Nigeria

The Struggle for National Memory in Contemporary Nigeria

June 30, 2022 by Christopher Hebert

Biafran independence demonstration. Photo Credit: Sigfrid Lundberg, used under Creative Commons.

In early 2021, the Eastern Security Network, an armed group linked to Igbo separatism, clashed with government security forces resulting in the deaths of more than 20 police officers. The federal government replied with excessive force, killing at least 115 people, some of whom were likely civilians. These tensions, however, are nothing new. Animosity between separatist and governmental groups in Nigeria trace back to ethnic divisions cemented by colonial policy and conflicting public narratives on the post-independence Nigeria-Biafran war.

Ethnic divisions in Nigeria today have deep historical roots, extending back to the Berlin Conference of 1884 and British colonization. The British invented the country of Nigeria by imposing borders that ignored pre-existing boundaries between peoples, creating a place that contained three dominant ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba, along with hundreds of micro-minorities.

Britain capitalized on these divisions through indirect colonial rule, using competing interests and existing rivalries between the three dominant groups as negotiating tools. The colonial administration was able to “divide-and-rule” in this manner until Nigerian independence in 1960. However, the enflamed rivalries between different groups in Nigeria did not disappear after independence. In many ways, British colonialism set the stage for the next major event in Nigerian history—the Nigeria-Biafran War lasting from 1967-1970.

Two military coups in the same year (1966) aggravated ethnic tensions and led to the targeted killings of Igbos in Northern Nigeria. Following these events, the Southeast region and parts of Eastern Nigeria, with a majority Igbo population, attempted to secede and called their breakaway region Biafra. The fact that the East/Biafra had the majority of Nigeria’s oil reserves meant both that the breakaway region was economically viable, and that the federal government would undoubtedly resist Biafra’s secession.

While some scholars believe that ethnic divisions were the leading cause of the war, others argue that oil played the most important role in Biafra’s attempt to secede. The oil hypothesis is useful because it reinforces Britain’s role in the conflict—they supported a “One Nigeria” solution primarily to protect British oil interests. Indeed, oil is often referred to in the Nigerian context as a “resource curse” because multinational companies like Shell play an outsized role in Nigeria’s politics and environmental degradation. Yet, irrespective of whether ethnic divisions or oil resources played a larger causal role, the attempt to create an independent Biafra has a direct link to Igbo separatist goals today.

After a protracted and bloody conflict that led to a highly-publicized humanitarian crisis in Biafra, the federal government curbed the region’s attempt to secede. After the war there was a proliferation of narratives about the war, dominated by the federal government’s hegemonic narrative.

The official state narrative is that the war was one of national unity, but Igbo people perceive the conflict as a war of Igbo national liberation. It is crucial to note that even today, the federal government’s notion of “nation” and the Igbo people’s notion of “nation” is not yet congruent. Furthermore, non-Igbo minority groups within Biafra experienced atrocities committed by both federal and Biafran troops during the conflict. Their narratives have not yet been incorporated into official discourses on the war.

There are also problems with how the memory of the war has been institutionalized or ignored in schools and universities across the country. An emblematic example of the discursive competition primarily between Igbo people and the federal government is how the war is named. School textbooks usually call it the Nigerian Civil War or the War of National Unity, while groups sympathetic to the Biafran side refer to the war as the Nigeria-Biafra War or simply the Biafran War. The word “Biafra” has also been purged from state documents and discourse, and the Bight of Biafra, the southern part of Nigeria’s Atlantic coast, was renamed the Bight of Bonny.

Despite the federal government’s attempts to erase or obscure public memory of the war, Igbo separatism has survived until today. The main separatist group currently is the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) headed by Nnamdi Kanu, which is an offshoot of The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). IPOB has its own security force called the Eastern Security Network (ESN) which ostensibly exists to protect the Igbo people from Fulani herders.

IPOB believes that the federal government supports Muslim Fulani herders against the primarily Christian Igbo people in an attempt to Islamize the country. Even though there is no evidence for the federal government’s support of Islamization, the fact remains that IPOB does not trust the federal government to provide security for Igbo people in the East and opts to provide security for themselves.

Recent conflicts between IPOB and the federal government indicates that genuine reconciliation between the Igbo people and the federal government never happened after the Nigeria-Biafran War. However, they do not explain the attitudes of other groups within Nigeria. The Yoruba, for example, were on the federal government’s side during the Nigeria-Biafran War, but there are still calls for the establishment of the Yoruba Oduduwa Republic. Additionally, there are calls in the north for an Arewa Republic made up of Hausa-Fulani. Even in the Niger Delta there are demands for a Niger Delta Republic. The proliferation of separatist attitudes in the present speaks to a constant need to assess the lasting effects of colonialism in modern Nigeria and the inability of the federal government to provide security for Nigerian people or create any sense of national unity.

It is difficult to make value judgements on the separatist aspirations of Igbo groups given the historical persecution of Igbo people. Still, in conflicts between the federal government and separatists, it is often the micro-minorities outside of the dominating Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba that suffer the most. During the Nigeria-Biafran War, it was these groups of people—including Ijaw, Edo, and Ogoni—who were caught in-between federal and Biafran forces and endured atrocities at the hands of both. The solution to separatism in Nigeria cannot be the redrawing of borders, as this would likely lead to bloody, protracted conflict. Instead, the Nigerian state needs to actively reckon with its past, particularly the events of the Nigeria-Biafran War, and most importantly center the accounts of micro-minority groups. The federal government’s sanitization and censorship of the war cannot be the answer, but neither can unbridled Igbo nostalgia for Biafra. Both ideologies harm the people in the middle, which is why any serious attempt at reconciliation should begin with their stories.

The Growing Threat of Armed Banditry in North-West Nigeria

January 8, 2021 by Adedeji Ademola

Nigerian authorities had earlier in April this year, deployed special forces in the country’s northwest to combat kidnappers and bandits. Source: Reuters Archive

For some time now, Nigeria has been a hotbed of conflicts. Apart from the perennial conflict between the farmers and herdsmen, there are other notable security challenges, which includes the activities of the Biafra separatists, militant Islamists in the North-East, kidnappings in many parts of the country, the Niger Delta imbroglio, and so on. However, the Boko Haram group remains arguably Nigeria’s biggest security threat. The group poses a significant threat to neighboring countries as well, especially Cameroon, Niger, and Chad resulting in grave economic, social, and humanitarian consequences. For example, the group recently gruesomely executed 40 rice farmers in Jere Local Government area of Borno State, Nigeria. The United Nations had claimed that the number of deaths were far more than reported.[1] But while the group is making lives unbearable for the people living in Northeast Nigeria, another organised group referred to as the armed bandits are increasingly making lives difficult for the people living in the Northwest area of Nigeria. Life is no longer sacred in these parts of the country and the overall impact will certainly last for generations. Government is clearly overwhelmed and the citizens helpless. It is therefore expedient to examine the dynamics of this recent surge in armed banditry, the challenges inhibiting the fight against banditry and how to prevent the total shutdown of the country by bandits and insurgents alike. But first, who are these bandits?

Banditry violence is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. The history of banditry in Nigeria can be traced to pre-civil war period when government deteriorated in certain parts of the old Western region resulting in political violence, crime and organised insurgency.[2] Accordingly, during the civilian reign, local bandits were reportedly stealing domestic animals. [3] Recently, in the Northwest area of Nigeria particularly in Zamfara, Sokoto, Katsina, Niger, Kaduna and Kebbi States, the activities of Bandits have been particularly worrisome. The activities of these bandits’ ranges from kidnapping to murder, robbery, rape, cattle-rustling, and the likes. Their modus operandi involves maiming and killing their victims when they least expect. Usually, they mobilized themselves through the forests into the neighborhood riding on fast motorcycles especially in the nights and shoot at will. Sometimes in the afternoon, once they were sure there were no security presence of the police or military around, they unleash terror in the communities. This growing threat is claiming victims in hundreds. Several children have been orphaned and women became widows overnight while the issue of food security as well as humanitarian tragedy will further make life unbearable for many Nigerians.

The facts are scary. While about “1,100 people were murdered in 2018 in the six states of North west Nigeria in 2018, over 2,200 were killed in 2019 and 1,600 killed between January and June 2020”. [4] About 247,000 people had been displaced while their activities alone have led to the production of more than 41,000 refugees. [5] In Zamfara alone, over 8000 people have been murdered in the last decade, 200,000 displaced internally and others fleeing to neighbouring states. [6] The situation is so porous already that the religious leader and Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammadu Sa ad Abubakar opined that “Bandits now move in the North from house to house with AK47 and lamented that the region had become the worst place to live in Nigeria…”[7]In Sokoto, more than 250 people have been killed in about 20 attacks, [8] just to mention but few.

It is important to note that the newest Northwest conflict started because of fight over depleting lands and water resources between the farmers and the herdsmen with the farmers belonging mostly to the Hausa people and the herdsmen being predominantly Fulani.[9] As a consequence, there has been massive deforestation because of the impact of the Sahara Desert spreading south. [10]

Also, in an area where poverty is deeply rooted and illiteracy extremely high, rearing cattle is the preoccupation of many Fulani’. Thus, whenever this source of livelihood is threatened, whether by nature or human intervention, they are willing to do anything to survive. In addition, there is the problem of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the area, inequality and as John Campbell puts it, “weakened, stretched and demoralized security services.[11] There are also problems of failure of local justice and ethnic division [12] as well as uncoordinated and under policed borders. Indeed, in recent history, banditry also became the order of the day because of government’s inability to protect lives and property as well as failure to put the welfare of the people first.

Government has responded at both state and federal level. The initial reaction was the bombardments of the various abodes of the bandits by the military and police under different code names, but this did not yield much significant result.[13] The state governments have also tried to negotiate and give amnesty to repentant bandits. While this initially worked, the result did not last.[14]

There are salient reasons why government interventions are not yielding fruit till date. A major factor is the topography of the area. The terrain is such that security presence is virtually unavailable for most people in the area particularly, those living in remote areas. It takes hours sometimes for security personnel to respond to distress calls of victims.[15] This is further propelled by the massive forests surrounding the areas which is shielding the bandits from being easily captured especially as they make use of forests such as the Falgore, Kamara, Kunduma, Subudu, Kamuku and Kiyanbana forests.[16] This makes it difficult for the military to secure the lives and property of the people residing in the areas especially without modern technology systems. So, what is the way forward?

The Nigerian government has complained about not having adequate modern equipment to give to her security personnel to work and had appealed to the international community to help in this regard. Fighting terrorism or banditry is not a tea party. Government must be proactive and partner with affected communities to bring a lasting solution to it. How do these bandits’ source for guns and tools to fight with? Where are they hiding? How do they access finance? Do they have records that can be accessed? Is it possible to trace their roots and linkage? How can information leakage among security personnel’s or civilians partnering with them be reduced? Answers to these questions will show that the threats of bandits can be reduced if not nullified.

Civil-military cooperation is a necessity and infrastructural development is a must even to rural dwellers as well as access to communication, police presence and protection. Not only these, the vigilantes that have been formed in the various communities in the north to combat the activities of these bandits must also be professionally trained and well organised by the government to work better and aid their communities. Movement of small arms and light ammunitions through the porous borders must be checked in cooperation with other countries in the region but ultimately, poverty must be drastically reduced, and providing good education to all citizens must become the priority of the government.

Endnotes

[1] The Punch, “Anger spreads as UN says 110 Borno farmers killed”, 30 November 2020.

[2] Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, (December 27, 2018, “Banditry in Nigeria: A brief history of a long war”, The Punch.

[3] Mustapha Umar Nadama, (2019) Armed banditry and Internal security in Zamfara State”, International Journal of Scientific and Engineering research, 10 (8) : 1220.

[4] “Banditry violence and displacement in the Northwest”, (2020), retrieved from https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200723_acaps_short_note_northwest_banditry_crisis_nwbc_nigeria.pdf 30/11/2020

[5] Ibid.

[6] International Crisis Group Report (2020), “Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem”, 288:3.

[7] Onyebuchi Ezigbo (2020), “Bandits now move in the north from house to house with AK47”, ThisDayLive, retrieved from https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/11/26/bandits-now-move-in-the-north-from-house-to-house-with-ak47-says-sultan, 11/26/2020

[8] Rakiya A. Mohammed (2020), “Sokoto: Over 250 persons killed in 20 Deadly attacks’, Daily Trust, retrieved from https://dailytrust.com/how-bandits-killed-over-70-in-sokoto

[9] International Crisis Group Report (2020), “Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem”, 288:3.

[10] Nduka Orjiinmo, (2020), “Katsina: The motorcycle bandits terrorizing northern Nigeria”, retrieved at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53009704 11/26/2020

[11] John Campbell, “Not all violent problems require violent solutions: Banditry in Nigeria’s North-West, retrieved at https://www.cfr.org/blog/not-all-violent-problems-require-violent-solutions-banditry-nigerias-north-west 11/26/2020

[12] Emmanuel Akinwotu, (2020) “Waves of bandit massacres rupture rural life in northwest Nigeria”, The Guardian retrieved from https://theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/03/waves-of-bandit-massacres-rupture-rural-life-in-north-west-nigeria 11/26/2020

[13] John Campbell (2020), “Not all Violent Problems Require Violent Solutions: Banditry in Nigeria’s North-West, retrieved from cfr.org/blog/not-all-violent-problems-require-violent-solutions-banditry-nigerias-north-west, 5/12/2020

[14] The Premium Times (2019), “Northwest governors grant amnesty to ‘bandits’, herders”, retrieved from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/nwest/344330-north-west-governors-grant-amnesty-to-bandits-gerders.html

[15] International Crisis Group Report (2017), “Herders against Farmers: Nigeria’s Expanding Deadly Conflict”, 252

[16] WANEP (2020) “Addressing Armed Banditry in the North West Region of Nigeria: Exploring the potentials of a Multi-Dimensional Conflict Management Approach”, 5.

Nigeria’s choice: Good news for democracy, bad news for Boko Haram?

April 5, 2015 by Strife Staff

By David Bruckmeier:

Image caption: Nigeria’s next president: Muhammadu Buhari (Chatham House, via Wikimedia Commons) — Nigeria’s next president: Muhammadu Buhari. Photo: Chatham House (via Wikimedia Commons)

For Muhammadu Buhari, fourth time’s the charm. After three unsuccessful runs for the Nigerian presidency, the 72-year-old was officially declared winner of last week’s elections with a lead of more than two million votes over his main rival, the incumbent Goodluck Jonathan. It is the first time a ruling president of Nigeria has been replaced through democratic elections rather than a coup. What was different this time, then?

Unlike previous elections, Buhari enjoyed the backing of a large coalition of formerly disparate opposition groups. In the All Progressives Congress (APC), a credible and united alternative to Jonathan’s PDP has emerged for the first time since the reinstitution of civilian rule in 1998. Although it remains to be seen whether the APC survives in the long-term, Buhari’s victory marks the beginning of Nigeria’s transformation into a true multi-party democracy. Moreover, Muslim northerner Buhari managed to win over the predominantly Christian south-west, weakening the sharp north-south, Muslim-Christian divide that has characterised the country’s politics since independence. Among other areas in the south, he prevailed in the most populous state and business hub Lagos, whose widely respected governor had joined the APC.

But Buhari himself was not always so fond of the democratic principles that made his victory possible. From 1983 to 1985, he ruled the country as a military dictator, gaining a reputation for ruthlessly suppressing any opposition to his rule until he was himself ousted by a military coup. Yet when the incoming president is inaugurated on 29 May, he will find himself at the helm of a country that has radically changed since the days of his military dictatorship.

Buhari describes himself as a ‘converted democrat’, and it is unlikely that he would be able to return to his old ways even if he had such intentions. Nigeria now has a vibrant and critical media and a relatively effective, if imperfect, system of checks-and-balances to ensure free elections. Most importantly, as Jonathan’s defeat has shown, it has a well-informed electorate that holds its leaders to account and looks beyond ethnic and religious affiliations on election day. Its political elite seems to have learned as well: in a gesture of goodwill, President Jonathan quickly accepted defeat and congratulated his opponent on his victory. Thus far, there is no sign of a repetition of the riots that marred the 2011 elections.

The challenges Buhari is facing are massive. At the top of the list is the fight against Boko Haram, whose six-year reign of terror has cost over 15,000 lives in north-eastern Nigeria and neighbouring countries. In the election campaign, Buhari frequently attacked the current government for ignoring the Islamist group for too long, a view shared by many observers. A last-minute military campaign against Boko Haram launched by Jonathan just a few days before the original election date was largely perceived as a desperate election stunt. Recent successes against the Islamists have substantially weakened the group but are mostly thanks to Chadian and Nigerien intervention as well as Nigerian-enlisted mercenaries from South Africa. Buhari, who as military commander warded off Chad’s annexation of territories in north-eastern Nigeria, has called the presence of foreign troops on Nigerian soil a disgrace and vowed to eliminate Boko Haram without their assistance.

If Buhari’s promise is to become reality, he will have to shake up Nigeria’s military, once one of Africa’s most competent and powerful. Under Jonathan and his PDP predecessors, it has become the victim of a glaring absence of long-term strategic thinking and rampant corruption. Much of the country’s $6 billion annual military budget never reaches its destination, disappearing instead into the pockets of officials as it passes myriad levels of bureaucracy. The result is a badly equipped and ill-trained army, with reports of human rights abuses by Nigerian troops on the rise. To prevent Boko Haram from simply reverting to its pre-2014 strategy of hit-and-run attacks, a sustainable security strategy must involve the installation of a permanent military and police presence in areas cleared of the terrorist group.

Although his election manifesto was slim on concrete proposals, Buhari has pledged to restore discipline in public administration and fight the country’s endemic corruption. His military background, ascetic demeanour and reputation as a no-nonsense man lends his promises credibility in the eyes of many voters.

Even so, there is no doubt that the fight against Boko Haram cannot be won by military means alone. The group’s rise is primarily the result of massive economic disparities and the disenfranchisement of north-eastern Nigeria’s population from the country’s political and economic elites. Previous governments have neglected the economically insignificant region, allowing the insurgency to grow almost unchecked, and to many residents of Lagos or Abuja, Maiduguri feels no closer than Nairobi. The Jonathan government’s decision to restrict internet and mobile phone access in three north-eastern states in order to curtail Boko Haram’s operations has contributed to the sense of disconnectedness.

As a northerner, Buhari is likely to have a better understanding of the region’s needs than his predecessor. His challenge will be to convince those who did not vote for him that he is their president too. In particular, he will have to be careful not to make enemies in the oil-rich Niger Delta, where another insurgency has only recently calmed down and might flare up again if people feel that their region’s needs are not adequately taken into account.

Trouble looms on the economic front, too. Africa’s largest economy has made strides towards diversification in recent years, but crude oil still accounts for 70% of government revenues. The collapse of the oil price has hit Nigeria’s economy hard, forcing the government to implement significant budget cuts. As a result of decreasing demand for the country’s main commodity, the Naira has depreciated sharply – bad news for a country that imports most consumer goods and, ironically, processed petroleum. Economic turmoil and the threat posed by Boko Haram have driven borrowing costs to an all-time high, putting strains on business and government alike.

In the short term, Buhari will have no choice but to continue with the austerity measures initiated by the current government. In the long-term, further economic diversification and a provident management of oil revenues to provide for bad times must be top priorities for the next president. He has promised to improve the energy supply (identified by voters as the single most important election issue) and infrastructure, but otherwise kept a low profile on economic policy – possibly because his economic track record as military ruler is less than stellar.

The next few years will be crucial to consolidating Nigeria’s status as Africa’s foremost political and economic power. As their country stands at a critical point in its history, Nigerians have taken a leap of faith by electing a former military dictator as their leader. More than anything else, their vote was a remarkable expression of democratic will and a promising sign for national unity. Once he takes power, Buhari will have to flesh out how he intends to turn vague promises into political outcomes. Boko Haram’s elimination is within the realm of possibility. Its roots are local, and if its underlying causes are addressed, the insurgency could be history by the next elections. Nigeria is not a country of miracles, but it has proved doomsayers wrong time and again. If Buhari plays his cards right, there is a strong chance that it will emerge a stronger, safer and more united country.

David Bruckmeier is an MA Student in International Relations at King’s College London. He is particularly interested in African affairs.

Nigeria's elections and the quest for change

February 11, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood:

President Goodluck Jonathan (2011). Photo: Annaliese McDonough (creative commons)

“Elections belong to people. It’s their decision. If they decide to turn their back on the fire and burn their behinds, then they will just have to sit on their blisters” – Abraham Lincoln

When elections loom we often make the mistake of believing that voting for a different party or a new president will bring about real change. Soon we realise that those voted in are just a continuation of the old system, but with a different face, or the reappearance of a system that has long ceased to be relevant. This is the choice between change – real change – and just an alternative government.

The Nigerian elections, originally scheduled for Saturday but recently postponed by six weeks due to security concerns, raise this issue. Do the Nigerian people want change, or just an alternative government?

For many, the time is right for someone other than the incumbent president, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, to lead the country. These people argue that the current president has failed to deliver his electoral promises, as well as failing to protect Nigerians from the Islamist sect, Boko Haram. The 276 girls they kidnapped in April 2014 are still missing and last month they allegedly killed an estimated 2000 people in Baga, Bornu State.[i] As a result, many Nigerians believe that Retired General Buhari is the change Nigeria needs.[ii]

Buhari’s time in office as military leader in 1984 was short-lived because he was soon ousted by a coup. While opinion is divided as to whether he was an effective leader or not, it is no secret that his time as military president was marked by deplorable human rights abuses. His regime is accused of engaging in extrajudicial detention, killings, enforced disappearance, and house arrests, amongst other violations.[iii] He contested the 2011 democratic elections and lost. A loss he did not accept quietly.

The victor was Goodluck Jonathan, who has been ridiculed in the Western media as an ineffective leader more concerned with protecting his own than dealing with the security crisis in his country. But is this fair?

Upon taking his oath of office in May 2011, Jonathan promised Nigerians a policy package tagged the ‘Transformation Agenda’. A five-year development plan aimed at ensuring strong, inclusive and non-inflationary growth, generating employment and alleviating poverty, among other things.[iv]

Undoubtedly, Goodluck Jonathan’s ‘transformation agenda’ has its shortcomings. For example, despite recording occasional ‘victories’ against Boko Haram, the security situation in Nigeria remains deplorable. In addition, despite pledging to having a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption, his government has thus far failed to show commitment to prosecuting corrupt officials. In terms of the economy, although it is improving, with Nigeria having emerged as the biggest economy in Africa, poverty remains rife in the country, with an estimated 70% of the Nigerian population living below the poverty line.[v]

Similarly, health care delivery in Nigeria is still lacking, especially in the rural areas where the majority of the population live.[vi] There are many reasons to be frustrated by the lack of progress made by the incumbent president in fulfilling his ‘transformation agenda’; particularly with respect to the state of tertiary institutions, where strike remains rife among lecturers.

Yet it is important to recognise that the president’s ‘transformative agenda’ has had its positives too, especially judging by Nigeria’s current economic trends, with enormous investment in the agricultural sector.[vii] Nigeria is trying to diversify its sources of revenue and move away from its over-reliance on oil, as it had done in the past.[viii] One achievement of his administration, for which his detractors do not give him enough credit, is the revamp of creaking infrastructure like the airports, roads, and railways. While progress is slow, these infrastructure issues are receiving much-needed attention after decades of neglect or, in the case of the railways, complete desertion. There is also evidence of an improvement in the electricity supply, which has been a long-standing problem.[ix]

While the falling petrol prices across the globe might not be in the interest of the economy, since Jonathan was elected president the issue of petrol scarcity has become a thing of the past, especially during the festive periods. What is more, the price of fuel has fallen for ordinary Nigerians in more recent times, which his detractors are not happy to admit.[x]

The main alternative to President Jonathan is Rtd General Mohamed Buhari. Those who are against the idea of him leading Nigeria argue that, at almost 73, he is too old and frail, and that he would represent a step backwards, not a step forwards. In 2001, Buhari pushed for the implementation of Sharia law across Nigeria, despite the fact that the country is multi-religious. [xi] If elected, would he not commit to his vision of implementing Sharia law across Nigeria?

In 2013, his response to the incumbent president’s counter terrorism strategy was that the clampdown on Boko Haram was an injustice to the Northern region.[xii] The President of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) even accused him of funding the Islamist group.[xiii] Yet as part of his election campaign he promised to get rid of Boko Haram within weeks.[xiv] His apparently contradictory stance leaves the Nigerian people wondering what he would actually do if he were to win the presidency.

Critics also argue that Buhari is a violent man and lacks the credentials to lead a democratic regime. Following his defeat in the 2011 elections, he is quoted to have said:

“God willing, by 2015, something will happen. They will either conduct a free and fair election or they will go a very disgraceful way. If what happened in 2011 [alleged rigging] should again happen in 2015, by the grace of God, the dog and the baboon will all be soaked in blood.”[xv]

Similarly, expressing his views on why Buhari must not be elected, Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka argues that “all evidence suggests that this is one individual who remains convinced that this is one ex-ruler that the nation cannot call to order.”[xvi]

Given all this, it is not surprising that there is divided opinion as to who is eligible to deliver change. Keeping in mind the terrible security situation, the most pressing need is to ensure that the country does not plunge into further violence, no matter who is elected as president. According to the International Crisis Group, “If this violent trend continues, and particularly if the vote is close, marred or followed by widespread violence, it would deepen Nigeria’s already grave security and governance crises” (2014).

Rtd General Buhari’s candidacy presents Nigerians with an alternative; however, his record as a former military president means that he does not represent the real change that Nigerians need. But re-electing the incumbent president would mean voting for continuity and improvement, especially as he continues to work towards ensuring that Nigeria takes centre stage in the global economy.

When Nigerians go to the poll, they must be reminded of Abraham Lincoln’s words: the forthcoming elections belong to them, they must decide wisely. Doing anything to the contrary would amount to turning their back on the fire. And if they vote for Rtd General Buhari believing that he will bring about real change, then they must be prepared to spend the next few years sitting on their blistered behinds.

Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood is a PhD candidate with the African Leadership Centre, within the International Development Institute at King’s College London. Her research seeks to explore the interactions between illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, as well as its possibility in the Gulf of Guinea. She was a Masters of Arts Associate of the African Leadership Centre and a Visiting Scholar at the University of Nairobi from October 2013 to February 2014. She has an MA in Conflict, Security and Development from King’s and a BA in International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies from London Metropolitan University.

NOTES

[i] AFP, 2015

[ii] Nossiter, 2015

[iii] Tureta, 2015; Web-Staff, 2014

[iv] Gyong, 2012

[v] Okorie, 2014; Onwuka, 2012

[vi] Oluwabamide, 2014

[vii] Okorie, 2014

[viii] Ojo, 2014

[ix] Onwuka, 2012

[x] Adetayo, Opara, & Asu, 2015

[xi] Oyewole, 2014

[xii] Akowe, 2013

[xiii] Oyeyipo & Akinsuyi, 2013

[xiv] Baiyewu, 2014

[xv] Alechenu, Fabiyi, Odesola, & Adetayo, 2012

[xvi] Web-Staff, 2014

Adetayo, O., Opara, S., & Asu, F. (2015, January 19). Petrol now N87 per litre – FG. The Punch. Retrieved from http://www.punchng.com/news/petrol-now-n87-per-litre-fg/

AFP. (2015, January 13). 2,000 killed in Boko Haram’s reign of terror as Nigeria appeals for help. The Nation.

Akowe, T. (2013, June 2). Buhari faults clampdown on Boko Haram members. The Nation. Retrieved from http://thenationonlineng.net/new/buhari-faults-clampdown-on-boko-haram-members/

Alechenu, J., Fabiyi, O., Odesola, T., & Adetayo, O. (2012, May 16). Buhari under fire over threat of bloodshed. The Punch. Retrieved from http://www.punchng.com/news/buhari-under-fire-over-threat-of-bloodshed/

Baiyewu, L. (2014, December 14). We will see the end of Boko Haram –Buhari. The Punch. Retrieved from http://www.punchng.com/news/we-will-see-the-end-of-boko-haram-buhari/

BBC. (2014). Nigeria’s Muhammadu Buhari in profile. Retrieved January 15, 2015, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12890807

Gyong, J. E. (2012). A Social Analysis of the Transformation Agenda of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. European Scientific Institute, 8(16), 95–113.

History-Staff. (2009). George W. Bush. Retrieved January 26, 2015, from http://www.history.com/topics/us-presidents/george-w-bush

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Bring back our girls, bring back our country

June 30, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Akinbode Fasakin:

After the abduction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok, Nigeria, on April 15 and the outrage it generated globally, one would assume that the Nigerian government under President Goodluck Jonathan would come alive with a new determination to bring back these girls and work to address the myriad of security issues present in Nigeria. Subsequent events, however, particularly the bomb explosions at Emab Plaza in Abuja on 25 June and those of May 20 and 25in Plateau and 27 and 31 May 2014 in Borno states, as well as the incessant killings and alleged abduction in Borno villages, further undermine the Nigerian government’s response to terrorism and general security problems facing Nigeria. These ceaseless attacks by Boko Haram reinforce the fact that the militarisation of the area by the Nigerian federal government has not prevented the group from carrying out its operations.

There are also inadequate troops to prevent the daily bloodbath in Borno. According to a military source, ‘they claim that there are 10,000 soldiers in Maiduguri but it is a lie. If we have 10,000 soldiers, Boko Haram would have ended.’[i] Now, Boko Haram, according to a recent report, controls Boni Yadi, where the group had killed about 45 security personnel and hoisted its flag – proclaiming the town as its capital. This style chimes with the Azawad declaration of an independent state in Mali in 2012. The repeated challenges to state sovereignty from irredentist and radicalised groups in these regions cannot be described merely as acts of terrorism; they are signs of serious weaknesses of these states. The failure of the Nigerian government to secure these areas, currently under a state of emergency, worsens the loss of confidence in the current administration as well as its ability to secure the safe return of the missing schoolgirls.

Unfortunately, the Nigerian government is not only failing to win the war on terror, but it is also showing a high level of insensitivity to the agonies felt by parents of the abducted girls and the plight of Nigerians’ security in general. This is not just due to the government playing politics with the issue, but even more so because it is failing to listen to the voices of its constituents. The President has not yet visited the families of the abducted girls. Rather, the government has pitched its tent with foreign partners that it assumes has the ‘specialized’ intelligence to rescue the abducted girls and offer the magic solution to the barrages of security problems in Nigeria. At the same time, it uncritically interrogates the rationale for which foreign intervention is provided by foreign countries in the current situation. The Nigerian president would rather discuss Nigeria’s security situation abroad, a point the Paris summit on Boko Haram expresses. This summit, called by President Francois Holland, was intended to protect French interests for according to a French diplomat, ‘among Western nations, France is the main target for Boko Haram. That’s why we are getting involved.’[ii] While President Goodluck travelled to Paris, a move that may help preserve France’s interest, his administration has not considered a security summit that draws Nigerian security experts from within and outside the country.

By refusing to visit Chibok, the Nigerian President undermines the empathy and compassion the families of the victim could experience from his visit. As the leader has a responsibility to empathize, as well as manage trust and attention, the President’s visit to the families of the abducted students carries significant weight. It can also offer the government the opportunity to present its efforts so far and the extent of the progress the administration has made in the girls’ search and rescue operation. This will, without doubt, increase these families’ confidence in the administration and present the government with an opportunity to listen to what these families have to say. This will certainly lighten the burden of the pain these families feel and present the Nigerian government as responsible to its people. As far as the Nigerian government is concerned, however, such thought has not been given a priority. The government can now delight in the fact that the Chibok girls’ abduction story is gradually falling out of the global limelight and rapidly losing steam; the hashtag #bringbackourgirls is fast falling into disuse. While it is yet unclear if foreign involvement and tactics that the government seems to rely on will lead to the safe return of these girls and their reunification with their families, one cannot but express a premonition of the futility of this alliance and the likelihood it will worsen the security situation in Nigeria.

The presence of foreign troops on Nigeria’s soil is unfortunate. Apart from the fact that these troops are likely to receive the credit for whatever success the anti-Boko Haram military operations brings, if any, their presence carries the possibility of thrusting Nigeria deeper into the dungeon of global terrorist attacks by Boko Haram or other like-minded organizations around the world. Nigeria is therefore likely to further incur the wrath of the fundamentalists from within the country and around the world who resent American presence and activities in the Middle East and believe. As Osama Bin Laden noted, Muslim-populated areas are now ripe for radical changes and attacks against Western interests and pro-West regimes.[iii] The presence of 80 intelligence experts from the United States and other military support from the UK, France and Israel is not only an indication of the weakness in capacity to respond to this abduction by the current administration, but an alignment of a secular state with Western countries, that these fundamentalists perceive as being Christian countries. As positive as it may be that many foreign forces are rendering help to Nigeria with the search and rescue operation, the negative implication of this is that Nigerians are now more vulnerable and exposed to forces sympathetic to the Boko Haram’s cause. Worse still, many of these foreign troops will not share raw intelligence information with the Nigerian forces.[iv]

The fact that one cannot sweep under the rug the interests of the foreign troops, currently assisting Nigeria in the Chibok girls’ search and rescue operation, is another issue. Even though it is difficult to authoritatively state the rationale for the intervention, the alacrity with which the American government responded to Nigeria’s call for international assistance leaves much to be desired. Is Uncle Sam up to something or merely acting altruistically? States mostly act in their self-interests and as a state whose foreign policy is underpinned by realism, is America doing Nigeria a favor for nothing? In addition, even though the US might have responded to the abducted girls’ rescue out of its desire to offer Nigeria some help, the US selectively responds to issues of insecurity. Nigeria’s reliance on foreign troops further militarise the war against terrorism without giving a room for understanding the content and context of the crisis. Apart from the fact that the US intervention fails to restore peace in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the deployment military troops to Nigeria will not solve the roots of the problem. Not only that, this intervention raises serious questions about how much faith the Nigerian government has in imported specialized intelligence over its own forces. Perhaps, this explains why the Nigerian President cancelled the negotiation process that would have led to the exchange of the girls for Boko Haram insurgents in government’s prison.[v] It is doubtful, however, if the government would take the same action had the children of the President been involved.

Nigerians are talking; the government is presumably acting, but there is disconnect between Nigerians perception of security and the government’s implementation of a security agenda. Though the Chibok abduction, according to government, has ascended to a national priority status, it is yet unclear if the return of these girls will happen soon. Furthermore, it is doubtful if it will either reduce or prevent future abductions by Boko Haram or similar groups in Nigeria.

The government requires concrete and holistic, long and medium-term, strategic plans that inform short-term intervention. In the short-term, however, the continuation of negotiations that can result in the release of the girls is necessary. In the long-term, genuine efforts that capture a wide range of Nigerian security experts’ views on insurgency, radicalisation, extremism, militancy and other forms of insecurity is required. It is neither a time for mudslinging, name-calling nor for spewing half-baked and contradictory statements from the officialdom. This period is critically important in terms of the intersection between the government’s perception of security and the Nigerian people’s security. The security of the people begins with the creation of an atmosphere that is conducive to their personal and collective safety, freedom and development. Nigerians are averse to the deception, corruption, secrecy, and pretense with which government is thus far handling national security. What the population is saying is simple: do what is needed, bring back our girls, our security, and our country.

__________________

Akinbode Fasakin is a Fellow of the African Leadership Centre at King’s College London. He is currently undertaking research on leadership and national security in Nigeria.

NOTES

[i] Godwin, Ameh Comrade. ‘Military chiefs are aiding Boko Haram, they did not send 10,000 troops to Borno – soldiers,’ Daily Post Newspaper. 7 April 2014. < http://dailypost.ng/2014/04/07/military-chiefs-aiding-boko-haram-send-10000-troops-borno-soldiers/>
[ii]See Philippe Wojazer, ‘France holds Summit on Nigeria’s Boko Haram Threat’ http://africajournalismtheworld.com/tag/paris-boko-haram-summit/
[iii]See Olawale Ismail, Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in West Africa: Implications for African and International Security, Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2013.
[iv]This point was made by the American Peter Pham, Director of the African Program at the Atlantic think tank in Washington. According to him, The the Nigerian security forces are unreliable as it is being penetrated by people who are sympathisers. See Oran Dorell, ‘Obama Sends U.S. Troops to Chad to Find Nigerian Girls’ available on http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/05/21/usa-search-for-nigerian-girls-goes-to-chad/9389703/
[v]David Williams and Ian Drurry, ‘UK troops to help free Nigeria girls: Hundreds sent to country to assist local forces in battle against Boko Haram’ http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2641151/UK-troops-help-free-Nigeria-girls-Hundreds-sent-country-assist-local-forces-battle-against-Boko-Haram.html

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