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You are here: Home / Archives for Palestine

Palestine

Can the Trump Peace Plan Survive Political Upheaval in Israel’s Upcoming Elections?

March 4, 2019 by Lauren Mellinger

By Lauren Mellinger

4 March 2019

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump shake hands during a press conference in February 2017. Netanyahu is up for reelection in April, after which Trump plans to release a Middle East peace plan. (Benjamin Applebaum)

 

As Israelis prepare to vote on April 9, the Trump administration has announced that at long last, the U.S. peace plan, which President Trump has referred to as ‘the deal of the century’, will be unveiled in April. The fate of the plan however, and of the prospect of an American role in getting the parties to return to the negotiating table, remains an open question.

From an “election about nothing” to a referendum on Netanyahu

In September 1992, the popular TV-sitcom Seinfeld aired an episode titled ‘The Pitch’, in which Jerry Seinfeld and his friend, George Constanza, pitch a pilot to NBC, predicated on a half hour of, well, nothing. Fast forward 27 years, and one could similarly describe the current Israeli elections as a race about nothing. Israel faces formidable challenges at home and abroad — including the threats from Iran’s increasing presence in Syria and their assistance in Hizballah’s growing arsenal; the withdrawal of the US from Syria and the challenge of Russia’s expanding presence in the region; and ongoing tensions in Gaza. In addition, a host of unresolved religion and state issues, in particular matters pertaining to burden-sharing, continue to vex slimmer, right-wing-led coalitions, while challenges to Israel’s relationship with Diaspora Jewish communities and the ongoing stalemate in negotiations with the Palestinians merit more debate time. In lieu of a substantive debate regarding the geopolitical and domestic challenges facing Israel however, the election thus far has largely focused on whether Benjamin Netanyahu, the incumbent prime minister, should win another term. 

The prospect of Israel’s incoming government led by someone other than Netanyahu increased this past week, following Attorney General Avishai Mandelblit’s announcement of the intent to indict Netanyahu on charges including bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. Following the announcement, Israel’s newest party, the Blue White list, eclipsed Netanyahu’s Likud Party in the polls for the first time, suggesting that Netanyahu might not be able to form a coalition.

Though damaging to Netanyahu, per Israeli law, Mandleblit’s announcement does not preclude him from running, or serving in office —pending a verdict. Thus far Netanyahu responded by doubling down on populist rhetoric, a move that will most likely preclude the formation of anything other than a right-wing coalition, in the event Netanyahu can win another term. This would then put the incoming Israeli government squarely at odds with the Trump administration’s plan, should the Americans proceed with the plan’s release.

The ‘deal of the century’ is finally set to be unveiled in April . . . maybe

The lack of substantive issue-oriented discussions in the election thus far is by no means evidence of the lack of a campaign strategy — by either side of the political spectrum. By not formally taking a position on the issue of future peace with the Palestinians outright, the centre-left bloc may be hoping to pry votes away from the right. If their efforts ultimately pay off, it would likely be due to two key reasons: a party list which has prioritized leaders with bona fide security credentials, namely three former military chiefs of staff (including one who also served as defence minister); and the fact that Netanyahu, who until recently faced the prospect of an indictment on corruption charges, has moved so far to the right to maintain his grip on the premiership that he coordinated a deal that could bring the extremist group Otzma Yehudit — a group anathema to even right-leaning Israeli voters — into the Knesset.

And here is where the Trump administration lost a critical opportunity. Most veteran Mideast observers would undoubtedly caution an American administration against announcing a potentially game-changing peace effort amid an Israeli election — both to avoid an outward appearance of intervening in Israel’s domestic politics and to insulate the administration from having the initiative fail. Yet, in the current political environment, waiting until April to release the plan is a missed opportunity. As Beilin argued, for the moment, neither Netanyahu nor former IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, head of the Blue White Party, appeared bothered by the administration’s decision to delay the unveiling of the plan until after the elections. Gantz’s new alliance has yet to reveal their platform, but the presence of one of his bloc partners, former defence minister Moshe Ya’alon, currently #3 on the Blue White List, having ruled out support for a two-state solution, together with the party’s reported opposition to dividing Jerusalem and evacuating settlement blocs in the West Bank, suggest that a two-state solution is a non-starter. Recent statements from Naftali Bennett’s new party, and those of parties to the right of Bennett that are now aligned with Netanyahu, as well as recent statements by Netanyahu himself, seem to suggest that this may be one area of agreement for the right and centre. Laying out the terms of the Trump peace plan now, rather than after April 9, would have required the parties to address the issue in a more substantive way.

Should Netanyahu manage to emerge the victor in April’s elections, he will come to a crossroad in his relationship with Trump, which until now has arguably been the closest relationship Netanyahu has ever had with a U.S. president. The farther right the prime minister has to move in order to secure his reelection and manage to assemble a coalition, the more difficult it will be to make any concessions regarding a peace agreement. Nor does the prime minister appear willing to do so. As Netanyahu himself recently stated, if he wins, he will form a religious, right-wing governing coalition, and will not offer a partnership to his centrist challengers. The possibility that Otzma Yehudit crosses the 3.25% threshold and forms a part of a future government poses yet another challenge for the Trump peace plan, and for U.S.-Israel relations more broadly, in light of U.S. anti-terrorism laws. (Under U.S. law, Otzma Yehudit is led by followers of the late Rabbi Meir Kahane, and Kahane Chai/Kach is still designated as a foreign terrorist organisation).

An added complication likely to hamper the success of Trump’s peace plan is the current U.S. relationship with the Palestinians, which has deteriorated significantly while President Trump has been in office, due to a host of missteps by the administration, including aid cuts, the President’s decision to relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem, and his more recent decision to downgrade the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem by merging the two, a move largely considered a further affront to the Palestinians, and suggests that the pending announcement of the Trump peace plan will not endorse a two-state solution.

Now with five weeks to go before the election, with the race essentially boiling down to a referendum on the incumbent prime minister, it remains to be seen whether a substantive, issue-oriented debate about the future of a two-state solution can occur before Israelis head to the polls. With what appears to be a close race between Netanyahu and Gantz for the premiership, both parties would be well advised to develop their positions on the pending Trump plan. The U.S. president is well-known for maintaining a transactional relationship with politicians and world leaders. As President Trump has demonstrated a penchant for responding to praise while doubling down on petty, yet damaging, attacks on opponents when he feels criticized, precisely how much attention the U.S. will give to efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the next two (or six) years will likely depend on how both sides — Israelis and Palestinians — respond to his administration’s proposed peace plan.


Lauren Mellinger is a doctoral candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and a 2018-19 Israel Institute Doctoral Fellow. She is also a former senior editor of Strife’s blog and journal. Her research specializes in Israeli counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national security decision-making, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. You can follow her on Twitter @Lauren_M04.


Image source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?search=Netanyahu+Trump&title=Special%3ASearch&profile=advanced&fulltext=1&advancedSearch-current=%7B%22namespaces%22%3A%5B6%2C12%2C14%2C100%2C106%2C0%5D%7D&ns6=1&ns12=1&ns14=1&ns100=1&ns106=1&ns0=1#/media/File:President_Donald_Trump_and_Prime_Minister_Benjamin_Netanyahu_Joint_Press_Conference,_February_15,_2017_(01).jpg

 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Israel, Israel-Palestine Conflict, Israeli Elections, netanyahu, Palestine, Trump, Trump Peace Plan

Gaza, Israel, and Netanyahu’s Latest Coalition Crisis

December 21, 2018 by Lauren Mellinger

By Lauren Mellinger

21 December 2018

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants to avoid an early election for fear that he might lose due to the public’s displeasure with his handling of the Gaza crisis. (Photo credit: David Shankbone)

 

This past tumultuous month in Israeli politics challenged two key assumptions about Israel’s long-serving prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. First, despite speculation in recent months that the Netanyahu-era is drawing to a close, it is certainly not over yet. Perhaps of greater significance is the second element to emerge from last month’s political crisis: Israel’s ‘Mr. Security’ — who recently said that ‘[t]here is no diplomatic solution to Gaza’ and compared Hamas to ISIS — is not going to topple Hamas in Gaza.

How Gaza precipitated Israel’s latest domestic political crisis

In November Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Qatar agreed to provide $90 million in cash to Gaza over the next six months, along with an immediate infusion of fuel into the Strip. The initial $15 million instalment was paid out to Palestinian civil servants in the Gaza Strip on November 11 and served to further bolster Hamas amongst its Gaza-based supporters. The deal was controversial for several reasons: first, whereas Israel has periodically allowed Gulf States to transfer materials for civilian projects and fuel to Gaza, it typically rejects cash donations due to concerns that it would reach Hamas militants. Hamas’s Gaza-based leader Yahya Sinwar responded to the first cash delivery by publicly allying himself with Hamas’s military wing. It is also noteworthy that Israel approved the terms despite having long regarded Qatar as a ‘terror-supporting state.’ Lastly, the move was heavily debated within the security cabinet, but was not coordinated with the Palestinian Authority, suggesting that the Netanyahu government was seeking some form of long-term compromise with Hamas in Gaza, despite a long history of stating the opposite.

Then the political crisis began. Shortly after images of the first suitcases of Qatari cash entering Gaza went public, news broke of a botched IDF raid near Khan Younis, followed by a 48-hour barrage of rockets from Gaza — for which Hamas claimed responsibility. Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman resigned, and withdrew his party from the coalition — arguing that the ceasefire, together with the Qatar arrangement, was ‘capitulating to terror.’ Then, Education Minister and Jewish Home Party leader Naftali Bennett threatened to quit the coalition unless he were assigned the defence portfolio. Given the likelihood that Netanyahu would reject Bennett’s ultimatum, both right and left-wing parties began to call for new elections.

As Israel’s government teetered on the brink of collapse, Netanyahu once again shrewdly outmanoeuvred his political rivals. Speaking from the Defence Ministry — a portfolio which Netanyahu currently holds, as well as that of prime minister and foreign minister — he rejected calls for new elections stating, ‘We are in the middle of a military campaign, and you don’t abandon a campaign to play politics.’ In an embarrassing about-face the following morning Bennett announced he would remain in the coalition — reneging on his prior ultimatum.

Though Kulanu leader and current Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon signalled to his faction that they should prepare for early elections, he too has not yet resigned from the government. For now, Netanyahu’s coalition stands with a fragile 61-seat majority.

Why delay early elections?

Early elections are routine in Israel’s domestic politics. In the 70 years since the country’s founding not one government has completed a full term. The current prime minister himself has engineered conditions for snap elections on more than one occasion. While it appeared that early elections seemed inevitable following Lieberman’s resignation, Netanyahu acted swiftly, doing everything possible to delay them.

Growing dissatisfaction with Netanyahu’s Gaza policies left him open to a challenge by both the right-wing parties within his coalition, and the public. This latest political crisis had Netanyahu challenged by junior coalition partners from his right, and specifically on matters of national security. Netanyahu has long proclaimed himself to be the best protector of Israel’s security. Indeed his campaign slogan in the 2015 elections translates to ‘Only the Likud — Only Netanyahu.’ New elections under such circumstances would have forced Netanyahu to face his ‘worst-case election scenario.’

Public opinion was also a critical factor in Netanyahu’s efforts to avoid early elections. Following the events last month, polls showed that 74 percent of Israelis were dissatisfied with Netanyahu’s performance in the Gaza crisis. Likud remained in the lead in most polls, albeit with a record-low 29 seats — a significant drop from August 2018, when Netanyahu told a Likud faction that he anticipated winning between 35 and 40 seats in the next elections. Furthermore, by holding onto the defence portfolio, at least for now, Netanyahu made himself vulnerable to criticism by becoming the main target for the public’s outrage. This was evident from demonstrations in southern towns bordering Gaza, as well as outside of the defence ministry in Tel Aviv following Lieberman’s resignation, where protestors shouted ‘Bibi go home!’ among other slogans expressing disapproval with the prime minister’s Gaza policies. 

Can Israel’s ‘Mr. Security’ win another term?

With Israel heading into a definite election year, all politicians are officially in campaign mode. It is highly unlikely that this government will continue until November 2019, when elections are scheduled to be held. For the moment, if everything is held constant, the Likud remains in the lead to net the most seats in the next election. As political consultant Mitchell Barak remarked, ‘[Netanyahu’s] got no competition. . . He’s running against himself.’ Yet, the polls referenced above did not take into account the prospect of a viable centre or centre-left bloc forming ahead of the elections. Nor did they account for the likelihood that former IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz will announce a new party. Though Gantz’s party may not be able to surpass Likud in the next elections, it is expected to chip away at Likud’s lead.

Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether Netanyahu’s efforts to outmanoeuvre his rivals did more to damage them electorally, than him. Shortly after the crisis was resolved, a poll found that 58 percent of Israelis did not believe Netanyahu’s claims that the government should not be brought down at present due to a ‘sensitive security situation’ for which he provided no further explanation. This is compared with only 31 percent who felt his concerns for Israel’s national security were genuine.

In a region with countless hostile adversaries popping up like a never-ending game of whack-a-mole, Netanyahu’s reputation as ‘Mr. Security’ is a high bar to uphold. The public’s disapproval of his latest Gaza policies however, should be understood in the broader context. Despite a history of brash public statements calling for a tough response to Hamas, and terrorism in general, and having criticised his predecessors in office on numerous occasions for their handling of Hamas and Gaza, his actions in office indicate that he is risk-averse — in particular when it comes to employing military force, and is reluctant to commit to putting boots on the ground in Gaza. His past public statements stand in marked contrast to his actions in recent weeks, including working towards a ceasefire and allowing an influx of Qatari cash. Thus it is hardly surprising that residents of Gaza-border communities — a core base of Likud voters — and several of his coalition partners spent much of the past few weeks accusing him of being ‘weak’ on Gaza.

Moreover, in recent weeks Netanyahu has struggled to restore the public’s faith in his reputation as ‘Mr. Security.’ A Tel Aviv University poll earlier this month found 76 percent of Jewish Israelis thought that Netanyahu failed when dealing with Hamas. The increase in terror attacks in the West Bank in recent weeks has renewed protests against Netanyahu — once again, from members of his base, challenging his recent decisions regarding Gaza. Despite the recently launched Operation Northern Shield’s initial successes in uncovering Hizballah-built tunnels under the Israel-Lebanon border, many have raised questions as to whether the timing of the operation was politically motivated, in light of the hit to his reputation Netanyahu has experienced in recent weeks, and with the prospect of indictments hanging over his head.

Though polls indicate that Netanyahu averted the prospect of early elections for now and has, for the moment, avoided a referendum on his handling of Gaza, the situation with Hamas in both Gaza and the West Bank has yet to be stabilised. Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent Netanyahu can proceed with the arrangements with Qatar, absent broader public support. It remains to be seen whether Israel’s ‘Mr. Security’ can prevail in the next elections, or whether Netanyahu has run out of political life lines.


Lauren Mellinger is a doctoral candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and a 2018-19 Israel Institute Doctoral Fellow. She is also a former senior editor of Strife’s blog and journal. Her research specializes in Israeli counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national security decision-making, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. You can follow her on Twitter @Lauren_M04.


Image source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Netanyahu_campaign_posters_in_Jerusalem.jpg

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Benjamin Netanyahu, early election, Gaza, Gaza crisis, Hamas, Israel, Palestine

Are Hamas rockets terrorism? Hollywood weighs in

June 30, 2016 by Lauren Mellinger

By: Lauren Mellinger

QassamRocket

On June 20, 2016, NBC Universal (Universal Cable Productions) filed a lawsuit in a California federal court against its insurer, Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company. At first glance the case appears to be a typical dispute over a contract – a Hollywood production company is suing its insurer for failure to pay the expenses incurred due to last minute decisions made by the production company in response to the last round of fighting between Hamas and Israel during the summer of 2014. Yet, at the centre of the case lies the question: Whether Hamas’s rocket attacks during that conflict should be classified as a war between sovereign nations, or as the militant acts of a terrorist group.

Summer 2014: A Brief Overview of Operation Protective Edge

On June 12, 2014, three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped and murdered in the West Bank. Hamas would later claim responsibility for the attack but in the ensuing weeks, Israel cracked down on Hamas operatives in the West Bank, and Hamas in Gaza responded with a barrage of rocket fire. On July 7, over 85 rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel, for which Hamas claimed responsibility. The next day, the Israel Defense Forces launched Operation Protective Edge. Neither Israel nor Hamas wanted the conflict to escalate – becoming the third in a series of rounds in a war of attrition that has existed between the two sides since Hamas took control of Gaza in June 2007. The operation lasted seven weeks, ending in a cease-fire on August 26.

Now for the obvious question – Why is the operation suddenly being featured in The Hollywood Reporter?

Enter Hollywood

In the summer of 2015, USA network aired the miniseries Dig, the television show at the centre of this lawsuit. When production began the previous summer, the plan was for the mystery-conspiracy-thriller which is set in Jerusalem to film on location in Israel – the location shoot being integral to the creative process. Indeed at a panel at that summer’s annual Comic-Con, Dig’s creators boasted that “[s]hooting there [in Jerusalem] is paramount to the story in capturing the vividness and emphasizing the characters of the show.”

But when the violence broke out that June, only the pilot episode had been filmed. Following a week-long unplanned hiatus (an expensive undertaking for a production company, especially on an overseas location shoot), Universal opted to relocate filming to New Mexico and Croatia for the duration of production for that season. Due to the unanticipated relocation, Universal incurred $6.9 million in unforeseen costs. When Universal submitted a claim to its insurer, Atlantic, for reimbursement, the company denied the claim.

So far – a typical contractual dispute. But now for the added twist:

According to Universal Cable Productions, of which USA Network is a subsidiary, after the violence broke out, the U.S. State Department attributed the rocket attacks to Hamas. At that point, Universal argues, it submitted a claim to Atlantic, which then denied coverage.

In their complaint, Universal maintains that Atlantic’s rationale for failing to reimburse the production company contravenes the official policy of the U.S. government, which to date has not recognised Hamas as a sovereign government. Indeed according to the documents filed with the court, Universal argues that:

“[t]he United States government has officially designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation. Nevertheless, Atlantic has ignored the United States government position and applicable law. It claims Hamas is a sovereign or quasi-sovereign government over the Gaza Strip (even though Atlantic admits the Gaza Strip is not a recognized sovereign nation), in a self-serving attempt to invoke the war exclusion and avoid its coverage obligations.”

Atlantic maintains that the company denied Universal’s claim on the grounds that, per the terms of the contract, coverage is excluded for war or warlike actions. According to documents filed with the court, Atlantic stated that the company informed Universal in a letter dated July 28, 2014 that at the time “the terrorism coverage should not apply” to the events of July 2014, as Hamas’s actions did not target either the United States or its policies, and that “the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury has not certified the [Hamas/Israel] events as acts of terrorism.”

Barring any issue of justiciability per U.S. law, should the case proceed, the California federal court will be forced to confront an issue that has seemingly confounded policymakers and international jurists since January 2006: How to define Hamas.

The Challenge of Defining Hamas

While it is too early in the proceedings to state with certainty, the likelihood is that Atlantic is not taking a stand on political grounds. Rather, it is more likely that they saw the amount incurred by Universal when production was moved at the eleventh hour, and looked for a loophole that would allow them to avoid payment. The fact that Atlantic can even ask the court to entertain its argument is due to what has amounted over the past decade, if not longer, to an “accepted ambiguity” in international law and policymaking regarding Hamas.

This “accepted ambiguity” with respect to accurately classifying Hamas is primarily the result of two factors: first, the fact that the organisation’s victory in the 2006 elections caught Israel and the international community off guard, and many government officials, academics and foreign policy experts found it difficult to explain how an entity, regarded by many as a terrorist organisation, could ascend to power through a democratic process without first having relinquished its armed strategy. (This element of surprise certainly applied to the Bush administration, which had invested in the Palestinian Authority as part of a larger effort to promote democratic governance in the region, and at the time, had encouraged the Palestinians to proceed with the elections.) The second factor has been the subsequent intellectual inertia of policymakers who have failed to adequately respond to the threat posed by the Hamas’s transformation from a terrorist organisation, to a democratically elected terrorist organisation, now with actual governing responsibilities and access to state budgets and other resources.

On January 25, 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, when its Change and Reform party list won 74 out of 132 seats. In the wake of the results, some counterterrorism analysts and Middle East specialists argued that participating in democratic elections, and subsequently serving in a government, would result in the group’s eventual moderation. Yet, notwithstanding the periodic moderate statements made by some members of their leadership, Hamas’s actions since the election wholly contradict the assertion that participation in politics will ultimately tame them. Hamas, since coming to power and becoming the de facto government in Gaza, has implemented a system of government that largely adheres to the movement’s core principles – espoused in a founding document the organisation has yet to officially renounce. This includes adhering to the use of violence, and refusing to recognise Israel. Hence, serving in the capacity of a democratically elected government has not impeded Hamas’s efforts to further its militant ideological goals.

In short:

Is Hamas a terrorist organisation? Yes.

Is Hamas a government? Yes.

Is Hamas currently in de facto control of the Gaza Strip? Yes, for the time being, in light of their takeover of the coastal enclave in June 2007, and until such time as the Palestinians hold new legislative elections (or the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority manages to reclaim control over Gaza.)

The challenge for policymakers is to understand the nature of the adversary they are confronting and formulate policies to mitigate the threat posed. It is long overdue for policymakers (and academics) to embrace a new paradigm with respect to Hamas – that of the hybrid terrorist organisation.[1]

In his latest book Global Alert, Israeli counterterrorism scholar Boaz Ganor has proposed a definition for hybrid terrorist organisations. Ganor’s model consists of a single organisation comprised of three interrelated wings: first, the terrorist or guerrilla wing, per the classic definitions. To this a second wing is added – a political wing, that enables the organisation to participate in institutional politics, where it can gain legitimacy, albeit gradually. Lastly, such groups often maintain a robust social-welfare network, the purpose of which is to ensure a steady stream of new recruits to the organisation over time.[2]

That an organisation can exist as a “hybrid” challenges the theory, widely accepted in both academia and among policymakers, that an armed group’s decision to participate in electoral politics is an automatic indication of its eventual transition into a “legitimate” political actor (i.e., a political party that has abandoned its armed strategy.)[3]  Yet, groups like Hamas are challenging the conventional wisdom. In her study of Islamist terrorist and guerrilla groups in transition in the Middle East, scholar Krista Wiegand found that an organisation’s existence as a hybrid or a “dual-status” group does not presuppose the group’s eventual transition to a non-violent political party. Rather, it reflects a rational choice. According to Wiegand, for armed groups that embody a hybrid status, “the use of political violence is a strategic rational choice under certain conditions, while under other conditions, non-violent political participation is more rational . . . violence and non-violence are not mutually exclusive choices.”[4]

In other words, a hybrid group has the best of both worlds – the opportunity to slowly gain international legitimacy while obtaining access to state resources, without ever having to forsake the use of violence.

What Happens Next?

Given the international community’s glacially slow response to understanding the threat posed by hybrid organisations, it is likely that the immediate effect of Universal’s lawsuit will be on Israel’s relationship with Hollywood. In 2014, Dig was not the only Hollywood production filming in Israel that opted to relocate due to the ongoing violence in Gaza. Indeed, one day before USA pulled production from Israel, the FX series Tyrant also decided to move production for season one to Turkey due to the hostilities. Production on The Dovekeepers, a new biblical miniseries that CBS originally intended to film on location in Israel, was relocated to Malta. That decisions such as defining Hamas may be subject to the ad hoc rulings of lower courts may hamper Israel’s efforts to entice foreign production companies to consider Israel when looking for suitable foreign locales for film and television projects.

Still, the growing challenge that hybrid organisations such as Hamas pose to Israel is by no means exclusively a challenge for Israel. Modern history is replete with examples of armed groups that have eventually transitioned to non-violent political parties. At present, what sets Hamas (and for that matter, groups such as the Lebanese Hizballah) apart from other armed organisations that have undergone some form of transition is an issue that lies at the heart of this lawsuit – are these organisations in fact in the process of transitioning? Or rather, do they embody a new type of security challenge for democratic states?

The latter is more likely in the case of Hamas. Therefore, those states that opt to designate only the militant wing of an organisation such as Hamas as a terrorist organisation, excluding the political arm of the organisation, are doing little more than creating an artificial distinction. By effectively enshrining a false dichotomy into law – that an organisation can either be a “terrorist organisation” or “the political wing of an armed group” – the state fails to account for the organisational and operational reality of hybrid groups, namely, that existence as a hybrid is a rational choice, not to be misconstrued with the initial phase in an eventual transition a legitimate political party. Only with an appropriate understanding of such groups can states begin to devise adequate policies to mitigate the threat such groups pose to their security.

 

 

Lauren Mellinger is a doctoral candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and a senior editor of Strife’s blog and journal. Her research specializes in Israeli counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national security decision-making, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. You can follow her on Twitter @Lauren_M04

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] For a more in depth understanding of the emerging concept of the “hybrid” organisation see: Boaz Ganor, Global Alert: The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism and the Challenge to the Liberal Democratic World (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 73-83; Amichai Magen, “Hybrid War and the ‘Gulliverization’ of Israel,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 5(1) (2011): 59-72; Benedetta Berti, Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins  University Press, 2013); Jeroen de Zeeuw, “Understanding the Political Transformation of Rebel Movements,” in ed. Jeroen de Zeeuw, From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2008); Krista E. Wiegand, Bombs Over Ballots: Governance by Islamist Terrorist and Guerrilla Groups (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2010).

[2] Ganor, Global Alert, p. 74.

[3] See Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Arie Perliger, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups (London: Routledge, 2003); Marina Ottoway, “Islamists and Democracy: Keep the Faith,” The New Republic, June 6 and 13, 2005.

[4] Wiegand, Bombs Over Ballots, p. 75-76.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: feature, Hamas, Hollywood, Israel, Palestine

An analysis of Omar: a film by Hany Abu-Assad

December 11, 2015 by Bradley Lineker

By: Bradley Lineker

Author’s note: The film, Omar, was released on 30 May 2014. Analysis herein contains spoilers.

Omar - Palestinian film by Hany Abu-Assad 2013 - Cartel salta muro

 

Omar, as the latest film written and directed by Hany Abu-Assad, is a compelling political drama set in the West Bank that skilfully depicts the dangerous spider’s web of Israeli occupation around a young Palestinian dissident and his love, after he takes part in an act of rebellion with his two childhood friends.

The film begins with Omar (played by Adam Baktri) illegally climbing the 18-foot West Bank separation wall to visit his high-school sweetheart, Nadia (Leem Lubany). Soon after, Omar and his two friends, Anjam (Samer Bisharat), and Nadia’s brother, Tarek (Eyad Hourani), attack an Israeli checkpoint. Because of this, Omar is later captured and then coerced into working as a double agent by the Le Carré-esque Israeli Agent Rami (Waleed Zuaiter). Rami releases Omar from prison, who, amid intense stigmatization, attempts to find out who betrayed him and his friends. Events escalate until Omar is left almost totally under the thrall of Agent Rami, whose influence erodes the trust that existed between him and those around him, and Omar is gradually pushed towards killing his two friends to save himself and Nadia.

The film’s artistry is seen in its subtle portrayal of the ways in which the occupation frames and shapes the characters. Visually superb, it moves from darkened, tight-angled shots of the Israeli prison where Omar was held, to the tiny interconnected Palestinian neighbourhoods, into wider, sun-drenched backdrops of wasteland where Omar and his friends try to get time and space away from the occupation forces. Much of these shots are centered around the tight frames of the two main characters, Omar and Nadia, which, while supposedly intimate, further contributes to the unrelenting sense of latent danger – especially when the viewer is led to believe that Nadia may be the Israeli snitch.

In some ways, the occupation itself is the core focus of the film that, while dramatised through a tight group of characters, nevertheless underplays much of what happens on the screen. This is because the film offers a fascinating portrait of the subtle ways that the occupation frames and then insidiously reshapes existence: it is depicted as an infection that seeps into the natural and unspoken gaps between friends and family, and in these dark edges, steadily festers, making the individual suspect everyone of betrayal.

The wider Israeli occupation is itself only abstractly introduced at the start through Omar climbing the imposing 18-foot separation wall, and is only then explained as the narrative unfolds. Interestingly, it is Agent Rami, the film’s tangible manifestation of the Israeli occupation regime, who offers the most cogent explanation. He describes how one petty-resistance leader is assassinated, another comes to take his place, and thus his job is a cyclical quest to gain leverage on whomever comes into power – a process that serves as a metaphor for the wider occupation. Moreover, the highly-visible technology of the occupation forces – from their stun grenades, high-tech assault rifles, helicopters and prison systems – is contrasted with the three friends, whose attempts at resistance rely on an old bolt-action rifle and meetings in wasteland areas. This minimalist-critique arguably comes to a head at the end of the film, as Agent Rami attempts to compare his pistol to the svelte-body of a woman. The viewer can’t help but compare his hollow and half-hearted metaphor to the reality of the sacrifices Omar has made throughout the film for Nadia, his own love. This restrained, often abstract, way of discussing the conflict is highly effective, as it sidesteps much of the politics that weighs-down the Israel-Palestine issue, and allows the viewer to reach their own conclusions about what they see on the screen.

This subtle and sympathetic approach to the characters is also afforded to the society in which they live. The formal social code that governs onscreen Palestinian interaction is so well built up during the course of the film that, without it being a distraction, it artfully weaves into the overall narrative, enabling the viewer to understand and sympathise with the constraints on Omar towards the end. For instance, the scene where Omar is talking to Nadia in Anjam’s house, a house and family that the viewer knows Omar was set-up to give away, was truly haunting in view of portraying how the social structures have essentially trapped them in their respective roles, despite Omar figuring out how Anjam has betrayed him. Within such scenes is the implicit statement of how the influence of the occupation regime itself warps such social formalities, so that they become constraining – this is certainly true of Agent Rami’s intimation of Nadia’s infidelity.

Despite the film’s great strengths, its highly compact plot felt unnecessarily convoluted at times, which, coupled with its relatively sparse use of dialogue, could prove to be confusing in patches. For instance, much of the ending depended upon one critical piece of dialogue between Omar and Nadia, which, if missed, would have left the viewer unsure about Omar’s actions at the end. While the betrayal was artfully constructed to complement the insidiousness of the occupation, it could have been depicted in clearer terms. Moreover, there were some plot-holes, such as the ambush scene, where the trio of friends each take up an AK-47, despite being depicted earlier in the film painstakingly learning how to use a bolt-action rifle. But on the whole, these issues are largely irrelevant for appreciating the film’s style and purpose.

The dark beauty of the film lies in the way it entombs the main character in a smothering claustrophobia – from having to daily climb an 18 foot wall to see his love, or facing the ultimate choice of killing either Agent Rami or Anjam – which powerfully portrays the nature of occupation to the viewer. In sum, Omar is a visually beautiful film with an exceptional way of introducing very large and emotional themes, but in subtle and sympathetic ways.

Filed Under: Film Review Tagged With: Hany Abu-Assad, Israel, Omar, Palestine

Review: 'The Tail Wags the Dog: International Politics and the Middle East' by Efraim Karsh

December 3, 2015 by Bradley Lineker and Samar Batrawi

Reviewed by: Bradley Lineker & Samar Batrawi

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Efraim Karsh. The Tail Wags the Dog: International Politics and the Middle East. London & New York: Bloomsbury/ Continuum, 2015. ISBN: 978-14-72-91046-2. Pp. 236. Hardcover. £21.99.

The Tail Wags the Dog: International Politics and the Middle East is the latest book from Efraim Karsh, professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and King’s College London. While situated in his wider project of challenging the supposed orthodoxies inherent in the study of the region, Karsh’s core argument in this book is the alleged need to shift explanations for the region’s instability away from external pressures and instead place them squarely upon ‘Middle-Easterners’[i] themselves.[ii]

While the simplicity of the book’s title intimates that this argument is embedded into a straightforward package, the ambiguity of the subtitle (for the uninitiated, it reads: ‘a complex discourse in a complex geographical region’) hints at the dichotomy between the stated aim and the text’s actual structure and content. On the one hand, Karsh manifestly fails to give a voice to the apparent orthodoxy inherent to scholarship on the Middle East – which considerably weakens his claim to disprove it – and on the other hand, Karsh, instead of taking an approach based on assessing the work of other scholars, chooses to try and prove how this other position is incorrect by retelling the history of the modern Middle-East across a paltry 192 pages of generously-spaced text. While these two dichotomies would be themselves enough to mar the text, together, with the book’s polemical style, Karsh’s blithe historical determinism, the use of a narrow selection of English-orientated sources, and the seemingly random selection of chapter topics, they mortally undermine any attempt to construct a convincing platform to change approaches to the Middle East.

Situated within the same paradigm of Karsh’s other work, then, this book is at best a  sketch of the professor’s reading of the formation and present make-up of the modern Middle East, book-ended between an argument that does not explicitly resonate in the detail of the text; at worst, it is a disjointed collection of chapters written to support a charged political stance without enough meaningful evidence-based discussion, aesthetically covered by a singular-deterministic narrative on a region known for its complexity. Indeed, ‘Middle Easterners’ (as Karsh calls them[iii]) are subject to sweeping and unverifiable generalisations, such as the following assessment:

‘[f]or Western observers, the passage “from dark into light” that was the “Arab Spring” meant transition to a liberal, secular democracy. For Middle Easterners it meant a return to the Islamic sociopolitical order that had underpinned the region for over a millennium[,] as the schizophrenic state system established in its place after World War I failed to fill the void left by its destruction.’[iv]  Perhaps the most toxic misunderstanding of ‘Middle Easterners’ and Muslims in Karsh’s book is illustrated by his casual replacement of the word ‘Islamist’ by ‘Islamic’, equating the collective, organised, and political Islam, denoted by the word ‘Islamist’, with the personal religious devotion designated by ‘Islamic’.[v]

The book begins in the early 20th century[vi] and is thereafter divided thematically into 8 other chapters that follow a loose chronological structure and which range from the Israel/Palestine conflict,[vii] American policy in Iran,[viii] Soviet engagement in the Middle-East,[ix] an assessment of American policy since 2001,[x] as well as a breezy chapter on today’s Middle East. While historical in scope, the book is stylistically a right-leaning polemic tentatively based in international relations discourse. Indeed, one of the core historical premises used by Karsh is that Islam was born in fire[xi] and that this ‘imperial aggressiveness,’[xii] and the wider predisposition towards violence,[xiii] survived the fall of the Ottoman Empire ‘to haunt Islamic and Middle Eastern politics … [in] the twenty-first century.’[xiv]

However, at times, it appears that Karsh has constructed – with a remarkably fine-tooth comb – a specific historical narrative, coloured by patterns of thinking that have emerged in the post-American intervention world, to support his own political stance on the modern Middle East. His own narrative, as he openly admits, is to expel the influence of foreign powers on the Middle East;[xv] to thereby pointedly blame indigenous groups for the relative instability. This is mirrored in the detail used to prove fairly basic points, which does not, as he surmises, facilitate reader understanding but rather seems self-serving and out of place. This is certainly evident in his discussions of the birth of Israel and the conflict with the Palestinians: the former is accorded significant attention and detail – to promulgate a specific founding narrative – whereas, in the case of the latter, he makes no mention of the forced displacement in 1948, excepting one cryptic defensive paragraph that makes the bold claim that Palestinians left despite the wishes of the Jewish forces.[xvi] Moreover, in the sub-section ‘Courting Hitler’, Karsh lists every Arab overture to the great enemy of ‘perfidious Albion’[xvii] in the 1930s and 1940s in a way that is inescapably spiteful, especially upon reflection of the way his argument unfolds in the rest of the book. For instance, while Arab overtures towards Hitler are judged in moral terms,[xviii] Karsh upholds the same patterns of behaviour – of playing one great power off against another – as the accepted norm in international relations in his depictions of the Cold War (he essentially glorifies Egypt on this regard)[xix]. Finally, Karsh often criticises the Middle East’s preponderance to harmful religious exclusivism, while, often within the same sentence, arguing that Israel is an example against this trend – despite evidently being an entity enthused with patterns of institutionalised religious exclusivism.[xx]

While ultimately lop-sided to Karsh’s political paradigm, the book does manage to provide a decent overview of some of the events that it covers: such as the politics behind the post-First World War fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire’s possessions in the Levant and ancient Mesopotamia, as well as a good American-based summary of the intelligence failure during the Iranian Revolution. However, even the book’s strongest sections are marked by the fact that the issues they cover are always better covered elsewhere in more specialised studies.

 

Bradley Lineker is currently a fully-funded ESRC doctoral candidate in the War Studies Department, King’s College London, where he studies refugee shelter provision in Jordan. He has extensive experience working as a consulting research analyst with the UN and the private sector on contexts like Israel/Palestine, Jordan, Kenya, Somalia and Syria. Follow him @BradleyLineker.

Samar Batrawi is a doctoral candidate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where she studies social movements in Palestine. She has worked for the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling in Palestine, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation in London, and the Clingendael Institute for International Relations in The Hague. Follow her at @SamarBatrawi.

 

 

Notes:

[i] Karsh, The Tail Wags the Dog, p. 2, p. 157.
[ii] Ibid., pp. 1-2.
[iii] Ibid., p. 157.
[iv] Ibid., p. 183.
[v] Ibid., p. 188.
[vi] Ibid., p.9.
[vii] Ibid., pp. 31-48, pp. 49-62.
[viii] Ibid., pp. 63-80.
[ix] Ibid., pp. 81-102.
[x] Ibid., pp. 153-174.
[xi] Ibid., p. 188.
[xii] Ibid., p. 155.
[xiii] Ibid., p. 187.
[xiv] Ibid., p. 155.
[xv] Ibid., p. 2.
[xvi] Ibid., p. 59.
[xvii] Ibid., p. 19.
[xviii] Ibid., pp. 35-37.
[xix] Ibid., pp. 1-2.
[xx] Ibid., p. 189.

 

 

 

 

Filed Under: Book Review Tagged With: islam, Karsh, Middle East, muslim, Palestine, Syria

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