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Operation Iraqi Freedom’: Ten Years, 189,000 lives, and 2.2 trillion US taxpayer dollars

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By Maura James

You may have noticed the ‘Reel Iraq’ film festival badge Strife hosted on the blog over the past week. Thursday I attended the festival launch which featured the documentary, ‘The Dreams of Sparrows’ directed by Haydar Daffar. Daffar chronicles 2003, the year of the US led invasion, in Baghdad Iraq, his home town. The film was very moving, and I encourage readers to view it. What I would like to share, though, is my experience Friday, when I participated in ‘Art, War and Peace: Responses to the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq’. The day-long conference featured Iraqi artists from the diaspora and was moderated by Dr Alan Ingram (UCL). The talks were presented by artists featured in the exhibition ‘Geographies of War: Iraq Revisited’

The first talk presented by Rashad Selim titled ‘Separation, Outflow and Attitudes of Return’, set the tone for the day. Selim, like all of the artists present, is a diaspora Iraqi artist. His talk focused on a sense of entanglement and loss that he feels as an Iraqi artist and that Iraq is currently experiencing. Throughout history, Iraq and Mesopotamia was the bed of civilisation. Art and culture flowed from there to the rest of the world, but today there is an outflow and talent drain that is leaving Iraq. Selim is very concerned about the cultural identity of exchange that has been threatened by the wars and turmoil in the land for the past fifty years. His talk was depressing, but Selim is focused on creating points of connection in his art to revive the historical exchange. Though Mesopotamia is the cradle of civilisation, Selim noted that the cradle can be the grave.

Satta Hashem described how his identity as an Iraqi was intertwined in his artwork because, according to Hashem, art reflects experience. As a youth he was tortured and forced to flee Iraq to go to school in Algeria. After university he returned to northern Iraq and became a partisan for three years before leaving Iraq in 1978. In 1991 his family, still living in Iraq, lost everything as a result of the first Gulf War. During the first Gulf War he was constantly watching the footage coming out of Iraq and he spoke to his family regularly. Much of his work reflects the horror of that time and his feelings of dislocation and despair. Unlike the other artists, Hashem called the American invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq the ‘liberation’ of Iraq. He, like others, highlighted the recent history of violence in his homeland but emphasised the repressiveness of Sadam’s regime.

The afternoon sessions featured Nadje Al-Ali, a Gender Studies professor at SOAS and Hana Malallah, another diaspora Iraqi artist. Al-Ali just published the book We are Iraqis: Aesthetics and Politics in a Time of War which explores the ways in which Iraqi artists and activists produce art and activism and resist destruction. Malallah fled Iraq in 2007. As a recent refugee, a lot of her art focuses on, what she calls, the ‘cycle of ruin’. She watched her country rebuild after the first Gulf War only to be destroyed again during the US led invasion in 2003. She looks to create violence in her art to reflect the destruction around her. After Malallah presented her work and story, some in the audience were quite offended with her portal of ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’. She in no way endorsed or commended Sadam Hussein in her discussion. Since she was forced to flee her country during the American led invasion, though, it is clear that she does not support the current state of affairs which she sees as a result of invasion and occupation.

It was very interested to hear the exchange between Malallah and other audience members. The discussion got quite passionate, and Ingram had to step in to stop the talk from descending into shouting. The discussion on Friday between those who viewed the operation as an invasion and those who viewed it as a liberation illuminates the complexities of the Iraqi people and the core of the debate. A skit from ‘The Dreams of Sparrows’ articulates these nuances. Daffar interviews a female filmmaker in his documentary. She talks of the censorship under Sadam and how artists were forced to produce propaganda for the regime or be jailed. Daffar points to a picture of George W. Bush in her living room and asks her why it is there. She says she loves George Bush. ‘And the Americans?’ Daffar asks, ‘How do you like life under the Americans?’ The artist responded by saying, ‘Sadam was bad. The Americans are bad. It is all bad.’

The sectarian violence that now grips Iraq and the weak democracy that is in place does not give anyone much hope for the future of the country. As an American, the whole festival was somewhat surreal. Many of the European attendees had opposed the Iraq war since before it began. There were massive protests across the world in opposition to the invasion. It just was not like that in the US, of course there was opposition but not in the same way. One was unpatriotic or did not support the troops if one did not buy into the Iraq war as an integral battle in the War on Terror. I was young, and I opposed the war, probably because my parents opposed it. Ten years later, though, it does not feel very good to be able to say ‘I told you so’.

Operation Pillar of Defence Revisited

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By Hayden Pirkle

The outbreak of violence between Israeli and Hamas forces that erupted in mid-November 2012 and captivated spectators’ attention across the globe is now just a minor blip on the radar of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is amazing how short-term the media’s and the general public’s respective memories can be. Our attention spans are seemingly short, as even major events quickly fall into obscurity. In review, at the time of the latest spurt of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there was widespread speculation among political pundits that the Israeli campaign in Gaza, dubbed “Operation Pillar of Defence”, was fuelled by Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu’s motivations to ensure victory in the forthcoming elections in January 2013. The elections have come and gone. The results are in. As such, it is worth revisiting November’s conflict in order to connect the dots, if any, between Pillar of Defence and the 2013 Israeli elections.

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched Operation Pillar of Defence on 14 November 2012 in response to sporadic rocket fire coming out of Hamas-controlled Gaza. That day’s most significant event was the Israeli assassination of Hamas’ military commander, Ahmed Jabari, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike. As a result of the assassination, there was a rapid intensification of violence from both sides, although the Gazan population shouldered a disproportionate amount of the force and destruction, as the IDF pounded the densely populated Gaza Strip with a formidable aerial campaign. The violence came to an end eight days later, as Egypt’s recently-elected president, Mohamed Morsi, brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. The brief conflict killed nearly 150 Palestinians and injured upward of 1000, over 200 of which were children. According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, six Israelis were killed, 17 critically or moderately injured, and some 220 ‘lightly’ injured throughout the escalation.

In the eyes of many, the November escalation, falling just two months before the 2013 general elections, was strategically instigated by Netanyahu as a means of diverting public attention from the numerous socio-economic issues that currently plague Israel. Such issues, which include the rising cost of housing and living, have resulted in domestic unrest within Israel. As such, it seems that Pillar of Defense could have been a pre-election attempt to distract the public from the real issues facing the country by drumming up a collective emotional response against a common enemy. This beating-of-the-war drum prior to an election has been used in Israel before. Israel’s politicians and ruling parties have utilized, with varying degrees of success, strategically timed military offensives as a means of galvanizing their respective electorates and redirecting national attention from detrimental domestic issues, as, according to Haaretz, “social and economic problems are edged off the national agenda.”

Perhaps the most telling evidence of an election-based ulterior motive is the event that led to the intense escalation of violence in the first place: Israel’s assassination of Hamas’ military- wing leader, Ahmed Jabari. Jabari was the key actor used by high-ranking Hamas officials to feel out how ceasefire negotiations between the party and the Israelis would be received by the local population in Gaza. He also played a critical role in the release of Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, last year while representing Hamas during the prisoner exchange negotiations. The assassination of such a crucial figure was imprudent for Israel in two ways. Firstly, Israel killed off a key, seemingly pragmatic, figure for potential peace negotiations in the future. Secondly, the Israelis should have no doubt expected a violent response by Hamas. Such a response would in turn result in an escalation of violence between the two sides. Perhaps this was the desired effect. In other words, if Netanyahu wanted to incite a skirmish with Hamas to overshadow burgeoning domestic issues right before an election, he certainly picked the right target. This is not to say that Jabari’s assassination is indisputable proof of an election-based ulterior motive for the Netanyahu regime. There is certainly no direct link in causation between the two; although in my opinion, assassinating such a strategic figure in Israel-Hamas dialogue and negotiations, and thus instigating a round of violence just before a key election, is highly suggestive of such an ulterior motive.

To return to the present, nearly three months since the Egypt-brokered ceasefire, the elections have been held and the process of coalition building has finally concluded. But what were the results? Netanyahu’s right-wing Likud party, the expected favourite, in conjunction with its electoral ally, Yisrael Beiteinu, won a mere 31 of 120 available parliamentary seats. This is down from the 42 seats that the two-party alliance won in the last election. The surprise of the election was the success of the centrist party, Yesh Atid, which won 19 seats. Yesh Atid, led by Yair Lapid, campaigned for the alleviation of Israel’s socio-economic ailments and championed middle-class interests. Coming in third was the Labour party, which like Yesh Atid, also focused on domestic issues, albeit from a more leftist political position.

To Netanyahu’s chagrin, the coalition-building process proved to be far trickier than he likely ever could have imagined. Nearly six weeks since the elections and after considerable political wrangling, Netanyahu finally formed a coalition. However, although Netanyahu narrowly succeeded in forming a coalition, its composition is without question not the ideal result that he envisioned. Most notably, it includes the centrist Yesh Atid and the pro-settler Jewish Home party, and for the first time in a decade, the coalition government will not include any ultra-orthodox groups. Netanyahu’s new government is expected to focus on domestic socio- economic issues rather than the situation with Palestine. This focus is far more tenuous than posturing political support on the basis of national security.

In sum, Netanyahu and Likud experienced rather disappointing election results, which forced Netanyahu into forming a rather unstable coalition government. It appears that the socio- economic issues that parties like Yesh Atid and Labour based their campaigns upon could not be masked by conflict with Hamas. In other words, if Operation Pillar of Defence was intended to secure Netanyahu and his allies a decisive political victory in 2013, it was a complete failure. What now remains to be seen how the new government will handle the Palestinian situation. Will the presence of pro-peace Yesh Atid within the Netanyahu-led coalition result in the curbing of conflict and resumption of the peace talks with Hamas? Or will the more hawkish voices once again prevail and the tense and unproductive status quo remain?

23F or ‘The Coup that Never Was’

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by Laura Hamilton

Last month marks the 32nd anniversary of 23F, the failed military coup in Spain, which threatened to challenge the state’s transition to democracy.

On the 23rd February 1981, the military governors in the various regions around Spain planned a coup d’etat. Although Franco had nominated the King as his successor, military leaders, led by General Milans del Bosch, were not happy with the changes that were taking place as Spain transitioned from a repressive dictatorship to a fully-fledged democracy.

The coup began when Antonio Tejero stormed congress with the Guardia Civil (Spanish military police) and held the Parliament hostage. This was meant to be the signal to mobilise the rest of the country. However, they were hesitant and it was only in Valencia that tanks rolled in the streets.

My parents were living in Spain at the time, having moved to Madrid only a month earlier. Having come from England, where a military coup is an unfamiliar concept, they weren’t really sure what was going on. My father was in a meeting, which was overrunning. One of his Spanish colleagues left to call his wife and tell her he would be late. Hurrying back in a few minutes later, he agitatedly informed the room “¡Hay un golpe!” (There’s a coup!) before all the Spaniards rushed home to check on their families.

Spain’s history is marred with coups – it was this lack of stability, which provoked the army to rise up under Franco. We recently discussed, in one of my classes, the way that your culture influences the way you view a situation. The Spaniards had grown up in a country that had been under 40 years of military dictatorship. Although the majority of the population supported the transition to democracy, the constant threat of a military takeover existed since a sizeable minority still believed that life under Franco was better: there were low crime rates; goods were cheap; ‘immoral’ behaviour wasn’t rife.

No one explained the seriousness to my father and his colleague, who were the only expats in the room, so they didn’t fully grasp the concept of what was going on. Instead, they decided to continue working, travelling across Madrid to another meeting. My father recalls how this meeting was located in the same building as the Spanish press and TV headquarters. On their arrival, they found that the whole area was closed off and the seriousness of the situation began to set in.

At the same time, my mother, in a foreign country where she didn’t speak the language, had no idea what was going on. She had no television or radio, since they were still in the process of being shipped across, and it was prior to the widespread use of the Internet or mobile phones. She first found out what was happening when my father’s colleague called, excitedly informing her “have you heard the news? There’s been a coup!” Having no way of contacting my father, she was worried, mainly because of the fear of the unknown. As aforementioned, if you do not have any experience of a situation, you have no idea what to expect or how to prepare.

The whole country was on tenterhooks and there was only one person who was able to change the situation – the King. Having been ‘trained’ and chosen by Franco, he was seen by the majority of Spaniards as Franco’s puppet. However, his actions on the night of 23rd February turned him into the nation’s saviour, affirming his leadership of the country. As Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the military governors had sworn allegiance and loyalty to the King. It was this promise that he used to assert his authority and bring Spain back on the path to democracy. He appeared on the national television channel, TVE, throughout the night. Dressed in his military uniform, he broadcast the message that he did not support the coup and reaffirmed the need for democracy in Spain. It was this message that managed to convince the military governors to step down and not continue with their planned coup.

Spain’s future hung in the balance on that date. Yet, through the strong leadership of the head of state, he was able to save it and proceed with the transition that was taking place. There is a strong belief that, had the King supported it, the coup would have been successful and Spain would be a very different place today. Although Spain has recently been marred by many problems, there is no doubt that things would have been worse had the King not fully supported the path to democracy and used his leadership to save the country from returning to a military dictatorship.

Wanted: Great thinkers for Europe!

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by Mareike Kuerschner

Why follow moderate ideas, when you have a great one? Why give up on it, even you know, it can’t be reached? Churchill spoke in 1946 about the ‘United States of Europe’, which I consider as a great, but unfortunately unattainable idea. But that should not mean that we can’t pursue this idea as an ideal. We honestly have to question, what do we want Europe to be and what we are willing to contribute to a European community?

I attended a speech at the London School of Economics held by Professor Norbert Lammert, President of the German Bundestag, who promoted Churchill’s idea and does well to spread it especially among young people, the future leaders of Europe. His remarks were mainly focused around the statement that there is no crisis that can’t be overcome as the European Union is the product of the crises of two World Wars. We are experiencing a period of stability and prosperity – and, according to Lammert, we are overusing the term ‘crisis’ compared to what Europe has already gone through.

Europe’s (financial) crisis can be solved, when we disengage us from the assumption that today’s problems can be tackled on a national level. Like a mantra, the President of the German Bundestag repeats that – and he is right. If we want to regain control over the economic integration we pursued, European states need to integrate politically. There was a wish for a European market right at the beginning (implemented with the Treaty of Rome), we created it and now – better late than never – we need to cope with the consequences, which indicate a political community to get hold of the problems. Giving up sovereignty is not a new issue, but the tremendous challenges we are facing now give us new reasons to do so.

We should not be afraid of utopian ideas, if we can see them as ideals to lead us through turbulent times. Therefore, the ‘United States of Europe’ should be seen as an ideal on the way to an efficient European community, because economic integration demands a mutual approach on the political level. But it is neither the current institutional structure nor the fundamental differences between the 27 member states of the European Union, which worry me the most. It is the lack of capable individuals with a clear idea for the future of Europe, people who believe in Europe as a political, not only economic entity and are willing to contribute to it.

Syria: A Proxy Battleground

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By Pezhman Mohammadi

Almost two years after unrest began in Syria, not only has the ‘popular revolution’ not borne fruit, but also many of the ‘freedom fighters’ have turned out to be non-Syrian, foreign-funded terrorists. What made Syria a target of a foreign-backed insurgency? And what could be the solution to the crisis?

Since 2011, Syria has become a target of indirect foreign intervention to topple the Assad’s regime. Various motives have been suggested for such aggression against the secular state. First, Syria is strategically important for many countries, including the United States, Israel, Iran and Russia. Second, Syria is Iran’s strongest ally, Israel’s long-time adversary, and a channel for Iranian arms transport to resistance organisations in Palestine and Lebanon.

Has a new ‘Cold War’ emerged in the Middle East? Putting Russia aside for the moment, Syria can be argued to have become a battlefield for a clash between Iran and the United States. The US, assisted by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, is arming the Free Syrian Army (FSA) terrorists against Assad. Meanwhile, Iran is providing financial assistance and military know-how to the Syrian President through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) shadowy Quds Force, hence the reason the Syrian President is still standing.

To some analysts, the current Syrian turmoil is as part of a US plan to contain and further isolate Iran by removing Islamic Republic’s only Arab ally in an era of increasing Arab-Iranian regional rivalry. Assad’s regime is considered as a fundamental pillar in Tehran’s policy approach towards Israel and hostile Arab states. Clearly, in his absence, Iran loses significant influence in that arena. In this context, Michael Hanna of Century Foundation in New York stated that “Syria is a central player in Iranian power projection”. Nevertheless, this would be an attempt to correct an earlier American miscalculation, namely the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which significantly strengthened Iran’s position in the region. This is a textbook proxy conflict scenario in which the laws of war appear to be absent, causing mass civilian casualties.

Some believe that Syria without Assad would be an ideal state, a liberated society. But this is wrong. Syria is currently witnessing a sectarian clash, thanks to the emergence of extremist Wahhabi ideology in the Free Syrian Army. According to this ideology, other religious sects, whether Jewish, Christian, or Islamic factions such as Shiites, are all considered as ‘infidels’ and must either accept the fanatic organisation’s ideology or be persecuted and killed. In the absence of Assad, a once secular country is likely to disintegrate as sectarian conflicts intensify. This provides an explanation for the loyalty of the Alawite-dominated Syrian army to President Assad: they prefer his rule to that of the FSA.

The solution to the Syrian crisis is far from straightforward. I would suggest that bilateral talks between Iran and the US would be a step in the right direction. Improved US-Iranian relations would contribute to improved regional stability.

Moreover, in late-2012, Iran proposed a ‘Six-Point Plan’ to solve the Syrian Crisis. The Plan’s steps include immediate cease-fire; initiation of a ‘national dialogue’; establishment of a united government which; humanitarian assistance to the citizens of Syria; freedom for all prisoners who have not committed a crime against the country; and full and unbiased media access to Syria. Although this has been widely rejected by the ‘anti-Syrian coalition’ for obvious reasons, Russia and China may be able to enforce the Plan using their influence in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Further, states must stop arming the terrorists in Syria. In this context, the United Nations (UN) is obliged to issue a firm resolution against the terror-sponsoring bodies. After all, these are the same gang of radicals that the West is fighting against in different corners of the world. A related practical, but extremely difficult, measure would be to place punitive economic sanctions on countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar that financially and militarily sponsor such groups.