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You are here: Home / Archives for Funding

Funding

The Funding of Terrorism (Part I) - Hookahs and Honey: Funding Terrorism through ‘Benign’ Activities

August 3, 2019 by Ian Ralby

by Ian Ralby

4 August 2019

Shisha pipes across the Middle East are being filled with charcoal smuggled from Somalia. This seemingly benign but criminal activity nets the terrorist group Al-Shabaab millions, if not tens of millions, of dollars each year. (Image credit: Flickr)

 

Terrorism catches people’s attention, charcoal does not. It is a certitude much like the fact that a bomb blowing up a building will make international news and a fishing boat laden with jerry cans of diesel will not. Over the last decade, terrorist groups have increasingly sought to fund their operations using activities that many consider ‘benign’ and thus undeserving of serious scrutiny. While the trafficking of arms, drugs or humans draws significant law enforcement attention around the world, goods including fuel, charcoal, honey, sugar, fish and antiquities do not occupy prominent positions on most of these agencies’ priority lists – if they feature at all. Noting how high-profile crimes tend to attract the close watch of national and international authorities, terrorist organisations around the world have found relative ease in recent years by funding themselves through profitable ‘benign’ operations. It is imperative for law enforcement agencies and counterterrorism authorities to increase their coordination on these matters and scrutinise such often overlooked activities as critical sources of terrorist financing.

Perhaps the best-known instance, at least in counterterrorism circles, of seemingly benign economic activity that actually finances terrorist organisations is the trading of Somali charcoal to the Middle East. Acacia charcoal, excellent for use in shisha pipes, has been exported from Somalia for decades. As Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group established in 2006, took over parts of Somalia, it sought to benefit from the lucrative trade in various ways, including through informal taxes and port revenues. In response, the Transitional Federal Government banned the export of charcoal from Somalia and later the international community imposed an embargo on it. The result has been an extensive smuggling operation in an effort to maintain the income stream. Publicly disclosed estimates from the British Royal Navy suggest that this operation currently yields $7 million per year for Al-Shabaab. Prior to substantial interdiction efforts, that figure was once estimated to be in the tens, or even hundreds, of millions. Unlike issues like piracy or wildlife trafficking, charcoal has not captured public attention in the same way, and thus has not garnered the same political interest, though recent exposés have sought to change that. While the counterterrorism community is heavily focused on charcoal, many politicians still view it as a low priority, since compared to other goods it still seems relatively benign. And even if charcoal does gain further visibility, the situation with Al-Shabaab is only one example of a larger phenomenon.

The same apathy towards smuggling of a benign commodity has been a major factor in illicit oil and fuel activities becoming a substantial source of terrorist financing. The majority of people around the world rely on fuel in their daily lives. Consequently, it is perhaps the most ubiquitous commodity and one which people are most interested in obtaining at a discount. Too often, widespread and seemingly harmless shopping for discounts equates to a willingness on the part of law enforcement and the political establishment to overlook the sources of cheaper-than-market-price fuel. They disregard what seem to be low-scale illicit operations as not meriting the attention of law enforcement. This salutary neglect of black market fuel trading has become a major point of manipulation for terrorist groups looking for under-the-radar income streams.

Furthermore, the success of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has inspired groups around the world to adopt a Jihadi-Salafist philosophy and seek to ‘restore’ the early Islamic caliphate. ISIS-inspired groups, however, are inspired not only by ISIS ideology but also by ISIS methods and it is well-known that ISIS’ principle source of income has been proceeds from illicit oil and fuel activities. It is therefore not surprising that affiliated groups in other regions of the world have turned to fuel smuggling as their primary source of income. In the Philippines for example, Abu Sayyaf used fuel smuggling both to fund itself and to reinforce smuggling routes that supported its movement of weapons and ammunition in the lead-up to and throughout the year-long siege of Marawi. In Trinidad and Tobago, a similar co-location of ISIS ideology and rampant fuel smuggling has given rise to significant international concern. As with charcoal, a prevalent perception of the commodity itself as being benign has created a blind spot that allows terrorist groups to earn substantial profits with little interference or even interest.

Beyond charcoal and fuel, other goods such as fish, livestock, honey, sugar, minerals and antiquities, depending on their availability, profitability, and relative visibility by law enforcement, have all become sources of income for terrorist groups. Osama Bin Laden used honey trading both to make profits and for money laundering. Few goods could seem less sinister than honey, and that provided the perfect cover and income stream for one of history’s most ominous terrorists. Whether the trade is initially illegal, as with fuel smuggling, or technically legal, as with honey or charcoal trading, the very fact that it is being used to fund terrorist organisations makes it illegal.

The point is that terrorist groups are relying on economic activities perceived as benign in order to make, maintain and move their wealth. And wealth is extremely important for terrorism, as evidenced by the direct correlation between the number of attacks perpetrated by a group and its relative financial stature. In a 2016 interview, Maj. Gen. Amos Gilad, former Director of the Israeli Defense Ministry’s Political-Military Bureau, stated, ‘The financial component of terror organizations is critical, and its indispensability for terror attacks is like fuel for the car’. As true as this statement is, the irony is that the financial component of terror organisations may literally be fuel for the car.

To change this dynamic, law enforcement agencies and counterterrorism units need to become more proactive in identifying their own blind spots and false perceptions. This means consciously reexamining those matters they have overlooked in the past. That, however, is not easy to do. Terrorist groups will continue to seek, find and exploit economic opportunities that occupy lower positions on the priority lists of the authoritaries. Inevitably, as law enforcement approaches change, so, too, will terrorist activities. But, it is imperative that the crimes and trading activities that have been relegated to benign status be reconsidered not just in their own right but for their malignant implications. The profits accruing from such overlooked criminal goods as shisha charcoal, farm diesel or artisanal honey, may actually be funding deadly bombings, hijackings, or militant offensives.


Dr. Ian Ralby is a leading expert in international law, maritime security and countering transnational organized crime. He and his team at I.R. Consilium, LLC have world leading expertise in oil and fuel crimes, and the nexus between maritime crimes and both criminal and terrorist activities. Among other degrees, he holds a J.D. from William & Mary and a Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge where he was a Gates Scholar.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: al-Shabaab, bin-laden, coal, Funding, honey, IS, ISIS, money laundering, Osama, shisha, smuggling, terrorism

Strife Series on The Funding of Terrorism – Introduction

July 31, 2019 by Alexandra Roberts

by Alexandra Roberts

1 August 2019

The funding of terrorism, an overlooked but important field of inquiry (Image credit: UK Defence Journal)

 

Editorial

We have all seen the outcome of violent acts of terrorism . The attacks of 11 September 2001 were among the largest coordinated assaults that had ever been carried out. In the near two decades that have since passed, there has been a sustained multi-national effort to curb terrorism and to try to prevent further attacks. Troops have been deployed in kinetic operations around the world and intelligence agencies and analysts have increased in numbers to gather and interpret data and intelligence. An essential, but frequently overlooked, component of stopping terrorism is preventing terrorist groups from raising the funds necessary to enact their plans. The practicalities of such operations are little known and rarely focussed on in the public discourse on terrorism. However, like any other organisation or group, terrorists need to be able to finance their activities in order to carry out their objectives.

This leads to questions of where the money come from, how it is moved and how it can be stopped. We, the public, tend to know its source is something nefarious. Almost certainly illegal. That al-Qaeda probably did not check their credit rating or apply for a larger overdraft facility in order to fund the 9/11 attacks. But, beyond that, we have very little knowledge about their funding. We know that there are laws designed to prevent the financing of terrorist activities, but we do not tend know what they are, how they operate or who applies them. Even where these laws exist, not all countries and governments agree on how or whose should be implemented. Moreover, because of the asymmetric nature of terrorism, a tool that can be used stifle one group, may have no practical application to another, whilst at the same time the methods and modes used by terrorists to finance themselves are evolving. In turn, legal instruments that can be used to stop them must also evolve too.

This Strife series explores the relationship between money and terrorism. The series looks at who funds it, how they do it, what tools we have to prevent it and even how the laws to stop it can be misused. Its purpose is to highlight quite how complex and diverse the issues surrounding terrorism’s funding are. That it is not just a matter of finding the sources of their finance and shutting it down, but rather understanding the multifaceted political web it is entangled in.

Publication Schedule

In the first article (04/08), Dr Ian Ralby raises concerns about how low profile and seemingly benign criminal activities are used to fund global terrorism. He makes the case that law enforcement agencies need to recognise that terrorist groups will exploit these overlooked, lesser crimes as a way of raising funds and laundering money and must respond.

In the second article (06/08), Dr Vanessa Neumann explores the relationship between Venezuela’s Maduro regime and Hezbollah through long-standing links with post-revolutionary Iran. She tracks the history of the relationship between these groups and argues that ending the Maduro regime will deliver a severe setback for Hezbollah.

In the third article (08/08), Dr Michael Greenwald examines how Section 311 of the Patriot Act that pertains to correspondent banking relationships between the United States and other countries has been used to stop terrorism. He argues that in a new era of great power competition, it needs to be updated to be able to respond to the current global political and economic climate.

In the final article (10/08), Dr Jack Watling looks at how mass trails and vague charges are undermining efforts in the Middle East to stop the Shia system of tithes and its opaque financing practices potentially funding terrorism. He highlights that these questionable prosecutions are not only used as tools of state oppression, but that they are counterproductive in reaching a more transparent financial system.


Alexandra is studying for an MA in Terrorism, Security and Society at King’s College London. She is particularly interested in the role of women in Jihadist terrorism and US foreign security policy. Prior to starting her postgraduate studies, she worked as a political and security researcher, with a particular focus on the MENA region. She also done work focussing on the prevention of IUU fishing. Alexandra has a BSc in Oil and Gas management, with particular focus on the petrochemical industry in Iraq and its potential social, economic and political impacts on the country, using knowledge and experience gained working in the private security sector with a company specialising in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: editorial, Funding, introduction, terrorism

Financing Terror, Part I: Private Kuwaiti donors in Syria's Civil War

January 12, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Arne Holverscheid:

Fighters from Islamic State in Raqqa, north Syria. (Photo: Ogbodo Solution - Flickr)

What happened to President Bashar al-Assad? When Syria descended into civil war in 2011, he was the perfect enemy for the Western public: supported by his ally Iran, he preferred watching his people die and his country be torn apart than give in to demands for freedom, democracy and civil rights. The line between good and evil, between friend and foe seemed clear: it was the Syrian people and their democratic ambitions against Bashar Assad and his powerful friend, Tehran.[i]

Now, after almost four years of fighting, this clear line has become more and more blurred. The Syrian opposition has radicalized: extremists, among them jihadist and Islamist groups, seem to have become the dominant actors.[ii] The Free Syrian Army (FSA), once bearer of hope for Syria in the Western world, is weaker than ever. States from the Arabian Peninsula, considered allies of the United States and Western countries, have joined the fight and have been financing rebel groups in Syria. Many of these rebel groups allegedly belong to the spectrum of Islamic extremism, which is arguably just as opposed to liberal democracy as is Assad.[iii],[iv] But in this complex conflict, private donors from the wealthy state of Kuwait have played a significant part in further blurring the lines in a manner which is much less conspicuous yet leaves a lasting impact.

According to the Koran, giving alms is ordained by Allah. Donations are meant for ‘the poor and the needy…for those in bondage and in debt, in the cause of Allah, and for the wayfarer’ (Sura 9.60). Kuwaiti donors have taken their religious duty very seriously during the on-going conflict and have made substantial humanitarian contributions to ease the suffering of the Syrian population.[v] The Kuwaiti government has so far refused to go beyond financial contributions and arm Syrian rebels. But many private donors and fundraisers have decided to do exactly this, and the fairly liberal Kuwaiti political system has allowed them to advocate and conduct fundraising activities freely among the Kuwaiti public.[vi] Many within the Sunni majority even openly criticize the government for not arming the Syrian opposition, and influential Salafi figures have joined the efforts to raise money for the Syrian cause.[vii]

Donations are mostly collected using Twitter and other social media networks and are delivered personally by couriers who travel to the Turkish-Syrian border. Hundreds of millions of dollars are estimated to have entered the Syrian civil war in this way, and the proportion of funds that goes to radical groups is hard to determine. However, donors tend to support and actively encourage those rebels who are specifically aligned with their own religious or ideological beliefs. The Kuwaiti fundraising scene is dominated by extreme religious figures, and it has become clear that large donations were sent to prominent groups in the jihadi spectrum. Particularly close connections have been established with Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra. The latter is known to be an al-Qaeda affiliate, and both groups are reported to have recently come to an agreement with the Islamic State (IS), halting the fight against each other in order to challenge common enemies. In addition, the Sunni majority in Kuwait have recently developed a more sympathetic view toward the IS, resulting in a rift between donors about who to support (Al Qaeda/Al–Nusra or IS) and reflecting the overall competition between al-Qaeda/al-Nusra and IS.[viii],[ix]

In a 2013 report, Human Rights Watch identified individuals responsible for the funding of an attack on villages and civilians in the countryside of Latakia, Syria’s most prominent seaport. Fighters of Ahrar al-Sham, IS and Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar killed around 190 people and abducted over 200 civilians during the attack. Among the six primary figures who financed and organised the ambush were three Kuwaitis who actively used Twitter and YouTube to fundraise for the planned attack. One of them, Sheikh Hajjej al-Ajami, even travelled to the Latakia region and met the jihadists for whom he was fundraising. This journey suggests a high degree of cooperation between private donors and rebel groups and the possibility that donors are able to exercise control over the rebel groups they support.

Examples like this show the effect private donors are having on the Syrian civil war. Under the protection of Kuwait’s liberal and constitutional monarchy, they raise funds for extremists and jihadists who are aligned with their ideological beliefs and who are reportedly linked to acts of terrorism. By supporting these groups and strengthening their position, the donors implant their radical Salafi view of Islam into the conflict, fostering sectarianism among the Syrian opposition and reducing the chances for moderate forces to gain the upper hand. They also exacerbate the on-going competition between al-Qaeda and the IS over support from such donors, and are arguably partly responsible for the recent upswing in sympathy for the IS among the Sunni community in Kuwait. With the increasing friction between rebel groups and the apparent rivalry between two of the largest terrorist organizations involved in the conflict, a peaceful reunification seems less and less likely.

Now, after almost four years, who is the enemy in Syria? For the Western world, “Assad” no longer seems to be the only enemy. The conflict lines in Syria have blurred, extremists and terrorists have multiplied and the Alawite regime almost seems like a good alternative. The exemplary case of Kuwaiti private donors shows that when determining friend and foe, the situation is extremely complex. Syria has become far more than a proxy war between world powers. Private self-interests as well as opposing religious and ideological beliefs play an increasingly significant role in determining Syria’s conflict lines, conflict lines which must be understood in a wider regional context.


Arne Holverscheid is an undergraduate student of Political Science, Middle Eastern Studies and History at Ludwig Maximilians University Munich. He is currently interning for the International Center for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel. His interests include terrorism funding, radical Islamic ideologies and the history of terrorism. Twitter: @AHolverscheid.

This article is part of a Strife series on financing terror. Over the next few weeks Strife will feature other articles that focus on different ways of financing terrorism. Next, Claire Mennessier will examine the involvement of Pakistan in financing terror groups, and the motivations and challenges presented by this involvement.

NOTES

[i] “The long road to Damascus: There are signs that the Syrian regime may become still more violent”, The Economist, February 11, 2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21547305.

[ii] Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, “How the U.S. fragmented Syria’s rebels”, The Washington Post, September 22, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/22/how-the-u-s-fragmented-syrias-rebels/.

[iii] Jamie Dettmer, “Syria’s Saudi Jihadist Problem”, The Daily Beast, December 16, 2013. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/12/16/syria-s-saudi-jihadist-problem.html.

[iv] Mariam Karouny, “Saudi edges Qatar to control Syrian rebel support”, Reuters, May 31, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-syria-crisis-saudi-insight-idUSBRE94U0ZV20130531.

[v] “Kuwait launches Syria relief campaign”, Al Arabiya English, January 13, 2014. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/01/13/Kuwait-s-emir-appeals-for-Syrian-relief-aid.html.

[vi] Sylvia Westall and Mahmoud Harby, “Insight: Kuwaitis campaign privately to arm Syrian rebels”, Reuters, June 27 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/27/us-syria-kuwait-insight-idUSBRE95P0TG20130627.

[vii] Lori Plotkin Boghardt, “The Terrorist Funding Disconnect with Qatar and Kuwait”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 2, 2014. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-terrorist-funding-disconnect-with-qatar-and-kuwait.

[viii] Joby Warrick, “Private donations give edge to Islamists in Syria, officials say”, The Washington Post, September 21, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/private-donations-give-edge-to-islamists-in-syria-officials-say/2013/09/21/a6c783d2-2207-11e3-a358-1144dee636dd_story.html.

[ix] Elizabeth Dickinson, “Kuwait: the crisis in Syria comes home”, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2, 2014. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_kuwait_the_crisis_in_syria_comes_home323.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: al-Qaeda, Funding, Islamic State, Kuwait, Private, Syria, terrorism

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