Obama

The Timid Giant: the Retreating Drift of U.S. Foreign Policy under Barack Obama

December 7, 2016 by Adam Evans

By: Adam Evans

President Barack Obama listens during one in a series of meetings discussing the mission against Osama bin Laden, in the Situation Room of the White House. This marked a rare and tangible foreign policy success for Obama over the course of a tenure where inertia and lack of direction became characteristic. (Photo by Pete Souza/The White House via Getty Images)

Upon assuming office as President of the United States (U.S.) on 20 January 2009, Barack Obama inherited two undesirable bequeathments: at home, a tanking economy gripped by a recession; and abroad, a set of unpopular, bloody and seemingly unending military entanglements in Iraq and Afghanistan. The degree of success of Obama’s handling of domestic economic troubles is a subject for debate. However, on most indicators, it would appear reasonable to state that his administration is leaving the country no worse off than when he entered the White House – whether through good fortune or nuanced policies (probably a mixture of both). The same assertion cannot be made regarding U.S. foreign policy. Through eight years of indecision, appeasement and miscalculation, Obama leaves his own endowment of weakening U.S. influence amidst greater global instability to his successor.

Inauspicious beginnings

If Obama’s foreign policy were to be summed up in one sentence, we need look no further than his inauguration speech in 2009:

‘To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench a fist’.

On one hand, Obama’s remarks appeared to be optimistic, positive, and beneficent – emphasising that good behaviour will be rewarded, and signifying a marked change from years of perceived U.S. aggression and hawkishness. On the other hand, only wistful criticism is levelled at the corrupt and the dissenting for being on the wrong side of “history”, but it is unclear what the penalty of such a course will be – plenty of carrots, but no obvious stick.

That Obama chose such a path is not surprising. By 2009, U.S. citizens and the western world were war weary and drained in terms of blood and treasure. The disaster of George W. Bush’s Middle Eastern exploits had ensured that not only was change necessary but that it would be difficult. As detailed during Jeff Goldberg’s interview with Obama in 2016, a reluctance to be drawn into additional conflicts when Afghanistan and Iraq were still causing headaches clearly weighed heavily on Obama’s thinking.

The Syrian paradigm

However, the retreat of the U.S. from the global stage under Obama has engendered instability and resulted in the weakening of U.S. influence and credibility. The extent of this U.S. malaise is perfectly encapsulated in the current Syria/Iraq catastrophe.

Firstly, a failure to provide decisive military and political support to key U.S. allies has undoubtedly failed to check the expansion of ISIS and other terror groups. Although the U.S. cannot bear sole responsibility for the complexities around the emergence of ISIS, a timid and faltering response has exacerbated the situation, thereby harming U.S. and global interests.

Secondly, a failure to decisively intervene in the Syrian conflict, even when Obama’s self-imposed threshold regarding the use of chemical weapons was breached, has only emboldened a genocidal tyrant in Bashar Al-Assad and others in his ilk.

Thirdly, a failure at a diplomatic level has isolated a crucial geopolitical ally and fellow NATO member Turkey (particularly in the immediate aftermath of the failed coup d’etat of July 2016).

Finally, but perhaps most worrying of all, a resurgent, militaristic Russia has emerged, confident that its contempt for international law and alleged human rights abuse will go unpunished by a U.S. leader who has exhibited only weakness and appeasement in the face of increasing aggression. In the 2012 Presidential election campaign, Obama had derided – with characteristic wit – Mitt Romney’s prescient caution that Russia represented the greatest threat to U.S. interests, quipping that ‘the 1980s were calling to ask for their foreign policy back’. Yet, it is Obama who is laughing no more.

Outside of Syria and Iraq, the U.S.’ diminishing influence as a guarantor of stability is also evident. China’s assertive actions in the South China sea, the severance of the U.S.-Philippine strategic alliance by Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte, and the increasing belligerent actions of North Korea all pose malignant threats to the international order.

Reasons for optimism (and nervousness)

To state that U.S. foreign policy has been an unmitigated disaster under Obama would be an exaggeration. Relations with Cuba appear to have been positively reset. The deal with Iran has, at least temporarily, suspended their nuclear ambitions. Osama Bin Laden, the ultimate boogeyman in the U.S. War on Terror has been removed. And, most significantly, the U.S. has not suffered another major terror attack since 9/11. Perhaps Obama played the best of a bad hand, scoring successes in the areas in which he felt he could.

However, opposing this view is the fact that the U.S. in 2016 remains, by a considerable margin, the pre-eminent military force in the world. The annual American defence budget in 2015/16 was nearly US$ 600 billion – greater than the defence budgets of the next seven largest countries combined). In addition to overwhelming military superiority, it has extremely sophisticated channels of soft power. The opportunity for the U.S. to positively and actively shape international relations remains alive and well, contrary to the exaggerated narratives of U.S. decline. Under Obama, however, the conviction to use that power was often lacking, and it is this temerity that led to an increase in global insecurity. Obama’s self-proclaimed foreign policy tenet was ‘Don’t do stupid shit’. Unfortunately, in the interconnected world of the 21^st Century, this is not ambitious enough for the pre-eminent power.

So, while the U.S. retains the capacity to influence global events, it is impossible not to feel trepidation at the possible consequences of a Donald Trump presidency. Elected on a platform of isolationism and protectionism, it is difficult to foresee a positive and active U.S. foreign policy emerging in the next four years. Furthermore, whilst Obama could be criticised for excessive cautiousness, the consequences of sheer recklessness would likely be far worse.

Adam Evans is a postgraduate student in Conflict, Security, and Development at Kings College London, and a consultant with professional services firm KPMG. Adam can be reached at adam.evans@kcl.ac.uk.

Image credit: http://img.theepochtimes.com/n3/eet-content/uploads/2016/05/04/GettyImages-113482655.jpg

The Question of Limited Intervention in Syria: ‘And Then What?’

October 26, 2015 by Strife Staff

By: Alexander Decina

NATO-backed Patriot missile defence systems set up in Gaziantep, Turkey, February 4, 2013. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:U-s-service-members-stand-by-a-patriot-missile-battery-in-gaziantep-turkey.jpg — NATO-backed Patriot missile defence systems set up in Gaziantep, Turkey, February 4, 2013. Picture used under Creative Commons License.

Given the atrocities witnessed during the course of the Syrian civil war—be it the Bashar al-Assad regime’s use of barrel bombs or the depravity of the so-called Islamic State—it is hardly surprising to hear continued frustration at U.S. and Western inaction. Some have estimated the death toll to be higher than 250,000—a number that will surely increase given Russia’s intervention and the recent surge in Iranian efforts. In the United States, not only Republican candidates and policymakers, but also prominent Democratic figures including Hillary Clinton and John Kerry have called for the creation of either safe zones, a no-fly zone, or both. These options were most recently discussed in July this year, when Turkey authorised the United States to use its Incirlik airbase to launch sorties, but the Obama Administration has yet to enact such measures. While some advocates of safe or no-fly zones consider this a failure and lament the lack of U.S. leadership, these proponents fail to answer, or perhaps ask, an important question – “And then what?”

Safe Zones
Critics, activists, and leaders in the United States and abroad, have called for the creation of safe zones to protect civilians from the forces loyal to the Assad regime and the Islamic State. One such safe zone discussed could be up to 60 miles long and 25 miles deep into Syria along its border with Turkey. If established, the area would serve as a crucial operation centre for various elements of the Syrian opposition, ranging from those affiliated with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to the more dominant and radical groups including Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, which are under the Army of Conquest umbrella. It remains to be seen who would be tasked with enforcing this safe zone. Placing U.S. or other Western troops on the ground would be highly undesirable, not only for the sending countries, but also for communities in Syria in the long run. If Turkey, which has pushed for the establishment of the safe zone, sent its own troops, this would inevitably result in clashes with the Kurdish forces in northern Syria. The Kurds have already accused Ankara of bombing the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). Alternatively, Arab countries opposed to Iranian influence could send their troops to Syria as they have in Yemen, but the last thing Syria needs is the influx of additional foreign fighters on either side of the conflict. Perhaps it would be best if Syrian groups themselves controlled the area, but such an endeavour would require far more weapons and support than the United States and the West are currently providing.

If more aid is needed for the opposition to enforce the safe zones, then which of the Syrian groups should Washington support? The administration has recently come under fire for its limited success in training and equipping Syrian rebels, yet the smaller numbers are not due to a lack of resources but rather the high vetting standards for the rebels. There are reports that the Department of Defense is lowering these standards, but this, if true, would be a dangerous move. There are numerous challenges to the vetting process, mainly stemming from the lack of information available on the individuals in question. However, even if with lower vetting thresholds the United States continues to restrict equipment provisions to FSA-affiliated groups only, this still poses substantial risks. There have been multiple reports of FSA fighters, and sometimes entire units, joining forces with Nusra. Short of this, there is also nothing to stop FSA groups from selling, if not surrendering, weapons to more extreme militias including ones they are actively fighting.

Thus, the more material support Washington supplies to any Syrian rebels, even the FSA, the higher the likelihood that those weapons and ammunition will fall into the hands of Nusra and other radical groups. Some may argue that if the FSA is strengthened, it will be less vulnerable and less susceptible to defections and loss of equipment, however this is unlikely. Considering how fragmented the FSA’s brigades are, it is hard to believe that it could stand as a cohesive entity against Nusra or the Army of Conquest, especially given that the latter groups are backed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey—all of which use far less discretion than the United States. As such, these jihadist groups will surely maintain their edge over the moderate elements of FSA. With safe zones keeping the Assad regime, the regime’s backers, and the Islamic State out of large pockets of Syria—and absent strong opponents within the Syrian opposition—Nusra and groups like it will surely reap further benefits. And then what? Is tipping the scales against Assad worth bolstering Syria’s al-Qaeda affiliate?

A No-Fly Zone
If a safe zone is too complicated to establish effectively, then shouldn’t the United States and its allies at least implement a no-fly zone? Protecting Syrian civilians from the indiscriminate barrel bombings of the Syrian Arab Air Force (SAAF) is indeed a worthy goal. However, even if decisions concerning Russian maneuverability within the airspace were placed aside, this measure would still have its complications. Horrific as the SAAF’s attacks are, it does more than target civilians or even the FSA. It also targets the extreme jihadist organisations mentioned earlier by attacking their leadership, stockpiles, and supply routes. Having cleared the SAAF (and perhaps Russian jets) from the skies, would the United States be prepared to pick up the mantle of neutralizing jihadist organisations that pose a legitimate threat?

It is worth remembering the case of Ansar al-Sharia, one of the Islamist militias that rose up under the cover of a NATO-enforced no-fly zone in Libya. After the September 2012 attack on the United States consulate in Benghazi (which Ansar al-Sharia is suspected of carrying out), Benghazans stormed the group’s headquarters. Ansar al-Sharia then withdrew, only to return the following year with weapons looted from Muammar al-Gaddafi’s stockpiles. In coordination with other Islamist and revolutionary militias, Ansar al-Sharia took control of Benghazi in the summer of 2014. While it has lost control of most of the city and has been weakened since last year, the group still conducts its operations and retains its stockpiles and training camps. Thus, its fighters still pose a real threat in Libya and abroad.

When applying the lessons of Libya to Syria, if the United States and its allies are to impose a no-fly zone, what will be their response when such measures inevitably bolster Nusra and other radical forces? Thus far, the United States has conducted strikes on Nusra concurrently with its attacks on the Islamic State, but this has not yet had a major impact on the group. If Washington were intensify these efforts and mount a serious campaign against Nusra, its fighters and leadership could either temporarily recede into the background as Ansar al-Sharia did, splinter off into new Sunni groups, or even join allied groups in the Army of Conquest umbrella that the United States is less likely to target.

And then what? If the United States were to aggressively continue targeting Nusra’s members after the group’s disbanding—an operational approach that would be wrought with imprecision and mistakes due to insufficient information—such measures would not be well received by the Sunni community in Syria and the region. Furthermore, Nusra would be able to continue building its weapons stockpiles, whether under its own name or under the auspices of other groups, and the United States would have no reliable means to prevent this.

U.S. Limitations in Syria
The creation of either a safe zone or a no-fly zone risks bolstering radical groups within the Syrian opposition by increasing their access to weapons and support. It will neither tip the scales and overwhelm Assad, nor bring an end to the conflict, but will instead contribute to prolonging it. Thus it is imperative the United States understands the very real limitations it has in addressing the Syrian civil war. Although extraordinarily difficult, instead of a limited intervention, Washington should work towards creating an environment in which Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, and other states will be willing to stem the flow of weapons and support to both the opposition and the Assad regime. This is an arduous undertaking that may indeed be impossible, but the alternative should not involve adopting a short-sighted policy that lacks a realistic end goal. Frustrating as it may be, acting for the sake of acting is a reckless approach. Thus, before attempting to alter the situation in Syria, the Obama administration, and future administrations, must ask themselves “And then what?”

Alexander Decina is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he focuses on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. He previously worked for the Tripoli, Libya-based Sadeq Institute and for the Sustainable Democracy Center in Beirut, Lebanon.

Obama offers some humility; this can be a good thing

May 29, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zachary Wolfraim:

President Obama sought to outline a vision for US foreign policy in his commencement speech to West Point graduates on 28 May and once more highlighted the role of American leadership in global affairs. While he noted that the US was the ‘indispensible nation’, the new dangers to the international system were neither to be underestimated, nor should the US be complacent about its place in this system. Indeed, President Obama noted the rising challenges coming from a rapidly developing world and outlined the continued need for American leadership in tackling future crises. Moreover, despite the blows struck against al-Qaeda, he also highlighted the still dangerous and diffuse threat of international terrorism.

What exactly does this mean for the role of the US as primus inter pares? Perhaps most notably, Obama’s speech sought to balance optimism with a dose of humility. The heavy toll of Iraq and Afghanistan has certainly given pause for reflection over the use of force as an immediate solution for major foreign policy crises. Indeed as he noted, “just because we have the best hammer doesn’t mean that every problem is a nail.” Similarly, Obama sought to highlight the importance of restoring America’s moral leadership – again vowing to close Guantanamo, revise protocols on intelligence gathering and support the broader cause of international justice. Of course, this was balanced by his continued support for drone strikes as a vital counter-terrorism tool.

Critics of the President may see this speech as broadly kowtowing to international public opinion and damaging US ability to project its power and protect its interests internationally. However, in many ways the speech betrays a realism that has been a long time coming. America’s ‘unipolar moment’ is long past and the dynamics of international power continue to change; however, to suggest that the US has less of a role in world than it did in the past is also wrong. Indeed, as noted already, the US remains first among equals and will for some time yet, despite previous missteps or errors like the drawing of ‘red-lines’ with regards to Syrian chemical weapons.

As outlined in the speech, redoubling efforts to reinforce legitimacy-building institutions enhances American power far beyond military adventures or one-off diplomatic initiatives. The recognition that military power does not exist in a vacuum recognizes the important lessons learned from Afghanistan. As demonstrated by the shaky progress in Afghanistan, development and diplomacy need to be critical components of any future intervention or counter-terrorism initiative from the very beginning. Utilising appropriate international organizations will help achieve this by building the capabilities of allies reinforcing partnerships.

Nonetheless, the foreign policy as outlined carries dangers if followed through half-heartedly. If the US is to truly try and reform and reinforce the components of the current international order it needs to be done so with zeal, commitment and genuine follow-through to prevent its efforts from being bogged down in a bureaucratic quagmire. Taking on deeply entrenched bureaucracies such as the UN will require serious diplomatic commitment on the part of the US and its allies. This echoes many of the same issues that the US has faced in NATO in the past with regards to free-riding and burden sharing. Any optimism about the US trying to embed itself deeper in the system of international institutions should be tempered by the recognition that its partners and allies must match or at least share in this commitment. Indeed, US leadership is all well and good, but not all nations will see this renewed engagement as a positive step. Rather, this move can open the door to restrict, contain or otherwise hamper the exercise of American power internationally. Additionally, the increased engagement of the US in these organizations can also open them to criticism that they are only instruments of Western power. Perhaps most vitally, the international community should not expect the Obama administration or future administrations to sacrifice the ability to act on some issues on the altar of international legitimacy.

While Obama has outlined this ‘new’ approach to foreign policy, the international community should not expect any dramatic, immediate changes. He has already shown a hesitancy to use military force; largely reflecting the tentativeness of the American public to avoid another prolonged entanglement abroad. Rather this likely signals a greater effort to support existing areas of US influence within international organizations. NATO, ever starved for summit deliverables, will likely have a raft of possibilities for counter-terrorism cooperation, alongside cyber-defence and other joint activities to bolster European defence. With regards to the UN, IMF and World Bank, it will be interesting to see new American initiatives in these organizations and what these entail.

The announcement of new priorities in US foreign policy certainly deserves attention. It is naïve, however, to think that this will dramatically change any of the numerous challenges facing the international community. That said, if executed properly this sets the stage for US foreign policy over the next decade. It serves Obama and any future administrations well to recognize that the international system is changing, as is the position of the US within it. Terrorism, Syria, and challenges posed by Russia all present continuing threats to the international order. In order to stay relevant, US foreign policy must adapt and learn the lessons of the past decade’s military adventurism. We should all hope that Obama’s speech, if followed through and implemented, represents a step in the right direction.

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Zachary Wolfraim is a third year PhD student in the War Studies Department, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. You can follow him on Twitter @ZachWol.

Drones series, Part IV. ‘May you die in a drone strike’: Yemen, AQAP and the US drone program

April 18, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Dr Victoria Fontan:

Drones are slowly making their way into our modern lives. They can now deliver books, medical marijuana, or beer to sailors at sea. In the next few years, drones will dramatically change our lives. Farea al-Muslimi, a Yemeni youth activist, explains how they have already changed the social fabric of his country.[i] ‘May you die in a drone strike’ has now become people’s favourite curse, and when a parent wants a child to behave, he/she only needs to threaten to ‘call the drones,’ and the child will comply with any request. In the Global North, drones bring modernity to your doorstep. In Yemen, they deliver death.

Competing numbers of casualties

The exact number of drone strikes in Yemen cannot be fully ascertained, due to the covert nature of US operations in the region. While the first strike was carried out in 2002, all others have taken place after President Obama took office in 2009.

The table below summarises the data collected by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, New America Foundation, the Long War Journal and the Government of Yemen on drone strikes in the country.

In Yemen, drone strikes are only part of the story regarding the targeted killings performed by the United States government against, allegedly, Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula (AQAP). Other types of attacks can be launched from US Navy warships or army bases in neighbouring Saudi Arabia, whose fighter planes also participate in the US war on AQAP in Yemen.[ii] The public is being reassured that targeted killings are all carefully regulated, and that only terrorists are dying, minus a few collateral deaths that outweigh the potential civilian deaths resulting from an actual act of terrorism.[iii]

Grounds for targeted killings

On what grounds can a targeted killing take place? Al-Muslimi has had a lot of time to reflect on this. His village, Wessab, was targeted by a strike on April 17^th 2013.[iv] Six days later, he testified before the US Senate on the attack. An anti-drone activist since then, he explains that two are types of killings. Under the first type, the United States Department of Justice provided three clear conditions for a killing to take place: the person has to be designated as a person of interest and he or she must represent a direct threat to the US; the target cannot be captured; and, finally, the operation must not target civilians.[v] The other type is the ‘signature strike’, whereby any high-ranking military officer can order the death of anyone displaying suspicious behaviour.[vi] There lies a rather complex problem for any civilian: ‘What is suspicious behaviour in the US is completely normal behaviour here,’ explains Farea. ‘It can represent every single Yemeni in Yemen. If I am with you, going to a wedding outside Sana’a, we will obviously be between the age of 15 and 65, we will be carrying guns [they are part of the Yemeni dress code], and we will be a group, [that’s] enough! It is not even intelligent criteria anymore.’

Questions of effectiveness

These criteria raise many questions. First, if anyone can potentially be targeted, how effective can the strikes be in relation to weakening AQAP in the region? Moreover, are the conditions highlighted by Barack Obama ever being met? Several attacks come to mind, some of them involving drones, others both drones and missiles sent from US Navy ships. The first one is that of al Majaala, on December 17^th 2009, portrayed in Jeremy Scahill’s 2013 documentary Dirty Wars.[vii] The target of this attack was Mohammed al-Qazimi, a former alleged al-Qaeda associate who had spent five years in a Yemeni jail, and had been released shortly before the strike. Since he had returned to Maajala, he had been passing by an army checkpoint morning and afternoon to go and buy his daily bread and khat.[viii] He could easily have been arrested and tried at any time for any crimes he was accused of. Did he represent a known threat to the Yemeni government? It is unlikely that he would have ever been released from prison if he did. Fifty-five people died on that day, including 14 women, seven of which were pregnant, and 21 children.[ix] A second attack of interest is that of Qawlan, on January 23^rd 2013.[x] On that day, a known opponent of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Rabieh Hamud Labieh, was travelling by car. Labieh was a democratically elected local councillor who had turned against former President Saleh during the 2011 Arab Spring-related demonstrations. Labieh was notorious for having denounced the smuggling of government weapons between Sana’a and Saleh’s countryside stronghold right after his demise. He had been an opponent to the new regime, arguing that the country was still a dictatorship. Once again, why should he be targeted by the US government, except to contribute to a Yemeni government purge? Eight people died on that day, all civilians with no connections to AQAP.

AQAP, the ‘moderates’ and anti-US sentiment

Al-Muslimi remarks that the strike against his own village in April 2013 has increased anti-US sentiment throughout the region, hence boosting the local support for AQAP by default. The fact that AQAP now occasionally compensates villagers after drone strikes is a politically savvy move, clearly winning local hearts and minds in the process and also undermining the Yemeni government, which rarely offers compensation after strikes. Abdul Rahman Ali Barman, director of HOOD, a Yemeni-based Human Rights NGO, makes a more disturbing assertion regarding AQAP.[xi] Barman argues that moderates within the organization have been purged to the benefit of hardliners, all thanks to drone strikes. He mentions the recent killing of two moderate al-Qaeda officials by a strikes, Fadel Qasr and Mohammed el-Hamda. According to him, Qasr and el-Hamda were members of the AQAP council, the Shura, which decides on operations across the country. They both had withdrawn during the vote on several operations, which they did not agree with. Their names and locations were conveniently given to the Yemeni government, which then forwarded them to the US.[xii] According to Ali Barman, AQAP’s military leader, Qasm al-Raimi, is actually very close to the previous and current governments. If this is indeed the case as Ali Barman alleges, then indirectly, the US government would be aiding and abating AQAP, helping it purging its moderates. Of importance here is the idea that moderates within AQAP and other al-Qaeda related organizations seem to be more inclined towards addressing social justice issues, rather than directly challenging the State into the formation of an exclusive Caliphate.[xiii]

Drone strikes and targeted killings in Yemen are a very complex affair, much more so than the US government would like to admit. All parties involved, except the local population, seem to be benefiting from them. Ali Barman recalls the funeral of the Al-Maajala victims with emotion, especially an old lady who pleaded, referring to the US: ‘They even have laws that protect animals, why can’t they just consider us like their animals?’ Drones and the protection of animals in the US are two great signs of progress. In Yemen, they bear a sinister meaning. If the drone program continues in Yemen, the support from the population towards AQAP is likely to become much stronger, this due to the fact that many more civilians die in strikes than AQAP operatives, and that when AQAP members are targeted and killed, there are many candidates to replace them, often being more radical than their predecessors. Since it is public knowledge that the Yemeni government provides its US ally with the necessary intelligence before a strike, popular support can only go one way, that of AQAP.

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Dr. Victoria Fontan is an MPhil Candidate in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. She carried out research on drone strikes in Yemen in January 2014. This article is based on a series of stories published on her blog, which can be found at www.victoriacfontan.com. In July 2014, with some families of drone victims, she will contribute to the establishment of a network aimed at the systematic compilation of evidence after new strikes.

NOTES
[i] Interview with Farea Al-Muslimi, Sana’a, Yemen, January 7^th 2014.
[ii] See http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/americas/article3647656.ece
[iii] See Barack Obama’s remarks at the National Defense University (NDU): http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-barack-obama
[iv] See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtQ_mMKx3Ck
[v] See the US Department of Justice White paper for more information: http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf
[vi] President Obama stated in the NDU speech referenced above that this type of strike would be examined. The Wedding Party strike of December 2013 suggests that ‘signature strikes’ are still active, since the wedding convoy was mistaken for an AQAP convoy: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/12/us-drone-strike-wedding-party-yemen_n_4434127.html
[vii] For a detailed account of the US government involvement in Yemen and the Majaala attack, see: http://www.thenation.com/article/159578/dangerous-us-game-yemen?page=0,2
[viii]Khat is a locally grown leaf that is chewed daily for its stimulant properties.
[ix] See Al-Karama and HOOD’s report on drone strikes in Yemen for more details: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:zixkp3osuKQJ:en.alkarama.org/documents/ALK_USA-Yemen_Drones_SRCTwHR_4June2013_Final_EN.pdf+Al-Karama+and+HOOD’s+report+on+drone+strikes+in+Yemen&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=safari
[x] Interview with Mohammed al-Qawli, Qawlan, Yemen, January 8^th 2014.
[xi] Interview with Abdul Rahman Ali Barman, Sana’a, Yemen, January 9^th 2014.
[xii] In December 2013, the Yemeni parliament almost unanimously called for an end to drone strikes in their country. The vote was a clear disavowal of Yemeni President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s support for and collaboration with the drone program. See: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/15/world/meast/yemen-drones/
[xiii] The author has recently initiated a research on the issue of moderate al-Qaeda affiliates in Fallujah, Iraq. For preliminary results, see: V. Fontan, ‘Out beyond Occupy Fallujah and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, there was a field’, in Harmonie Toros & Yannis Tellidis (eds.), Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis and Opposition (Routledge, forthcoming in August 2014).

Obama, NATO and the Brussels Response

March 28, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zachary Wolfraim:

president-obama_1 — U.S. President Barack Obama holds a speech at Bozar concert hall in Brussels, 26 March, 2014 (photo: Yves Herman/Reuters)

Editor’s note: On Wednesday, March 26, US President Obama visited Brussels to recommit his position to the NATO alliance. This piece is a response by a former NATO consultant who attended the event.

This speech was initially meant to discuss the transatlantic relationship, events in the Ukraine conspired to turn the event into a compelling, albeit professorial comment on the current state of transatlantic affairs. There were hints of the speech’s initial focus, highlighting the importance and endurance of the transatlantic relationship, however, mixed into this was also messaging directed at Russian critics of American power as well as a warning for the young people in the audience to not take the freedoms and prosperity we in the West enjoy, for granted. Obama couched all of these in the importance of freedom and in the framework of a respect for international law. All requisite credit to his speechwriters, he managed to do so relatively well, if not in the most dynamic fashion. Altogether, there were no surprising elements to his speech, furthermore, there was none of the previous spark and verve that has previously characterized Obama’s remarks to a young(ish) crowd.

The first key, and arguably most critical theme, was the importance of the transatlantic relationship between the US and Europe. In light of events in Crimea, this is a refrain that the US leadership has been repeating at NATO and throughout the President’s trip. After several years of Obama’s much-publicised Pacific ‘pivot’, Obama needed to reiterate to NATO Allies that the US will not turn away from Europe and that the security of the continent remained clearly in the US national interest. This of course came with the requisite warnings over European burden sharing which certainly take on greater importance given the EU’s relative impotence in the face of Russian belligerence. Nonetheless, while the US will not disengage from the NATO Alliance, European capitols should be concerned about a degree of US retrenchment after the Alliance’s Afghanistan and Libya adventures. That said, Obama correctly did not suggest any concrete realignment of US priorities regarding Europe. Given the sorry state of European defense capabilities and continued recession-driven cuts, Europe not only needs to demonstrate a greater unity of purpose, but also that it possesses its own robust capabilities to hold up its end of the transatlantic relationship.

The second key element was targeted at Moscow and sought to quiet the Russian criticism of the US. Russian leaders and commentators have sought to characterize the US and more broadly the Western response, as hypocritical. In highlighting the Iraq and Kosovo examples Obama aimed to blunt Russian criticism as, right or wrong, both conflicts were firmly situated in international fora, be it the UN, NATO or the International Court of Justice. This line of reasoning remains a bit fuzzy when one considers the legal grey areas US foreign policy still inhabits (NSA spying, drone strikes, Guantanamo etc…). Nonetheless, it highlights that the Russian pot calling the American kettle black is a weak defense of what still remains an egregious violation of international norms. Obama’s stronger gambit was to emphasise that this is not an effort by the West to undermine Russia but rather it was in our collective interest to see a “strong and responsible Russia, not a weak one.” In expressing a desire to move beyond the Cold War style rhetoric and trying to move past the language of zero sum games, it ideally helps to create some space in which dialogue can occur. Whether this elicits any kind of Russian response however remains to be seen, though scepticism is not unwarranted.

The final key element was an exhortation of the youths in Western nations to take up the torch of our forebears and defend the freedom and liberties for which they fought and died. He referenced the battlefields of northern Europe that attest to the price paid for the society of which we are now part. Despite the powerful imagery invoked, this was perhaps the most tepid part of the speech. There is a compelling case to be made about the engagement of all people in the defense of our freedoms, not just the younger generation. Obama’s warning about the parochial disputes that currently threaten the European project was well made, but this is not something that should concern only the next generation of leaders and voters, but all Europeans. Moreover, the younger generation that Obama sought to reach out to, the one which has suffered disproportionately from the economic downturn, runs the risk of becoming the most cynical and disengaged if governments remain unresponsive. This is why this element of the speech was arguably the weak link – in light of what has happened in the Crimea there needed to be a reminder to the audience that while we are all ‘heirs to the struggle for freedom’, all of us in the Western world have greater things at stake, young and old.

In the wake of the speech there was discussion among the audience as to whether this was a pivotal speech in the response to Russian aggression. Such a verdict is hard to render without context and perhaps more vitally, without Russian response. Obama sought to underline the importance of international order and his call for the vigilant defense of our freedoms is right, that said, no one should be under the illusion that Russia will surrender the Crimea. While Obama may cast the West as defenders of freedom, truth and prosperity it would be naive to assume that this is any more compelling than Russia’s counter-narratives of an greedy, arrogant West that has previously run roughshod over international law when it suited them. At the very least, NATO can breathe easy as it vindicates the move towards ‘NATO Prepared’ which reorients the Alliance towards readiness and crisis response and thus ensures its continued relevance. Fundamentally, the speech does not represent a sea-change in American policy towards Europe nor will it assuage critics of Obama who have sought to cast him as too dovish towards Russia. Nonetheless, in highlighting the importance of international norms like the ‘responsibility to protect’ and their ability to be twisted, it reminds Europe that that there are major fundamental issues at stake in the Crimea that go beyond simple questions of economics or national interest. Sadly, given the tide of anti-EU populism sweeping through Europe it is possible that this message has fallen on deaf ears.

Zachary Wolfraim is a third year PhD student in the War Studies Department, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.

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