Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

You are here: Home / Archives for army

army

The Burmese Civil War: Seventy Years and Counting

by

By Ed Nash

20 May 2019

Kachin militiaman watching Burma Army outposts for activity. Kachin State, 2018. (Ed Nash)

The world’s current longest running war, the internal conflict in Burma (also known as Myanmar) receives but limited attention in the outside world. Considering the complexities of the conflict, as well as the growing importance of neighbouring countries and an increasingly assertive China, it may be useful for any watcher of international affairs to develop an understanding of the current events in Burma. This article aims to provide a basic grounding of the situation to those who may be interested in a conflict that has killed an estimated 130,000 people.

Since 1948 the Burmese Civil War has carried on largely unabated and today finds itself on the verge of escalating violently, as groups negotiating as part of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) become further disillusioned. Despite seventy years of bloodshed under an oppressive military dictatorship, the year 2015 signalled a break-through for democracy, as the famous prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD party rose to power. The NCA negotiations began promisingly, however the last few years have seen growing discontent from several Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) stemming both from the lack of progress in talks with the central government and the actions undertaken against them by the powerful Burmese military, the Tatmadaw

Since January 2019, the Arakan Army (AA) has been battling against the Burmese Army in Rakhine State, situated on the western coast of Burma. The AA, formed in 2009, have been employing both conventional and guerrilla tactics against the army and police units and experienced a surge in support with around 7000 volunteering to fight. Although months of fighting have led to an estimated 33,000 civilians displaced, the AA appear committed to resistance. On 17 April 2019, their leader Tun Myat Naing, speaking at a military parade in Wa State, said: “We are not the ones to give up. We have to fight the war. We will not get peace by praying.”

Meanwhile, in Kachin and Shan States, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) continues to fight a guerrilla war in the mountains and dominate large sections across the Burma-China borderline. The Burmese Army have deployed their Light Infantry Division 99 (LID99) into the region, a unit notorious for brutality and its role in the Rohingya genocide of 2017 that saw over 10,000 civilians murdered and another 700,000 displaced into neighbouring Bangladesh.

Additionally, two of the AA’s allies in the east, the MNDAA and the TNLA have both issued threats that they “have to take necessary action” in support of their alliance. The last time there was extensive combat between the Tatmadaw and the MNDAA, an errant Burma Air Force bomb killed four Chinese citizens, provoking an angry response from Chinese officials. Therefore, there is no doubt that a flare-up in that sector will draw the watchful attention of China’s People’s Liberation Army, which is speculated to be informally assisting the MDNAA.[1]

Further south-east of Burma, in Kayin State, the Karen are also experiencing a series of attacks. Despite guarantees given during NCA negotiations between the Burmese government and the Karen National Union (KNU), the KNU have accused the Burmese Army of breaking faith by building roads in areas under Karen control. Also, there are reports of Kayin civilians being murdered by Burma Army personnel. To add to the growing internal conflict, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) – considered to be the strongest of ethnic minorities within Burma – have just celebrated their thirtieth anniversary with a deliberate display of their military might and statements that mark a more belligerent tone than usual.

An estimated 25,000 soldiers at their disposal, the Wa have generally been circumspect of antagonising the central government since they signed a truce in 1989. But on 17 April, a spokesman stated that he was doubtful the agreements would remain in effect after the general elections of 2020. Such a development would represent a substantial change in the Wa’s situation as “flexibility and compromise have long been crucial to the UWSA”[2] but a collapse  of their current accord with the Tatmadaw could well mean the Wa becoming aggressive to protect the considerable business empire they have created, especially if other ethnic forces are also fully engaged.

With the NLD government appearing increasingly autocratic or powerless to rein in the military, it’s likely the next few years may see a return to the widespread warfare of the kind that blighted Burma in the past, as the EAOs abandon any hopes for peace through talks. If the Tatmadaw continues to push its presence into ethnic areas in defiance to the residents wishes, they will see no other recourse but to fight. Such an event would likely spell a complete disaster for any hopes of a lasting peace for another generation.

Ed Nash has spent years travelling around the world and, on occasion, interfering as he sees fit. Between June 2015 and July 2016 he volunteered with the Kurdish YPG in its battle against ISIS in Syria. His book Desert Sniper: How One Ordinary Brit Went to War Against ISIS was published in September 2018. 

[1] Beehner, Lionel; “State-building, Military Modernization and Cross-border Ethnic Violence in Myanmar”, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, Volume: 5 issue: 1 (January 30, 2018); p.24

[2] Ong, Andrew, “Producing Intransigence: (Mis) Understanding the United Wa State Army in Myanmar.” Contemporary Southeast Asia vol. 40, no. 3 (2018); p. 462

The Role of History in the British and German Army Officer Corps: Training, Attitudes and Identity

by

By Dr Sarah Katharina Kayß

 

German soldier of the Gebirgsjägerbataillon 232 (Credit Image: Bundeswehr / Andrea Bienert)

 

“Each nation steps into the future carrying the heritage of its own past. This past leaves its mark on the development of society, and on the way people think, including the way the military staff thinks.”

(Vladimir Rukavishnikov 2007, 24)

 

The Study – the book

In the past few years (during my work at the War Studies Department at King’s College London) I have concerned myself with the significance of history perceptions in the British and German forces. The following article gives you a glimpse insight of the results of the research undertaken and what to expect in my book which was just published by Routledge. The main purpose of my study was to draw attention to under-researched and yet extremely important aspects in military studies, namely: the detection of professional identity in the British and German forces and the role of history within the enlistment process of aspiring officers in both countries. Modern-day Britain and Germany are Western liberal democracies whose armed forces, (which are both NATO members and under civilian control,) recruit professional soldiers and officers for territorial defence and foreign deployment. Despite many cultural similarities, British and German societal perceptions towards their military pasts seem to differ substantially.

History is essential if you want to understand the power of traditions and the building up of the national image and what history can do in a nation’s psyche.

[British officer cadet]

 

The Argument

In the book I argue that officers have a strong relationship with the history of their country because the history of their country is identical to the history of their employer. Consequently, soldiers and officers are inevitably more connected to the history of their country than other professional groups. The data results clearly show that the officer cadets’ decision-making was influenced by their interpretation of their professional role, which in turn was heavily dependent on their understanding of history and alleged lessons learned from the past. The study therefore provides insights into the British and German army officer cadets’ understanding of the world that they were surrounded with, and illustrates how far their understanding of history was influenced by the culture in which they grew up in.

I think history was a huge part of my motivation. Obviously, (…) the whole history of Britain is completely intertwined with its armed forces’ history (…) So it connects to pride joining the British Army, because you are linked towards a history that civilians wouldn’t be.

[British officer cadet]

 

Data and identity studies

The formation of identity, particularly in the field of work identity, has generated a great deal of interest (e.g. Vest 2012; Ben-Shalom and Benbenisty 2016; Franke 2000; Broesder et al. 2014; Pratt et al. 2006; Schott et al. 2016), yet still very little is known about the professional identity formation of army personnel in general and that of officers in particular. I therefore designed a questionnaire covering topics such as the cadets’ motivation to enlist, attitudes towards war and combat, army training and perceptions about the officer profession in the past, present and future. In Britain, 481 British officer cadets who started their training at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 2014 completed the survey. Additionally, 49 of those cadets were interviewed. In Germany, 274 cadets who were going through basic officer training at the Officer School of the Army in Dresden (to proceed with a degree course in Munich or Hamburg) in 2014 filled out the questionnaire. Fifty-four of those cadets were also interviewed.

 

Significance and innovation

Detecting the professional identity of young cadets is important for a multitude of reasons. First and foremost, the cadets’ awareness of their future profession provides information about ideals which the cadets connected to the officer profession. Although not all of those ideals necessarily correspond with reality, they are insights into what the cadets’ expected from their future profession (comp. Wiik 2010: 58; Remley and Herlihy 2005: 22).

The study demonstrates that developing an understanding of how young British and German officers perceive their profession and the world around them provide some indicators on how those officers might act in the future. Additionally, in 1993, Dandeker and Strachan (282-283) requested more research into what army recruits think about the armed forces, their social characteristics and their perceptions of their role within the army as a way of optimising recruitment methods and gaining an overall understanding of future military leaders’ ways of perceiving the world. My book answers this request in two ways: First, it offers insight into the British and German officer cadets’ thinking by analysing their professional identity, and second, it adds a new incentive for enlistment to the field of recruitment studies by introducing history-oriented reasons for enlistment.

As a result of increased multinational military operations after 1990, the British and German armies began working side by side. An intercultural understanding of future officers’ thinking, perceptions and attitudes are undoubtedly vital for effective, functional and successful cooperation in the years to come. It is important to keep in mind that the cadets are not isolated from their respective societies. Consequently, their way of dealing with the past by either approving or rejecting common history narratives within their culture is also likely to be shared with civilian society.

 

The Contents

The overall analysis undertaken in the book enables a rigorous understanding of the preconditions for officer enlistment in Britain and Germany. The examination of the cadets’ motivation to enlist focuses in particular on how cadets have aligned their knowledge of the past with their occupational decision-making. A short introduction into the history of the British and German Army until 2014 and the officer training courses in Britain and Germany at the beginning of the book already demonstrate that many differences go back to a different dealing with the shadows of the past.

The book also deals with the cadets’ social and educational background and points out how different experiences in history have not only led to different military systems in Britain and Germany, but also to different external stimuli which influenced the cadets’ decision to enlist. The sections on the British cadets discuss the impact of heritage and education, linkages between the social and educational background of the cadets and their regimental allocations, preconditioning through funding or cadet training (at British schools and universities) and the cadets’ professional perceptions about the officer profession. The sections on German cadets focus on compulsory and voluntary military service and differences between officer cadets which go back to regimental allocations, their attitudes towards the degree course integrated into the officer training and their professional outlook towards a career in the military. Additionally, the social composition of the British and German army officer corps is contrasted followed by a discussion about whether different training systems in Britain and Germany have led to a certain type of officer. The data results clearly oppose popular statements made by prominent researchers of the military sphere such as Karl Haltiner’s (2003) argument that the British and German (Spartans vs. Athenians) forces employ a different type of soldier as a result of the different army training systems to name just one example.

 

Some results

Along with the two world wars, the British Empire and German reunification stood at the centre of the British and German cadets’ historical awareness. A study from the Swedish National Defence College concluded that historical analogies used by young people usually refer to recent events, or to events that have had a great psychological impact on the individual or the society to which he or she belongs (Brändström et al. 2004: 208). Both the British Empire for the British cadets and German reunification for the German cadets fell into those categories. Although those events vary significantly, they helped a vast majority of the British and German cadets to develop a positive outlook towards history.

The results from the empirical data analysis reveal that the cadets’ perceptions about the British and German armies were incorporated as a part of their professional identity to motivate them in the present by either acknowledging or rejecting what preceding officers in both armies have done. This comparison highlighted many factors which are responsible for most differences between the British and German cadets’ outlook towards their profession. One of those factors was the different dealing with lessons learned from the past and its impact on the military systems in the two countries. Considering that the majority of the British and German cadets were heavily influenced by their perceptions of history – not only in regards to their initial interest in the military and a number of value-related incentives for enlistment, but also in regards to their very decision to serve their countries in the armed forces – clearly demonstrates that history-oriented reasons for enlistment should not take a backseat in future recruitment research.

The study’s results stress that soldiering is not just what one does, but who one is: the professional role identity of the British and German cadets can therefore be seen as a basis from which they will act and respond to their environment during missions in the future (Broesder et al 2014: 522). The officer corps has always been a vital component in the armed forces as it determines the military mind-set and upholds and revises the military ethos (Caforio 2006: 255). Since the surveyed and interviewed cadets are most likely going to impact on all-encompassing developments in all sectors in the British and German armies in the near future, my study has also acted as research on the current military culture in Britain and Germany.

It is important to recognise that the officer intake of 2014 will influence following generations of officer cadets, because it seems likely that the new cadets will identify with the 2014 intake’s thinking more than with the thinking of the older generations. Consequently, the British and German cadets who started their training in 2014 will socialise future generations of officers and transmit their traditions and perceptions of history to them.

Multilateralism and interoperability are deeply engrained in NATO doctrine and both can only function if the forces who work together have at least a basic understanding of each other (comp. Hedlund 2017). Understanding each other on a deeper level will allow officers and soldiers to successfully adapt to external forces and difficulties in their missions to come. The book does therefore not only enable a rigorous understanding of British and German military history and its impact on the training and attitudes of officers in Britain and Germany, it also provides key knowledge for intercultural competence which will be key in the missions to come.

 

Kayß received her PhD at the War Studies Department at King’s College London. For her large-scale study, she conducted more than a hundred interviews and surveyed almost 900 British and German Army Officer Cadets between 2014 – 2015. All research results can be found in her book “Identity, Motivation and Memory: The Role of History in the British and German forces” which has just been published by Routledge (2018): https://www.routledge.com/Identity-Motivation-and-Memory-The-Role-of-History-in-the-British-and/Kayss/p/book/9781138589155. Please feel free to contact Sarah if you require further information about the study and the book at academia.edu: http://kcl.academia.edu/SarahKatharinaKay%C3%9F

Image Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/bundeswehrfoto/22202153424

Literature

 

U. Ben-Shalom; Y. Benbenisty, ‘ Coping Styles and Combat Motivation During Operations: An IDF Case Study’, in Armed Forces & Society 42:4 (2016), 655-674

Brändström, A.; Bynander, F. and ’t Hart, P. (2004): “Governing by looking back: historical analogies and crisis management” in Public Administration 82:1, 191–210.

Broesder, W.A.; Op den Buijs, T.P.; Vogelaar, L.W.; Euwema, M.C. (2014): “Can Soldiers Combine Sword and Ploughshares? The Construction of the Warrior-Peacekeeper Role Identity Survey (WPRIS)” in Armed Forces & Society 41:3, 519-540.

Caforio, G. (2006): “Military Officer Education” in Caforio, G. (ed.), Handbook of the Sociology of the Military. New York: Springer, 255-278.

Dandeker and Strachan 1993 | C. Dandeker; A. Strachan, ‘Soldier Recruitment to the British Army, A Spartial and Social Methodology for Analysis and Monitoring’, in Armed Forces & Society 19:2 (1993), 279-290.

V. C. Franke, ‘Duty, Honor, Country: The Social Identity of West Point Cadets’, in Armed Forces & Society 26:2 (2000), 175-202.

Haltiner, K.W. (2003): „Spartaner oder Athener? Die europäische Offiziersberufsausbildung vor neuen Herausforderungen“ in Collmer, S.; Kümmel, G. (eds): Soldat, Militär, Politik, Gesellschaft, Facetten militärbezogener sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 35-48.

Hedlung, E. (2017): ‘Team Learning and Leadership in Multinational Military Staff Exercises” in Armed Forces & Society 43:3, 459-477.

Kayss, S.K. (2018): Identity, Motivation and Memory: The Role of History in the British and German forces. Oxon/New York: Routledge.

M. G. Pratt; K. W. Rockmann; J. B. Kaufmann, ‘Constructing Professional Identity: the Role of Work and Identity learning Cycles in the Customization of Identity among medical residents’, in Academy of Management Journal 49:2 (2006), 235-262.

Remley and Herlihy 2005 | T. P. Remley; B. Herlihy, Ethical, Legal and Professional Issues in Counseling (New Jersey: Pearson, 2005).

Rukavishnikov, V. (2007): “Challenges of the twenty-first, social science and strategic thinking” in Caforio, G. (ed.): Social Science and the Military, An Interdisciplinary Overview. Oxon: Routledge, 23-45.

C. Schott; D. D. van Kleef; T. P. S. Steen, ‘The combined impact of professional role identity and public service motivation on decision-making in dilemma situations’, in International Review of Administrative Sciences 0 (2016), http://ras.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/04/18/0020852315599589.full.pdf+html?hwshib2=authn%3A1476623981%3A20161015%253A8a3b555a-c418-4f27-8b9d-62aeed75e605%3A0%3A0%3A0%3Ai5de6XBZCZkejVO95MTyKQ%3D%3D (accessed on 15 Oct 2016).

E.g. B. M. Vest, ‘Citizen, Soldier, or Citizen-Soldier? Negotiating Identity in the US National Guard’, in Armed Forces & Society 39:4 (2012), 602-627.

J. Wiik, Journalism in Transition: The Professional Identity of Swedish Journalists, PhD thesis submitted to the Department of Journalism, Media and Communication at the University of Gothenburg 2010.

Strife Feature – Political leaders with military backgrounds: a comparison of India and the US

by

by Saawani Raje

George Washington at the Battle of Monmouth

The US and India are similar nations in many respects. They have both had fairly stable trajectories of progress in the course of their democratic histories. Covering large areas of geographical territory, they are both nationalistic territorial nations with a colonial past. Significantly, they both have a history of successful civilian rule uninterrupted by military coups or takeovers. However, they appear to differ in one important aspect— in America, civilian leaders having military experience is common and politically advantageous. Multiple Presidents were serving Generals prior to ascending to the Presidency. In India by contrast, it is rare for political leaders at any level to have come from a military background.

This difference is interesting because it speaks to the civil-military ‘problematique’, which has been a central concern of civil-military relations theorists for the past several decades. This problematique is the challenge of reconciling a military strong enough to do anything civilians ask them to, with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorise them to do.[1] A key question in this civil-military debate is the role of the military in the polity of a nation, especially in its decision-making process. A brief survey of military involvement in political decision-making in two of the world’s biggest democracies— India and the US — brings forth an interesting distinction. The difference in American and Indian attitudes towards military participation in  politics, I argue, stems from the role conflict has played in the creation of both these nations.

 

Military involvement in the United States 

In a TIME article of April 2016, Mark Thompson discusses why Americans wanted a military general in the White House. Looking back at American history, the trend of military leaders eventually becoming civilian leaders is fairly typical. George Washington was the first general who went on to serve as the President of the United States, and twelve Generals have won American Presidential elections since. Significantly, only twelve out of the forty-three American presidents have never served in the military. In the 2017-2018 Congress, 102 members (18.8% of the leadership) had served or were serving in the military.

A 2017 Gallup poll shows that American society’s confidence in the military remains high, at 72%. Additionally, public endorsement of presidential candidates by retired Generals and military officers has become a mainstay of the presidential race. In the 2004 Bush-Kerry presidential race, twelve retired generals and admirals endorsed Kerry, himself a military veteran. Kerry’s Vietnam war record became a matter of controversy, and General Merrill McPeak eventually appeared in television advertisements defending Kerry and his service in Vietnam. On the other side, retired General Tommy Franks who had the distinguished military record of being the architect of the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions, endorsed George Bush and went on to speak in support of his candidacy at the Republican National Convention. In 2008, Colin Powell , a retired four-star general and the National Security Advisor under George Bush (2001-2005) famously crossed party lines to endorse Obama on national television. Political endorsements from military leaders reached a fever pitch during the Clinton-Trump race. In September 2016, Clinton touted 100 endorsements from former military leaders after Trump displayed 88 retired military figures who backed his campaign. The involvement of military officials in American politics, whether as leaders or leader-makers continues unabated.

 

Civil-military gap in India 

The situation in India could not be more dissimilar. The civil-military dissonance is so pronounced that there seems to be no evidence of polls, policy briefs or literature that even engage with the notion of a civilian leader with military experience taking office. This lack of any evidence points to how deeply entrenched the civil-military separation is in the minds of the Indian populace and political and military elites alike. Since 1947 (when India became independent), there has not been a single Prime Minister with military experience. Defence analyst Nitin Gokhale opines that the ‘havoc’ wrought by ‘an indifferent polity and insensitive bureaucracy’ to India’s armed forces ‘has hit the ordinary soldier hard….The Indian soldier today stands at the crossroads, confused about his status in the society and unsure about his own role in a nation led by “faux peaceniks”’. Retired military men make rare appearances on news channels— never the campaign trail— and restrict themselves to talking about military matters. In recent years, the military has shown an increased willingness to get involved in the polity. In 2007, for example, the Indian army opposed the demilitarisation of the Siachen glacier. The Army chief General J J Singh publicly expressed his views  more than once in a country where it is extremely unusual for military leadership to vocalise their disagreement with civilian leaders. These instances are, however, not a mainstay of political debates around policymaking and certainly never crossing the border into civilian leadership, in sharp contrast to the US.

 

Role of military conflict as influencing factor 

This poses an interesting question: What could be the factors that influence this significant difference in the way military involvement in politics is perceived in the US as opposed to India? I would argue that the role military conflict played in the formation of a nation and national identity is a significant factor in influencing attitudes to military involvement in politics. Military conflict played a significant role in the development of the US as a nation. The US has been in a state of either declared war or conflict for 79 of the 179 years, from just before the founding of Jamestown until 1785, nominally known as the end of the Revolution. It thus had a predominantly military experience of colonialism. The military also played a crucial role in the War of Revolution marking the end of colonial rule. The War was an event with mass participation— according to some historical estimates, two out of every five white American men who could serve did so either in the state militias or the Continental Army.

Royster proposes that military service was the source of an ‘American’ character.[2]  The Revolutionary War created a ‘dual army’ tradition that combined a citizen-soldier reserve (which was the militia) with a small professional force ‘that provided military expertise and staying power’.[3] This democratised and nationalised military service has lasting legacies on the psyche of American society regarding attitudes to military service. Furthermore, Congress in 1775 created the Continental Army commanded by George Washington. This Continental Army was built on ideological motivation and a sense of loyalty that surprised most foreign observers. Baron von Closen of the French army exclaimed: ‘It is incredible that soldiers composed of men of every age, even children of fifteen, of whites and blacks, almost naked, unpaid, and rather poorly fed, can march so well and withstand fire so steadfastly!’[4]

This and Washington’s appointment as General of the Continental Army despite the ‘hypersensitive fear of military ascendancy’ are significant.[5] Washington remained deferential to Congress even when its inefficiency threatened the army’s survival. Despite the prominent position held by the military, Washington set forth an example of civil supremacy while commanding the army. This attitude and his later Presidency could have contributed to erasing civilian suspicion of ex-military men becoming civilian leaders.  In sum, it can be argued that armed conflict and the military experience— whether for independence or for individual rights as Englishmen within the empire played an intrinsic role in shaping the American identity as a society and nation.

 

Transfer of Power from the British to Indian government on 15 August 1947

 

Indian independence and the military

 The Indian experience of the handover of power was very different. First, unlike in America, the Transfer of Power from the British to the Indian government was a predominantly administrative procedure that did not involve physical military confrontation. The army was seen as a tool by the British and Indian civilian leaders who used it for their own political ends. Second, the British recruitment policy for the colonial Indian army focused on drawing recruits from select communities, alienating the armed forces from the rest of the population involved in the nationalist movement. This was in contrast to the experience of the US militias, which democratised and nationalised military service and experience. This also built a deep-rooted suspicion between the civilian leaders of India and the military (which was headed by British commanders-in-chief for a few years even after India became independent). This suspicion led to institutional arrangements separating civilian and military spheres. The position of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces was abolished, soon after independence in 1947, and the President of India (a nominal civilian head) was made the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.[6] Significantly, a Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs occupied the top tier of higher defence management in India. This was a purely civilian committee and included senior ministers from the Prime Minister’s Cabinet.[7]

Additionally, lasting attitudes of civilian and military leaders also did not allow the overlapping of military and civilian leadership to the extent that was prevalent in America. In September 1946, a year before India became independent, Jawaharlal Nehru (the first Prime Minister of India) wrote to the Indian Commander-in-Chief Sir Auchinleck. As a ‘coup-proofing’ strategy, Nehru felt ‘the need to make the army firmly responsible to India’s elected representatives in the future’. This resulted in Indian institution-building regarding defence and military matters that continuously evaluates the army to  prevent it from getting ‘out of control’. For example, the Commander-in-Chief was removed from the Cabinet in 1946— a privilege he had enjoyed thus far— to keep him out of political decision-making. Additionally, all significant communications and decisions have to go through civilian officials and politicians at the Ministry of Defence little or no military experience. Thus, decision-making in India with regard to military matters was firmly established as the preserve of the civilian bureaucrats.

 

Conclusions

 It can be proposed that the stake of military conflict in the creation of an independent nation is a factor influencing social and political attitudes towards the mixing of civilian and military spheres. This is not to argue that this is the only factor. The time periods in which India and the US secured independence are drastically different. Furthermore, India follows the Westminster parliamentary system and not the Presidential system, which influences public opinion on political leadership in general. Additionally, while India has been involved in a protracted conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir since independence, it has not had the direct experience of experiencing the World Wars or Cold War as an independent state or major party. These factors contribute to civilian perceptions of military involvement in political spheres.

 Lawrence Freedman in his recent work ‘The Future of War: A History’ emphasises the need to keep context central to the study of war and conflict.[8] Differences such as the one identified in this article raise pertinent questions about the applicability of seemingly generalisable civil-military relations theories. This post makes a case for viewing these theories through specific historical contexts.

 

Saawani Raje is a Doctoral Candidate in the King’s India Institute. Her work focuses on civil-military relations in India and decision-making during military crises. She holds an MA in South Asia and Global Security from King’s College London and a BA from the University of Cambridge. Her other areas of research interest include security studies, strategy, diplomatic history and South Asian politics. You can follow her @saawaniraje

Notes:

[1] Peter Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 2 (January 1996): 149- 78.

[2] Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People At War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1979).

[3] Alan Millet, Peter Maslowski and William Feis, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012 (New York: Free Press, 2012), 165.

[4] Millet, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 175.

[5] Millet, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 179.

[6] Ayesha Ray. The Soldier and the State in India. (California: Sage Publications, 2013), 37.

[7] Ayesha Ray in Harsh Pant (ed.) The Handbook of Indian Defence Policy (New Delhi: Routledge India 2015).

[8] Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War: A History (London: Allen Lane, 2017).

 

Image Source: 

Banner/image 1: http://www.pages.drexel.edu/~cjd327/military.html

Image 2: https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/india/images/9/9f/Transfer_of_power_in_India%2C_1947.jpg

‘For the Ashes of his Fathers, And the Temples of his Gods’. Or is it something else that makes a soldier fight? – Part II

by

By Sonia Bhatia and Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu

The ritual of training and leadership works best for a military group (Credit Image: CC0 Creative Commons)

 

Introduction

Part I of this article had argued that shared political views and motivations do not shape soldiers’ actions in battlefield. Instead, their actions are defined by more immediate things such as the group survival, deprivation, fatigue and fear for life and limb. In addition, it argued that the combat effectiveness of a squad, section, platoon or a company is derived from its cohesiveness and training, which does not depend upon any cultural or linguistic basis. Part II of the article will highlight that groups are formed through rituals, and that the ritual of training and leadership works best for a military group.

 

Group formation through Rituals

Ardant du Picq, a nineteenth century French army officer wrote that

‘From living together, and obeying the same chiefs, from commanding the same men, from sharing fatigue and rest, from cooperation among men who quickly understand each other in the execution of warlike movements, may be bred brotherhood, professional knowledge, sentiment and above all unity’.[1]

One of the most effective ways to form cohesive groups is through ‘Rituals’. Tarak Barkawi rightly states that living and acting like a group, in daily and periodic rituals, creates group feeling. Groups do not require an outside social basis or an essentialised identity like nation, religion or caste to account for their solidarity or common behaviour. Rituals exercise their power when a group simply participates in them. Tarak also mentions the Australian concept of Mana – a ‘vague power’ or ‘force’ that seems to flow through and among participants in ritual, conjoining group members, their totems and their god, and inspiring sentiments of unity, cooperation and sacrifice. Fed by daily and periodic ritual activities performed under common symbols and identities, formal and informal, mana is what military professionals call esprit de corps. Thus, rituals are a ‘strategic form of socialisation’. In military terms it boils down to nothing else but ‘effective training’.

Training, which occupies a great deal of time in military calendars, achieves a dual purpose of both ritualised solidarity-building as well as disciplinary instruction in taking the correct actions in combat.[2] Training may be more technically grounded, focusing on the geography and climate of the area of operation. Training can also be superimposed with the principles and ideals, such as ‘fighting for the common good of the population’ and ‘the victory of good over evil’ and are common to everyone irrespective of their religion or social background. Soldiers easily identify with these principles and ideals as they were a part of their upbringing and may have been a reason why they chose to join the army.

 

Leadership

Besides training, another crucial factor that kneads any military sub-unit together, irrespective of its social composition is effective leadership. Officers, and in particular, commanders, play a crucial role as personified symbols of collective groups. Commanders, such as Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Napoleon Bonaparte, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw and many others, can also symbolise the identity and spirit of military formations.[3] War time historiography is full of military leaders who, through trust, character, courage and competence, have brought out the highest virtues of all who followed them. Since early years of warfare, irrespective of the nature of armaments in use, tactics and strategy, organisational structure, training and discipline, the political construction of states and the social makeup of the armies, the characteristics of leadership have not changed. Group solidarity rituals are just as important as creating strong leaders whom soldiers can follow.

 

Conclusion: War and Political Rationality

The primary group theory (as explained in Part I of this  article) and the national narratives of sacrifice, the two sources of fighting spirit of a soldier, are often connected through a historical framework. The martial antagonism towards an adversary is invoked through the way national histories of war and armies are written. Unfortunately, the inquiry, whether the adversary is real or perceived, is left to current political narratives, also often used to justify the rationality of the government’s actions. This is where the magical language of national sacrifice becomes necessary and the belief in such narratives important, simply because the population finds it appealing. Whether this is correct approach or not, remains debatable and varies from one region to another and from one society to another.

Nevertheless, it is always better to generate battlefield effectiveness from strong primary groups created from rituals of training and leadership rather than from any other source. Once trained, a soldier is motivated enough to do his job as long his/her primary group is strong and intact and there is a strong leader to follow. The battlefield generated sources are good enough to shape a soldier’s combat behaviour. A soldier’s personal idea of nationalism and politics alone may not work, as each man all by himself may just contribute as much as a cog in the wheel. It is however, the coordinated action of each cog that makes the wheel turn. Same is true for any formation. This coordination is only possible with an institutionalised training program. An effective training program focusses on tactics and operations rather than on ideologies or political narratives. Tarak Barkawi sums it up appropriately by saying that

To represent soldiers and their actions in the service of one or another nationalist cause is to reduce war to a political rationality. The problem is that war, and the fate of people caught up in it, exceeds politics.[4]

 

Raised in an army household, Sonia Bhatia is a Post Graduate Diploma holder in Public Relations and Human Resource Management from the University of Madras. She graduated in BA, Health and Nutrition from Delhi University. She has been brought up in a traditional Army family which has seen generations of men and women serving in the Army and the Air Force. Her experiences and interests have been close to the social structure of the Army Regimental life. She also has five years of work experience in Human Resource Management in the corporate sector, which enriched her with the contrast of the social structure that exists outside the army.

Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu is a doctoral student at the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London. He is currently researching on India’s defence diplomacy in the 21st century. His other research interests include South Asian security and military culture. Kamaldeep is an alumni of National Defence Academy, Pune as well as Army War College, Mhow. He has served as an officer with the Indian army’s Parachute Regiment for ten years. Thereafter he graduated in MA, ‘War in the Modern World’ from the department of War Studies at King’s College London in 2014. You can find him on Twitter @kamal_sandhu78

 

Notes

[1] Barkawi, Tarak, ‘Soldiers of Empire: Indian and British Armies in World War II’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p.166 and (Du Picq, Battle Studies, p. 96)

[2] (Barkawi, 2017), p.179

[3] (Barkawi, 2017), p.181

[4] (Barkawi, 2017), p. 119

 

Image Source: 

https://pixabay.com/en/military-paratroopers-airborne-582356/

 

‘For the Ashes of his Fathers, And the Temples of his Gods’. Or is it something else that makes a soldier fight? – Part I

by

By Sonia Bhatia and Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu

‘Horatius Cocles defending the Bridge’ by Charles Le Brun (1619 – 1690) – Google Art Project (Credit Image: Wikimedia Commons)

Introduction

In the 6th century BC, during a battle between the armies of Rome and Clusium, a Roman officer Publius Horatius took a suicidal stand defending a bridge on river Tibre. His actions injured him permanently but saved the day for the city, as the delay he caused was enough for the bridge for to be damaged by the Romans, thus preventing the enemy from crossing the swollen river Tiber.

Later in the 19th century, Thomas Babington Macaulay, inspired by this Roman tale of bravery, wrote a poem ‘Horatius’ in his dedication, narrating the often-quoted lines, ‘… For the ashes of his fathers, And the temples of his Gods…’ These lines have influenced plethora of narratives inspiring generations of young men and women to fight for their motherlands both in and out of armed forces.

One can argue that these narratives do ignite passion and romanticism to serve and to protect the society from which one emanates. However, when it comes to the actual battlefield, when bullets are flying overhead and buddies are getting killed or injured, what is the motivation that drives a soldier to kill and to die? Thomas Macaulay’s Horatius suggests a viewpoint that a soldier is motivated by the desire to protect his family, friends and society in general and thus performs such extreme acts of violence. In the contemporary era, the language used in the recruitment drives, news reporting, obituaries, commentaries on military ceremonies, etc also advocates this viewpoint. It forces us to think that the spirit needed for deliverance or sacrifice during wartime is usually derived from ideology, political ideals and, above all, nationalism.

From a soldier’s point of view things are very different. At an individual level, soldiers, like any other human being, seek meaning to their job and do so by more visible and immediate things such as by ‘pursuing relations of estrangement and identification with others’,[1]  especially with whom they live and work on daily basis. For a soldier, what matters is his squad, company, battalion or at most his regiment. Based on Tarak Barkawi’s latest book, ‘Soldiers of Empire: Indian and British Armies in the World War II’, this two part article aims to carry this debate further.

 

Primary Group Theory

Shils and Janowitz in their seminal essay published in 1948, based on the study of captured prisoners of war of Wehrmacht, argued that it is a soldier’s relationship with his primary group, that is his section, platoon and company, which goes far to explain why he responds to one appeal and not to another.[2]

‘He [a soldier] was likely to go on fighting, provided he had the necessary weapons, as long as the group possessed leadership, with which he could identify himself, and as long as he gave affection to and received affection from the other members of his squad and platoon. In other words, as long as he felt himself to be a member of his primary group and therefore bound by the expectations and demands of its other members, his soldierly achievement was likely to be good’.[3]

The average age of a soldier, when he joins his battalion for the very first time is about twenty years. This is also the age at which he starts carving out his own identity for the very first time. While he may identify with the customs and ideals of his family, his identity is still very malleable. As he leaves home to serve his country, his background and upbringing continue to have an impact on his speech, accent, food preference etc. These traits however are dwarfed in front of the adaptations he makes willingly with a susceptible young mind ready to be impressed upon by his peers and environment. It creates a distinct identity for him as he serves alongside other men of various backgrounds and beliefs.

For soldiers, the idea of fighting, living and dying for the motherland/fatherland or for the cultural possessions of the fatherland, is a relatively distant thought. In Indian Army, for example, officers and soldiers are groomed under strong regimental ethos to serve for ‘Naam, Namak aur Nishaan’ (reputation, loyalty and standard/identity) of their battalions and regiments. While ideas such as nationalism, patriotism, country, nation, ideology and politics are commonly used to articulate the required social and political narratives; when in actual operations, these ideas are overshadowed by soldiers’ relationships with each other, their will to survive and succeed. Tarak Barkawi has argued that during the Second World War, the shared political beliefs did not shape soldiers’ discipline and cohesion. Their actions were shaped by what was more immediate – deprivation, fatigue, fear for limb, for oneself and others near him.[4] This issue, therefore, inherently becomes one of the critical considerations for battle effectiveness.

 

Battle effectiveness

But how does it matter? As long as soldiers have the required motivation to do their job, why is this distinction necessary and this debate critical? In the fast changing socio-economic context it is pertinent to be aware of the dynamic motivations of a soldier, especially for the military leaders. The Indian Army Infantry Regiments are a case study in hand. Since independence in 1947, the Indian Army has won many conventional battles. Besides good strategy, tactics, training and logistics, one of the most important battle-winning factor has been the cultural and linguistic cohesion at the unit and sub-unit level. Hence, until recent years, the recruitment for the infantry regiments was carried out from specific social groups and regions. The military elites had resisted the political pressure to recruit from all communities, under one pretext or another, in order to maintain the class composition of its infantry battalions. The army’s leadership was determined to preserve these compositions, because it saw them as crucial to its effectiveness and cohesion based on ‘intimate sense of kinsman-ship and traditions’.[5] However during the last few years, the army has started recruiting from all communities for its infantry regiments.  So, what will be the binding factor for the units, which were so used to bonding based on kinship and common language dialect, when troops from different regions and languages start joining?

Fortunately, the universal fact is that the cultural identities of soldiers in a group are malleable. The Second World War proved that when the army was disrupted, disordered and re-ordered due to the heavy losses suffered initially, the British realised that their worries about the martial races and mixing classes were ill-founded. [6] Soldiers become attached to their unit identities through serving in those units.[7] For instance, in 2/13th Frontier Force Rifles, Jats were incorporated into its Sikh company due to wartime recruitment shortages .The Jats ‘fitted well with the Sikhs’. When the time came to revert to an all Sikh company toward the end of the war, the Jats asked if they could convert to Sikhism in order to remain with the battalion.[8]

 

Conclusion

Nationalism and fighting for the flag may seem as the ultimate motivation for a soldier. It is, however, the operating environment generated factors – which include a vivid account of passion for survival that they share with their comrades, about conviction of the cause, their dependability on each other, clarity of each other’s perspectives, strengths and weaknesses, and more importantly, the faith that they stand by each other – that truly act as a driving force. The military effectiveness will always remain dependent upon effective group formation at the lowest levels of squad, section, platoon and company. The empirical evidence suggests that as long as a military sub-unit has good training and strong leadership, it will be ‘fit for battle’ irrespective of its cultural, demographic or linguistic composition.

 

(…To be continued in Part II)

Raised in an army household, Sonia Bhatia is a Post Graduate Diploma holder in Public Relations and Human Resource Management from the University of Madras. She graduated in BA, Health and Nutrition from Delhi University. She has been brought up in a traditional Army family which has seen generations of men and women serving in the Army and the Air Force. Her experiences and interests have been close to the social structure of the Army Regimental life. She also has five years of work experience in Human Resource Management in the corporate sector, which enriched her with the contrast of the social structure that exists outside the army. She is married to an Army officer and continues to uphold the values she has learnt, while imbibing the same in her two children.

Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu is a doctoral student at the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London. He is currently researching on India’s defence diplomacy in the 21st century. His other research interests include South Asian security and military culture. Kamaldeep is an alumni of National Defence Academy, Pune as well as Army War College, Mhow. He has served as an officer with the Indian army’s Parachute Regiment for ten years. Thereafter he graduated in MA, ‘War in the Modern World’ from the department of War Studies at King’s College London in 2014. You can find him on Twitter @kamal_sandhu78

Notes: 

1 Barkawi, Tarak, ‘Soldiers of Empire: Indian and British Armies in World War II’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p.159

2 (Shils and Janowitz 1948), p.380

3 (Shils and Janowitz 1948), p.284

4 (Barkawi 2017), p.82-83

5 Wilkinson, Steven I., ‘Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy since Independence’, Permanent Black, Ranikhet, 2015), p.115

6 (Barkawi 2017), p.80

7 (Barkawi 2017), p. 271

8 (Barkawi 2017), p.56

Image Source

https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=22151760