• Skip to primary navigation
  • Skip to main content
  • Skip to footer
  • Home
  • About
    • Editorial Staff
      • Bryan Strawser, Editor in Chief, Strife
      • Dr Anna B. Plunkett, Founder, Women in Writing
      • Strife Journal Editors
      • Strife Blog Editors
      • Strife Communications Team
      • Senior Editors
      • Series Editors
      • Copy Editors
      • Strife Writing Fellows
      • Commissioning Editors
      • War Studies @ 60 Project Team
      • Web Team
    • Publication Ethics
    • Open Access Statement
  • Archive
  • Series
  • Strife Journal
  • Contact us
  • Submit to Strife!

Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

  • Announcements
  • Articles
  • Book Reviews
  • Call for Papers
  • Features
  • Interviews
You are here: Home / Archives for Hamas

Hamas

Gaza, Israel, and Netanyahu’s Latest Coalition Crisis

December 21, 2018 by Lauren Mellinger

By Lauren Mellinger

21 December 2018

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants to avoid an early election for fear that he might lose due to the public’s displeasure with his handling of the Gaza crisis. (Photo credit: David Shankbone)

 

This past tumultuous month in Israeli politics challenged two key assumptions about Israel’s long-serving prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. First, despite speculation in recent months that the Netanyahu-era is drawing to a close, it is certainly not over yet. Perhaps of greater significance is the second element to emerge from last month’s political crisis: Israel’s ‘Mr. Security’ — who recently said that ‘[t]here is no diplomatic solution to Gaza’ and compared Hamas to ISIS — is not going to topple Hamas in Gaza.

How Gaza precipitated Israel’s latest domestic political crisis

In November Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Qatar agreed to provide $90 million in cash to Gaza over the next six months, along with an immediate infusion of fuel into the Strip. The initial $15 million instalment was paid out to Palestinian civil servants in the Gaza Strip on November 11 and served to further bolster Hamas amongst its Gaza-based supporters. The deal was controversial for several reasons: first, whereas Israel has periodically allowed Gulf States to transfer materials for civilian projects and fuel to Gaza, it typically rejects cash donations due to concerns that it would reach Hamas militants. Hamas’s Gaza-based leader Yahya Sinwar responded to the first cash delivery by publicly allying himself with Hamas’s military wing. It is also noteworthy that Israel approved the terms despite having long regarded Qatar as a ‘terror-supporting state.’ Lastly, the move was heavily debated within the security cabinet, but was not coordinated with the Palestinian Authority, suggesting that the Netanyahu government was seeking some form of long-term compromise with Hamas in Gaza, despite a long history of stating the opposite.

Then the political crisis began. Shortly after images of the first suitcases of Qatari cash entering Gaza went public, news broke of a botched IDF raid near Khan Younis, followed by a 48-hour barrage of rockets from Gaza — for which Hamas claimed responsibility. Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman resigned, and withdrew his party from the coalition — arguing that the ceasefire, together with the Qatar arrangement, was ‘capitulating to terror.’ Then, Education Minister and Jewish Home Party leader Naftali Bennett threatened to quit the coalition unless he were assigned the defence portfolio. Given the likelihood that Netanyahu would reject Bennett’s ultimatum, both right and left-wing parties began to call for new elections.

As Israel’s government teetered on the brink of collapse, Netanyahu once again shrewdly outmanoeuvred his political rivals. Speaking from the Defence Ministry — a portfolio which Netanyahu currently holds, as well as that of prime minister and foreign minister — he rejected calls for new elections stating, ‘We are in the middle of a military campaign, and you don’t abandon a campaign to play politics.’ In an embarrassing about-face the following morning Bennett announced he would remain in the coalition — reneging on his prior ultimatum.

Though Kulanu leader and current Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon signalled to his faction that they should prepare for early elections, he too has not yet resigned from the government. For now, Netanyahu’s coalition stands with a fragile 61-seat majority.

Why delay early elections?

Early elections are routine in Israel’s domestic politics. In the 70 years since the country’s founding not one government has completed a full term. The current prime minister himself has engineered conditions for snap elections on more than one occasion. While it appeared that early elections seemed inevitable following Lieberman’s resignation, Netanyahu acted swiftly, doing everything possible to delay them.

Growing dissatisfaction with Netanyahu’s Gaza policies left him open to a challenge by both the right-wing parties within his coalition, and the public. This latest political crisis had Netanyahu challenged by junior coalition partners from his right, and specifically on matters of national security. Netanyahu has long proclaimed himself to be the best protector of Israel’s security. Indeed his campaign slogan in the 2015 elections translates to ‘Only the Likud — Only Netanyahu.’ New elections under such circumstances would have forced Netanyahu to face his ‘worst-case election scenario.’

Public opinion was also a critical factor in Netanyahu’s efforts to avoid early elections. Following the events last month, polls showed that 74 percent of Israelis were dissatisfied with Netanyahu’s performance in the Gaza crisis. Likud remained in the lead in most polls, albeit with a record-low 29 seats — a significant drop from August 2018, when Netanyahu told a Likud faction that he anticipated winning between 35 and 40 seats in the next elections. Furthermore, by holding onto the defence portfolio, at least for now, Netanyahu made himself vulnerable to criticism by becoming the main target for the public’s outrage. This was evident from demonstrations in southern towns bordering Gaza, as well as outside of the defence ministry in Tel Aviv following Lieberman’s resignation, where protestors shouted ‘Bibi go home!’ among other slogans expressing disapproval with the prime minister’s Gaza policies.

Can Israel’s ‘Mr. Security’ win another term?

With Israel heading into a definite election year, all politicians are officially in campaign mode. It is highly unlikely that this government will continue until November 2019, when elections are scheduled to be held. For the moment, if everything is held constant, the Likud remains in the lead to net the most seats in the next election. As political consultant Mitchell Barak remarked, ‘[Netanyahu’s] got no competition. . . He’s running against himself.’ Yet, the polls referenced above did not take into account the prospect of a viable centre or centre-left bloc forming ahead of the elections. Nor did they account for the likelihood that former IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz will announce a new party. Though Gantz’s party may not be able to surpass Likud in the next elections, it is expected to chip away at Likud’s lead.

Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether Netanyahu’s efforts to outmanoeuvre his rivals did more to damage them electorally, than him. Shortly after the crisis was resolved, a poll found that 58 percent of Israelis did not believe Netanyahu’s claims that the government should not be brought down at present due to a ‘sensitive security situation’ for which he provided no further explanation. This is compared with only 31 percent who felt his concerns for Israel’s national security were genuine.

In a region with countless hostile adversaries popping up like a never-ending game of whack-a-mole, Netanyahu’s reputation as ‘Mr. Security’ is a high bar to uphold. The public’s disapproval of his latest Gaza policies however, should be understood in the broader context. Despite a history of brash public statements calling for a tough response to Hamas, and terrorism in general, and having criticised his predecessors in office on numerous occasions for their handling of Hamas and Gaza, his actions in office indicate that he is risk-averse — in particular when it comes to employing military force, and is reluctant to commit to putting boots on the ground in Gaza. His past public statements stand in marked contrast to his actions in recent weeks, including working towards a ceasefire and allowing an influx of Qatari cash. Thus it is hardly surprising that residents of Gaza-border communities — a core base of Likud voters — and several of his coalition partners spent much of the past few weeks accusing him of being ‘weak’ on Gaza.

Moreover, in recent weeks Netanyahu has struggled to restore the public’s faith in his reputation as ‘Mr. Security.’ A Tel Aviv University poll earlier this month found 76 percent of Jewish Israelis thought that Netanyahu failed when dealing with Hamas. The increase in terror attacks in the West Bank in recent weeks has renewed protests against Netanyahu — once again, from members of his base, challenging his recent decisions regarding Gaza. Despite the recently launched Operation Northern Shield’s initial successes in uncovering Hizballah-built tunnels under the Israel-Lebanon border, many have raised questions as to whether the timing of the operation was politically motivated, in light of the hit to his reputation Netanyahu has experienced in recent weeks, and with the prospect of indictments hanging over his head.

Though polls indicate that Netanyahu averted the prospect of early elections for now and has, for the moment, avoided a referendum on his handling of Gaza, the situation with Hamas in both Gaza and the West Bank has yet to be stabilised. Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent Netanyahu can proceed with the arrangements with Qatar, absent broader public support. It remains to be seen whether Israel’s ‘Mr. Security’ can prevail in the next elections, or whether Netanyahu has run out of political life lines.


Lauren Mellinger is a doctoral candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and a 2018-19 Israel Institute Doctoral Fellow. She is also a former senior editor of Strife’s blog and journal. Her research specializes in Israeli counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national security decision-making, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. You can follow her on Twitter @Lauren_M04.


Image source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Netanyahu_campaign_posters_in_Jerusalem.jpg

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Benjamin Netanyahu, early election, Gaza, Gaza crisis, Hamas, Israel, Palestine

Are Hamas rockets terrorism? Hollywood weighs in

June 30, 2016 by Lauren Mellinger

By: Lauren Mellinger

QassamRocket

On June 20, 2016, NBC Universal (Universal Cable Productions) filed a lawsuit in a California federal court against its insurer, Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company. At first glance the case appears to be a typical dispute over a contract – a Hollywood production company is suing its insurer for failure to pay the expenses incurred due to last minute decisions made by the production company in response to the last round of fighting between Hamas and Israel during the summer of 2014. Yet, at the centre of the case lies the question: Whether Hamas’s rocket attacks during that conflict should be classified as a war between sovereign nations, or as the militant acts of a terrorist group.

Summer 2014: A Brief Overview of Operation Protective Edge

On June 12, 2014, three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped and murdered in the West Bank. Hamas would later claim responsibility for the attack but in the ensuing weeks, Israel cracked down on Hamas operatives in the West Bank, and Hamas in Gaza responded with a barrage of rocket fire. On July 7, over 85 rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel, for which Hamas claimed responsibility. The next day, the Israel Defense Forces launched Operation Protective Edge. Neither Israel nor Hamas wanted the conflict to escalate – becoming the third in a series of rounds in a war of attrition that has existed between the two sides since Hamas took control of Gaza in June 2007. The operation lasted seven weeks, ending in a cease-fire on August 26.

Now for the obvious question – Why is the operation suddenly being featured in The Hollywood Reporter?

Enter Hollywood

In the summer of 2015, USA network aired the miniseries Dig, the television show at the centre of this lawsuit. When production began the previous summer, the plan was for the mystery-conspiracy-thriller which is set in Jerusalem to film on location in Israel – the location shoot being integral to the creative process. Indeed at a panel at that summer’s annual Comic-Con, Dig’s creators boasted that “[s]hooting there [in Jerusalem] is paramount to the story in capturing the vividness and emphasizing the characters of the show.”

But when the violence broke out that June, only the pilot episode had been filmed. Following a week-long unplanned hiatus (an expensive undertaking for a production company, especially on an overseas location shoot), Universal opted to relocate filming to New Mexico and Croatia for the duration of production for that season. Due to the unanticipated relocation, Universal incurred $6.9 million in unforeseen costs. When Universal submitted a claim to its insurer, Atlantic, for reimbursement, the company denied the claim.

So far – a typical contractual dispute. But now for the added twist:

According to Universal Cable Productions, of which USA Network is a subsidiary, after the violence broke out, the U.S. State Department attributed the rocket attacks to Hamas. At that point, Universal argues, it submitted a claim to Atlantic, which then denied coverage.

In their complaint, Universal maintains that Atlantic’s rationale for failing to reimburse the production company contravenes the official policy of the U.S. government, which to date has not recognised Hamas as a sovereign government. Indeed according to the documents filed with the court, Universal argues that:

“[t]he United States government has officially designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation. Nevertheless, Atlantic has ignored the United States government position and applicable law. It claims Hamas is a sovereign or quasi-sovereign government over the Gaza Strip (even though Atlantic admits the Gaza Strip is not a recognized sovereign nation), in a self-serving attempt to invoke the war exclusion and avoid its coverage obligations.”

Atlantic maintains that the company denied Universal’s claim on the grounds that, per the terms of the contract, coverage is excluded for war or warlike actions. According to documents filed with the court, Atlantic stated that the company informed Universal in a letter dated July 28, 2014 that at the time “the terrorism coverage should not apply” to the events of July 2014, as Hamas’s actions did not target either the United States or its policies, and that “the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury has not certified the [Hamas/Israel] events as acts of terrorism.”

Barring any issue of justiciability per U.S. law, should the case proceed, the California federal court will be forced to confront an issue that has seemingly confounded policymakers and international jurists since January 2006: How to define Hamas.

The Challenge of Defining Hamas

While it is too early in the proceedings to state with certainty, the likelihood is that Atlantic is not taking a stand on political grounds. Rather, it is more likely that they saw the amount incurred by Universal when production was moved at the eleventh hour, and looked for a loophole that would allow them to avoid payment. The fact that Atlantic can even ask the court to entertain its argument is due to what has amounted over the past decade, if not longer, to an “accepted ambiguity” in international law and policymaking regarding Hamas.

This “accepted ambiguity” with respect to accurately classifying Hamas is primarily the result of two factors: first, the fact that the organisation’s victory in the 2006 elections caught Israel and the international community off guard, and many government officials, academics and foreign policy experts found it difficult to explain how an entity, regarded by many as a terrorist organisation, could ascend to power through a democratic process without first having relinquished its armed strategy. (This element of surprise certainly applied to the Bush administration, which had invested in the Palestinian Authority as part of a larger effort to promote democratic governance in the region, and at the time, had encouraged the Palestinians to proceed with the elections.) The second factor has been the subsequent intellectual inertia of policymakers who have failed to adequately respond to the threat posed by the Hamas’s transformation from a terrorist organisation, to a democratically elected terrorist organisation, now with actual governing responsibilities and access to state budgets and other resources.

On January 25, 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, when its Change and Reform party list won 74 out of 132 seats. In the wake of the results, some counterterrorism analysts and Middle East specialists argued that participating in democratic elections, and subsequently serving in a government, would result in the group’s eventual moderation. Yet, notwithstanding the periodic moderate statements made by some members of their leadership, Hamas’s actions since the election wholly contradict the assertion that participation in politics will ultimately tame them. Hamas, since coming to power and becoming the de facto government in Gaza, has implemented a system of government that largely adheres to the movement’s core principles – espoused in a founding document the organisation has yet to officially renounce. This includes adhering to the use of violence, and refusing to recognise Israel. Hence, serving in the capacity of a democratically elected government has not impeded Hamas’s efforts to further its militant ideological goals.

In short:

Is Hamas a terrorist organisation? Yes.

Is Hamas a government? Yes.

Is Hamas currently in de facto control of the Gaza Strip? Yes, for the time being, in light of their takeover of the coastal enclave in June 2007, and until such time as the Palestinians hold new legislative elections (or the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority manages to reclaim control over Gaza.)

The challenge for policymakers is to understand the nature of the adversary they are confronting and formulate policies to mitigate the threat posed. It is long overdue for policymakers (and academics) to embrace a new paradigm with respect to Hamas – that of the hybrid terrorist organisation.[1]

In his latest book Global Alert, Israeli counterterrorism scholar Boaz Ganor has proposed a definition for hybrid terrorist organisations. Ganor’s model consists of a single organisation comprised of three interrelated wings: first, the terrorist or guerrilla wing, per the classic definitions. To this a second wing is added – a political wing, that enables the organisation to participate in institutional politics, where it can gain legitimacy, albeit gradually. Lastly, such groups often maintain a robust social-welfare network, the purpose of which is to ensure a steady stream of new recruits to the organisation over time.[2]

That an organisation can exist as a “hybrid” challenges the theory, widely accepted in both academia and among policymakers, that an armed group’s decision to participate in electoral politics is an automatic indication of its eventual transition into a “legitimate” political actor (i.e., a political party that has abandoned its armed strategy.)[3] Yet, groups like Hamas are challenging the conventional wisdom. In her study of Islamist terrorist and guerrilla groups in transition in the Middle East, scholar Krista Wiegand found that an organisation’s existence as a hybrid or a “dual-status” group does not presuppose the group’s eventual transition to a non-violent political party. Rather, it reflects a rational choice. According to Wiegand, for armed groups that embody a hybrid status, “the use of political violence is a strategic rational choice under certain conditions, while under other conditions, non-violent political participation is more rational . . . violence and non-violence are not mutually exclusive choices.”[4]

In other words, a hybrid group has the best of both worlds – the opportunity to slowly gain international legitimacy while obtaining access to state resources, without ever having to forsake the use of violence.

What Happens Next?

Given the international community’s glacially slow response to understanding the threat posed by hybrid organisations, it is likely that the immediate effect of Universal’s lawsuit will be on Israel’s relationship with Hollywood. In 2014, Dig was not the only Hollywood production filming in Israel that opted to relocate due to the ongoing violence in Gaza. Indeed, one day before USA pulled production from Israel, the FX series Tyrant also decided to move production for season one to Turkey due to the hostilities. Production on The Dovekeepers, a new biblical miniseries that CBS originally intended to film on location in Israel, was relocated to Malta. That decisions such as defining Hamas may be subject to the ad hoc rulings of lower courts may hamper Israel’s efforts to entice foreign production companies to consider Israel when looking for suitable foreign locales for film and television projects.

Still, the growing challenge that hybrid organisations such as Hamas pose to Israel is by no means exclusively a challenge for Israel. Modern history is replete with examples of armed groups that have eventually transitioned to non-violent political parties. At present, what sets Hamas (and for that matter, groups such as the Lebanese Hizballah) apart from other armed organisations that have undergone some form of transition is an issue that lies at the heart of this lawsuit – are these organisations in fact in the process of transitioning? Or rather, do they embody a new type of security challenge for democratic states?

The latter is more likely in the case of Hamas. Therefore, those states that opt to designate only the militant wing of an organisation such as Hamas as a terrorist organisation, excluding the political arm of the organisation, are doing little more than creating an artificial distinction. By effectively enshrining a false dichotomy into law – that an organisation can either be a “terrorist organisation” or “the political wing of an armed group” – the state fails to account for the organisational and operational reality of hybrid groups, namely, that existence as a hybrid is a rational choice, not to be misconstrued with the initial phase in an eventual transition a legitimate political party. Only with an appropriate understanding of such groups can states begin to devise adequate policies to mitigate the threat such groups pose to their security.

 

 

Lauren Mellinger is a doctoral candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and a senior editor of Strife’s blog and journal. Her research specializes in Israeli counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national security decision-making, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. You can follow her on Twitter @Lauren_M04

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] For a more in depth understanding of the emerging concept of the “hybrid” organisation see: Boaz Ganor, Global Alert: The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism and the Challenge to the Liberal Democratic World (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 73-83; Amichai Magen, “Hybrid War and the ‘Gulliverization’ of Israel,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 5(1) (2011): 59-72; Benedetta Berti, Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013); Jeroen de Zeeuw, “Understanding the Political Transformation of Rebel Movements,” in ed. Jeroen de Zeeuw, From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2008); Krista E. Wiegand, Bombs Over Ballots: Governance by Islamist Terrorist and Guerrilla Groups (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2010).

[2] Ganor, Global Alert, p. 74.

[3] See Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Arie Perliger, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups (London: Routledge, 2003); Marina Ottoway, “Islamists and Democracy: Keep the Faith,” The New Republic, June 6 and 13, 2005.

[4] Wiegand, Bombs Over Ballots, p. 75-76.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: feature, Hamas, Hollywood, Israel, Palestine

Financing Terror, Part IV: Charities and terrorism in the Middle East

February 2, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Drew Alyeshmerni:

Rockets fired from gaza by the military wing of Hamas. Photo: Zoriah (creative commons)
Rockets fired from the Gaza Strip by the military wing of Hamas. Photo: Zoriah (creative commons)

In Judaism, it’s tzedakah. In Islam, it’s zakat. In Christianity, it’s tithing. Each major religion sees the importance of giving charity, whether for the sake of doing good or as a religious obligation. Other influences on an individual’s propensity for charitable donations include political affiliation, religion, race, sexual orientation, country of origin, interests or concerns.

Charities provide local or international assistance and are often regulated by government entities such as the Internal Revenue Service in the United States and the Charity Commission1 in the United Kingdom. These organisations try to make sure that charities operating in conflict zones do not have ties to terrorism. Charities diverting money towards terrorist groups has happened in the Syrian Civil War and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Due to the large number of local and international organizations raising funds for Syrian relief efforts, the Charity Commission issued an alert in April 2013 titled ‘Safer Giving Advice for Syria’. Their concerns have proved prescient. In February 2014, British citizen Abdul Waheed Majid joined an aid convoy heading to Aleppo with the Birmingham-based ‘Children in Deen’ organization. While in Syria, he abandoned his convoy, joined the Al Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front, and drove a truck full of explosives into a prison wall. His suicide mission – partially funded by unsuspecting individuals’ charitable contributions – caused dozens of civilian deaths and allowed hundreds of dangerous prisoners to escape.2

Events such as Majid’s suicide mission have sparked great concern over the destination of funds raised by charities who claim to be doing humanitarian work but are actually directly or indirectly supporting terrorist groups. Since February 2014, the Charity Commission has opened an investigation into 86 aid groups suspected of supporting extremists, including 37 charities involved in providing aid to war-torn Syria.3 In addition to Children in Deen, these charities include Aid Convoy, Syria Aid, and Al-Fatiha Global. The investigations are still underway and dozens of other charities are being monitored for their fundraising activities in the UK.4

This phenomenon – the use of charities as funding fronts for terrorist activities – is not new. After the September 11, 2001, attacks the United States government initiated the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) in order to identify, track and pursue terrorist groups’ sources of funding.5 Through the TFTP, the US government has uncovered and shut down over 40 designated charities used as Potential Fundraising Front Organizations, or PFFOs.6 In August 2010 the US entered a TFTP agreement with the European Union.7 This agreement enables the sharing of intelligence between the US and the EU, although there are limits to the efficiency of the US in preventing the flow of funds to terrorist organizations. Prime examples of these limits are the attitudes and actions by other countries against organizations such as Hamas, a US-designated terrorist organization that operates throughout the Levant, Israel, and the Palestinian territories.

Charitable organizations identified as PFFOs for Hamas in the US are not designated as such in the EU and UK. One such organization is Interpal, the Palestinian Relief and Development Fund. Interpal, a UK-based charity, is allegedly designed to hide the flow of money to Hamas.8 According to the US Treasury, Hamas raises tens of millions of dollars per year throughout the world by using charitable fundraising as a cover.9

While Hamas supports a wide array of humanitarian projects in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, their work is also a primary recruiting tool for the organization’s military wing,10 which is responsible for carrying out acts of terrorism against Israel. These include the June 2014 kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teens, the firing of 11,000 rockets since 2005 upon southern Israel’s civilians, and the use of cross-border tunnels to carry out attacks within Israel. In stark contrast to the findings of ongoing investigations into organizations feared to be funding terrorist operations in Syria, the UK’s Charity Commission claims that Interpal does not support terrorism.11 Additionally, the EU has actually removed Hamas from its list of designated terrorist organizations.12

What is the effectiveness then of the Charity Commission’s policy aimed at eradicating the abuse of charitable organizations by Syrian-based terror groups when potential fundraising front organizations for other groups such as Hamas, still considered a terrorist organisation in countries such as Egypt and the United States, are allowed to freely operate on British and European soil?

In the case of Hamas and Interpal, the joint EU-US TFTP agreement and system of checks erected in the UK’s Charity Act of 2006 to audit charities suspected of abuse are proving to be tools influenced by public opinion surrounding the political climate on any given day. In the case of the few dozen Syrian-linked charities in the UK being investigated by the Charity Commission, one has to wonder if the only reason they are being investigated is because of the intense publicity surrounding events that relate Syria to Britain, like Majid’s suicide mission, the beheading of a British aid worker, and the migration of 500 British jihadists to the Islamic State. Would those charities have even been flagged for review if not for these events? And if not for these events, would the Islamic State or the al-Nusra Front have been considered terrorist organizations, or would they have been considered nationalist liberation organizations for the Sunnis of the Middle East, much like Hamas for the Palestinians? The point is that public opinion seems to determine the policy of those organisations charged with investigating charities suspected of funding terrorist groups.

After exploring these two different cases in Syria and Palestine, we must ask ourselves the following questions: Are the policies used to oversee and investigate charities indeed founded on justice, or are they simply based on political interest and public opinion? Is it important for individual donors to do their due diligence when determining where to make their international charitable contributions, or must donors simply put their trust in governmental bodies that may potentially be influenced by politics and public opinion?

In order to ensure that your charitable contributions go directly to supporting the cause you care about, dig a little deeper with your research. Look at other countries’ information on charities to which you are considering making a contribution, and consider whether there is a correlation between the activities of such charities and the operations of terrorist organizations. Your generosity is surely heartfelt, but unless you do the necessary research, you may unwittingly be supporting a cause other than the one you intended.


Drew Alyeshmerni has an MA in Public Policy from Tel Aviv University and certification in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Arizona. While in Israel she coordinated international humanitarian aid projects for the Palestinian population of the West Bank under the Civil Administration and worked in a variety of Human Rights groups, including the Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, Hiddush: Freedom of Religion for Israel, and the Center for Jewish Arab Economic Development. Drew currently lives in Los Angeles, California, where she focuses on reconciliation between Arabs and Jews on college campuses. Find her on LinkedIn.

This article was the final part of a Strife series on terrorist financing. Over the last four weeks authors have examined different methods of terrorist financing, using modern and varied case studies, offering a new look at who and what is funding today’s terror activities. In Part I Arne Holverscheid discussed the role of private Kuwaiti donors in financing rebel groups in Syria affiliated with terror organisations and blurring the lines between good and bad, friend and foe. In Part II Claire Mennessier examined the involvement of Pakistan in financing terror groups, and the motivations and challenges presented by this involvement. Last week, in Part III, Samuel Smith addressed the frightening trend of kidnapping for ransom as a source of finance for terror groups through a case study of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and Southeast Asia.

NOTES

1 The Charity Commission is responsible for registering eligible charitable organisations in the United Kingdom and investigating cases of malpractice or misconduct by charitable organisations. See the following page for further information: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/charity-commission/about

2 Sophie Jane Evans, “Investigation Launched into Birmingham Charity Used by ‘British Suicide Bomber’ to Travel to Syria and Carry out Attack,” Mail Online, March 3, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2571460/Children-Deen-used-British-suicide-bomber-travel-Syria-carry-attack.html.

3 Tim Ross et al., “Charity Commission: British Charities Investigated for Terror Risk,” The Telegraph, November 1, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11203569/Charity-Commission-British-charities-investigated-for-terror-links.html

4 Ibid

5 “Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP),” U.S. Department of Treasury, May 5, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Terrorist-Finance-Tracking/Pages/tftp.aspx.

6 “Protecting Charitable Organizations - E ,” U.S. Department of Treasury, August 21, 2007, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Pages/protecting-charities_execorder_13224-e.aspx .

7 “Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme,” European Commission, December 12, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/tftp/index_en.htm.

8 “Protecting Charitable Organizations – E” – Listed under Interpal

9 ibid- listed under H- Hamas Fundraising

10 ibid -Listed under H- Hamas Fundraising

11“UK Charity Commission: Interpal Not Supporting Terror Groups,” Charity and Security Network, April 9, 2009, http://www.charityandsecurity.org/news/UK_Charity_Commission_Interpal_Not%20Supporting_Terror.

12“EU court takes Hamas off terrorist organisations list,” BBC, December 17, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30511569

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: charity, Hamas, Palestine, Syria, terrorism

Israel vs. Hamas: Undermining deterrence

July 4, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Charles Kirchofer:

Israeli soldiers in Hebron [Photograph taken by the author, 5 June 2014.]

Israel’s military response to the abduction and murder of three teenaged Israeli citizens, which has included a massive deployment of Israeli soldiers in the Palestinian territories, is understandable. But, this response has threatened to undermine what had been a relatively stable deterrence relationship with Hamas, however. The border with Gaza had been reasonably quiet, but recent days have seen increased rocket fire that has now hit homes in southern Israel. Israel’s military is now shifting troops to the Gaza border. Together, these actions threaten to be the start of another round of escalation between the two sides. Was this deterioration of the situation inevitable? If a ceasefire soon comes into effect, what does this say about Israel’s deterrence relationship with Hamas?

Despite Hamas’s anti-Israel Charter and its unrelenting stance against recognising Israel or even accepting the idea of a permanent peace with it, Hamas has avoided provoking active conflict with Israel since 2012. There has been a trickle of rockets from the Gaza Strip, but this has long been the case. What’s more, it does not appear that Hamas itself was responsible for any of these attacks until just recently. In fact, Hamas has long arrested militants launching rockets from within Gaza to prevent Israeli retaliation. The fact that the number of rockets launched in 2014 has at times risen above 20 per month may, in truth, be more a sign of Hamas’s weakness than of its strength: Egypt has tightened its control over Gaza’s southern border, closing smuggling tunnels that Hamas relied upon for much of its revenue, and Hamas’s relations with its sponsor Iran have been strained since it declared itself opposed to Iran’s close ally and Syria’s leader, Bashar al-Assad, and moved its headquarters out of Damascus. Even now, Hamas’s leadership has said it does not desire escalation, despite recently launching its first rockets on Israel since 2012.

If Hamas activists are proved responsible for the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teens, this in itself would already indicate a massive escalation, justifying a retaliatory response from Israel. Hamas internal chief Ismail Haniyeh allegedly said as recently as this April that abducting Israeli soldiers was a ‘top priority’ to use as ‘bargaining chips’ to free Palestinian prisoners. When three Israeli teens were reported kidnapped, justified suspicion quickly fell on Hamas. Hamas’s leaders denied all knowledge of the kidnapping even as Israeli security claimed to have found solid evidence of the group’s involvement. Reports have now come to light that suggest that both are ‘correct’. It seems the kidnappers are a ‘rogue Hamas branch’ that was not acting on orders when it abducted the teens. The fact that the teens were quickly murdered rather than held for ransom and that Hamas from the start denied responsibility and was unable to reap any political or strategic gain from the incident lends credibility to this claim. It thus seems that the attack was a criminal act motivated by sectarian hatred rather than a terror tactic used as part of a plan to improve Hamas’s bargaining position with Israel or the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Israel’s military response, named ‘Operation Brother’s Keeper’, has been calibrated on the assumption of the latter rather than the former. Israel detained over 300 Hamas members and some other Palestinians not associated with the group, also raiding Hamas institutions. A report noted that ‘soldiers entered Palestinian cities and towns in numbers not seen there in years, which led to frequent violent clashes with Palestinian youths. Five Palestinians [were] killed by soldiers’ fire during the clashes. Only a few of those detained are suspected of actually participating in terrorist activity.’ A Palestinian academic commented to this author and asked “Don’t you think Israel is using the disappearance [of the three teens] as a pretext to go after Hamas?” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated openly that attacking Hamas’s infrastructure in the West Bank was a central aim of ‘Operation Brother’s Keeper’.

From a deterrence perspective, this could be an appropriate response if Hamas as an organisation were indeed behind the murders of the three Israeli youths. It would help to reinforce clear ‘red lines’ that Hamas may not cross without inflicting significant damage on itself. If Hamas is already deterred and did not commit the murders, however, such a broad attack on it is not necessary to maintain or re-establish deterrence. What’s more, unnecessarily forceful responses are risky. The operation has stirred up anger among the Palestinian population, for example in several clashes with Israeli troops, which resulted in the death of five Palestinian youths. These deaths have naturally intensified anger and threaten to escalate the situation further. Israel’s air force also struck targets in Gaza. In response, Hamas then launched its first rockets since 2012 at Israel on 30 June. Further violence is possible.

The recent escalation was not inevitable. If Hamas as an organisation was not behind the abduction and murder of the three Israeli teens that sparked this latest round of violence, the escalation also does not appear necessary. There have been discussions today of a possible ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, but at the time of writing, one had not yet taken effect. Both sides appear willing to de-escalate, however, with an Israeli official saying that ‘quiet will be met with quiet’.

If things do quiet down, this will be evidence that Hamas is weak and deterred. If they do not, we will look back on Operation Brother’s Keeper as understandable, but we may also view it as a mistake that led to further unnecessary bloodshed.

_________________

Charles Kirchofer is a PhD candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He is currently researching the use of deterrence against non-state actors using the case of Israel’s conflict with Hamas and has recently conducted field research in Israel and Palestine. You can follow him on Twitter @CPKirchofer

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: ceasefire, Deterrence, Gaza, Hamas, Israel, Palestine

Footer

Contact

The Strife Blog & Journal

King’s College London
Department of War Studies
Strand Campus
London
WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

[email protected]

 

Recent Posts

  • The Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: a distorted reality
  • Russia’s 2021 State Duma Elections: A sham vote but with signs pointing to possible future change
  • Feminist Foreign Policy and South Asia: A scuffle between values and change
  • Communications positions available at Strife
  • Editor Positions available at Strife

Tags

Afghanistan Africa Brexit China Climate Change conflict counterterrorism COVID-19 Cybersecurity Cyber Security Diplomacy Donald Trump drones Elections EU feature foreign policy France India intelligence Iran Iraq ISIL ISIS Israel ma NATO North Korea nuclear Pakistan Politics Russia security strategy Strife series Syria terrorism Turkey UK Ukraine United States us USA women Yemen

Licensed under Creative Commons (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivatives) | Proudly powered by Wordpress & the Genesis Framework