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Financing Terror, Part I: Private Kuwaiti donors in Syria's Civil War

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By Arne Holverscheid:

Fighters from Islamic State in Raqqa, north Syria. (Photo: Ogbodo Solution - Flickr)

What happened to President Bashar al-Assad? When Syria descended into civil war in 2011, he was the perfect enemy for the Western public: supported by his ally Iran, he preferred watching his people die and his country be torn apart than give in to demands for freedom, democracy and civil rights. The line between good and evil, between friend and foe seemed clear: it was the Syrian people and their democratic ambitions against Bashar Assad and his powerful friend, Tehran.[i]

Now, after almost four years of fighting, this clear line has become more and more blurred. The Syrian opposition has radicalized: extremists, among them jihadist and Islamist groups, seem to have become the dominant actors.[ii] The Free Syrian Army (FSA), once bearer of hope for Syria in the Western world, is weaker than ever. States from the Arabian Peninsula, considered allies of the United States and Western countries, have joined the fight and have been financing rebel groups in Syria. Many of these rebel groups allegedly belong to the spectrum of Islamic extremism, which is arguably just as opposed to liberal democracy as is Assad.[iii],[iv] But in this complex conflict, private donors from the wealthy state of Kuwait have played a significant part in further blurring the lines in a manner which is much less conspicuous yet leaves a lasting impact.

According to the Koran, giving alms is ordained by Allah. Donations are meant for ‘the poor and the needy…for those in bondage and in debt, in the cause of Allah, and for the wayfarer’ (Sura 9.60). Kuwaiti donors have taken their religious duty very seriously during the on-going conflict and have made substantial humanitarian contributions to ease the suffering of the Syrian population.[v] The Kuwaiti government has so far refused to go beyond financial contributions and arm Syrian rebels. But many private donors and fundraisers have decided to do exactly this, and the fairly liberal Kuwaiti political system has allowed them to advocate and conduct fundraising activities freely among the Kuwaiti public.[vi] Many within the Sunni majority even openly criticize the government for not arming the Syrian opposition, and influential Salafi figures have joined the efforts to raise money for the Syrian cause.[vii]

Donations are mostly collected using Twitter and other social media networks and are delivered personally by couriers who travel to the Turkish-Syrian border. Hundreds of millions of dollars are estimated to have entered the Syrian civil war in this way, and the proportion of funds that goes to radical groups is hard to determine. However, donors tend to support and actively encourage those rebels who are specifically aligned with their own religious or ideological beliefs. The Kuwaiti fundraising scene is dominated by extreme religious figures, and it has become clear that large donations were sent to prominent groups in the jihadi spectrum. Particularly close connections have been established with Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra. The latter is known to be an al-Qaeda affiliate, and both groups are reported to have recently come to an agreement with the Islamic State (IS), halting the fight against each other in order to challenge common enemies. In addition, the Sunni majority in Kuwait have recently developed a more sympathetic view toward the IS, resulting in a rift between donors about who to support (Al Qaeda/Al–Nusra or IS) and reflecting the overall competition between al-Qaeda/al-Nusra and IS.[viii],[ix]

In a 2013 report, Human Rights Watch identified individuals responsible for the funding of an attack on villages and civilians in the countryside of Latakia, Syria’s most prominent seaport. Fighters of Ahrar al-Sham, IS and Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar killed around 190 people and abducted over 200 civilians during the attack. Among the six primary figures who financed and organised the ambush were three Kuwaitis who actively used Twitter and YouTube to fundraise for the planned attack. One of them, Sheikh Hajjej al-Ajami, even travelled to the Latakia region and met the jihadists for whom he was fundraising. This journey suggests a high degree of cooperation between private donors and rebel groups and the possibility that donors are able to exercise control over the rebel groups they support.

Examples like this show the effect private donors are having on the Syrian civil war. Under the protection of Kuwait’s liberal and constitutional monarchy, they raise funds for extremists and jihadists who are aligned with their ideological beliefs and who are reportedly linked to acts of terrorism. By supporting these groups and strengthening their position, the donors implant their radical Salafi view of Islam into the conflict, fostering sectarianism among the Syrian opposition and reducing the chances for moderate forces to gain the upper hand. They also exacerbate the on-going competition between al-Qaeda and the IS over support from such donors, and are arguably partly responsible for the recent upswing in sympathy for the IS among the Sunni community in Kuwait. With the increasing friction between rebel groups and the apparent rivalry between two of the largest terrorist organizations involved in the conflict, a peaceful reunification seems less and less likely.

Now, after almost four years, who is the enemy in Syria? For the Western world, “Assad” no longer seems to be the only enemy. The conflict lines in Syria have blurred, extremists and terrorists have multiplied and the Alawite regime almost seems like a good alternative. The exemplary case of Kuwaiti private donors shows that when determining friend and foe, the situation is extremely complex. Syria has become far more than a proxy war between world powers. Private self-interests as well as opposing religious and ideological beliefs play an increasingly significant role in determining Syria’s conflict lines, conflict lines which must be understood in a wider regional context.

Arne Holverscheid is an undergraduate student of Political Science, Middle Eastern Studies and History at Ludwig Maximilians University Munich. He is currently interning for the International Center for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel. His interests include terrorism funding, radical Islamic ideologies and the history of terrorism. Twitter: @AHolverscheid.

This article is part of a Strife series on financing terror. Over the next few weeks Strife will feature other articles that focus on different ways of financing terrorism. Next, Claire Mennessier will examine the involvement of Pakistan in financing terror groups, and the motivations and challenges presented by this involvement.

NOTES

[i] “The long road to Damascus: There are signs that the Syrian regime may become still more violent”, The Economist, February 11, 2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21547305.

[ii] Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, “How the U.S. fragmented Syria’s rebels”, The Washington Post, September 22, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/22/how-the-u-s-fragmented-syrias-rebels/.

[iii] Jamie Dettmer, “Syria’s Saudi Jihadist Problem”, The Daily Beast, December 16, 2013. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/12/16/syria-s-saudi-jihadist-problem.html.

[iv] Mariam Karouny, “Saudi edges Qatar to control Syrian rebel support”, Reuters, May 31, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-syria-crisis-saudi-insight-idUSBRE94U0ZV20130531.

[v] “Kuwait launches Syria relief campaign”, Al Arabiya English, January 13, 2014. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/01/13/Kuwait-s-emir-appeals-for-Syrian-relief-aid.html.

[vi] Sylvia Westall and Mahmoud Harby, “Insight: Kuwaitis campaign privately to arm Syrian rebels”, Reuters, June 27 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/27/us-syria-kuwait-insight-idUSBRE95P0TG20130627.

[vii] Lori Plotkin Boghardt, “The Terrorist Funding Disconnect with Qatar and Kuwait”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 2, 2014. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-terrorist-funding-disconnect-with-qatar-and-kuwait.

[viii] Joby Warrick, “Private donations give edge to Islamists in Syria, officials say”, The Washington Post, September 21, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/private-donations-give-edge-to-islamists-in-syria-officials-say/2013/09/21/a6c783d2-2207-11e3-a358-1144dee636dd_story.html.

[ix] Elizabeth Dickinson, “Kuwait: the crisis in Syria comes home”, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2, 2014. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_kuwait_the_crisis_in_syria_comes_home323.

Financing Terror: A Strife 4-part series

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By: Maya Ehrmann:

Photo: Wikipedia
Photo: Wikipedia

Al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Taliban are household names these days. Yet, in the climate of the ‘War on Terror’, how do organisations like these survive and even thrive? It takes more than just strong leadership and organizational skills to uphold the proper functioning of terrorist groups - it takes money. Terrorism is the culmination of costly planning. It includes the dissemination of ideology, maintenance of logistics, recruitment and training of operatives, and perpetration of the terrorist act itself. Financial activity related to terrorism accounts for an estimated 5% of the annual global output, or about $1.5 trillion USD. 1

The events of September 11th 2001 thrust the issue of terrorist funding into the limelight of the global arena. Globalisation of communication, the internet, and banking systems have enabled terrorist organizations to expand their activities and financial mechanisms needed to finance these activities. While state-sponsoring was previously a primary source of funding for terrorist activity, international cooperation through UN resolutions and economic sanctions has dissuaded state actors from sponsoring terrorist activities, thereby leading to the substantial decrease of this method of funding. Terrorist organizations have, as a result, increasingly turned to diverse and alternative sources of revenue, such as criminal activities – including drug trafficking, credit card fraud, and kidnapping for ransom – as well as private sources of funding through charities and individuals.

The methods and resources used to fund terrorism vary from region to region, and from group to group. Limiting the financial resources available to terrorist organisations is a crucial step in the fight against terrorism, and both national governments and international bodies have taken steps to address this.

The attacks of September 11th had highlighted the shortcomings of UNSC Resolution 1267, which called upon UN member states to identify, seize, and freeze financial resources of the Taliban, Al Qaeda and their affiliates, but which lacked any means of enforcing its provisions. In response to these shortcomings, the UN adopted UNSC Resolution 1373 in 2001, which required all UN member states to criminalize direct or indirect support for terrorism, including terrorism funding.

As one of the leaders in the ‘War on Terror’, the US government issued the USA Patriot Act which created strict legal measures to counter terrorist financing. Also, the Financial Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental body created in 1989 by the G-7 in order to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, issued a revised series of recommendations on how to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The World Bank and the IMF have since developed assistance programs for countries to ensure compliance with the FATF’s recommendations.

Current international efforts to combat this phenomenon have been largely focused on commitments by UN member states. This is problematic, as it does not provide a framework or incentive for non-UN member states or entities to effectively combat terrorist financing. Furthermore, current international legislation on terrorist financing is very general and does not take into consideration the unique situation of each state. Whereas the United States may easily implement some of the legislation on a national level, it is very difficult for a state such as Syria, which is currently in the midst of a civil war and is a hotbed of terrorist activity and chaos, to properly implement international legislation on terrorist financing. Ironically, it is precisely states such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq which may benefit the most from a crackdown on terrorist financing.

On a strategic level, despite a growing international focus on combating terrorist funding, increasingly sophisticated methods of financing terrorism have meant terrorists are often able to stay one step ahead of authorities. The illegal activities used by terrorist groups to finance their activities often do not leave a cash trail, making them difficult to track. Thus, terrorist financing continues to remain a major stumbling block to curtailing terrorist activity.

Over the next few weeks Strife will feature a four-part series on terrorist financing. Each author will examine a different method of terrorist financing, using modern and varied case studies, offering a new look at who and what is funding today’s terror activities. Arne Holverscheid will discuss the role of private Kuwaiti donors in financing rebel groups in Syria affiliated with terror organisations and blurring the lines between good and bad, friend and foe. Claire Mennessier will examine the involvement of Pakistan in financing terror groups, and the motivations and challenges presented by this involvement. Samuel Smith will address the frightening trend of kidnapping for ransom as a source of finance for terror groups through a case study of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and Southeast Asia. Finally, Drew Alyeshmerni will shed light upon the use of charities as a cover for terrorist financing and the implication that defining certain organisations as terror groups may have upon the eradication of this source of financing.

The financing of terrorism continues to be a global challenge and an increasingly important aspect of counterterrorism efforts. We hope this series will pique your interest in the subject and lead to a more detailed understanding of the sophisticated and varied ways of financing terror.

Maya Ehrmann is a Guest Editor for Strife. She is currently reading for an MA in Intelligence and International Security at King’s College London and holds a BA in Government and Diplomacy from the Interdisciplinary Centre, Israel. Her primary areas of research interest include counterterrorism, international security, and Middle Eastern affairs. References: 1 Jennifer L. Hesterman, The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, Organized Crime, and Terror Groups, (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2013), p. 167.

Why is everyone Hitler?

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By Thomas Colley:

Why do so many political leaders seem incapable of analogising undesirable behaviour to anyone other than Hitler and the Nazis? Conflict in Ukraine has seen the protagonists base their propaganda on demonising the other side as ‘Nazis’ and ‘fascists’. David Cameron recently compared the dilemmas of dealing with Putin with those of Neville Chamberlain dealing with Hitler.[i] Tony Abbott recently claimed that The Islamic State (IS/ISIS/ISIL) were akin to Nazis and Communists. It is almost surprising that the Ebola virus hasn’t been compared to Hitler.

The extensive use of the Hitler analogy has fuelled debate over the extent to which such analogies are accurate.[ii] Arguably however, a more important issue is how useful such analogies are, and what they say about political leaders that they continue to use them.

An analogy is a comparison between two things based on some sort of shared characteristic. In politics, this tends to involve a comparison between current events or actors and those of the past, in order to make current events more easily intelligible, or even prescribe future action. Similarity cannot and need not be absolute, since focusing on the similarities in analogies tends to obscure differences. In this way, Al Qaeda may be immeasurably different to Imperial Japan, but focusing on the idea of ‘surprise attack on America’ makes 9/11 akin to Pearl Harbour, the differences obscured. In the same way, Putin’s annexation of Crimea is akin to Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland, while obscuring the obvious strategic differences between their aims.

The first way such analogies are used might be to prescribe strategy. If one likens Putin to Hitler, collective memories of the Second World War support the idea that Putin should be challenged, as appeasement will only fuel Russian aggression. Multiple European leaders have used rhetoric to this effect, arguing that Europe faces an existential threat if Putin is not stopped. Admittedly, the analogy is not wholly unfounded. Putin’s conduct in Ukraine has some similarities to the Nazi leader. Both his actions and rhetoric used in annexing the Crimea did resemble Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland. But Putin is not Hitler, and it is disturbing to think that such a crude comparison might be used for strategy-making.

Thankfully, based on the West’s response, it is relatively obvious that they know Putin is not Hitler, and are not acting as if he is even if they are saying so. After all, if Putin were Hitler, and to use another analogy, the West’s economic sanctions might be the equivalent of freezing the accounts of Himmler, Heydrich and Goering. Would this deter Hitler, once Goebbels, Bormann and Speer were added to the list, and are the West even thinking this way? Clearly not. There is little that indicates that Putin’s grand designs are in any way equivalent to Hitler. Bismarck would be a better comparison for his grasp of realpolitik; Stalin is a far more apt comparison in terms of his desire to maintain influence in states bordering Russia. However, this search for the least distorting analogy is of limited strategic use; the situation with Ukraine is unique and must be understood on its own terms.

If the Hitler analogy is not being used to prescribe strategy, it is being used to legitimise strategy. This is achieved through the most elementary level of playground logic: that Hitler was a bully; Putin is a bully, and as every child learns in primary school, if no one stands up to bullies they keep on bullying. This legitimises Western foreign policy towards Russia since states can at least claim they are acting against the bully. Whether their actions are sufficient to deter the bully is doubtful; only time will tell. Certainly the West’s rhetoric about what should be done has been extensive. But when faced with the West’s rhetoric, Putin can draw again from a primary school lesson recounted in Britain, that ‘sticks and stones will break my bones but words will never hurt me.’

Aside from Putin, the Hitler analogy continues to be invoked based on another metaphor, that of Hitler as ‘evil’. This appears by far the most common use of the Hitler analogy in political discourse; that through instigating the Second World War and perpetrating the Holocaust, Hitler epitomises human evil. Analogising to Hitler is therefore a common use of hyperbole to undermine an opponent, be it in the debating hall or in international politics. In fact, so popular is the ‘Hitler as evil’ metaphor that using it to demonise one’s opponent seems to be one of the first acts of many leaders’ propaganda playbooks. Putin repeatedly compared Poroshenko’s government to the Nazis; the Ukrainians responded in turn. Accusation and counter-accusation flowed, and the West joined in in what increasingly resembled the sort of name-calling found on exactly the same primary school playground from which the bullying analogy is understood.

The analogy was even more crudely exemplified by Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s claim that ISIS were comparable to the Nazis and the Communists based on the evil inherent in their provocatively public beheadings. Leaving aside the heterogeneity of global communism, the analogy seems only to function through the basic idea that ‘these people are evil, really, really bad, so we should stop them’. The ostensibly sagacious can then reinforce this with Burke’s dictum that ‘all that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing’, and action against the evil threat is justified. Faced with Burke’s eloquence, no one apparently notices that evil will presumably also flourish if ‘men do the wrong thing, or don’t do enough for long enough’. Still, this makes the Hitler analogy a simple tactic to secure public support – we must act, or evil (Hitlers) will win.

However, this basic tactic illuminates several troubling issues with our political leaders’ grasp of communication and their faith in their publics. First, if every state repeats the same analogy, then its persuasive effects are limited. If the aim of using Hitler is to evoke fear and stir collective memory, if both sides are constantly doing so, then what effect is it likely to have? Second, once strategy is shown to contradict the analogy, then the analogy is inevitably revealed as propaganda – as just another person playing the Hitler card, as if they can’t think of anything better to say.

So why does the Hitler analogy remain such a compelling rhetorical device for political leaders? The answer seems to be that those using it assume that such analogies will stir an emotional response from an irrational, volatile public that has limited knowledge of international affairs, but at least understands that ‘Hitler was an evil and a bully, and so evil bullies like Hitler should be stopped.’ This logic reflects the same assumption that it is enough to shout ‘terrorist threat’ to engender mass fear and secure extensive public support. There is some irony here. David Cameron’s statement that ISIS are ‘a greater and deeper threat to our security than we have known before’ appears currently to be a securitising move of immense hyperbole.[iii] Yet it is precisely the understanding of the existential threat posed by Hitler that highlights how unnecessarily hyperbolic Cameron’s claim appears.

This suggests that many political leaders continue to base their communication assumptions on those of almost a century ago, assuming like Lippman, Almond and Bernays that publics are emotional, volatile and ignorant masses.[iv] This ignores a vast body of research that has shown the public to be, if not highly knowledgeable, at least reasoning on matters of foreign policy.[v] Why, for example, did Abbott feel that it was necessary to compare ISIS with Hitler? Did he or his speechwriters assume that it was beyond the public to grasp the evil of blunt-knifed public beheadings without the need for lazy hyperbole and overused analogy?

In this way, the use of the Hitler analogy betrays the lack of faith political elites have in their publics. Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond’s comparison between the Scottish referendum and the post-apartheid elections in South Africa demonstrated a similar viewpoint. The analogy did support the otherwise persuasive narrative of oppressive Westminster rule over Scotland, but the comparison is tenuous at best, crass at worst.[vi] The only rational explanation for the choice of analogy is the assumption that the publics Salmond was trying to persuade are too ill-informed, or overwhelmed by nationalist fervour, that they would notice the difference between democratic Scotland and post-apartheid South Africa. The irony is that in using such crude analogies, politicians make themselves look as ill-informed as they assume their publics to be. This is probably not the case, but it contributes to the pervasive distrust between political elites and their publics.

I am of the view that if political leaders decide to use historical analogies, their choices should be carefully considered, grounded in a more optimistic perspective of the publics they are trying to persuade. Some might argue this is naïve, and that publics are largely ignorant of foreign policy matters and susceptible to crude analogies. However if one adopts this viewpoint, the tactic is still questionable, since governments would be better off trying to influence the active citizenry that are engaged in the political process. Surely these are the exact people that would expect more from their politicians than ‘everyone is Hitler’?

Perhaps the most telling indictment comes from one of the ‘rules of the internet’. Godwin’s law states that as online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison with Hitler or the Nazis increases.[vii] Interestingly, the person who first analogises to Hitler automatically loses the debate, for recourse to the Hitler analogy is to lack the ability to construct a more meaningful argument. Applied to political leaders, this would mean that the first person to be reduced to using a Hitler analogy loses the debate; the person who compares a peacetime democratic referendum to a people emerging from decades of racial oppression loses the debate; the leader who just lists ‘evil people we don’t like’ loses the debate.

As Hoggart wrote sceptically of the working classes, people may appear to have views on political matters, but they usually consist of

 

‘a bundle of largely unexamined and orally-transmitted tags, enshrining generalisations, prejudices
and half-truths, and elevated by epigrammatic phrasing into the status of maxims…. These are often contradictory of each other; but they are not thought about, not intellectually considered.’[viii]

In their use of analogies, many political leaders don’t seem to be doing much better.

 

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Thomas Colley is a PhD student in War Studies at King’s College London. His research interests include propaganda, strategic communication and public attitudes to the use of military force. You can follow Thomas on Twitter @ThomasColley.

 

NOTES

[i] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/02/tony-abbott-says-extreme-force-needed-to-counter-isis-death-cult, 2 September 2014.

[ii] For reasons of brevity, ‘the Hitler analogy’ refers to analogies relating to Hitler and Nazism in general.

[iii] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/threat-level-from-international-terrorism-raised-pm-press-conference, 29 August 2014.

[iv] Almond, Gabriel A. The American People and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1950; Bernays, Edward L. Propaganda. Ig Publishing, 1928; Lippmann, Walter. Public Opinion. Transaction Publishers, 1946.

[v] Aldrich, John, Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, and Kristin Thompson Sharp. “Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection.” Annual Review of Political Science, 9 (2006): 477–502; Popkin, Samuel L. The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns. University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Page, Benjamin, and Robert Shapiro. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences. University of Chicago Press, 2010.

[vi] It is possibly that Salmond’s analogy may have been more thoughtless than calculating. However, he probably knew that he had been described as the ‘paler Mandela’ months before on social media, which suggests the analogy was deliberate. See http://www.scotsman.com/news/drumlanrig-gordon-brown-nelson-mandela-geoff-hurst-1-3224520, 29 September 2014.

[vii] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/6408927/Internet-rules-and-laws-the-top-10-from-Godwin-to-Poe.html, 23 October 2009.

[viii] Hoggart, Richard. The Uses of Literacy: Aspects of Working-Class Life. London: Penguin Classics, 2009, 86.

Obama offers some humility; this can be a good thing

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By Zachary Wolfraim:

Barack Obama

President Obama sought to outline a vision for US foreign policy in his commencement speech to West Point graduates on 28 May and once more highlighted the role of American leadership in global affairs. While he noted that the US was the ‘indispensible nation’, the new dangers to the international system were neither to be underestimated, nor should the US be complacent about its place in this system. Indeed, President Obama noted the rising challenges coming from a rapidly developing world and outlined the continued need for American leadership in tackling future crises. Moreover, despite the blows struck against al-Qaeda, he also highlighted the still dangerous and diffuse threat of international terrorism.

What exactly does this mean for the role of the US as primus inter pares? Perhaps most notably, Obama’s speech sought to balance optimism with a dose of humility. The heavy toll of Iraq and Afghanistan has certainly given pause for reflection over the use of force as an immediate solution for major foreign policy crises. Indeed as he noted, “just because we have the best hammer doesn’t mean that every problem is a nail.” Similarly, Obama sought to highlight the importance of restoring America’s moral leadership – again vowing to close Guantanamo, revise protocols on intelligence gathering and support the broader cause of international justice. Of course, this was balanced by his continued support for drone strikes as a vital counter-terrorism tool.

Critics of the President may see this speech as broadly kowtowing to international public opinion and damaging US ability to project its power and protect its interests internationally. However, in many ways the speech betrays a realism that has been a long time coming. America’s ‘unipolar moment’ is long past and the dynamics of international power continue to change; however, to suggest that the US has less of a role in world than it did in the past is also wrong. Indeed, as noted already, the US remains first among equals and will for some time yet, despite previous missteps or errors like the drawing of ‘red-lines’ with regards to Syrian chemical weapons.

As outlined in the speech, redoubling efforts to reinforce legitimacy-building institutions enhances American power far beyond military adventures or one-off diplomatic initiatives. The recognition that military power does not exist in a vacuum recognizes the important lessons learned from Afghanistan. As demonstrated by the shaky progress in Afghanistan, development and diplomacy need to be critical components of any future intervention or counter-terrorism initiative from the very beginning. Utilising appropriate international organizations will help achieve this by building the capabilities of allies reinforcing partnerships.

Nonetheless, the foreign policy as outlined carries dangers if followed through half-heartedly. If the US is to truly try and reform and reinforce the components of the current international order it needs to be done so with zeal, commitment and genuine follow-through to prevent its efforts from being bogged down in a bureaucratic quagmire. Taking on deeply entrenched bureaucracies such as the UN will require serious diplomatic commitment on the part of the US and its allies. This echoes many of the same issues that the US has faced in NATO in the past with regards to free-riding and burden sharing. Any optimism about the US trying to embed itself deeper in the system of international institutions should be tempered by the recognition that its partners and allies must match or at least share in this commitment. Indeed, US leadership is all well and good, but not all nations will see this renewed engagement as a positive step. Rather, this move can open the door to restrict, contain or otherwise hamper the exercise of American power internationally. Additionally, the increased engagement of the US in these organizations can also open them to criticism that they are only instruments of Western power. Perhaps most vitally, the international community should not expect the Obama administration or future administrations to sacrifice the ability to act on some issues on the altar of international legitimacy.

While Obama has outlined this ‘new’ approach to foreign policy, the international community should not expect any dramatic, immediate changes. He has already shown a hesitancy to use military force; largely reflecting the tentativeness of the American public to avoid another prolonged entanglement abroad. Rather this likely signals a greater effort to support existing areas of US influence within international organizations. NATO, ever starved for summit deliverables, will likely have a raft of possibilities for counter-terrorism cooperation, alongside cyber-defence and other joint activities to bolster European defence. With regards to the UN, IMF and World Bank, it will be interesting to see new American initiatives in these organizations and what these entail.

The announcement of new priorities in US foreign policy certainly deserves attention. It is naïve, however, to think that this will dramatically change any of the numerous challenges facing the international community. That said, if executed properly this sets the stage for US foreign policy over the next decade. It serves Obama and any future administrations well to recognize that the international system is changing, as is the position of the US within it. Terrorism, Syria, and challenges posed by Russia all present continuing threats to the international order. In order to stay relevant, US foreign policy must adapt and learn the lessons of the past decade’s military adventurism. We should all hope that Obama’s speech, if followed through and implemented, represents a step in the right direction.

 

________________
Zachary Wolfraim is a third year PhD student in the War Studies Department, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. You can follow him on Twitter @ZachWol.

Drones series, Part I: Pakistan's decade of drones (2004-2014)

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By Zoha Waseem:

‘Things fall out of the sky’

In June 2004, the first drone strike in Pakistan targeted a man who had rejected peace agreements with the government, sworn allegiance to the Taliban, and vowed to continue his ‘jihad’ against the United States in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military initially claimed responsibility for Nek Mohammad’s death, until more could be revealed about the drone programme. It was speculated that Pakistan granted CIA access into its airspace in order to take Mohammad out. This was to be the first of several hundred such attacks that neither the American nor Pakistani administrations were willing to officially acknowledge. Musharraf would later go on record to justify these attacks: ‘In Pakistan, things fall out of the sky all the time.’

Indeed, they would. Following the strike on Nek Mohammad, there would be 44 attacks under the Bush administration. The drone campaign initially made use of the notorious Shamsi Airfield near Quetta, leased to the CIA in 2001. In 2011, NATO forces opened fire on two Pakistani border check-posts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), killing 24 Pakistani soldiers, unleashing a country-wide outrage, and resulting in Islamabad ordering the US to evacuate (Salala attack).

The total numbers of strikes in Pakistan have ranged from 330 to over 380, escalating dramatically under the Obama administration. Those targeted are suspected of belonging primarily to al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and various Pakistani and foreign jihadi organisations, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The campaign in Pakistan has been largely restricted to FATA, a region where the concentration of militants has been overwhelming. Located northwest of Pakistan, FATA borders Afghanistan on the eastern side of the Durand Line. The tribal areas fall outside the writ of Pakistani law and governance – a weakness that the US and terrorists alike draw to their own advantages for respective onslaughts and campaigns.

Casualty Controversies

The calculation of civilian casualties has always been an area of contention. To an extent, this is understandable given the challenges of reporting from within the tribal areas. Additionally, the environment in FATA, their complex terrains and geographies makes it difficult to differentiate civilians from militants who blend in by living amongst locals.

Regardless, American and Pakistani authorities have not been forthcoming in acknowledging drone attacks or their casualties and the recognition of civilian deaths has been misleading. In March 2013, Pakistani officials claimed that between 400 and 600 civilians had been killed; in October, the Pakistani Ministry of Defence claimed the figure stood at 67 since 2008. A month later, Islamabad retracted the statement, claiming it was ‘wrong and fabricated’.

The table below summarises the data collected by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, New America Foundation and the Government of Pakistan on drone strikes in the country.

* Of which 332 strikes were carried out under President Obama’s administration.
///////** According to a Special Rapporteur, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The CIA maintains these strikes are ‘surgically precise’. It has yet to officially acknowledge any civilian casualty.

‘The only game in town’

The question of Islamabad’s consent has been the centre of debates on drones in Pakistan. In one article, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann wrote, ‘Behind the scenes, many Pakistani officials – including [former] president Asif Ali Zardari and [then] Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani – have supported the drone strikes, despite their occasional public protests.’ Local perceptions from within Pakistan suggest a majority of people believe they are carried out by Islamabad’s consent. Amnesty International’s Pakistan Researcher, Mustafa Qadri told Strife that Pakistan may have given tacit approval but there is no paper trail.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to President Obama last year, along with his plea to stop drone strikes, was little but a political move to show his countrymen that the Sharif government does not condone breaches of Pakistan’s sovereignty. Islamabad relies immensely on aid from the US. Telling the Americans what to do would mean disrupting an incoming flow of dollars; acknowledging approval for drones would result in a severe backlash from Pakistani militants and civil society alike; keeping the debate running under the shadow of dubious press releases, timely condemnations, and a lack of transparency, allows Islamabad to control resistance from within the Pakistani populace, appease local militants, and avoid upsetting allies in D.C.

Within the US, the debate has steadily been questioning American foreign policy in the war on terror. Mazzetti pointed out in his book, The Way of the Knife, that this ‘knife fighting’ is not as surgical as agencies claim. It ‘creates enemies just as it has obliterated them’ and has ‘lowered the bar for waging war’. Despite protests from the likes of David Kilcullen and Cameron Munter, Leon Panetta has notoriously described the drone programme as “the only game in town”.

An aspect that is often under-considered is how drones have contributed to militant propaganda. The TTP has repeatedly used the destruction caused by drones to further their ‘jihad’. Till 2009, estimates suggested the TTP and allied groups carried out suicide attacks in retaliation for drone strikes. Either way, civilians have been at the receiving end which has made it easier to instil anti-American sentiments within the aggrieved populace. As a result, the campaign has resulted in heated debates within Pakistan, leaving its citizens divided.

Local Debates, Perspectives and Impacts

The case against drone attacks within Pakistan has been most aggressively taken up by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf’s chairman, Imran Khan. The social and psychological impacts of drones are the main arguments put forth by Khan, who believes drones (and American presence in the region in general) have created terrorism in the country. Amnesty’s Qadri disagrees. ‘Drones are not the drivers of radicalization; local, social factors are’.

Qadri’s own investigations into the campaign (published in Amnesty’s report, Will I Be Next?) took him across Pakistan, making him critically aware of local perceptions. ‘The closer you get to FATA, the more sympathy you will find for drone strikes. People don’t like the Taliban. They are annoyed with terrorists. When you’re in such a violent region, people think, at least there are terrorists being killed [by drones]. It is not morally justified, but they are saying it out of frustration. [Drones] appear to be the least worst option out of some very bad options.’

A more extreme case for drone attacks was made by a columnist, Irfan Hussain. 2009 was known as ‘the year of the drone’ in Pakistan. Shortly after, Hussain asked, ‘If we condemn the Americans so vociferously over the drone campaign, should we not be more critical of the thugs who are killing far more Pakistani civilians?’ Hussain’s opinions are amongst the minority; the majority still protests against drones.

The anti-drone advocacy in Pakistan goes beyond the element of fear. Little is written about the rural-to-urban displacement of people since the start of the campaign. The displacement of people from northern areas to cities further strains the limited resources allocated for urban areas like Karachi. Conflicted cities, aggravated by an influx of IDPs, increase instability and deepen anti-American sentiments amongst the urban and liberal populace.

Moreover, the campaign has made Pakistanis doubtful about local and international humanitarian efforts. “It is difficult for aid agencies [including polio workers], local and foreign, to operate in these areas. Locals tend to think [these workers] are being used for spying”, points out Mustafa Qadri, resonating a view that has been prevalent since the Abbottabad raid of May 2001.

Another concerning matter is the lack of rehabilitation and reconstruction accompanying the campaign. Since there are no official agencies appointed for these efforts, groups such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the charity wing of Lashkar-e-Taiba, are able to sweep in to assist the locals, further propagating anti-Pakistani and anti-American rhetoric. Coupled with this is the fact that often two strikes occur consecutively at a given location; when locals reach the location following the first strike to provide assistance, a second hits. This makes local rescue operations much more difficult.

Internal impacts, popular dissent against drones and relations between the US and Pakistan may be contributing to a gradual decrease in strikes. In an unprecedented move, these factors led the Peshawar High Court to direct the government to move a resolution against the attacks in the United Nations. The historic verdict declared drones as ‘illegal, inhumane, and a violation of the UN charter on human rights’.

Last December, after pressure from Pakistan, the UN adopted a resolution on drone strikes, calling on the US to comply with international law. In March this year, the UNHCR held a third round of discussions on the draft resolution. Washington boycotted, refusing to supply UN any details about its programme

It is unclear whether the campaign will remain paused for the duration of negotiations between the Pakistan government and the TTP. It can be assumed that Pakistan may witness a decrease in the number of strikes as NATO withdrawal is undertaken from Afghanistan and as western interests shift from South Asia. Till then, it suffices to say that Pakistan’s decade of drones has caused yet another rift in the country’s socio-political fabric.

 

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Zoha Waseem is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research focuses on urban violence, organised crime and conflicts in cities. You can follow her on Twitter @ZohaWaseem.