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Power Game in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Implications for the U.S.

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By Sena Namlu

(The Abraham Lincoln and John C. Stennis carrier strike groups are conducting carrier strike force operations in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility. Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jeremiah Bartelt/U.S.)

“Each of the carriers operating in the Mediterranean as this time represent 100,000 tons of international diplomacy,” – Jon Huntsman, Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia

Sitting at the junction of three continents and main international trade routes, the Mediterranean Sea has been of capital importance for both littoral states and international powers. The name of Mediterranean itself, originating from the Latin term (mediues terra) and meaning “the sea in the middle of the earth,” illustrates its significant place in international affairs. While for regional powers, such as Italy, Greece, and Turkey, the Mediterranean Sea determines their national security and prosperity, it equally has strategic implications for states outside of the basin with regards to furthering influence over different regions and connection with other parts of the world.

The United States has been engaged in the region since the 19th century. America’s involvement reached its apogee during the Cold War; a time when two superpowers vied for control over the Mediterranean region, encompassing an immense maritime zone between the Straits of Gibraltar, the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal. The Mediterranean Sea has witnessed many examples of coercive naval diplomacy, historically known as Gunboat Diplomacy, which involves the application of naval forces to compel or deter a state. By the end of the Cold War, the United States had achieved unity in the Mediterranean, for the first time since ancient Rome, through bilateral and multilateral political arrangements; transforming the Sea into an almost a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) lake or a Mare Nostrum for the Alliance.

The emerging threats and complex regional challenges of the post-Cold War era brought renewed attention to the Mediterranean and forced states to engage in the region, notwithstanding the United States’ gradual retreatment. The American policy of withdrawal was initiated with the Obama Administration, but was taken further in the Trump era. Rising regional and international powers are eager to fill this expanding void left in America’s wake, seeking to gain as much control as they can in such a promising maritime area.

Russia, which has historically had strong incentives to access the warm watersof the Mediterranean, has successfully exploited the long-lasting conflicts in the Mediterranean as well as the current power gap, leading to the establishment of a permanent presence through heavy investments in the Syrian Port of Tarsus, where now it has both an air base and naval facility.

China has adopted a relatively peaceful method of further its influence in the Mediterranean through weaponization of its global supply chain. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which the Mediterranean is a crucial part, led to the country investing in the high-tech industries of Europe such as aerospace and artificial intelligence, and connecting said ventures through an immense supply chain comprised of many Mediterranean ports in which Chinese state-owned companies have significant holdings. Following the acquisitions of ports in several coastal states such as Italy, Malta and Greece, Chinese state firms now have significant influence in one-tenth of all European port capacity. Beijing is orchestrating every instrument at its disposal, including political, economic, and security creating a symphony in the words of Chinese Foreign Minister, in order to expand Chinese influence and presence around the world. One of the major concerns is of the possibility that China may not hesitate to use its civilian port facilities to the military end as it has done so in the past. Furthermore, Beijing’s previous experience of dispatching one of its most impressive-looking warships, the 689-foot-long amphibious transport dock Jinggangshan to Syria” to participate in Russian coercive diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean, makes the menace even greater for Europe and the United States.

Turkish claims based on the Blue Homeland doctrine and enforced through the dispatch of the seismic research vessel Oruç Reis raised the unresolved issues in the Mediterranean relating to maritime delimitation and jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean. As the country with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Turkey regards drilling activities on the continental shelf as its fundamental right and disregards any solution that “confines Turkey to the shores.” Turkish foreign policy objectives relate the region directly to national security, rights, and interests. Additionally, Turkey’s perception of being left out in the Eastern Mediterranean based on the regional cooperation efforts excluding Turkey such as EastMed Gas Forum aggravates the tension and induces Ankara to resort more to coercive naval diplomacy. The successful outcome of natural gas reserve exploration in the Black Sea also strengthened Turkey’s commitment towards drilling operations in the Mediterranean.

Countries opposed to Turkey’s actions in the region gathered around France, whose expectations for further political and military supports towards the European Union and NATO remain unmet, have agreed on seeking regional cooperation. France that has been the most vocal European power in opposing Turkey’s regional claims so far, backed by Greece and Cyprus with joint military drilling operations and deployment of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the Eastern Mediterranean. France’s President, Emmanuel Macron seems quite determined to resist resurgent Turkish moves in the Mediterranean and has closed the ranks with its regional partners at all costs as being lacked of concrete support from the European Union and NATO members in its battling with Turkey.

Meanwhile, Turkey similarly seeks to strengthen its hand through bilateral arrangements with another regional actor. Ankara signed two memoranda of understanding with Libya’s United Nations-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), one of which regulates maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea in line with the Turkish claims and the other envisaging further security and military cooperation. These agreements are followed by a similar deal between Greece and Egypt.

In pursuit of the Greece-Egypt deal, Prime Minister of Greece Mitsotakis and the President of Egypt Sisi reflected their expectation of more decisive U.S. involvement in the region under a Biden Administration. Nevertheless, given the other prominent challenges facing America such as extreme domestic polarization and the rising Chinese threat in the Pacific region, it is hard to predict whether the election of “Joe Bidenopoulos”, as he introduced himself to a group of Greek Americans will result in a rotation of American attention towards the region and to what extent this shift will change the course in the Mediterranean. Biden will likely give more weight to international organizations, beginning with enhancement of the EU and NATO’s downsized role in the region. However, geopolitical challenges require further engagements. Besides Russia’s permanent return to the area, China’s rapprochement with America’s most important strategic partner in the region, Israel puts American regional and international interests at higher risk. Similarly, Huawei’s expansion based on the Digital Silk Road Initiative accordingly to ports-buying strategy raise the caveat of filching data from NATO allies and friends in the region.

There is little doubt that the President-elect Biden will find himself in the middle of various complex and entrenched issues related to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea once he takes the oval office. It is clear that defusing tensions, restoring once-existing U.S. and NATO’s influence, and countering the rise of Russia and China as the alternative strategic partners for the region will occupy the top of the lists of American policies in the area. Any help and support provided by the regional partners will be beneficial for the United States. Although the hard task of gathering regional NATO allies France, Greece and Turkey, around a table has become more challenging than it has been before, Biden Administration can bring a breath of fresh air in relations and create incentives for each party to bolster dialogue. Depending on the new American leader’s ability to manage sensitive and tangled regional relations and find a common ground among highly divided and determined actors, it will soon be seen whether this glimmer of hope may blaze out or rapidly fade away.

 

Sena Namlu is a youth and women’s right activist. She has actively partaken in social profit organizations working on particularly girls and youth empowerment — their inclusion in policy-making, conflict resolution, and peace-building processes, and initiated social projects. She is a board member of YCDC, the representative institution of Youth 20 in Turkey, and attended the Y20 Summit in Argentina and G(irls)20 Summit in Japan as Turkey’s delegate. She is also a fellow of the Women in Conflict 1325 Fellowship Programme. After graduation, she worked within Doctors of World Turkey Office as a Grant Officer. Sena is currently a graduate student in the Intelligence and International Security MA Program at the War Studies Department of KCL. Her research interests include processes of foreign policy-making, providing and analyzing information for decision-makers, as well as the role of women and non-governmental actors in conflict resolution and peace-building.

Turkish Claims and the Oil Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean

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by Rafaella Piyioti

The RV MTA Oruç Reis, named after the Admiral in the Ottoman Navy and chief governor in the Western Mediterranean, near the coast of Antalya, Turkey (Image credit: AP)

Over the past decade, discoveries of large amounts of natural gas in the Levant Basin as well as in the territorial waters of Israel and Cyprus show that the area is rich in resources. Their successful exploitation potentially holds enormous economic benefits. For this reason, a strong alliance between Cyprus, Israel, Greece, and Egypt led to the signing of maritime boundary agreements, establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for each country. The presence of these resources, however, also presents a challenge for regional stability. Turkey, for example, is left excluded from this initiative. As a result, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean are growing. The roots of this dispute over energy resources, nevertheless, is part of the conflictual histories of the actors involved, thus holding wider implications for the international community.

In January 2020, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, and Jordan formed the EastMed Gas Forum to establish the basis for cooperation and exploration of the natural resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. France made an official membership request while the US asked to become a permanent observer of the forum. At the same time, Turkey officially criticised the forum as an organised attempt to exclude Ankara. Part of the reason why, however, is that Turkey did not sign the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. According to the UNCLOS, the territorial waters of a nation extend up to 12 nautical miles from its shore and up to 200 nautical miles from the shore of its EEZ. Natural resources found within this territory belong exclusively to that country. Contrary to UNCLOS, Turkey formed its own continental shelf theory, which excludes islands, and states that a country’s EEZ extends underwater only to the very edge of its continental shelf. The absence of formal agreements between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus on their maritime borders, leads to competing claims on the extension of their territorial rights at sea made by Cyprus and Greece, and Turkey and Northern Cyprus.

(Image credit: FT)

With Northern Cyprus under Turkish control since the 1974 invasion, Turkey officially does not recognise the Cypriot Republic to the South. As such, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan rejects any Cypriot drilling activities in the region and refuses to recognise Cyprus’ agreements with Israel, Greece, and Egypt over the exploitation of natural resources found in the Eastern Mediterranean. Instead, Turkey considers the maritime territory of Northern Cyprus to be part of its EEZ and following its own continental shelf theory the exploitation of hydrocarbons found in the region is a Turkish legal right. Northern Cyprus, however, is not recognised by any country other than Turkey itself and Erdoğan’s actions are deemed illegal by the international community.

More recently, tensions over the ownership of the natural resources under the seabed of the Mediterranean between Turkey and Cyprus escalated, with Turkey holding military exercises in the Mediterranean. In May 2019, Turkey sent its first drilling ship to conduct exploratory drillings off the north coast of Cyprus. The European Union (EU), in response, imposed economic sanctions on Turkey. Erdoğan refused to de-escalate tensions stating that European sanctions will not affect Turkey’s determination to continue exercising what it sees as its legal rights in Cypriot waters. At present, two Turkish ships, Yavuz and Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa, are in territorial waters around Cyprus searching for natural resources.

Tensions between Greece and Turkey are more complicated. The two countries find themselves in an ongoing dispute over Kastellorizo, a Greek island located to the east of the Aegean Sea close to Turkey’s Anatolian coast. Greece insists that, according to UNCLOS, the island enjoys a full EEZ of 200 miles leaving Turkey with a very small EEZ relative to its coastline. Turkey rejects Athens’ claims and has continued to conduct drilling south of the island. In response, Greece has attempted to push for additional sanctions against Turkey but there is little appetite for such a response at the European level. German attempts to mediate between Greece and Turkey called for official negotiations, which failed to reach a mutual agreement over the EEZ of Kastellorizo. A maritime-boundary agreement between Greece and Egypt, viewed by Turkey as a move of aggression violating its maritime territory, thereby ending the negotiation process.

Renewed illegal drillings by Turkey in August 2020, this time with the presence of Turkish Navy warships in the area. Greek warships often shadow them creating a tense and potentially escalating situation. As Erdoğan renews his aggressive rhetoric, the Greek PM, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, introduced a new defence plan, increasing the country’s military capabilities. But as Turkey and Greece are NATO allies a push towards a new phase of negotiations seems more appealing than a military confrontation. France condemns Erdoğan’s violations of Greek and Cypriot maritime rights offering military assistance to Greece. Germany attempts to mediate between Greece and Turkey and the rest of the EU is still indecisive.

(Image credit: FT)

Turkey’s behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of Erdoğan’s ‘neo-Ottoman’ foreign policy, which aims at renewing Turkish influence in neighbouring countries, formerly part of the Ottoman empire. With the Turkish lira facing one of its lowest recorded values, the President is attempting to turn people’s attention away from the economic problems, by emphasising Turkish influence in the region. Turkey’s isolation from its NATO allies over their conflicting interests in the Eastern Mediterranean also pushed Erdoğan towards adopting a rather more Islamist tone, promoting himself domestically as the protector of all Muslims. After his long-lasting military presence in Syria since 2011, Erdoğan turned his attention to Libya. Turkey and Libya signed a maritime accord in November 2019 violating the Greek EEZ. To escalate things further Erdoğan sent military aid to the UN-recognised government (GNA) in Tripoli to help Fayez al-Sarraj defeat General Haftar’s Libyan National Army.

Turkey’s involvement in Libya could lead to further destabilisation in the region and draw the involvement of additional international actors. France, Greece, Egypt, Israel, and the UAE publicly backed Haftar, with the latter two signing a historic peace deal. Paradoxically, the U.S. did not take a clear position on Libyan tensions despite its’ close ties with General Haftar who holds U.S. citizenship. Turkey’s recent involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is another example of Erdoğan’s assertive foreign policy. Amid recent increases of violence in the region Erdoğan pledged his nation’s support for Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani forces are using Turkish-made drones in their fight against Armenians. Turkey is growing into a major drone player but the use of Turkish drones in Nagorno-Karabakh received international scrutiny.

Erdoğan envisions Turkey as a regional power and pursues an assertive foreign policy to extend its regional influence. Turkish claims at a sea, as well as its pursuits on land, fall within the scope of its neo-Ottoman vision, which sees Turkey advancing its influence in the region. The EU remains indecisive on how to approach Turkey; Germany acts as the mediator whilst France takes a tougher stance, pledging military support to Greece. Without the U.S. in its traditional, since the 1974 Turkish Invasion in Cyprus, mediating and stabilising role in the region, it is time for the EU to decide on a new approach to handle this crisis. The U.S. under President Donald Trump reduced its foreign involvement and distanced itself from its NATO allies. Under the future President Joe Biden, the USA might wish to think anew of taking up its traditional role in NATO and its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey is a strategic partner of the EU but if Erdoğan continues his aggressive behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean, tensions could escalate further jeopardising the future of EU-Turkey cooperation.

Rafaela is a part-time MA student in the Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies programme at King’s College London. She received her BA in War Studies and Philosophy and is a Staff Writer for Strife Blog, Shield, and writes for a Cypriot newspaper. Currently, she is a Research Analyst for London Politica. Her main academic interest is on the role of intelligence in policymaking. Rafaella also has a passion for Human Rights and has interned at the Cyprus Refugee Council. Rafaella enjoys travelling and learning about new cultures in her free time.

Interview - Dr Carol Bohmer on the Mediterranean migrant crisis

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By Joana Cook:

An inflatable hard bottom craft carrying some 87 would be immigrant maily from Somalia is pictured 26 miles from Lampedusa on June 15, 2008. AFP PHOTO/MAURICIO ESSE (Noborder CC 2.0)
An inflatable hard-bottom craft carrying some 87 migrants is pictured 26 miles from Lampedusa in June 2008. AFP PHOTO/MAURICIO ESSE (Noborder CC 2.0)

On Monday, yet another tragic story broke of a ship sinking off the coast of Libya en route to Europe. This time, however, there were a potential 900 fatalities – if confirmed this would represent the highest number in any single case yet. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) fears that 30,000 sea crossings of this sort could occur in 2015 – likely rife with continuing tragedies. EU Foreign Ministers are currently in Luxembourg discussing the issue and what response may be required to both manage criminal elements of this related to human smuggling, and preventing the increasing number of tragedies.

Strife talked to Dr. Carol Bohmer, Teaching Fellow in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, about those trying to reach Europe and how to address the current crisis.

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There seems to be a significant increase in the number of refugees trying to reach Europe from North Africa. Has there simply been more media coverage of this, or are the rates of these incidents significantly increasing?

The number of refugees drowning en route to Europe has increased exponentially over the last couple of years. So far this year, it is estimated that at least 1600 migrants have died, a 30-fold increase over the same period last year. There have been several incidents in the last couple of weeks, the latest one involving an estimated 800 or more deaths. Because of the magnitude of this tragedy, the media coverage has been intense.

Part of the media coverage has to do with the political implications of these disasters. Last October, Mare Nostrum, a programme of search and rescue, credited with saving 100,000 lives last year, was stopped. Several governments, including the British government, decided to end the operation because they believed that it encouraged migrants to flee to Europe. Not providing rescue was supposed to deter these desperate migrants from attempting the journey. These latest events have put the lie to the effectiveness of this deterrence argument.

Where do these refugees come from? What are the demographics?

The refugees come from places where there is war, civil strife and persecution. Not surprisingly, many come from Syria, Eritrea, South Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Others come from countries in the throes of unrest or economic stagnation. It is difficult to get exact numbers when the authorities do not even know how many have drowned, let alone where they came from. There is evidence that most of them are young with a number of children under 18, some as young as 10 or 12. It is unclear how many women are involved. There is also some evidence that as many as one million Syrians and Sub-Saharan Africans are waiting in Libya to cross into Europe.

What is likely to happen to these refugees if they reach Europe?

It should first be said that while many of the migrants are fleeing persecution, some of them are economic migrants looking for a better life. Even those fleeing the war and chaos of the Middle East do not all fit into the narrow framework of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which, with the follow up 1967 Protocol, provides the definition of refugee in the law.

It is very difficult to follow the path of those migrants and asylum seekers who make it to Europe. Many of them spend long periods of time in reception centres, waiting to be processed as refugees. Return to their countries of origin is extremely difficult, for both practical reasons and because of the international legal principle of “non-refoulement,” which forbids the return of someone to their country of origin if they have reason to fear persecution. Those who are granted asylum (and even those who aren’t) can move away from reception centres, to other parts of Italy or other parts of Europe, and no doubt some of them do, though statistics on this are hard to come by. Formal resettlement programmes appear to be rather limited, especially given Italy’s current financial difficulties.

What are some of the broader political implications (positive or negative) for increasing numbers of refugees travelling to Europe?

The increasing numbers of migrants travelling to Europe are grist for the mill for the far right political parties in many EU counties. The potential power of those parties affects the way those currently in power deal with the issue, focusing on punitive measures rather than more measured efforts as solutions. They are therefore more likely to respond, as Philip Hammond did this week, by supporting efforts to catch traffickers, rather than restart Mare Nostrum to prevent the migrants from drowning at sea.

It is possible that these tragedies will spur the EU to promulgate unified policies to deal with the crisis, and also to provide funding to do so. The Italian government, as well as others who receive migrants from the Mediterranean, argue that they are being forced to accept an unfair share of the burden with insufficient financial support from the rest of the EU.

Migration has the benefit of providing young workers in the EU countries that have ageing populations; the disadvantage of this type of irregular, usually unskilled, migration is that it may not provide the type of workers needed. It also has the disadvantage of indicating a lack of control of borders by those in power.

For those departing from conflict areas is there any evidence that these could be former combatants, or what security risks could be posed?

I don’t know of any evidence that some migrants are former combatants, but there is no reason to suppose they are not. The security risks are well known, and involve possible terrorist acts, though it is hard to imagine terrorists resorting to leaky boats as a means of transport to the EU so they can commit acts of terrorism once there.

In your opinion, how should the international community respond to these cases? What steps do you believe could be taken to avoid further tragedies?

The international community should restart Mare Nostrum. It is painfully clear that this deterrence does not work, given that the number of people risking crossing the Mediterranean have increased so markedly since Mare Nostrum was abandoned. It is inhumane not to try to save the lives of those who cross to Europe in a futile attempt to reduce the numbers. The reason that people are coming in increased numbers has to do with the situation in the places they are fleeing. Until the various crises are resolved we can expect migrant numbers to remain high. International efforts to this end could have some effect on the number of refugees who flee.

Given that not all the migrants are refugees but rather those seeking a better life than the barren and economically disastrous one in their places of origin, efforts to improve the economic outlook in those countries would also reduce the incentive for migrants to try to reach Europe.

Going after the traffickers would have some effect, but would not stop the transit of desperate people such as have been risking their lives recently. The desperation is too great and the rewards for the traffickers who are not caught are too high to deter them.

Dr. Carol Bohmer is a Teaching Fellow in the Department of War Studies, and is a Visiting Associate Professor at Dartmouth College, Hanover NH, USA. She is also the author of numerous books and publications including “The Politics of Invisibility and the Stigmatized Vernacular: The Case of Political Asylum Seekers” with Amy Shuman (forthcoming), and “Rejecting Refugees: Asylum in the US and the UK in the 21st Century”, with Amy Shuman” (2007).

Interview conducted by Joana Cook, Strife’s Editor-in-Chief.