ‘Shader’ air campaign over Iraq, brings a different element of risk. The murder of Jordanian pilot Lt Moaz al-Kasasbeh by Islamic State (IS) shows that any loss of aircraft over terrorist-controlled territory could have serious political consequences, through its effect upon public perceptions and consequent demands for military retaliation.

Recently, the intensity of numerous conflicts has increased, which makes for a substantially more dangerous world. Since 2008, the number of conflict fatalities has increased from 56,000 to 180,000 annually[8]. War has also come geographically closer to Britain, with some 5,000 fatalities in the Eastern Ukraine conflict by the end of 2014[9]. The Ukrainian war poses a particular danger of a rapid increase in its scale and intensity, since the casualties in that conflict were increasing until the recent cease-fire, which is being repeatedly violated by Russian forces.[10] Increasing levels of Russian military posturing, as demonstrated by recent long-range air patrol activity, similarly indicates hostilities may spread to new areas such as the Baltic States, further increasing the danger posed to Britain.

The terrorist threat

Moreover, terrorism as an enduring phenomenon has also risen on the security agenda since the 9/11 attacks and has become a major threat to the West. The UK has since experienced similar attacks in the form of the 7/7 London bombings (2005) and the recent shooting in Sousse, Tunisia. The growing threat of IS has brought with it numerous challenges for security officials, including the coordination of a timely and effective response to an attack; the identification of an appropriate level of proportionality in any given response; and the issue of fighting an enemy that does not respect borders. The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) states ‘The actual and potential threat to international security posed by ISIS triggered a degree of military engagement and political alignment by regional and international states that had not been seen for some time’.[11] Nevertheless, this has not yet led to decisive success in tackling terrorism.

Decision-makers remain divided on the subject of how best to respond to IS. There have been extended debates regarding the use of air power as a means of disrupting terrorist activity in Iraq, with numerous MPs calling for further RAF air strike capabilities in Syria, in the hope of further reducing the IS threat. Support for the greater use of British air power has noticeably increased, while ‘the defence secretary [Michael Fallon] has long believed it is not logical to limit air strikes to Iraq when the terrorists do not respect, or even recognise, borders’. These additional air strike capabilities could be committed by September 2015 and would incorporate the use of both conventional aircraft, as well as Reaper and Predator drones.

The effectiveness of these potential strikes, however, is open to question, unless their employment is fully supported by intelligence on the ground and a firm commitment of resources by policy-makers. But the UK’s full engagement in Syria with conventional ground forces is the subject of an ongoing debate. RUSI’s Professor Michael Clarke has stated that ‘sooner or later someone has got to take IS on [in Syria] at the centre of their power’. Others may soon come round to his view, since IS continues to control a substantial area of territory in spite of an extended air strike campaign.

Iran’s nuclear programme

Another current issue in the Middle East is Iran’s nuclear programme. The Iranian government was caught violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2002. The consequent 13 years of diplomatic stalemate was followed by the signing of an agreement this July. This deal has been called a ‘historic mistake’ by Benjamin Netanyahu, since, according to the Israeli president, it will allow Iran to produce nuclear weapons in 10-15 years, even if it abides by the terms of the accord.

It is noteworthy that Iran has made major policy changes in the past only under extreme pressure. At the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini declared the cease-fire “worse than drinking poison”. In 2003, the suspension of Iran’s nuclear programme was connected to regime fears of the US invasion of neighbouring Iraq. The latest statements made by Iran are very different, with Hassan Rouhani saying that the American commitment to keeping ‘all options are on the table’ has “broken legs”. Iran’s actions throughout the region suggest that it is unlikely to restrain its activities, since it is currently supporting both the Sunni terrorists of Hamas and the Shia terrorists of Hezbollah. Iran has also supplied weapons to the Houthi rebels in Yemen since at least 2009; contributing to the civil war there. It is likely that the confrontation between Iran and other Middle Eastern countries will intensify, as Iran’s budget grows following the lifting of sanctions.

Force readiness and willingness to use force

The UK’s force readiness remains in doubt, in terms of both conventional capabilities and newly emerging cyber technology. Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh stated that if UK spending does not increase, ‘the Government will be neglecting its prime and overriding duty … by failing to halt the progressive decline of British military capability into penny packet numbers.’ Concern has also arisen relating to the UK’s willingness to use force against both state and non-state actors. Britain has taken a leading role in the deployment of the High Readiness Joint Task Force to Eastern Europe, in response to Russia’s aggression in the Ukraine. Nonetheless, concerns have been fuelled by the fact that, on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis, Russia’s defence spending is now 5.4% of the world total, while the UK’s is just 2.4%.[12] Since 2011, Russian defence spending has grown from 2.7 to 3.4% of national GDP[13]. Russia may also be an example of the broadening threat of offensive cyber and psychological operations, which has been highlighted by the recent defection of Edward Snowden.[14]

Conversely, the British willingness to use air strikes in Syria has repeatedly come up against political opposition, which cited a deficit of hard intelligence and possible retaliatory domestic terrorist attacks. The SNP foreign affairs spokesperson, Alex Salmond, claimed that extending strikes to Syria would be ‘very hard to justify’, with a number of other MPs expressing similar sentiments. On the other hand, it is clear that the threat of IS will endure for a prolonged period given that ‘UK officials think some 600 Britons have fought in Syria, with 300 having returned.’

In summary, an image emerges of uncertain British capability in a time of increasing threat. Lord Dannatt has provided an important reminder that political commitment is vital for the success of military operations. Since such commitment, both in terms of capability and the desire to deploy available forces, has been weak or absent in several recent cases, the UK’s security position has deteriorated. In consequence, an urgent rethink of defence policy is required to meet a growing level of threat. The hour is late and the absence of policy change is likely to have extremely serious consequences as threats continue to appear.

Dan Zamansky & Hugh Pickering-Carter are KCL undergraduates in the Department of War Studies with an interest in current and foreign affairs.

NOTES

[1] IISS Military Balance 2015, p.68

[2] IISS Military Balance, 1985 and 2015.

[3] IISS Military Balance, 1985 and 2015.

[4] IISS Military Balance, 1985 and 2015.

[5] IISS Military Balance 1985, p. 41

[6] Ibid, p.43; IISS Military Balance 2015, p.152

[7] IISS Military Balance 2015, p.152

[8] IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2015, p. 78

[9] Ibid, p. 76

[10] Ibid, p. 326;

[11] IISS Military Balance 2015, p. 7

[12] IISS Military Balance 2015, p.22

[13] Ibid, p.164

[14] Ibid, p. 17

The paradox of Brazil’s militarised public security

by

By Christoph Harig:

POST - Harig_The Paradox of Brazil's Militarised Public Security
President Dilma Rousseff visiting the military ‘Pacification Force’ in Rio’s Complexo do Alemão, 2011.

Brazilian politicians have promised that the country would inherit lasting improvements from the World Cup. Among the many contested possible legacies, it is almost certain that the Armed Forces further enhanced their capability of performing domestic missions. About 57,000 soldiers took part in the 150,000-strong security force – the largest in the tournament´s and Brazil´s history – and primarily carried out tasks such as protecting critical infrastructure or preventing terrorism.[1] The military attracted significant investments for this purpose and are meant to prepare for large upcoming events, such as the Olympic Games.[2] As the police failed to deter protestors from blocking the bus of Brazil´s squad shortly before the tournament, the government swiftly resorted to a ´contingency force´ of 21,000 soldiers, planned to be on-call in case the police were on strike or otherwise not able to guarantee public order.[3] Troops were then protecting airports, hotels and streets used by football teams, foreign government officials as well as the heads of FIFA. For the duration of the tournament, the government therefore issued a ´preventive´ Guaranteeing Law and Order (GLO) measure,[4] which enables the military to take over the operational control of the police.[5] Using Armed Forces instead of, or in addition to, an arguably unreliable police, however, is not confined to large events. It is a recurring pattern and democratic ´leftist´ Brazilian governments have even trivialised internal missions in recent years.

Since the end of the military regime in 1985, troops have not only protected elections, the Carnival in Rio de Janeiro, the UN Earth Summit in 1992 and the visits of different popes, but also repressed strikes as well as manifestations and kept the landless movement from invading the farm of President Cardoso´s sons.[6] The on-going pacification programme and associated occupations of favelas in Rio de Janeiro is just one among many cases of a military-backed fight against crime. Praised for its innovativeness, Rio´s pacification strategy largely just repeats prior approaches: the idea of expelling criminals and occupying favelas with force as well as the ensuing intent to develop stronger ties between communities and the police dates back to the 1980s;[7] around 1,500 soldiers invaded as well as occupied more than 50 favelas in 1994.[8]

What is actually new about military engagements during pacification and large events is the juridical framework which has been adjusted to the Armed Forces´ demands for legal security and a wide room for manoeuvre. According to the 1988 Constitution, it is a secondary role of the military to guarantee law and order when asked to do so by any of the constitutional powers. However, detailed regulations were missing and the legal situation of internal deployments in the 1990s has often been uncertain. Today, the decision-making process has been clarified and troops have certain legal security for possible cases of ´collateral damage´.

Despite having given up their interventionism of former times, the Armed Forces still exert significant influence in this respect. Their political power does not only derive from the transitional pact that safeguarded military interests in the new democracy; there is also a lack of political will and civilian interest that grants them enormous autonomy in core institutional affairs. The fact that it took over 25 years of democracy until the government banned the Armed Forces from publicly commemorating the coup of 1964[9] – which they still call ´Democratic Revolution´ – anecdotally highlights some issues in civil-military relations.

One would expect that former regime opponents Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula da Silva, or particularly the torture victim and ex-guerrilla Dilma Rousseff would be inclined to reduce the domestic significance of the Armed Forces once in presidential power. Yet, in the midst of some successful and other failed attempts to cut back military prerogatives, their respective tenures have strikingly increased the legal support and the scope of internal military actions.[10] In 2001, Cardoso decreed that the Army had the right to arrest suspects during GLO operations.[11] Furthermore, he empowered the military command to take over the operational control of state police forces in GLO operations.[12] Lula later extended the right of arrest to Navy and Air Force.[13] During the tenure of Rousseff, whose current re-election explicitly refers to her imprisonment under military rule,[14] the first draft of a framework for GLO operations sparked heavy criticism for including protestors and social movements as possible ´opponents´. Some polemical formulations were deleted in the second draft in 2014, but the Ministry of Defence made clear that only semantic alterations were to be done.[15] Blurry definitions now allow a plethora of internal military missions,[16] arguably even more than the first draft.

Yet, why do former opponents of military rule intensify the domestic use of the Armed Forces? A serious security problem is part of this paradox. 2012 figures indicate 29 intentional homicides per 100,000 Brazilian inhabitants.[17] As a comparison: in Haiti, where the Brazilian military´s experience in domestic issues and urban conflict is used prominently in a peacekeeping operation,[18] the figure usually oscillates between 5.1 and 6.9.[19] This is combined with a severe problem of policing. Worst of all, police forces are major perpetrators of violence and have been responsible for killing many citizens.[20] State-level Polícia Civil (responsible for criminal investigations) and Polícia Militar (used for patrols, arrests and control of public order) suffer from corruption, bad education and poor salaries. As a legacy of the last military regime, the Polícia Militar is intimately linked to the Armed Forces in terms of ethos, guidelines, and education, which many commentators see as a major reason for their violent misbehaviour.[21] Nevertheless, police-military relations are tense as governments frequently send the Army to stand in during the many constitutionally forbidden police strikes,[22] or eventually to end them by violent means.[23] Brazilian governments have tried to increase their influence on security issues by circumventing state authorities, e.g. by creating the Força Nacional that follows federal commands. However, constitutional issues as well as numerous veto players are a huge impediment in this regard.[24]

Federal administrations are thus in a dilemma over how to tackle the security problem. In spite of undertaking an admittedly complex, but necessary police reform, they pragmatically opt for the regular use of Armed Forces. This may even appeal to voters, as the public perceives the military much better than the police: Figures for 2013 show that 70 percent of Brazilians distrust the police, while over 65 percent do trust the Armed Forces.[25] Still, it is highly questionable whether the further militarisation of public security is going to solve Brazil´s problem of policing, not to speak of crime: the military is aware that not all soldiers may be immune to corruption, and troops are usually not trained for police tasks such as collecting evidence. It is particularly troublesome that GLO operations fall under military jurisdiction.[26] As military courts in Brazil usually ´protect police and military personnel accused of human rights abuses against civilians´[27], impunity is one of the major problems in the relationship between police and population. GLO operations are therefore prone to the same accountability issue. Be that as it may, the Armed Forces adjust to their ´semi-permanent´ role in public security.[28] The Army´s dedicated training centre for GLO operations was due to be extended in order to satisfy the high demand and is likely going to host plenty of soldiers in the years to come.[29]

 

___________________

Christoph Harig is a PhD student at King’s Brazil Institute at King’s College London. He is researching the militarisation of public security and the consequences of police tasks carried out by Brazilian troops in peacekeeping and internal pacification missions.

 

NOTES

[1]MercoPress. 2014. “Ejército blinda Brasil con 150.000 hombres, fragatas, radares y misiles antiaéreos.” MercoPress. Notícias del Atlántico Sur. 12.06.2014. http://es.mercopress.com/2014/06/12/ejercito-blinda-brasil-con-150.000-hombres-fragatas-radares-y-misiles-antiaereos (04.07.2014).
[2]Ministério da Defesa do Brasil. “O Ministério da Defesa na Copa do Mundo FIFA 2014.”
[3]Naddeo, André. 2014. “Hotel e ônibus da seleção são cercados por manifestantes.” Terra Networks Brasil. 26.05.2014. http://esportes.terra.com.br/futebol/copa-2014/hotel-e-onibus-da-selecao-sao-cercados-por-manifestantes,e231c706cb836410VgnVCM3000009af154d0RCRD.html (09.07.2014).
[4]Werneck, Antônio. 2014. “Militares também vão atuar nos centros de treinamento da Copa.” O Globo. 28.05.2014. http://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/militares-tambem-vao-atuar-nos-centros-de-treinamento-da-copa-12641634 (July 4, 2014).
[5]Centro de Estudos Estratégicos do Exército. 2007. “As Forças Armadas e a Segurança Pública.” Coleção Meira Mattos - Revista das Ciências Militares 15: 20–40, p.33.
[6]Mathias, Suzeley Kalil, and Andre Cavaller Guzzi. 2010. “Autonomia na Lei: As Forças Armadas nas constituições nacionais.” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 25(73): 41–57, p.53; Zaverucha, Jorge. 2008. “The «Guaranteeing Law and Order Doctrine» and the increased role of the Brazilian Army in activities of public security.” Nueva Sociedad (213).
[7]Moulin Aguiar, Carolina, and Ludmila Mendonca Lopes Ribeiro. 2013. Old Problems and Old Solutions: An analysis of Rio de Janeiro ’s public safety policy and its impact. Rio de Janeiro: HASOW - Humanitarian Action in Situations other than War, Discussion Paper 7, p.27.
[8]Bertazzo, Juliana. 2012. “Brazilian security and defence policy under President Dilma Rousseff: transition and initial challenges.” Critical Sociology 38(6): 809–21, p.814; Reames, Benjamin Nelson. 2007. “Neofeudal aspects of Brazil’s public security.” In Comparative Policing: The Struggle for Democratization, eds. M R Haberfeld and Ibrahim Cerrah. London: SAGE, 61–95, p.73.
[9]Bertazzo, Juliana. 2012. p.817.
[10]Macaulay, Fiona. 2012. “Deepening the federative pact? The Dilma government’s approach to crime, justice and policing.” Critical Sociology 38(6): 823–34, p.830.
[11]Bertazzo, Juliana. 2012. p.814.
[12]Centro de Estudos Estratégicos do Exército. 2007. p. 33.
[13]Zaverucha, Jorge. 2005. FHC, Forças Armadas e Polícia. Entre o autoritarismo e a democracia (1999-2002). Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, p. 150.
[14]In the video to campaign song “Dilma Coração Valente”, the mug shot of Dilma´s arrest as well as other pictures of her imprisonment are shown. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3k8YQCSs8es (04.07.2014).
[15]Cantanhêde, Eliane. 2014. “Após críticas, Defesa irá alterar manual para tropas.” Folha de São Paulo. 14.02.2014.http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/01/1402694-apos-criticas-defe (04.07.2014).
[16]Ministério da Defesa do Brasil. 2014. “Garantia da Lei e da Ordem.”
[17]Waiselfisz, Julio Jacobo. 2014. Prévia do “Mapa da Violência 2014. Os jovens do Brasil.” Rio de Janeiro: FLACSO Brasil.
[18]Kenkel, Kai Michael. 2010. “South America’s emerging power: Brazil as peacekeeper.” International Peacekeeping 17(5): 644–61, p. 653.
[19]United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2012. “Intentional homicide, number and rate per 100,000 population.” http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=UNODC&f=tableCode:1 (05.04.2014).
[20]The police have long been accused of being responsible for a high number of extralegal killings, particularly of young, male and black favela dwellers (Perlman, Janice. 2009. “Megacity´s violence and its consequences in Rio de Janeiro.” In Megacities: The Politics of Urban Exclusion and Violence in the Global South, eds. Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt. London: Zed Books, 52–68, p.54.). Between 2007 and 2012, Brazilian police annually killed between 1,729 and 2,031 people. In the same time the USA, with a similar number of inhabitants, has between 378 and 414 fatal victims of confrontation with the police (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública. 2013. Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública. São Paulo, p. 125).
[21]Costa, Arthur Trinidade Maranhão. 2011. “Police brutality in Brazil: authoritarian legacy or institutional weakness?” Latin American Perspectives 38(5): 19–32; Da Silva, Jorge. 2000. “The favelados in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.” Policing and Society 10(1): 121–30.
[22]Zaverucha, Jorge, and Flavio da Cunha Rezende. 2009. “How the military competes for expenditure in Brazilian democracy: arguments for an outlier.” International Political Science Review 30(4): 1–23, p. 17.
[23]Gosman, Eleonora. 2012. “Sube la tensión en Brasil: choques en Bahía entre militares y policías en huelga.” Clarin. 06.02.2012. http://www.clarin.com/mundo/Sube-Brasil-disturbios-Bahia-militares_0_641336016.html (04.04.2013)
[24]Constitutionally, the role of the Força Nacional is inconsistent with single states´ large authority in issues of policing (Pereira, Gerson da Rosa. 2008. “A constitucionalidade da Força Nacional e o papel das Forças Armadas na Segurança Pública.” Faculdade de Direito de Santa Maria). A proposal for a constitutional amendment (PEC 195/2012) has been designed to change Article 144 and to establish the Força Nacional as one of the regular security forces. If approved, the Força Nacional would be trained and maintained by federal authorities and would no longer depend on significant co-operation of different states (Barros, Ciro. 2014. “Pela Ordem.” A Publica. http://apublica.org/2014/04/pela-ordem/ (May 31, 2014)). However, it is unclear whether and when PEC 195 is going to be approved, as PECs require a lengthy legislative process and broad majorities in both chambers of Congress. Due to Brazil´s federal institutional structure, any reform of the security architecture depends on many stake-holders and veto-players, e.g. the military, state politicians, state police forces (Macaulay, Fiona. 2012. p.826) and politicians are particularly aware of the large voting potential of police unions (Wells, Miriam. 2013. “Why do Brazilian police kill ?” InSightCrime. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/why-do-brazilian-police-kill (10.07.2014)).
[25]Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública. 2013. Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública. São Paulo, p.104. Since the return to democracy, Brazilian levels of trust have been much higher in the military than in the police. In general, Brazilian trust in the military is among the highest in the whole of Latin America and is accompanied by very positive attitudes towards military interventions in politics (Harig, Christoph. 2012. “Die zivile Kontrolle der Streitkräfte in Argentinien und Brasilien.” Die Friedens-Warte 87(2-3): 89–110, p.105).Even favela residents that experienced the pacification process show significantly more trust in the military than in the police (Brähler, Verena. 2014. “Oligopoly of Security Providers in Rio de Janeiro.” Presentation at LINKSCK Conference, 19.06.2014, Brussels).
[26]Brasil. Presidência da República. 2010. Lei Complementar N° 136. Brasília: Casa Civil. Subchefia para Assuntos Jurídicos.
[27]Pereira, Anthony W. 2001. “Virtual legality: authoritarian legacies and the reform of military justice in Brazil, the Southern Cone, and Mexico.” Comparative Political Studies 34(5): 555–74, p. 561.
[28]Speech of Army General Alberto Mendes Cardoso in 2003, cited in Klinguelfus Mendes, Carlos Alberto. 2012. “Considerações sobre a Força de Pacificação empregada no Rio de Janeiro.” Military Review (Julho-Agosto): 19–27, p. 19.
[29]Stochero, Tahiane. 2012. “Para Exército, ocupar Alemão é mais difícil que guerra e missão no Haiti.” G1 Globo. 15.08.2012. http://g1.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2012/08/para-exercito-ocupar-alemao-e-mais-dificil-que-%20guerra-e-missao-no-haiti.html (23.01.2014).

 

 

 

General John de Chastelain: Reflections on the introduction of women into combat roles in the Canadian military

by

By Joana Cook, Managing Editor, Strife
Interview conducted on 8 May 2014.

John-de-Chastelain-cc-600

Graduating from military college in 1960 with a commission in the Canadian Army, John de Chastelain rose quickly through the ranks. In 1989, he was promoted to General and appointed Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). During his tenure, the Canadian military was involved in the Oka crisis, as well as the first Gulf War and Somalia. He served as Canada’s Ambassador to the United States in 1993 before being reappointed to the post of CDS from which he retired in 1995. Since then, General de Chastelain has served as Chair of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning in Northern Ireland. He helped forge the Belfast Agreement, the blueprint for peace in Northern Ireland signed on Good Friday, 1998. General de Chastelain was named to the Order of Canada in 1993, and a Companion of Honour in 1999.

* * *

Joana Cook: In your time with the military, were you responsible for any initiatives that focused on increasing the number of women in the Canadian forces? If so, what motivated these changes?

General de Chastelain: When I was Commandant of the Royal Military College (RMC) in Kingston (1977-1980), the government made the decision to change the policy of not having women attend the College – other than in the postgraduate programs. The policy to exclude women had been in effect since the College was founded in 1876. It was felt by the government to be still valid up until 1980 as the majority of graduates from the College were commissioned into the combat or combat support classifications from which women were then excluded. As moves began to open these classifications to women, it was decided to open the College to women officer cadets. I was involved in the selection of the first class of such cadets who came to the College in 1980. Women have been fully involved at the College since that date.

In 1980 after leaving RMC I was appointed Commander of Canada’s 4th Mechanized Brigade Group in Lahr and Baden-Soellingen, Germany. At the same time a trial was announced by National Defence Headquarters to see how women could operate in “near-combat” roles, Germany being considered an operational area. That meant that women soldiers were employed in the Logistics Battalion and the Field Ambulance unit of the Brigade Group. They filled roles in these units that were normally filled by men and they went on all the exercises and the major Fall manoeuvres along with our NATO allies. At the end of the trial it was established that women should be employed in field combat support units without restriction. It was also felt that the expression “near combat” was a misnomer, since a vehicle technician repairing a fighting vehicle in a forward area was just as exposed to combat as were soldiers in the combat classifications. I believe it was the result of that trial that gradually opened up the role of women in combat classifications, including flying fighter aircraft, serving on fighting ships and in combat and combat support classifications.

The only limitation that was made was that women candidates had to meet physical fitness requirements for combat and combat support classifications as did men. As I recall, there was some debate about the physical differences between males and females with regard to fitness testing, but appropriate tests were established and women were enrolled in the combat and combat support classifications on a voluntary basis.

As to how this came about and who initiated it: I believe it was a combination of circumstances that were a part of the nationwide gradual entry of women into roles traditionally filled by men alone, eg, firefighters, loggers, police, and some emergency services. There was also an in-house (Defence Department) program to look at the benefits of opening up hitherto excluded classifications to women both as a means of expanding the recruiting base of qualified candidates as well as a sense of fairness. As technology played an increasing part in military capability, the need for engineers and science-oriented recruits expanded also, and women were equally capable in these fields.

A benefit many sought in joining the armed forces, was the ability to learn and practice a skill that would be of value after leaving the Service. For this reason there was seldom a shortage of recruits seeking careers in the technical and support classifications, particularly in the Navy and Air Force. While technical ability was equally important in the infantry, armour, artillery, field engineering and communications classifications, the nature of their work under field conditions made them less desirable to many of the men who applied to join the forces and to many of the women as well.

The one exception to all classifications being opened to women when I left the Forces in 1995 was in the submarine service. I believe that has since changed (and I believe it changed in the Royal Navy only this year).*

As to pressure for change, while there was pressure from the media and some politicians to open up hitherto excluded possibilities in the military for women. It was most vocal, I think, in the case of the Military College, which provides a paid-for university education for officer candidates entering the Regular Forces. Why, it was legitimately asked, should women be excluded from such an opportunity?

I’m not aware of what factors, other than personal desire, motivated women in their choice of the military role they wished to play.

In what roles did you see the majority of women take up in the forces? Do you feel that these changed over time?

I don’t know what the situation is in Canada’s Regular Force today. Certainly up until I left it was largely the technical and supporting classifications in all three Services, that attracted more women candidates, while the Navy and Air Force was more attractive to those seeking combat roles. That has perhaps changed. Certainly women have distinguished themselves in army combat roles, commanding units and subunits in the Afghanistan war. The only Canadian woman soldier killed in Afghanistan was an artillery Forward Observation Officer, killed while directing fire from her armoured vehicle.

It is fairly standard practice for someone to change their classification mid-career (or earlier). Not everybody finds they made the right choice at the outset and if a vacancy in another classification is available they may request the change. Those who have experience in combat units are frequently sought by the non-combat classifications, and those who have served in combat roles and look for a skill to get employment after they retire, may ask for such a transfer. In my experience, that was certainly the case for the men in the Forces and I assume it is the same for the women.

In International Military Training Operations (IMTO), what roles have women played?

The Forces have conducted a number of training missions in various countries (most recently, and ongoing, in Afghanistan). Some of these are conducted by Special Forces soldiers and I don’t know if they include women. I can see the advantage of having women soldiers involved in training missions in locations where male contact with female residents would be unacceptable for religious or societal reasons.

In regards to foreign operations, how did having women in the forces impact relations and interactions with both local populations and foreign forces?

During my time in uniform there was little foreign reaction to the role of Canadian women in operational units, as the numbers were then not large. Many national forces don’t have women in combat roles so there may exist a negative reaction among some to what Canada is doing in this regard (especially in societies where women’s roles are restricted – Afghanistan is an example of this), but I have no personal knowledge of it. In Afghanistan I understand Canadian women soldiers were able to play a unique role in contact with Afghan women.

What were some of the challenges you saw facing female military members? This could include operational, logistical, or social for example.

I suspect (but I have no evidence) that there may still be males who cannot accept that women should be in the fighting classifications and this attitude may still be a problem for women who seek such roles. At the Military College women equal or outperform men academically, militarily or athletically and I suspect the same is true of women in operational units. Recent publications in Canada report that sexual assault is a problem and that the hierarchy has been slow in responding to it. I understand assaults against Canadian women soldiers by foreign soldiers serving in the same overseas operational theatres have occurred. This has nothing to do with a woman soldier’s ability to perform their role and everything to do with the need to deal harshly with the offenders and the mentality that causes it.

What lessons do you think Canada could offer to other countries regarding the integration of women in to the military and onto the front lines?

The lesson that Canada can offer is that it has worked for us and is a conscious demonstration of the belief in the equal status of women in Canada. There may still be examples when equality of opportunity and pay is far from perfect in Canada, but in the Canadian Armed Forces the pay is the same for males and females. The glass ceiling may still be a problem for women in industry and business, but there are female General officers in the Canadian Forces. Canadians as a whole supported the efforts of its soldiers in Afghanistan, including the employment of women in combat roles there.

I think the best contribution Canada can make in this regard is to do what it is doing now, opening up security roles to qualified women; ensuring that those who resent or try to resist the policy are side-lined or dealt with; and demonstrating to the world that this is who we are and what we do.

* In 2001 General Maurice Baril, Chief of the Defence Staff of Canada, announced that women will serve in submarines

_______________________

Joana Cook is a PhD researcher at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London focusing on the role and agency of women in counterterrorism in Yemen. She is also a Research Affiliate with Public Safety Canada and member of the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS). You can follow her on Twitter @Joana_Cook