governance

Warning About Conflicts and Pandemics: How to Get Heard by Decision-Makers

July 1, 2020 by Christoph Meyer

by Christoph Meyer

As is often the case with warnings about conflict, there was a costly lack of timely responses to early warnings about the COVID-19 pandemic. Such delays are not necessarily just the fault of decision-makers. Expert warners can also do better. To be heard, they need to understand the world of policymakers, take risks and spell out expected consequences and actionable recommendations.

Could the mounting death toll, pain and costs from the coronavirus crisis have been prevented or at least lessened? Leaders and senior officials in the US and the UK have been accused of recklessly ignoring warnings, whilst Chinese officials even stand accused of suppressing them. The pandemic has been labelled the “worst intelligence failure in U.S. history” or UK’s “greatest science policy failure for a generation”. Future public inquiries will hopefully address not just questions of accountability but also, more importantly, which lessons should be learned.

Do Not Just Blame the Decision-Makers: Expert Warners Also Need to Do Better

However, even today there are striking parallels between the warning-response gap in conflict and mass atrocity prevention and the coronavirus crisis. Our extensive research on cases ranging from Rwanda 1994 to Crimea 2014 found a wide-spread tendency in the literature to overestimate the supply of “warnings” from inside and outside of government and to underestimate how difficult persuasive warning actually is. Warners are typically portrayed as altruistic, truthful and prescient, yet doomed to be ignored by irresponsible, ignorant and self-interested leaders. Imagine princess Cassandra of Troy trying to convince Mayor Vaughn from Jaws.

The first in-depth investigations of the decision-making on COVID-19 suggest that at least some of the warnings in the US case suffered from credibility problems whereas UK experts were criticised for not warning more forcefully, explicitly and earlier. This raises important questions about individual expert’s motivations, capabilities and strategies, but also about structural and cultural factors that can impede early, credible, actionable and, above all, persuasive warnings.

Expert Warners Need to Learn What the Obstacles Are for Their Messages to Be Heard

In our recent book we compare warning about war to the challenge of conquering an obstacle course against various competitors and often adverse weather conditions. The most successful competitors will be those who combine natural ability, high motivation, regular training, and risk-taking with a bit of luck. Many expert warners do not realise what the obstacles are, nor have they been trained to overcome them or are willing to take some of the professional risks involved in warning.

We found that the most effective warners tend to be those who (i) have acquired some personal trust as a result of previous personal contacts with decision-makers, (ii) can offer a positive professional reputation and track-record in their previous analysis and warnings, (iii) understand decision-makers’ agendas and “hot-buttons” (iv), share the same broad political or ideational outlook, and finally, (v) are willing to take some professional risks to get their message across.

Based on our research, we found that in order to increase their chances of being heard by decision-makers, expert warners should consider the following eight points.

1. Understand That Decision-Makers Work in a Completely Different Environment.

First and foremost, expert warners need to understand that senior officials inhabit a different world to themselves. Most experts tend to consume information from a relatively narrow range of quality sources focused on a specific subject area. They evaluate the quality of the method and evidence behind causal claims and, sometimes, the potential to solve a given problem. Warnings are relatively rare in this world. In contrast, decision-makers live in a world where warnings from different corners are plentiful and competing demands for their attention is constant and typically tied to requests for more government spending. They are trained to look for the interest behind the knowledge claim and are prone to see warnings as politically biased and potentially self-interested manipulation attempts. A New York Times investigation suggests, for example, that at least some of the coronavirus warnings were discounted as a result of perceived political bias regarding China.

2. Credibility Is Key to Who Is Being Noticed and Heard.

Even experts without an apparent or hidden agenda can and do contradict each other, including those working in the same field. On any given issue, there is rarely just one authoritative source of knowledge, but multiple individuals or organisations that supply knowledge. The cacophony gets greater when assessing the proportionality and unintended effects of the measures to control the disease, including the inadvertent increase of non-COVID deaths and severe loss of quality of life.

When politicians claim to be only following “expert advice” as was the case in the UK, they obscure necessary decisions about difficult trade-offs and dilemmas arising from diverse expert advice. Decision-makers need to decide whose advice to accept and to what extent. This is why credibility is key to who is being noticed and believed.

That means warners need to ask themselves whether they are likely to be perceived as credible or rather with suspicion by the people that ultimately take political decisions. If the latter is the case, they can try to target more receptive scientists sitting on official expert committee instead or organisations closer to decision-makers. They can publish pieces in news media likely to be consumed by politicians rather than those they might prefer themselves. Or they can boost their credibility by teaming up with others through open-letters or joint statements.

3. To Cut Through the Noise, You Might Have to Take Risks.

The next challenge is for warnings to stick-out from the everyday information and reporting “noise”. Officials may, for instance, choose an unusual channel or mode of communication. We know that ambassadors have used demarches as relatively rare and more formal formats to highlight the importance of their analysis rather than their routine reports.

Senior officials might cut through when they are ready to put their career and professional reputation on the line as Mukesh Kapila did when warning about Darfur in 2004 on BBC Radio 4. This lesson can also be drawn in the case of Capt. Brett E. Crozier who was fired after copying-in too many people into his outspoken warning about the spread of the virus on the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt.

Many external experts as well as intelligence analysts, such as Professor for Epidemiology, Mark Woolhouse, are satisfied just to be “heard and understood”. They do not seek for their advice to be accepted, prioritised and acted upon. However, sometimes a more pro-active and risk-taking approach is needed as was arguably the case with COVID-19 according to Professor Jonathan Ball: “Perhaps some of us should have got up in front of BBC News and said you lot ought to be petrified because this is going to be a pandemic that will kill hundreds of thousands of people. None of us thought this was a particularly constructive thing to do, but maybe with hindsight we should have. If there had been more voices, maybe politicians would have taken this a bit more seriously.”

4. Spell Out a Range of Expected Consequences.

Given leaders’ constant need to prioritise, experts need to spell out the range of expected consequences. They need to dare to be more precise about what the likelihood is for something to happen, the timing, scale and nature of the consequences. Too often we found warnings to be rather vague or hedged. Similarly to the account by Balls, an in-depth Reuter’s investigation also suggests that UK ‘scientists did not articulate their fears forcefully to the government’ and could have spelled out the probable deaths involved earlier.

5. Focus on What Matters to Decision-Makers, Not Yourself.

Warners need to focus on what matters most to decision-makers, not to them. One of the most successful warnings we came across in our research on conflict warnings highlighted not just the humanitarian suffering, but also how this escalation would resonate with important domestic constituencies such as evangelical Christians and how it might harm electoral chances. NGOs focused on conflict prevention and peace may find it easier to make their case if they also highlight the indirect and less immediate effects of instability on migration, jobs and security.

6. Understand the Reference Points and Contexts That Decision-Makers Work With in Any Given Situation.

Warners should try to understand and, if necessary, challenge the cognitive reference points that underpin leaders’ thinking. In the area of foreign policy, decision-makers often draw on lessons learnt from seemingly similar or recent cases from the region. For instance, preventive action against ethnic conflict in Macedonia in 2001 benefited from fresh lessons learnt from the Kosovo conflict. Spelling out what precisely is similar or different in present threats in relation to lessons learnt from previous familiar cases can encourage decision-makers to question and change their beliefs.

In the current crisis, one reason why senior officials in Europe may have underestimated the danger of coronavirus was that their reference point and planning assumption was a flu epidemic. Many also still remembered that the UK was accused of overreacting to the much milder than expected swine flu in 2009. In contrast, leaders in many Asian countries had other more dangerous viruses as their cognitive reference points and underpinning their pandemic plans.

7. Know What Kind of Evidence and Methods Decision-Makers Trust the Most.

Experts should try to understand what kind of evidence and methods decision-makers and their close advisors consider the most credible. In foreign affairs, decision-makers often trust secret intelligence based on human sources more than assessment based on expert judgement using open-sources. Other decision-makers like indicators and econometric models as compared to qualitative expert judgements. If unfamiliar with these particular methods, they could seek to collaborate with those experts who are can translate their findings into the most suitable language.

8. Include Actionable Recommendations With the Warnings.

The best warnings are those that contain also actionable recommendations. Decision-makers are more receptive to warnings that give them information on which they can act today, ideally including a range of options. The influential model by the Imperial College team appeared to resonate so well not only because of the method they used, but also because it gave decision-makers a clear sense of how death rates might develop for different policy options under discussion.

The dilemma for warners is that they can undermine their own credibility by suggesting policy options that are considered politically unfeasible. According to a Reuters account, the lock-down measures adopted in China and Italy were considered initially inconceivable for the UK and thus not considered in-depth early on. Warners do need to resist a narrow understanding of what is feasible and sometimes need to push to widen the menu of policy options considered.

It Is Also up to Government Bureaucracies and Decision-Makers to Be Open for Warnings

All of this is not to deny that the key explanation may ultimately lie with unreceptive decision-makers who cannot deal with uncomfortable advice or who create blame-shifting cultures in which many officials just seek to cover their backs. We should approach any justification why leaders did not notice or believe a warning with a healthy dose of scepticism. Politicians can be expected to ring-fence at least some of their time to regularly consider new and serious threats to the security and well-being of citizens, regardless of distractions by media headlines. There should be clarity about who is responsible to act or not to act on warnings. They should ask probing questions of experts that bring them reassuring news to tease out key uncertainties and down-side risks as was allegedly lacking in the UK case. They need to ensure there is sufficient diversity in the advice they are getting through expert committees, create channels for fast-tracking warnings and opportunities for informally expressing dissent with prevailing wisdom. Leaders have a responsibility to build cultures in which high-quality warnings can be expressed without fear of punishment or career disadvantage.

One of the questions to be addressed in postmortems will be whether the relationship of politicians to the intelligence community in the US and to health professionals in the UK was conducive to timely warning and preventive action. Have experts allowed themselves to be politicised? Have they cried wolf too often and on too many issues? Or, conversely, have they been affected by group-think and hesitated to ask difficult questions sooner and more forcefully? Keeping expert warners in the picture matters greatly to learning the right lessons from the crisis. The best experts with the most important messages need to find ways of cutting through, regardless of who happens to sit in the White House, Downing Street, the Élysée Palace or the Chancellery. Only with the benefit of hindsight is warning and acting on it easy.

This article is a reposting of Christoph Meyer’s article with the kind cooperation of Peacelab, please follow this link to see the original.

Christoph Meyer is the co-author (with Chiara De Franco and Florian Otto) of “Warning about War: Conflict, Persuasion and Foreign Policy” and leads a research project on Learning and Intelligence in European Foreign Policy. Support from the European Research Council and the UK Economic and Social Research Council is gratefully acknowledged.

France: Aftershocks of Terror Attacks

November 14, 2016 by Nicolas Seidman

By: Nicolas Seidman

A woman stands by a makeshift memorial in tribute to the victims of the deadly Bastille Day attack at the Promenade des Anglais in Nice (AFP Photo/Valery Hache)

This past year has been an unequivocal security challenge to the French government. November 13^th marks the one-year anniversary of the Paris attacks, which left 130 dead and 368 wounded, as well as the State of emergency, still currently in place. France has sustained three additional significant terrorist attacks since last November, adding over 500 people to the list of casualties. [1] In response, the government has made efforts to improve its prosecution legislation, reform its internal intelligence networks, and expand its counter-violent extremism programs. Despite such well-intentioned actions, this progress has been largely negligible. The failure to implement a coherent counter-terrorism strategy rather than rely on emergency measures continues to make France vulnerable to future Paris style attacks.

Governmental responses to the attack

The French government has improved some of its counter-terrorism capabilities since the Bataclan attack, yet must pass legislation to better address the security concerns that the state of emergency cannot. The State of emergency includes the ability of the police to conduct mass raids, heighten surveillance, detain and put under house arrest all those deemed potential threats to the State.[2] This has led to over 3,000 raids, 743 weapons seized, 341 individuals in police custody, 571 judicial proceedings, 407 house arrests and 10 mosques closed for extremist ties.[3] Despite the impressive numbers, only 28 individuals have been prosecuted under anti-terrorism legislation since February and has not increased considerably since.

Soldiers patrols on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, southern France, Wednesday, July 20, 2016. Joggers, cyclists and sun-seekers are back on Nice's famed Riviera coast, a further sign of normal life returning on the Promenade des Anglais where dozens were killed in last week's Bastille Day truck attack. Photo by Dan Kitwood/Getty Images — Soldiers patrols on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, southern France, Wednesday, July 20, 2016. Joggers, cyclists and sun-seekers are back on Nice’s famed Riviera coast, a further sign of normal life returning on the Promenade des Anglais where dozens were killed in last week’s Bastille Day truck attack. Photo by Dan Kitwood/Getty Images

The failure to identify and correctly prosecute suspected terrorists highlights the necessity for a revamped counter-terrorism strategy. To this end, instances such as the deadly attack at a Church in Normandy in July underlines the failure of the State of emergency to provide a credible counter-terrorism strategy. The perpetrator was put under house arrest after trying to join ISIS twice. Despite the clear presence of a potential foreign fighter the assailant was allowed four hours to leave his premises every morning.[4] During this time, he was able to commit a terror attack in the church, killing a priest and injuring three others.[5]

France must continue to pass legislation to address the limitation of its counter-terrorism capabilities, such as internal intelligence reform and prosecution of terrorists. The government has begun, in some ways, to understand the issues with the State of Emergency. It has advanced to legislate twice on counter-terrorism since the November attacks; the law of surveillance of international electronic communications and the law against organized crime, terrorism, and their finance. The first law adds a new article to the domestic security law which facilitates surveillance of devices in suspect of terrorism-related activity. The second law provides prosecutors and judges with increased investigative power, allowing for more operation leeway in relation to the financing of organized crime and terrorism, as these two are often inter-related. These laws will likely enable a long-term solution.

Deadlock

Most of the government’s failure in formulating an effective counter-terrorism strategy is attributed to the disagreement between policy-makers. Most notable example of this was after the release of a parliamentary inquiry into the State’s method of fighting against terrorism since January 2015.[6] French Parliamentarian Mr. Fenech, who spearheaded the inquiry, underlined the importance of a streamlined, more effective national intelligence agency. The inquiry highlighted the failure of intelligence agencies to maintain surveillance of Said Kouachi (one of the Charlie Hebdo assailants) when he moved from Paris to Rouen and failed to prevent Samy Amimour (one of the Bataclan assailants) from leaving to Syria despite being black-listed.[7] He proposed to use the framework underlying the National Counter-Intelligence Centre (NCTC), created post-9/11 by the United States for a new agency.

However, the current Minister of the Interior refuses to recognize the significance of the report, emphasizing that a national agency would create communication fog between agencies. Without a coherent strategy, the deadlock between MPs will only widen even further, and France will continue to be vulnerable to another Paris-style attack.

Clear and present danger

Despite the setbacks French counter-terrorism strategy has made some progress on its counter-violent extremism programs. Prisons have provided a breeding ground for the radicalization of inmates. It is estimated that 68 percent of foreign fighters from France, who left to join ISIS, have served prison time.[8] Five detention centres have been created specifically to address radicalized individuals. Additionally, 60 Muslim councilors have been recruited to maintain the narrative of peace in the Islamic faith.

The jihadists of tomorrow

France now faces a greater diversity of terrorist profiles as oppose to those of the November attacks. More specifically, the country can expect to witness two, more prominent, types to emerge. The first are returning foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria. With the decline in the territory of the ISIS, the European Jihadists are due to return to their native countries. The majority of these foreign fighters’ hail from France. These fighters bring back with them both greater skills and motivation than their home-grown counterparts. Second are ‘flash-to-bang’ radicalized individuals.[9] These are seen in perpetrators like the one from the Nice attack. These individuals are not long-time proponents to the jihadist ideology. Instead, they become radicalized within weeks, not months. This impulsive radicalization makes it harder for these individuals to get flagged by security services and thus impervious to their pre-emptive measures.

Conclusion

The perception of public insecurity in France shifts the narrative in favour of the terrorists. Its citizens must be resilient and go about their lives un-wavered by the threats of terrorism. The government can begin by cultivating a coherent strategy that addresses the changing landscape of the threat, far from the State of emergency that has failed to serve it well.

Nicolas Seidman is a second-year War Studies undergraduate at King’s College London. He previously worked as a research assistant for the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Israel. His main areas of focus are Islamic radicalization in France, terrorist group cooperation, and COIN operations in the Sahel.

Notes:

[1] Magnaville (2 deaths), Nice (86 deaths and 434 wounded), and Normandy (1 death and 3 injured)

[2] “Mise En œuvre De L’état D’urgence Sur Le Territoire National / L’actu Du Ministère / Actualités – Ministère De L’Intérieur.” Http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Mise-en-aeuvre-de-l-etat-d-urgence-sur-le-territoire-national. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Mise-en-aeuvre-de-l-etat-d-urgence-sur-le-territoire-national.

[3] “Prorogation De L’état D’urgence / L’actu Du Ministère / Actualités - Ministère De L’Intérieur.” Http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Prorogation-de-l-etat-d-urgence2, www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Prorogation-de-l-etat-d-urgence2

[4] “EN DIRECT - Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray : L’un Des Assassins était Connu Des Services Antiterroristes.” Le Figaro, www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/07/26/01016-20160726LIVWWW00086-prise-d-otage-en-cours-dans-une-eglise-de-saint-etienne-du-rouvray-pres-de-rouen.php

[5] “Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray: L’un Des Auteurs était Connu Des Services Antiterroristes.” BFMTV, www.bfmtv.com/societe/en-direct-prise-d-otage-a-saint-etienne-du-rouvray-un-otage-est-mort-les-auteurs-abattus-par-la-police-1019683.html#content/contribution/edit

[6] “N° 3922 Tome 1 - Rapport D’enquête Relative Aux Moyens Mis En oeuvre Par L’Etat Pour Lutter Contre Le Terrorisme Depuis Le 7 Janvier 2015.” Assemblée Nationale ~ Les Députés, Le Vote De La Loi, Le Parlement Français, www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rap-enq/r3922-t1.asp

[7] “Commission D’enquête Sur Les Attentats: La France N’était “pas à La Hauteur” | Public Sénat.” Public Sénat, www.publicsenat.fr/lcp/politique/commission-denquete-attentats-france-netait-pas-hauteur-1415924

[8] “Radicalisation En France - Infogram, Charts & Infographics.” Create Online Charts & Infographics | Infogr.am, infogr.am/radicalisation_en_france4.

[9] “How Nice Represents Both the Dumbing Down and Growing Danger of Terror - The Washington Post.” Washington Post, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-nice-represents-both-the-dumbing-down-and-growing-danger-of-terror/2016/07/18/cd89c01c-4aa3-11e6-90a8-fb84201e0645_story.html

Image 1 credit: http://www.leparisien.fr/societe/attentat-de-nice-chez-les-moins-de-30-ans-la-tristesse-l-emporte-sur-la-peur-22-07-2016-5986921.php

Image 2 credit: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/05/pictures-of-the-day-5-august-2016/french-soldiers-patrol-the-promenade-des-anglais-in-nice-france/

Feature image credit: http://www.teenvogue.com/gallery/paris-attack-image-slideshow

Cyber risks to governance, Part III: Hyper-connectivity and its impact on state power

August 31, 2015 by Strife Staff

By: Christy Quinn

In an era of Snowden, Wikileaks, Dark Web and data breaches there have never been so many cyber risks associated with governance. This article is the third of a 3-part Strife series which examines three diverse aspects of cyber risks to governance. Andreas Haggman began by looking at the online market place Silk Road and its transformation of the online market place. Yuji Develle and Jackson Webster then examined cyber attribution in policymaking, and finally Strife Editor Christy Quinn examines the implications of hyper-connectivity.

A 2011 study by the technology company Cisco predicted that by 2020, over 50 billion devices will be connected via the internet.^[1] Relatively little research has been done into the impact of such a huge growth in networking technologies upon the power and shape of the state. The first boom in global communication technologies triggered by the invention of the telegraph in 1837 and the spread of railways had a transformative impact on the state’s ability to maintain social control and wage war. The telegraph massively increased the speed of information exchange between cities and outposts connected by railway routes. While this allowed for rapid mobilisation of troops for transportation, it also sped up the spread of ideas and ideologies between urban centres, threatening the states’ capabilities for censorship and curtailing the spread of revolutionary movements. During the European ‘Springtime of the Peoples’ revolutions in 1848, news regarding the successful uprisings of anti-monarchist revolutionaries spread like wildfire through the major cities, inspiring a plethora of local efforts to capitalise on long-held feelings of disenfranchisement.^[2]

While the development and expansion of network and communication technologies of the 19th century had a relatively limited direct impact on the average citizen in Europe, the rapid expansion of 21st century network technologies threatens to upturn the relationship between state and citizen on much more fundamental levels. The growth and increased density of digital networks through the internet, coupled with providing the average citizen with access to many different forms of communication technologies, is resulting in societal ‘hyper-connectivity’; speed and quantity of communication coupled with complex many-to-many socio-technical networks. These networks offer the capability to empower citizens by providing them with vast quantities of free information and the ability to massively expand their social relationships beyond their own physical limitations. The huge increases in the volume of information and communications exchanged between citizens has also been seen by policymakers to threaten their capability to monitor society for threats to national security.^{^[3]}

What is important to note is that these huge changes in power relationships brought by hyper-connectivity enable all sectors of society. The same effects that allow farmers in rural China to access weather forecasts or micro-finance for their crops empower political extremists to organise remotely and propel their political message across huge distances. Thomas Rid and Hecker have suggested that these network effects are particularly useful for militant extremists on the fringes of society and political debate. By utilising network communication technologies to organise and attract new followers, extremists can self-organise and maintain their own distinct political space without having to attempt to attract followers from wider society.^{^[4]} Just as ‘bronies’, a subculture of mostly young men and committed followers of ‘My Little Pony’ TV series, can have an outsized cultural impact despite their esoteric tastes, militant jihadists can dictate the terms of politics through choice violent interventions. As a result, hyper-connectivity challenges the power of the state to dictate political values to society.

The complexity and unpredictability of a hyper-connected society also poses challenges to state power. State power reflects in part the ability of the state to respond quickly to societal developments and threats to its sovereignty. Post-structural theorist Paul Virilio has argued that the processes of urbanisation in European Medieval societies forced states to adapt their means of enforcing sovereignty away from simply building walls around its holdings and instead to increase the speed and manoeuvrability of their military forces.^{^[5]} Hyper-connectivity poses further challenges in time and space; challenges to state power can emerge at any point within societal networks. For example, an investigation by cyber security firm TrapX found that medical devices in a hospital had been implanted with malware designed to steal data regarding patient records.^{^[6]} The implantation of network technologies into every facet of life have brought security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious actors, creating new spaces to contest state controls on the spread of information.

One of the most significant network technologies at the centre of the growth in information exchange is encryption. Encryption and the public key infrastructure (PKI) that supports it is a central technology to a hyper-connected society by providing economic transactions such as online commerce and personal communications with guarantees of secure communications. However, the huge growth in the volume of encrypted communications, particularly since the Snowden revelations on 2013, also have the power to disrupt the sovereignty of states.^{^[7]} The growth of crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin, which circumvent traditional banking systems and are extremely difficult to track by utilising complex encryption ‘blockchains’, pose a direct challenge to the state’s ability to regulate and control economic activity within its own sovereign territory. Hidden services offered through Tor encrypted networks, such as The Silk Road drugs market, demonstrate the potential of these technologies to challenge the state’s ability to enforce moral and legal codes in the economy.

Clearly, a hyper-connected society offers huge challenges for the bureaucratic modern state. The difficulties experienced by state security services and law enforcement in tackling Islamic State (ISIL) online recruitment and the rapid development of cyber crime networks are ultimately just the visible tip of the iceberg. The byproducts of hyper-connectivity, such as huge increases in the volume of information flows, increasing levels of highly encrypted communications and new societal behaviours such as cyber stalking all threaten major social upheavals over the next few decades. States such as Russia and Iran are seeking limit the connective capacity of their own citizens through the creation of ‘sovereign internets’ that can be controlled and separated from global networks at will. What is likely to be more successful is seeking to increase the reactive capacity of the state by adapting to this new reality. Whether policymakers like it or not, we now live in a hyper-connected society and it is time to consider how a hyper-connected state could work with it.

Christy Quinn studied International History at the London School of Economics & Political Science and is currently reading for an MA in Intelligence & International Security at Kings College London. His research interests are cyber security, national security strategy and the Asia-Pacific region. He is a Guest Editor at Strife. Follow him on Twitter @ChristyQuinn.

^{^[1]} Dave Evans, “The Internet of Things: How the Next Evolution of the Internet Is Changing Everything,” (Cisco, 2011).

^{^[2]} Mike Rapport David McKeever, “Technology and the Revolutions of 1848 and 2011: How Technology Can Work Towards Catalyzing Popular Revolutions,” Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, http://www.kas.de/brasilien/en/publications/34903/.

^{^[3]} “Access to Communications Data by the Intelligence and Security Agencies,” (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2013).

^{^[4]} Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, “The Terror Fringe,” Policy Review, no. 158 (2009).

^{^[5]} John Armitage, “Beyond Postmodernism? Paul Virilio’s Hypermodern Cultural Theory,” Ctheory 90, no. 1 (2000).

^{^[6]} Kelly Jackson Higgins, “Hospital Medical Devices Used as Weapons in Cyberattacks,” Darkreading, http://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities—threats/hospital-medical-devices-used-as-weapons-in-cyberattacks/d/d-id/1320751.

^{^[7]} Patrick Howell O’Neill, “The State of Encryption Tools, 2 Years after Snowden Leaks,” The Daily Dot, http://www.dailydot.com/politics/encryption-since-snowden-trending-up/.

Nigeria's elections and the quest for change

February 11, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood:

President Goodluck Jonathan (2011). Photo: Annaliese McDonough (creative commons)

“Elections belong to people. It’s their decision. If they decide to turn their back on the fire and burn their behinds, then they will just have to sit on their blisters” - Abraham Lincoln

When elections loom we often make the mistake of believing that voting for a different party or a new president will bring about real change. Soon we realise that those voted in are just a continuation of the old system, but with a different face, or the reappearance of a system that has long ceased to be relevant. This is the choice between change – real change – and just an alternative government.

The Nigerian elections, originally scheduled for Saturday but recently postponed by six weeks due to security concerns, raise this issue. Do the Nigerian people want change, or just an alternative government?

For many, the time is right for someone other than the incumbent president, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, to lead the country. These people argue that the current president has failed to deliver his electoral promises, as well as failing to protect Nigerians from the Islamist sect, Boko Haram. The 276 girls they kidnapped in April 2014 are still missing and last month they allegedly killed an estimated 2000 people in Baga, Bornu State.[i] As a result, many Nigerians believe that Retired General Buhari is the change Nigeria needs.[ii]

Buhari’s time in office as military leader in 1984 was short-lived because he was soon ousted by a coup. While opinion is divided as to whether he was an effective leader or not, it is no secret that his time as military president was marked by deplorable human rights abuses. His regime is accused of engaging in extrajudicial detention, killings, enforced disappearance, and house arrests, amongst other violations.[iii] He contested the 2011 democratic elections and lost. A loss he did not accept quietly.

The victor was Goodluck Jonathan, who has been ridiculed in the Western media as an ineffective leader more concerned with protecting his own than dealing with the security crisis in his country. But is this fair?

Upon taking his oath of office in May 2011, Jonathan promised Nigerians a policy package tagged the ‘Transformation Agenda’. A five-year development plan aimed at ensuring strong, inclusive and non-inflationary growth, generating employment and alleviating poverty, among other things.[iv]

Undoubtedly, Goodluck Jonathan’s ‘transformation agenda’ has its shortcomings. For example, despite recording occasional ‘victories’ against Boko Haram, the security situation in Nigeria remains deplorable. In addition, despite pledging to having a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption, his government has thus far failed to show commitment to prosecuting corrupt officials. In terms of the economy, although it is improving, with Nigeria having emerged as the biggest economy in Africa, poverty remains rife in the country, with an estimated 70% of the Nigerian population living below the poverty line.[v]

Similarly, health care delivery in Nigeria is still lacking, especially in the rural areas where the majority of the population live.[vi] There are many reasons to be frustrated by the lack of progress made by the incumbent president in fulfilling his ‘transformation agenda’; particularly with respect to the state of tertiary institutions, where strike remains rife among lecturers.

Yet it is important to recognise that the president’s ‘transformative agenda’ has had its positives too, especially judging by Nigeria’s current economic trends, with enormous investment in the agricultural sector.[vii] Nigeria is trying to diversify its sources of revenue and move away from its over-reliance on oil, as it had done in the past.[viii] One achievement of his administration, for which his detractors do not give him enough credit, is the revamp of creaking infrastructure like the airports, roads, and railways. While progress is slow, these infrastructure issues are receiving much-needed attention after decades of neglect or, in the case of the railways, complete desertion. There is also evidence of an improvement in the electricity supply, which has been a long-standing problem.[ix]

While the falling petrol prices across the globe might not be in the interest of the economy, since Jonathan was elected president the issue of petrol scarcity has become a thing of the past, especially during the festive periods. What is more, the price of fuel has fallen for ordinary Nigerians in more recent times, which his detractors are not happy to admit.[x]

The main alternative to President Jonathan is Rtd General Mohamed Buhari. Those who are against the idea of him leading Nigeria argue that, at almost 73, he is too old and frail, and that he would represent a step backwards, not a step forwards. In 2001, Buhari pushed for the implementation of Sharia law across Nigeria, despite the fact that the country is multi-religious. [xi] If elected, would he not commit to his vision of implementing Sharia law across Nigeria?

In 2013, his response to the incumbent president’s counter terrorism strategy was that the clampdown on Boko Haram was an injustice to the Northern region.[xii] The President of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) even accused him of funding the Islamist group.[xiii] Yet as part of his election campaign he promised to get rid of Boko Haram within weeks.[xiv] His apparently contradictory stance leaves the Nigerian people wondering what he would actually do if he were to win the presidency.

Critics also argue that Buhari is a violent man and lacks the credentials to lead a democratic regime. Following his defeat in the 2011 elections, he is quoted to have said:

“God willing, by 2015, something will happen. They will either conduct a free and fair election or they will go a very disgraceful way. If what happened in 2011 [alleged rigging] should again happen in 2015, by the grace of God, the dog and the baboon will all be soaked in blood.”[xv]

Similarly, expressing his views on why Buhari must not be elected, Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka argues that “all evidence suggests that this is one individual who remains convinced that this is one ex-ruler that the nation cannot call to order.”[xvi]

Given all this, it is not surprising that there is divided opinion as to who is eligible to deliver change. Keeping in mind the terrible security situation, the most pressing need is to ensure that the country does not plunge into further violence, no matter who is elected as president. According to the International Crisis Group, “If this violent trend continues, and particularly if the vote is close, marred or followed by widespread violence, it would deepen Nigeria’s already grave security and governance crises” (2014).

Rtd General Buhari’s candidacy presents Nigerians with an alternative; however, his record as a former military president means that he does not represent the real change that Nigerians need. But re-electing the incumbent president would mean voting for continuity and improvement, especially as he continues to work towards ensuring that Nigeria takes centre stage in the global economy.

When Nigerians go to the poll, they must be reminded of Abraham Lincoln’s words: the forthcoming elections belong to them, they must decide wisely. Doing anything to the contrary would amount to turning their back on the fire. And if they vote for Rtd General Buhari believing that he will bring about real change, then they must be prepared to spend the next few years sitting on their blistered behinds.

Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood is a PhD candidate with the African Leadership Centre, within the International Development Institute at King’s College London. Her research seeks to explore the interactions between illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, as well as its possibility in the Gulf of Guinea. She was a Masters of Arts Associate of the African Leadership Centre and a Visiting Scholar at the University of Nairobi from October 2013 to February 2014. She has an MA in Conflict, Security and Development from King’s and a BA in International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies from London Metropolitan University.

NOTES

[i] AFP, 2015

[ii] Nossiter, 2015

[iii] Tureta, 2015; Web-Staff, 2014

[iv] Gyong, 2012

[v] Okorie, 2014; Onwuka, 2012

[vi] Oluwabamide, 2014

[vii] Okorie, 2014

[viii] Ojo, 2014

[ix] Onwuka, 2012

[x] Adetayo, Opara, & Asu, 2015

[xi] Oyewole, 2014

[xii] Akowe, 2013

[xiii] Oyeyipo & Akinsuyi, 2013

[xiv] Baiyewu, 2014

[xv] Alechenu, Fabiyi, Odesola, & Adetayo, 2012

[xvi] Web-Staff, 2014

Adetayo, O., Opara, S., & Asu, F. (2015, January 19). Petrol now N87 per litre – FG. The Punch. Retrieved from http://www.punchng.com/news/petrol-now-n87-per-litre-fg/

AFP. (2015, January 13). 2,000 killed in Boko Haram’s reign of terror as Nigeria appeals for help. The Nation.

Akowe, T. (2013, June 2). Buhari faults clampdown on Boko Haram members. The Nation. Retrieved from http://thenationonlineng.net/new/buhari-faults-clampdown-on-boko-haram-members/

Alechenu, J., Fabiyi, O., Odesola, T., & Adetayo, O. (2012, May 16). Buhari under fire over threat of bloodshed. The Punch. Retrieved from http://www.punchng.com/news/buhari-under-fire-over-threat-of-bloodshed/

Baiyewu, L. (2014, December 14). We will see the end of Boko Haram –Buhari. The Punch. Retrieved from http://www.punchng.com/news/we-will-see-the-end-of-boko-haram-buhari/

BBC. (2014). Nigeria’s Muhammadu Buhari in profile. Retrieved January 15, 2015, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12890807

Gyong, J. E. (2012). A Social Analysis of the Transformation Agenda of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. European Scientific Institute, 8(16), 95–113.

History-Staff. (2009). George W. Bush. Retrieved January 26, 2015, from http://www.history.com/topics/us-presidents/george-w-bush

Hoppock, J. (2008). Obama’s “Change” Slogan Gets a Change. Retrieved January 18, 2015, from http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2008/09/obamas-change-s/

ICG. (2014). Nigeria’s Dangerous 2015 Elections: Limiting the Violence. Retrieved from http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/220-nigeria-s-dangerous-2015-elections-limiting-the-violence.aspx

Nossiter, A. (2015, January 23). Beleaguered, Nigerians Seek to Restore a General to Power. The New York Times.

Ojo, K. (2014, January 9). Is the “Transformation Agenda” really working? The Punch. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/01/transformation-agenda-really-working/

Okorie, M. (2014, July 4). Is the Agricultural Transformation Agenda in Nigeria working? Afrimind. Retrieved from http://www.afrimind.org/agricultural-transformation-agenda-nigeria-working/

Oluwabamide, A. J. (2014). Health Sector and the Transformation Agenda of the Federal Government in Nigeria. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(10), 580–586.

Onwuka, A. (2012, September 28). President Jonathan: A success or failure? The Punch.

Owete, F. (2014, March 6). Jonathan has institutionalised corruption in Nigeria, says Amaechi. The Premium Times. Retrieved from http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/156297-jonathan-institutionalised-corruption-nigeria-says-amaechi.html

Oyewole, B. (2014, December 24). Insurgency and Buhari’s call for full Sharia. Vanguard. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/12/insurgency-buharis-call-full-sharia/

Oyeyipo, S., & Akinsuyi, Y. (2013, June 5). Oritsejafor Calls for Buhari’s Arrest over Boko Haram Comments. ThisDayLive.

Tureta, S. (2015, January 17). Buhari’s Campaign Funds, Age and Certificate Questions. ThisDay Live. Retrieved from http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/buhari-s-campaign-funds-age-and-certificate-questions/199379/

Web-Staff. (2014, December). “The Crimes of Buhari” – By Prof. Wole Soyinka. The Voice African News Magazine.

Drones series, Part V. The biopolitics of drone warfare

April 22, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Daniel Møller Ølgaard:

The current debate on armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), also known as drones, focuses mostly on legal implications and moral implications of their use. Issues such as civilian deaths, as well as the strategic implications and tactical advantages of drones are reigning supreme in the academic and public discussions. Yet these examinations fail to look at the wider implications of drone warfare. Through the prism of ‘biopolitics’, we can expose how war and governance is transformed and how increasingly life itself comes to be categorized and populations come to be controlled through the use of armed UAV’s.

A Biopolitical Understanding of War

With the emergence of a liberal paradigm, where the right of the individual trumps the rights of the sovereign, a global system of liberal governance is changing the way in which war is conducted. This has been characterized as the ‘liberal peace project’, and is associated widely with Kant’s notion of perpetual peace through the pursuit of cosmopolitan values.

As such, the concept of war is changing. Today, according to Derek Gregory, ‘vulnerabilities are differentially distributed but widely dispersed, and in consequence … late modern war is being changed by the slippery spaces through which it is conducted’.[i] As we enter a ‘global state of war’ where threats to liberal life are indeed seen as omnipresent, political and technological measures of control aimed at categorizing bodies and dividing populations become the basic principle of liberal governance in securing populations.

In drawing on Foucault’s notion of ‘biopolitics’, this form of control can be examined in terms of power directed at the control of populations; a ‘governmentality’ that works through the promise of protecting life rather than threatening it. As a consequence, ‘biopolitics is the pursuit of war by other means'[ii] and is weaved into all layers of socio-political action on an increasingly global scale.

To perform this, the state apparatus of modern liberal states are, according to Julian Reid and Michael Dillon, ‘comprised of techniques that examine the detailed properties and dynamics of populations so that they can be better managed with respect to their many needs and life chances’.[iii] Yet, in order to enhance life, the principal task of liberal governance must first be to define life along the line of those who are to be protected and those who are deemed threats.

The Virtue of the Drone

Several authors have pointed to an emerging drone strategy that, rather than identifying ‘known’ individuals from personal characteristics, focuses on examining, characterizing, dividing and targeting certain patterns of life as threatening. These signature strikes are performed on the basis of the movement of bodies. For example, simply being approached by suspected Taliban members can make you a target of drone strikes.[iv] This clearly indicates a move away from the official US emphasis on drones as tools to eliminate identified individuals, to a strategy ‘which takes as its target potential rather than actual risks’.[v] Characteristically, in defining legitimate targets for drone strikes outside of war zones the US defines combatants as all military-age males killed in a strike zone unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent.

Consequently, for Shaw, ‘dangerous signatures or patterns of life are assessed on their very potential to become dangerous’.[vi] Anyone in the proximity of a suspected threat is in essence targetable, and as the focus shifts from known threats to potential risks, everyone in essence becomes a potential subject to surveillance, control and punishment. It is here the drone most clearly emerges as a ‘technology of control’, that directs it power at groups and populations on a wider scale, rather than the individual body. The population subjected to its power is transformed from corporeal, fleshy bodies to sets of digital data that are categorized, catalogued and evaluated. In this way, life comes to be life as information; a mass of data on maps of movement rather than fleshy bodies.

In fact, it is the very lack of the human, both in terms of the digitisation of the body of the victim, but also specifically the lack of a pilot, that renders the drone a tool of a ‘clean’ war where the operator is situated in another space, free from the fog of war[vii] and is thus rendered less likely to fall short to human error. This is clearly reminiscent of Foucault’s notion of biopower that hides its use of violence and ‘gives to the power to inflict legal punishment a context in which it appears to be free of all excess and violence’.[viii]

Drones, Discipline and Global Governance

Yet, rather than punishing and targeting threats with the aim of integrating them into the global state of liberal governance, it seems that the drones are a tool to patrol and control; preventing threatening life from entering the global. What makes the drone so significant to how power and governance is imposed globally is its role as a technology of control that is in a sense enforcing a global liberal governmentality; a technology that is comprised of biopolitical techniques that examines, divides, and seeks to control populations through a promise of enhancing life for those living outside the targeted areas.

In essence, drones can be said to perform what Vivienne Jabri has characterized as ‘policing access to the modern’[ix] and to pre-empt threatening life from entering space deemed ‘safe’. Drawing on Foucault, one might even characterize the armed drones as a manifestation of the late modern Panopticon, a conceptualization of the omnipresent ‘tower of control’ patrolling the distant borderlands. This form of governance works not only through kinetic violence; it utilizes fear and anxiety that spreads through the population of the targeted areas. It does not impose control exclusively through death, but rather through the constant potentiality of death. In this way, areas such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan are moving ever closer to a space of total control. Here, to quote Foucault, in ‘this enclosed, segmented space … in which each individual figure is constantly located, examined and distributed’ a ‘compact model of the disciplinary mechanism’ is formed.[x] Except, in the case of drones, the surveillance of each individual figure becomes biopolitical as the tools of control are focused on life as mass rather than on individual bodies. Areas such as the FATA becomes sites of assessment and control, visible tropes of biopolitical power that focus on dividing the global population through technologies of control, to impose governance on a massive, global scale.

The drone, rather than a mere weapon, is a biopolitical tool aimed just as much at examining populations as it is killing individuals. The armed drone has both the capabilities and the (biopolitical) agency to categorize, catalogue and kill bodies,and its violence directed at ‘them’ is masked behind the promise to enhance life for ‘us’. As such, the conditions and capabilities for examining, categorizing and dividing bodies on an increasingly global scale are greatly enhanced with the emergence of the drone as a tool of war.

______________________

Daniel Møller Ølgaard is an MA candidate at the Department of War Studies. He is a former intern with the Foreign Affairs Spokesperson of the largest Danish government party, and writes for the Danish political magazine RÆSON (www.raeson.dk). His research focuses broadly on poststructuralist theory and international politics with a special focus on resistance movement

NOTES
[i]Derek Gregory, ‘The Everywhere War’, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 177, No. 3 (2011), p. 239.
[ii]Michael Dillon & Julian Reid, ‘Global Liberal Governance: Biopolitics, Security and War’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No 1 (2001), p. 41.
[iii]Ibid.
[iv]Ian Shaw, ‘Predator Empire: The Geopolitics of US Drone Warfare’, Geopolitics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (2013), p. 548.
[v]Ibid.
[vi]Ibid.
[vii]The term was coined by Carl von Clausewitz and was made famous by former US Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, which illustrates the difficulties of making decisions in the midst of conflict, chaos and uncertainty.
[viii]Michel Foucault, ‘Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the Collegé de France 1975-76′, Picador (2003), p. 203.
[ix]Vivienne Jabri, The Postcolonial Subject: Claiming Politics/Governing Others in Late Modernity (Routledge, 2013), pp. 31-56.
[x]Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Penguin, 1991), p. 197.