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The Myth of European Solidarity in the Face of COVID-19

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by Pezhman Mohammadi

Aid material at the international airport of Hangzhou in Zhejiang, being prepared to help Italy with its outbreak of COVID-19 (Image credit: China Daily/Reuters)

With just over 1.8 million active cases at the time of writing, COVID-19 continues to wreak havoc across the globe, rapidly changing the world we once knew. Among many other things, this pandemic has exposed the lack of solidarity and coordination within the European Union (EU), putting its future at risk. This article will look into how the EU failed to assist Italy in its hour of need.

Responsible for monitoring natural and manmade disasters, the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) is the EU’s crisis hub. It operates by forwarding any appeals for help by member states to others in order to find volunteers that are willing to assist. However, when COVID-19 broke out in Italy, calls for help by one of the EU’s most severely hit members were widely ignored. For weeks, not a single member state provided Italy with the critical supplies it needed to combat the virus. In the face of such inaction, help arrived from non-EU states: including China and Russia. The first batch of Chinese supplies arrived in Rome on March 12. It contained over thirty tons of Intensive Care Unit equipment, as well as medical and protective supplies. Just days after, Pratica di Mare, an Italian Air Force Base, received seven Russian military aircraft loaded with medical supplies to assist Italy. Even Cuba and Albania scrambled to help.

Signs of Italian discontent with the EU came into light following a survey in late March, in which only 49% of participants claimed to be ‘pro-EU’. This figure was 64% before the pandemic hit the country. The survey also concluded that 72% of participants believed the EU had failed them in this crisis, while 77% stated that they expect a rocky relationship with Brussels in the future.

The EU’s lack of assistance, however, was not merely limited to not providing essential supplies. Following a Eurogroup meeting on 9 April, it was effectively decided that economically, too, Italy was on its own. Instead of sharing the burden of the catastrophic economic effects, the EU provided a loan from the European Stability Mechanism (MSM) to Italy which is merely dedicated to coronavirus-related health care spending. As a country on the verge of an economic collapse, this was not the concession Italy had hoped for.

The shocking numbers coming out of Italy are also a direct result of the EU enforced austerity measures on the country’s economy following the 2008 financial crisis. Italy merely lacked the funds to invest in its health care system. This, coupled with the lack of support from other member states, especially the rich Northern ones who refused to agree to the so-called ‘corona-bonds’ to mitigate the economic costs of the pandemic, will have its geopolitical and strategic implications in the long run. Italy will not forget how the Chinese and the Russians came to the rescue when its allies turned their backs. Adding insult to the injury, the US’ absence from the international arena during this crisis compounded the massive void in Europe that China and Russia have successfully filled.

Undoubtedly, the EU’s future will be questioned once this pandemic is over. The fact that Germany, as the EU’s powerhouse, and other states neglected countries like Italy will have its unintended consequences. The EU was built on the premise of avoiding conflicts and economic nationalism. The negligence that was witnessed will certainly give rise to far-right nationalist and Eurosceptic factions within the EU, which will eventually leave their marks in European politics. Putting Eurosceptics aside, concerns about the future of the Bloc have been voiced by leading Europhiles such Jacques Delors who warned of a break-up. In addition, in an interview with the BBC, Giuseppe Conte, the Italian Prime Minister, issued a stark warning. Conte stated that the European leaders were ‘facing an appointment with history’. He also added that ‘if we do not seize the opportunity to put new life into the European project, the risk of failure is real.’

Pro-EU advocates have, too, concluded that Europe’s response was selfish, imprudent, and morally questionable. In his resignation letter, Mauro Ferrari, the former president of the European Research Council (ERC) observed that ‘the COVID-19 pandemic shone a merciless light on how mistaken I had been. In a time of emergency, people, and institutions, revert to their deepest nature and reveal their true character.’ Ferrari, an idealist who once supported and cherished the idea of a United Europe, was forced out of the office by the ERC’s Scientific Council as they opposed his efforts to create a coordinated science-led response to combat COVID-19.

Nonetheless, If Italy falls, it will take its friends down with it. After all, misery loves company. However, Europe’s response to Italy or Spain brings to light a much bigger, more serious issue. How would Europe respond in the face of a bigger crisis or threat? Can member states really trust one another and rely on each other’s assistance at times of major crisis? The Head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, apologised to Italy for the lack of support and solidarity – but considering the extent of the devastation caused, it is doubtful Italians will forget Europe’s cold response any time soon.

Pezhman Mohammadi studied Intelligence and International Security (MA) at King’s College London. Following graduation, he worked within the law enforcement field for over four years. Mohammadi now works in the financial industry.

EU Foreign Policy: More Grand Delusion than Grand Strategy

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by Eliz Peck

24 May 2019

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron after the signing of a new Germany-France friendship treaty at the historic Town Hall in Aachen, Germany on Tuesday, 22 January 2019. (AP Photo/Martin Meissner).

Henry Kissinger once said that “no foreign policy – no matter how ingenious – has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none”. With the EU divided not just between – but within – its member states, a united EU foreign and security policy seems less likely than ever to succeed, regardless of the strength of its leaders.

The job title ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ sounds important. And yet, relatively few everyday people living in the EU have probably heard of Federica Mogherini, or her job. In June 2016, Mogherini’s office published a European Union Global Strategy. It projected its vision of the EU’s grand strategy. In its introduction she urgently called for a united EU foreign and security policy in the face of “increasingly fractured identities.” Her calls came following the crises in Libya, Syria and Ukraine, where the EU proved itself an inadequate foreign policy actor, incapable of coordinating amongst its member states an effective and timely response to international crises.

It is misguided to simply attribute these foreign policy failures to weak political leadership. At state-level, leaders of the larger European countries have been as pro-active as domestic contexts have allowed in seeking to combat international crises. Chancellor Merkel sacrificed her political longevity when she threw open Germany’s doors in 2015 in response to the migrant crisis, asserting Wir Schaffen Das (‘We Can Do This’). The growth of the far-right, anti-immigration Alternative for Germany (AfD) party can be traced back to Merkel’s ambitious open-door refugee-policy. This domestic backlash pushed her to back-peddle on a liberal policy, instead striking a deal with Turkey in March 2016 that would curb the number of refugees arriving in Europe.

Although countries can cooperate in certain foreign policies, grand strategy is typically the preserve of an individual state. Hal Brands, Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, sees grand strategy as “a purposeful and coherent set of ideas about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world”. At their very core, grand strategy and foreign policy are a projection of the values and identity of the state. We see this clearly in President Truman’s policy of ‘containment’ between 1945 and 1953, which Brands describes as ‘the golden age of grand strategy’. First articulated in George Kennan’s so-called Long Telegram, the strategy of containment sought to mobilise the military, economic and diplomatic resources of the American state during the Cold War in order to mitigate the rise of their ideological and strategic rival, the USSR. Viewed from this perspective, the Marshall Plan not only aimed for a peaceful post-war economic reconstruction of Europe but sought to promote capitalist notions of liberty and prosperity that lie at the very heart of the American Dream.

Launching a coordinated European grand strategy for multiple states and multiple identities was always going to be tough. What is more, the EU is vast. Individual strategic priorities differ because of the way that they are shaped by historical context and the geo-political landscape. Russian aggrandisement is a pressing concern for Eastern European countries like Poland, but not for Southern European countries like Italy who are struggling with the flow of migrants crossing the Mediterranean.

No issue more clearly illustrates the failure to coordinate a single EU grand strategy than the rise of China. Despite the recently published EU-China document deeming China a ‘systemic rival’ and calling for ‘full unity’ in EU responses, the member states have nevertheless prioritised national interests over falling in line with Brussels. This is seen in the growing bilateral links between China and the Central and Eastern European states – the so-called 16+1 group, eleven of whom are in the EU – who are hungry for Belt and Road investments. In March 2019, President Macron tried to show a united front when he invited Chancellor Merkel and European Commissioner Jean-Claude Juncker to his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. He triumphantly claimed “The face of a Europe that speaks with one voice on the international scene is emerging.” Only days later, this claim was undermined when Italy became the first G7 partner to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with China, endorsing the Belt and Road.

The new critical focus on EU foreign and security policy comes in the wake of the radically changed geopolitical landscape. Before 2016, there was little desire for a coordinated EU foreign policy as outlined in the EU Global Strategy. After plans for a European Army were abandoned in 1954, the European integration project was first economic and later political. Secure in their defensive NATO alliance, and on American support for individual foreign policy, the larger EU countries felt an officially coordinated foreign policy with their non-NATO neighbours was not a priority.

Yet Trump’s erratic ‘America First’ policies have thrown doubt on the previously steadfast NATO pact. In a somewhat frantic response, EU countries have had to look to each other for support. The 2017 formation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) – an EU defence union – and Macron’s proposal of a European Intervention Initiative (E2I) at Sorbonne can be viewed in this light.

But this comes too little, too late. The time for establishing the groundwork for a common foreign and security policy was when times were good, not now. Euroscepticism dominates today’s political landscape. The rise of the far-right in Hungary and Poland, the populism of Brexit and Italy’s Five Star Movement and the domestic turmoil facing Macron and Merkel are calling into question certain values – multilateral cooperation and human rights, to name a few – that are the founding assumptions of EU cooperation. What we see now is a crisis of identity that goes to the very heart of the European project.

Collaboration between these countries is not impossible. The success of Europol and the European Counter Terrorism Centre show that states unite against a common-enemy. EU foreign policy has been even more effective in coordinating maritime missions aimed to disrupt acts of Somali-piracy based off the Horn of Africa, which threaten trade routes off the Gulf of Aden. But arguably, this success traces to the clear economic incentive for participation; most other foreign policy issues do not have such direct economic benefits. Without a wholehearted commitment to the European project, states will run into difficulty.

The last time the European territories’ foreign and security policies were coordinated under one single grand strategy was under Charlemagne, the ‘Father of Europe’ who died in the year 814 and was buried in Aachen. President Macron and Chancellor Merkel symbolically met there at the start of this year, in a show of solidarity and mutual commitment more than half a century after the Élysée Treaty was signed. Designed as a show of strength and renewed commitment, the limited progress made at the meeting only reinforced just how difficult foreign and security coordination is in the context of the current European disharmony.

Eliz Peck is an MA candidate in Conflict, Security and Development at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. You can follow her on Twitter @PeckEliz

Image source: https://www.apnews.com/02d7f1384f454f09b31a7c852d275e4e

Strife Feature – Nationalism and Lessons from Russia

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By Christopher Morton

In 2008 Russia invaded South Ossetia and in 2014 Russia invaded Crimea – both secessionist provinces of Georgia and Ukraine respectively. On the one hand, these interventions can be viewed as a justified defense of the rights of minority populations in these provinces. On the other hand, both interventions were deemed to be disproportionate acts of aggression towards sovereign states, in contravention of international law, reflecting a policy shift from cooperation with the international community to unilateral action in defiance of it. In this post, I shall consider the understandings that lay behind these actions: in particular, Russia’s shift from imitation of Western norms during the nineties, to increasingly strong opposition to these norms. Fanning this hostility towards the West was a nationalist consensus which was rehabilitated and consolidated under Putin, enhanced by NATO expansion which was deemed unacceptable by the Kremlin. Indeed, the events of 2008 and 2014 in part represented the failures of the West to make collective agreements, particularly on security, which could have allowed co-operation between Russia and the West rather than distrust to become the norm.[1] In the final part of this post, I shall consider some lessons that Britain can take from the development of nationalism in Russia as a stronger nationalist consensus emerges and the notion of British identity is reconstructed post-Brexit.

Levan Gabechava/Reuters/Landov. A column of Russian troops prepares to leave the checkpoint at a bridge over the Inguri River in Western Georgia, in October 2008, after securing the secession of Georgia’s breakaway South Ossetia region. Russia went to war in Georgia over the breakaway province of South Ossetia in a move justified by an increasingly nationalist tone from the Kremlin.

Since his election in 1998, Putin has been able to build a political consensus around a single idea of the Russian nation by emphasising the notion of Russia’s messianic purpose[2] and rehabilitating the myths and symbolism of former glories.[3] By placing the idea of Russia as a great power at the centre of his politics, Putin at once appeased hardline nationalists and co-opted those disenchanted by the failures of the nineties and searching for a grander narrative in which to root their identity.  In this way, Putin won the support of the very people whose liberty he would curtail in pursuit of soglasie (stability) and a more managed form of democracy. This same rhetoric was also used to alienate opponents. With Russia now portrayed as defending traditional values against the West, opponents were criticised not only as being against Putin, but as being against Russia itself.

In 2005 Putin was still talking about Russia as “above all, a major European power”, progressing “together with European nations” and in 2006 he stressed the importance of relations with the United States and a willingness “to take new steps to expand the areas and framework of our cooperation”[4]. However, such comments seemed increasingly insincere. In 2006, Dimitri Trenin offered a typical assessment of Russia’s attitude towards America and its Western allies. Essentially, Trenin argued that Russia had stopped caring about how the West perceived its actions. This was confirmed, for example, by Russian cooperation with Iran in opposition to Western sanctions against its uranium enrichment.[5] Putin’s apathy towards Western judgment culminated in the invasion of South Ossetia and has become markedly more hostile since. In 2013, Putin described Western norms as “infertile and genderless” and as overseeing “a destruction of values from above”.[6] Similarly, in a speech after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin lambasted the West for their part in inciting and supporting first the Orange revolution of 2004 and then the Maidan protests which led to the overthrow of Ukraine’s Russian-leaning president Viktor Yanukovich.[7] If Russia of the nineties was content to show deference to the West, Russia’s aggressive foreign policy from 2008 confirmed what Putin’s rhetoric suggested: that Russia now identified itself as a leader of the opposition to the U.S-led unipolar world order.

The end of the end of history

It is easily forgotten that in the nineties, Fukuyama’s argument that a convergence towards Western norms was inevitable encapsulated the prevailing mood.[8] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin, had been sympathetic to the so-called Western idea of liberal democracy. However, subservience to the Western model did not do the good that many had hoped. The economic plan implemented by Russia’s “young reformers” under the guiding hand of Western, neoliberal text books and the IMF, had catastrophic consequences for the lives of normal Russians, with poverty increasing from 2% in 1991 to over 40% of the population by 1998. Furthermore, the “privatisation at any costs” attitude of the Western capitalists and their Russian protégés allowed a business elite, now known as the “oligarchs”, to effectively steal national assets. Through the rigged “loans for shares” scheme, the Oligarchs were able to elevate themselves into the stratosphere of extreme wealth, while all around them, normal Russians struggled.

In the nineties, “shock therapy” privatisation led to wealth being concentrated amongst a group now known as the Oligarchs. President Boris Yeltsin has a meeting with CIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovsky in the Kremlin. c:Getty Images

All this created a vacuum in which a new sense of Russian identity could be created. Russians had been told that they were no longer allowed to feel pride in the once great Soviet Union. Nor could Russia find any pride in the adoption of a Western model which seemed to have left their country’s interests side-lined as the oligarchs increased their control over an emasculated state. It was into this vacuum that Vladimir Putin stepped as a relatively unknown figure and Yeltsin’s chosen one. Putin saw an opportunity to give the Russian people something to believe in: a proud Russia with a privileged role in international politics; a Russia that would not accept Western hegemony; a Russia that would reclaim its role as a great power by setting out its own vision for the world, rather than passively accepting the religion of the “end of history”. This is what Alfred Evans called Russia’s “strategy for identity management of social creativity”, as opposed to the strategy of “social mobility” which had been pursued under Yeltsin, whereby the norms of nations perceived as having a higher “social status” were adopted, with the aspiration of joining that group.[9]

May’s Britain

We have much to learn from the gradual embrace of nationalism in Russia. Of course, Theresa May is not Putin and Britain is not Russia, the notion that Britain is slipping slowly into a nationalist mentality is unmistakable – the perils of which are illuminated by the Russian experience. As in Russia, the failings of a system which puts the ideology of profit and privatisation before people has left many disenchanted, alienated in their communities and struggling for something meaningful in which to root their identity. As with Russia, British history, whilst not short of glory, cannot be separated from the legacy of colonial oppression, not to mention more recent catastrophic escapades in the Middle East. However, there is a sense of loss at Britain not being able to wield the influence it once did. Finally, Brexit suggests that Britain, like Russia, is rehabilitating a sense of its own historic purpose independent from international hegemony. In place of building a collective identity with its European neighbours and embracing the notion of a deeper union, Britain has chosen to emphasise its own distinct identity, to which pooling of sovereignty is seen as a threat.

Theresa May has adopted an increasingly nationalist tone and has revelled in the perception of her being a difficult opponent for the EU

Even before a snap election was called, Theresa May had sought not to stimulate debate but to shut it down. In one incident, she accused Caroline Lucas “and some Labour MPs” of being “the first to defend our country’s enemies”. Such divisive nationalist rhetoric is not so far removed from Putin’s reference to opponents as “a disparate bunch of traitors”. Theresa May, the Conservative strategists and the right-wing press are now continuing along this line, repeating ad infinitum that Jeremy Corbyn hates Britain and that he sympathises with terrorists. This discourse creates a stark division between those who considered patriots and those more prone to critique the role played by Britain within the international community. In Brexit negotiations, Theresa May revels in her depiction as a “bloody difficult woman”, appealing to the notion of the EU as a threat, or at least an opponent. Just as Putin gains popularity from depicting Russia’s resistance to the West, so too is Theresa May emphasising her resistance of the EU rather than the need to maintain a sense of collective identity and shared interests, even post-Brexit. The result of this strategy is implicit in Angela Merkel’s recent declaration that Britain, along with the U.S, can no longer be relied upon as partners of the EU.

Like the Russians, British people have good reason to be searching for something meaningful in which to root their identity. In a bid to appease the UK Independence Part (UKIP) wing of her party and mobilise those communities left behind by globalisation, the Conservatives under Theresa May have intensified their use of chauvinistic, nationalist rhetoric, whereby anybody who valorises Britain’s national legacy and makes a sharp distinction between “us” and the unworthy “other” is part of the patriotic in-crowd. However, in constructing a new national identity post-Brexit, there are false dichotomies which need to be fervently resisted. Firstly, the populist dichotomy between “patriots” who love their country and traitors who are quick to condemn it:  it is possible to be critical of one’s country, its policies and its history without hating it or “supporting its enemies”. Indeed, critique is a necessary engine of progress. A second dichotomy, as described by Alfred Evans, is between the opposing strategies of “social creativity” and “social mobility”: of course we want to be bold and “creative” in the actions we choose, standing up for our beliefs and, where possible, taking the lead on matters of international importance. However, we also want to be socially mobile, joining groups which share our interests and our values and strengthening the links that facilitate a convergence of understandings and the formation of collective identities that transcend borders.

As MP Jo Cox put it before her brutal murder at the hands of a neo-Nazi extremist, “we have more in common than that which divides us”. By entering into relationships of cooperation and collective responsibility, rather than seeking to impose our will upon others, this is a truth that can be internalised. This is a model which the EU, with all of its flaws and imperfections, represents through its motto: “United in Diversity”.  As the UK leaves the EU, it is all the more pressing that we remember the value of this aspiration, rather than collapsing into egoistic and suspicious nationalism. The breakdown of shared understandings and collective responsibility between Russia and the West serves as a warning as to the dangers that lie ahead for Britain as jingoistic nationalism in political discourse becomes normalised.

Christopher is pursuing his MA in International Relations at King’s College London. Previously, he studied French and Philosophy at the University of Nottingham before working as a teacher in Paris and London.

Notes:

[1] Sauer: 88-89; Mearshimer: 79

[2] Kolst/Blakkisrud: p.277

[3] Laruelle: p.24

[4] Putin, 2005/2006

[5] Trenin: p.3

[6] Putin: 2013

[7] Putin: 2014

[8] 1989: 1

[9] Evans: 401

Bibliography

Trenin, Dimitri; Russia Leaves the West (2006)
http://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/trenin4.pdf

Evans, Alfred; Ideological Change Under Vladimir Putin in the Perspective of Social Identity Theory (2015)

Fukuyama, Francis; The End of History? (1989)

Kolsto, Pal and Blakkisrud Helge (2005), Nation Building and Common Values in Russia

Mearsheimer, J. (2014), Why the Ukranian Crisis is the West’s Fault: the Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin

Vladimir Putin Addresses of the Russian Federation (on Crimea), March 18 2014 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603

Vladimir Putin’s Presidential address December 12, 2013
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19825

Sauer, T.  (2017), The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the need for collective security between Russia and the West

Feature image credit: Wikimedia Commons

Being English/ British/ European and the politics of difference

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By: Henry Redwood

Source: https://i.guim.co.uk/
Source: https://i.guim.co.uk/

To say that it has been a bad couple of weeks to be English (or is it British, or European? I’m not sure anymore…) is an understatement. Violent and racist football supporters in France; racist abuse at home; intolerant and divisive politics in all political parties; “Brexit”; and lastly, losing a football match to a team with more volcanoes than professional footballers. Each of these events has left in its wake a series of finger-pointing and questions over who’s to blame: Roy Hodgson? The working class? The Tories? The press? A complacent left? (Im)migrants and/or refugees? This need for someone, or a collective, to be blamed within society seems to run deep. It was certainly key in the angry protest vote that saw Britain leave the EU. The primary concern within each of these allegations seems to be to find the ‘Other’, upon whom we can unburden our own responsibilities and troubles – the immigrant; the elite; the European bureaucrat; the English -and draw, perhaps, clear lines that strongly delineate what “we are” – and more often what we are not.

However, the ‘blame game’ rests on an unsustainable model, which assumes that clear lines can be drawn which delineate what “we” are – and more often what we are not. The most obvious example here is the notion of “Great Britain”, which has been variously deployed in, often contradicting, ways by different parts of the argument. Underneath each, though, is a conception of a nation – a collective – that remains unchanging; of a set of morals, values, culture etcetera, that is transcendental, frequently constructed by relational difference (we are not European; we are not fascist).

The arbitrariness of this (of course, being arbitrary makes it no less violent) is seen with the difficulty we have in deciding at which point a particular “Great Britain” began. The pretence of unity and solidity of these categories, which was pumped out throughout the referendum ‘debate’, and the confidence that we could ever know what it means to be English, British or European (or all three at once), meant that the debate was conducted from a perspective where we could decide what it meant to be ‘British’ (or even democratic). This decision was made through exclusionary identity politics, rather than considerations on how we might reconfigure these understandings of difference to try to remove the harm caused by arbitrarily signifying Self against the ‘Other’.[1] This is not only directed at those who voted in favour of Brexit; this issue has come up repeatedly in the anti-Brexist arguments since, where Brexiters are labelled as racists, ignorant, idiots, and are consequently de-politicised in the process as their voices are considered irrelevant. This ignores both our (here meaning Remain voters) responsibility, and in these cases our dependency on this ‘Other’ to define us (I am not a Brexiter, I am not racist or fascist), which was perhaps most clearly seen in the celebratory pro-European protest in London on Saturday.[2] This protest summed up this forms of identity politics, and worryingly seemed to recreate the boundaries that de-politicised the voices of Brexiters, reproducing the same political relationships that led to the ostracisation of large sections of the population in the first place; hardly a basis upon which to rebuild the shattered community.

The accusatory, and often angry, politics of the blame game seems to have occupied us elsewhere over the past decades, and perhaps it marks a trend in the new-millennium’s political landscape. At University, and elsewhere, the response to the impact of austerity has frequently been about blame and the fragmenting of larger political ideologies and structures and issues into “bite size” issues. Students are angry at the staff for not providing more contact times; the academic staff resent students for wanting a corporate-inspired ‘transferable skills’ format of education that the University was not designed to deliver, and that they are not trained to deliver.[3] It feels as though something similar has happened in the political realm, where there seems to have been a turn to (possibly thanks to, or as a result of, the digital age) a politics based on fragmented and seemingly isolated issues. A trend most evident in the rise of pressure group politics and organisations like 38 degrees.

Underlying both of these points is a sense that we can distil responsibility – and perhaps importantly with this, a sense of belonging and being – to different individuals and collectives, without considering our shared responsibility and co-dependence. As such, we are failing to explore the culpability of much larger systems that produce these harms and us as recognisable subjects we are not looking at the shared responsibility that we consequently have for the reproduction of that system and the violence that relates to it. Without this understanding, the “immigrant” remains an external entity that we have no obligation to; a burden, rather than an always-already member of our community that we are responsible for.[4] Without this understanding, the Brexit voter remains an ignorant racist, rather than someone who has been subjectivised through the same system that produces others’ (my) privilege; someone silenced for decades whilst a politics was practised that was blind to its violence, and complicit in aggravating inequality.  In both, it is the gap and relation between the Self and the ‘Other’ that needs to be addressed. Not by blaming the ‘Other’, but by reconfiguring the system as a whole. The same system that currently produces the Self and ‘Other’ as different, and as opposing polarities. In a time of rising extremism – islamophobic; homophobic; transphobic; take your pick – such reframing is more important than ever.

 

 

Henry Redwood is a third year PhD student in the War Studies department and senior editor at strife. His work engages with critical theory to explore how international courts construct truths and the normative underpinnings these project. Alongside his research Henry has previously worked at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and a number of (I)NGOs working in Rwanda. Twitter: @hred44

 

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] See Martha Minow, Making all the difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American law (Cornell University Press, 1991)

[2] For an excellent insight into Brexiters see here

[3] http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/transferable-people/

[4] For an wonderful article on migrant identities and borders see, Francis Saunders, ‘Where on Earth Are You?’, 38:5 (2016), pages 7-12

 

After the European Elections: It’s time to make the case for Europe

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By Claire Yorke:

EU-UK

Waking up to the European election results this morning I was drawn to a book of Historic Tables by S. H. Steinberg from 1949 that documents the history of the world from 58BC to the end of the Second World War. Through its pages it charts the key dates and events that shaped Europe before the two World Wars that marked the start of the 20th century. In the hundred years before 1914, each page tells a story of aggression: of empires shifting and expanding, of defeats and military alliances. Not one goes by without a nation fighting to pursue its own interests at the expense of another. How different, then, is our modern experience of Europe from the European Coal and Steel Community of 1952 to the European Union of 28 member states today. It is an evolution marked by efforts to build stability, where cooperation and political and economic union have been the guiding force. Yet the case for the successes and strengths of Europe as a unified entity has never really been made.

Politicians in Britain have often shied away from this task, aware that Europe is one of those toxic issues, particularly within certain sectors of the media who like to whip up fear over the loss of sovereignty and national values that come from closer ties to the continent. During the recent election campaign, out of the three main parties only the Liberal Democrats came out as pro-European. Labour and the Conservatives appeared to hedge on Europe – a strategy that is hardly inspiring to voters, but which gives them room for manoeuvre, at least on the domestic front.

There is a danger that in response to last night’s results these parties may move to appease wandering voters, andmake concessions to the rhetoric and politics of UKIP in order to bolster their votes in next year’s General Election. This strategy would be counterintuitive. Instead, what is needed is genuine leadership that does not play to the lowest common denominator but makes the case for Europe in a constructive and positive way.

Perhaps it is unsurprising that the more populist messages of the anti-Europe campaign have had greater traction. It is far easier to highlight faults and limitations than to prove the successes we take for granted: The ease with which we can travel or work in Europe without a visa; the access to foreign markets and investment that support the economy; the ability to project power and influence beyond our own capabilities through security and defence cooperation. Yet these are just a few of the achievements that should be championed. Cooperation, rather than isolation, remains the best means by which to face future challenges that do not observe sovereign boundaries or national interests.

This is not to say that Europe is without fault. It is a large institution in need of genuine reform: not least to update European institutions after its recent expansion and new members. Yet given its size, this is will not happen over night and will require the effort of all members actively involved in the process, including the United Kingdom. Withdrawing from that process will reduce our influence and ability to shape change. Nonetheless, criticisms of European bureaucracy point to a deeper issue: How much do people really know about the roles and functions of European institutions? The answer is not enough. Yet, no one from the political establishment, whether through desire or ability, seems able to articulate the role and importance of the Union in a way that makes it relevant to the wider British electorate.

As political leaders and supporters of the three main parties reflect on the results that gave Nigel Farage’s UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) almost 28% of the vote and made his party the largest British party in the EU, David Cameron’s remarks this morning that people are “disillusioned” with the European Union may hold some truth. However, it does not follow that a knee-jerk reaction against Europe will do anything to improve the real issue of voter disillusionment or disengagement with politics.

Indeed, it is interesting to examine what makes Nigel Farage so popular in spite of the revelations of his own views and those in his party, as showcased in his interview on LBC radio on 16 May. In an age when PR and media spin create a glossy veneer around the other party leaders, Nigel Farage appears, for all intent and purpose, as a typical man down at the pub. Through his willingness to speak his mind he has managed to connect with parts of the general public who view politicians as adept at platitudes and empty sound-bites. This in no way means his views are correct, far from it, but for some voters, conviction and sincerity are lacking from modern British politics and Farage is filling this gap. Party leaders appear reluctant to provide a vision and court unpopularity, although both are necessary attributes of leadership.

Looking ahead, there should be an honest debate about Britain’s future in Europe. This should not focus on the practicalities of an ‘In-Out’ referendum, which is unlikely to succeed when the debate is so unbalanced. Instead, discussions should revolve around where Europe does and does not work: what steps are needed for change and how reform can be achieved. What can the UK do to push for that change? Some of the core issues that have been revealed by the results, such as immigration and economic security, should also be tackled, while recognising that the concerns may have domestic, rather than European roots. How can concerns about immigration be addressed in a way that distinguishes fact from fear? How can Europe help rather than hinder economic recovery and job prospects? Politicians and leaders should articulate the purpose Europe serves for British interests, and the opportunities it provides for people rather than resorting to the populist messages that come too easily.

In his essay The Lion and the Unicorn written in 1940, during the Second World War, George Orwell writes: “Nothing ever stands still. We must add to our heritage or lose it, we must grow greater or grow less, we must go forward or backward”. The European project, begun after the Second World War is not yet finished. A lot needs to be done to move it forward in a way that is fit for the 21st century, but it would be foolish to undo the significant progress made by retreating into an isolationist and backward policy before the story is complete.

 

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Claire Yorke is a doctoral researcher in the War Studies Department at Kings College London and a member of NATO’s Young Leader’s Working Group. Prior to her PhD Claire was programme manager of the International Security Research Department at Chatham House in London and worked as a Parliamentary Researcher in the House of Commons. You can follow her on Twitter @ClaireYorke.