Crisis

Turkey in the Midst of the Syrian Crisis: Security, Democracy and Secularism

September 16, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Gonenc Uysal:

After years of civil war in Syria, that has caused more than 210,000 – mostly civilian – deaths, the international community has recently been shaken by videos of war crimes undertaken by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). These have included beheadings and mass executions, sexual slavery, child soldiers and destruction of cultural heritage. Despite this, Turkey has not changed its rigid position against Bashar Assad, maintaining the doctrine of strategic depth outlined by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu. Moreover, the significant majority of international commentators, including scholars and journalists, continue to argue that Syrian rebel groups, particularly Islamists, have tried to reconcile liberal democracy with Islamism/political Islam.

Alongside the rise of radical political Islam in the Middle East, including in Turkey, there has been an apparent decline in support for the secularist principles that have long acted as the foundation of the Turkish state. This article argues that secularism should be reconfirmed as the founding principle of Turkey. This must be done in order to maintain the security of its democracy.

The tension between religion and secularism cannot be reduced to politico-cultural relativism, since secularism dictates the nature and boundaries of sovereignty, and thus the relationship between the state and its citizens as well as the relationship among citizens. Political Islam considers the spiritual sphere as sacred and grants sovereignty to divine rule. It also divides society into two antagonistic groups – believers and unbelievers – and claims the legitimacy of the former over the latter. Therefore, political Islam should be considered as a project which foresees the reconstruction of both state and society in accordance with the dictates of religion.

In various countries political Islam has been portrayed as being compatible with liberal democracy.[1] The result of this position is to veil class inequalities and the exploitation of the capitalist system, as well as the deepening dependence of national economies under the global capitalist system.[2] Such reconciliation between political Islam and liberal democracy is fundamentally in contradiction with the principle of equality of human beings,[3] and it has overruled any secular criticism that could overcome deficiencies of capitalism at the global, regional and domestic levels.

In the international sphere, Turkey served as a balance between the monopolist Western capital and the rising Gulf capital. Although the former remained cautious, it was still in alliance with the latter, for instance, by supporting Syrian rebel groups under the CIA long before the plan on training and equipping Syrian rebels took shape. However, in the face of ISIL’s war crimes and radicalisation among parts of the Western population, the West began to search for a way to legitimise the possibility of future cooperation with regional actors, such as Iran.

While a significant chunk of the international community began to discuss whether Assad could be a necessary evil, it also began to blame Turkey for encouraging ISIL by supplying military equipment and training, and medical care, and for fighting against the PYD (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat –Democratic Union Party), which has an organic relationship with the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane –Kurdistan Workers’ Party). As long as the possibility of changing power dynamics between Iran and the Gulf capital has existed, the sympathy of the international community toward the PYD has risen. Consequently, in order to regain its image as a Western ally and a bulwark against radical political Islam in the eyes of international and domestic public opinion, Turkey has let the USA use Incirlik air base close to the Syrian border, and called NATO for a meeting on the basis of the Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Turkey further agreed with the USA on an ISIL-free buffer-zone consisting of Syrian rebels, including a majority of the moderate Islamists.

However, since Turkey also contributed to the training and equipping of Syrian rebels, it still faces the possibility of the inadvertent radicalisation of Islamists,[4] similar to the case of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Any government’s tacit consent and arguably support for the so-called moderate Islamists would contribute to the deterioration of fundamental human rights and freedoms both in Turkey and in the Middle Eastern region. Therefore, Turkey urgently needs to reformulate its foreign policy and respond to the Syrian crisis in accordance with the principle of secularism.

In the domestic sphere, although the AKP government had already passed the controversial omnibus domestic security bill in April 2015, the latest terrorist attack against socialist activists in Suruc in July 2015 could not be prevented. On the contrary, whereas the police used disproportionate use of force against labour demonstrations on 1^st May 2015 and the LGBT parade in June 2015, the police did not intervene in the Caliphate Parade, which called for the application of sharia in Turkey and which was organised by Hizbut Tahrir in June 2015.

In July 2015, the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office launched an investigation against left-oriented pro-Kurdish HDP for allegedly supporting PKK’s terrorism, and President Erdogan declared that ‘the peace process’ was terminated. Beginning in August, the armed conflict between the PKK and the constabulary forces has begun to escalate with the loss of tens of civilians and combatants, and practices of martial law have been implemented in particular towns in south-eastern Turkey.

In the meantime, protests against the PKK’s terrorism turned into acts of vandalism against the opposing political parties and newspapers while shouting takbir (‘Allah is the greatest’). Although Davutoglu assured that the interim election government would prevent fratricide, he did not publicly discuss what the peace process exactly consisted of and why it was terminated, and he failed to delegitimise the political use of religion. Indeed, neither the AKP government nor the political opposition were criticised for their inability and unwillingness to prevent the political use of religion, and thus the rise of political Islam, by underestimating the importance of secularism.

In the face of the rise of radical political Islam and conflicts alongside ethnic and sectarian cleavages in semi-peripheral and peripheral countries of the global capitalist system, Turkey should understand the importance of secularism for addressing security issues and preserving fundamental human rights and freedoms. Marx once said that the critique of religion was ‘the prerequisite of every critique’, necessary to dismantle social domination.[5]

Any ideological movement which calls for the superiority of religion over the worldly sphere cannot be reconciled with democratic principles, particularly fundamental human rights and freedoms, since it aims to politically use religion as a tool for power.

In the era of neoliberalism security issues, as well as both authoritarian political regimes and deficiencies of liberal democracy, can be overcome through a political agenda which accepts the primacy of secularism. Since Turkey remains a semi-peripheral country within the framework of the Bretton Woods system,[6] and since Turkey has a majority Muslim population, the quest for secularism is urgent. Only through secularism can Turkey solve its domestic security issues and respond to its regional security issues.

Gonenc Uysal is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where she focuses on the state discourse on secularism and its interaction with civil-military relations in Turkey.

NOTES

[1] For the relationship between periphery/semi-periphery countries and the global capitalist system: Samir Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism. (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1976); Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007)

[2] For the relationship between political Islam and capitalism: Samir Amin, Eurocentrism: Modernity, Religion, and Democracy: A Critique of Eurocentrism and Culturalism. (R. Moore and J. Membrez, Trans.) (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009)

[3] For the paradoxical relationship between liberal democracy and capitalism: Ellen M. Wood, Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For neoliberalism: David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

[4] For a comprehensive summary on rebel groups in Syria: Fehim Tastekin, “Egit-Donat: Bir Batak Hikaye Daha”, Radikal, October 10, 2014, accessed http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/fehim_tastekin/egit_donat_bir_batak_hikaye_daha-1217979

[5] Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’. (A. Jolin and J. O’Malley, Trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p.131

[6] For the semi-peripheral place of Turkey in the global capitalist system: Nesecan Balkan and Sungur Savran, The Ravages of Neo-Liberalism: Economy, Society and Gender in Turkey. Eds. (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2002)

A reflection on Canadian identity in a moment of crisis

October 23, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Joana Cook,
Editor-in-Chief, Strife

Today Canadians watched in horror as Ottawa was locked down when at least one gunman opened fire at the national Parliament, forcing politicians to barricade doors, journalists to dive for cover, all while streaming live across national and international media. When the dust settled, one reservist and one gunman lay dead and a nation stood in shock.

Within a week of each other, two separate (and as of yet unlinked) incidents seemingly targeted symbols that Canadians hold dear – our capital city, our democratic institutions, a memorial to our fallen, our armed forces. Even amidst our own acknowledged rising threat levels, a country which had appeared to cautiously contain and manage the plots present in other nations is never prepared to see one unfold before their eyes. It is perhaps premature to reflect at this point, but in the thralls of the narratives, imagery and symbolism which flows forth in (real) times like these, the implications of these will impact upon Canadian consciousness for some time to come.

As a country in the midst of present and shifting global tensions and concerns, we have struggled with our evolving identity. Are we still the Canada of peacekeepers? Has our role in Afghanistan redefined us? How and why are extremists emerging from our own backyard? How do we envision our role in this world amid seemingly increasing violence?

These tragic events may have just reaffirmed how we view ourselves as Canadians, while also offering a starting point to rethink the broader questions above. We are a country which, when faced with the unthinkable, still reverts to unification, quiet and humble heroism, and the ‘level-headedness’ we have always held dear.

We sent tweets, messages and emails to those affected in Ottawa stating our support with them. We stood together as Canadians. We proved this with statistics.

We praised those who kept cool heads in the thralls of confusion, who didn’t ‘kill’ the terrorist, but instead ‘took down’ and stopped the attacker.

The actions of our everyday citizens spoke louder than words…

… while Canadians of all political affiliations and faiths spoke with the same message.

Perhaps most telling is the show of support and response to the soldier killed today while on duty. We will not see the same for the shooter.

Few in the national media directed the blame, or cited a motivation from the onset. We questioned, we scrutinized, but we did not point fingers carelessly. We were cautious with our language, phrasing and insinuation. We understand the weight that words can carry.

As the story unfolds in the coming days, we will find out more about the shooter. We will analyse the perpetrator’s plot and motivations, social profiles, background, and networks, as we should. We will need to understand what could instigate such violence, how and why it could be carried out, and how we can prevent such events in the future. We cannot afford to be naïve; there are many emerging risks we face and many challenges still to come.

As Canadians, we will continue to question the policies we form to address these, as well as their impacts. We will challenge the roles we take, and the ways and means by which we deal with new and uncertain problems that come our way. This is our right and our duty.

However, I believe we will do so knowing that in the face of those things which may challenge and frighten us, Canadians can act as an example of how to navigate such waters together with poise, thoughtfulness, and a remembrance of the values we hold dear as our guide. We will do so knowing that even if such hate can permeate certain individuals, these are not reflective of the overwhelming majority of our citizens.

If it is in tragic and painful moments like this that our identity as Canadians is shaped and reinforced, then I am confident we will, together, weather the storm and only emerge stronger as a nation.

__________________

Joana Cook is the Editor-in-Chief of Strife and a PhD researcher at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London where she focuses on the role and agency of women in counterterrorism. She is also a Research Affiliate with Public Safety Canada and member of the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS). You can follow her on Twitter @Joana_Cook. All views are her own.

Vox populi, vox dei: A few words on Ukraine, Crimea and the West

March 2, 2014 by Strife Staff

By N. Gourof,
Editor, Strife:

Events, those nemeses of politicians, according to Harold Macmillan, tend to unravel too fast for cautious observation and a balanced development of popular opinion. They have certainly done so in the crisis of recent days in Ukraine. Characteristically, views and perceptions of a large portion of the reading – and blogging – public, both in the region in crisis and in places remote, are lacking in balance, objectivity and common sense. The Russians are, as usual, overtly xenophobic, while the Russophobic West is singing odes to the Western ideals of liberty and democracy, leaving out the refrain of economic enslavement of the newly-liberated and newly-democraticised. Between the two Goliaths, Ukraine looks increasingly like a David with a split personality, its people(s) divided, with one part mesmerised by a false European dream and the other – by an almost messianic vision of Russia as its patrimonial protector.

We will not dwell here on the spark that ignited the Ukrainian powder keg, the notorious EU agreement rejected by the admittedly corrupt and rightly ousted V. Yanukovich, an agreement which the current authorities in Kiev are ready to sign without reservation. It is sufficient to say only that reading its articles brings to mind more than it should an understanding of Ukraine as tomorrow’s third-world market for European goods. What everybody should dwell on, however, are the words which are used resoundingly in the media, becoming weapons sharp and lethal in the information war that is currently raging. The word of the day seems to be ‘legitimacy’.

The Western media have been referring to the recently (locally) elected head of the Crimean Cabinet, Sergey Aksyonov as illegitimate. Mr. Aksyonov was branded as such on the day of his appointment by a formal decree from Kiev, signed by the acting President of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchinov. Decree 187/2014 cites several sources from the Ukrainian legislation, from constitutional articles to laws specific to the organisation and administration of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The problem, however, which is drawing little attention, is that the self-appointed government in Kiev has exactly the same basis of legitimacy as the self-appointed government of Crimea, if not less so. If in Kiev the justification for the ceasing of power is that ‘we were chosen [as opposed to ‘elected’] by the Ukrainian people’, how is Aksyonov’s appointment any different? The answer – it isn’t. In reality, Crimea, with its 58% ethnic Russian population seems to be closer to demonstrating legitimacy than the interim administration in Kiev. After all, the ideological and political divide in Ukraine as a whole is much less clear-cut than the localised division of affiliations in Crimea and Sevastopol, as pro-Russian demonstrations in major Ukrainian cities demonstrated during the weekend.

The fact that the Kievan government has been ‘recognised’ by the UK, the US and some of the EU states is not enough to make Turchinov the legitimate president and commander-in-chief. Before a national referendum at least, if not formal and clean elections, the current authorities in Kiev are no more legitimate than locally appointed or self-appointed officials. After all, recognition by an independent state is something the Crimean government can also boast. In the absence of extra-legal legitimising factors, only actual power remains the legitimising final word. The Kiev leaders have none. Russia already has an active military presence in the region, which not only gives more credibility to foreign recognition of the Crimean Government (from Moscow), but also grants actual advantage, strategic, tactical and political. Russia is already in Crimea, that much is obvious. Whether the uniformed (and unmarked) groups for three days now establishing tactical control in strategic points in the region were Russian one cannot say for certain. If this was the case, the ease with which this control was established demonstrates that Russia was always calling the shots there, especially as reports about the Ukrainian Army units holding out and not surrendering still cannot be verified, and as the latest declarations of Vladimir Zamana, the acting Defence Minister of Ukraine are particularly ineffective in countering the effects of the broadcast of the Commander of the Ukrainian Navy, Rear-Admiral Denis Berezovsky swearing allegiance to the people of Crimea.

Russia’s right to interfere on the basis of protecting the ethnic Russian population may be debatable. However, at the moment, the right of the Kiev government to issue orders and proclamations or to speak as if on behalf of a united and unified Ukraine is similarly debatable. As for the rights of the EU or the US to get actively involved, there are none. According to Reuters, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry earlier today condemned what he has called ‘Russia’s incredible act of aggression’ in Ukraine, saying that Russia is behaving ‘in 19th century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped up pre-text’. The examples of Kosovo, Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan, however, indicate that Russia’s behaviour is decidedly 21^st century. Moreover, ‘protection of one’s citizens and ethnic brothers on the other side of our border’ carries much more legitimising panache as a pretext than slogans about spreading democracy in foreign oil-wealthy countries far, far away.

Secretary Kerry indicated also, that Russia still has ‘a right set of choices’ to follow, threatening sanctions by the US and NATO. Dangerous chest-thumping from afar, and such it will remain. There is a moment in the film The Sum of all Fears, where the Russian President is discussing a crisis in the region and the possibility of Western intervention and says to the main character, a US analyst: ‘For you to get involved here, it’s like sleeping with another man’s wife… And what you are suggesting is that afterwards they all live together under the same roof. But what really happens is that the betrayed husband goes out and buys a gun.’

Unrest in Ukraine. What will the military do?

February 21, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Oscar Jonsson:

The last few days in Ukraine have shown that President Yanukovich’s foundation of power is decreasing rapidly. At mid-day it was declared that an agreement has been reached with President Yanukovich, the political opposition and the three European foreign ministers (FR, PL, DE) who have been negotiating throughout the night. The deal states that elections will be held and until then a coalition government will rule the country, and that changes in the constitution will limit the president’s powers.

The big question will be if, despite these promises, the opposition on the street will accept any kind of agreement that involves Yanukovich remaining in place . This looks less likely and statements are already coming from parts of the opposition that an election in December with Yanukovich still in place is simply not good enough.

Security forces and other state functions in the Western part of the country have declared that they are refusing to follow central orders and there have been reports of politicians and oligarchs fleeing the country both eastwards and westwards. Today (21/2), reports confirmed that police officers from the West of Ukraine have arrived in Kiev to defend the demonstrators. Yesterday evening (20/2), the Ukrainian parliament passed a bill condemning the recent police violence, repealed the invocation of an ‘anti-terrorist operation’ and prohibited the use of military forces.

The eventual use of the military would be the key trigger for the situation to escalate to a full-scale civil war. For now, the interior forces are the main leg of power upon which Yanukovich is balancing. However, the developments above show that he is continually losing ground and that the growing desperation could induce him to call upon the military.

Nonetheless, the military is a double-edged sword in whose reliability the Yanukovich can not trust. The military is based on conscription and its ranks form a good representation of Ukrainian society in general, and the variety of anti- or pro-Yanukovich sentiment in particular. Furthermore, the military is regionally drafted and an eventual break-up would follow the East-West divide which would be futile since political preference and geographical separation would align.

A big question mark thoughout is whether the military would march if they got the order. Just two days ago, on 19 February, Yanukovich fired the Chief of General Staff and replaced him with Admiral Yurii Ilyn, supposedly a loyalist. Furthermore, the deputy Chief of General Staff resigned this morning, and a few weeks ago at the end of January, the Chief of the Ground Forces was sacked from his post. This demonstrated the lack of any sort of consolidated leadership within the top levels of the military. On the one hand this gives Ilyn more room for manoeuvre since the dissenters are now gone. On the other hand, doubt is thus generated regarding his legitimacy. Given that he was put in place by Yanukovich, it is likely he would attempt to fulfil the marching order if it came. It is important to keep in mind that if the security service invoked the ‘anti-terrorism operation’ option, the President would be able to use the military without any judicial or legislative review.

My judgement is that if the marching order came to the army, parts of it would defect. The Ukrainian army has a tradition of loyalty to the state rather than to the government. It also follows a post-Soviet tradition not to intervene in domestic unrest, and of not firing at its own people, if it does. The most glaring example for this was the Orange Revolution in 2004, when the then-President Leonid Kuchma was allegedly pressured to call on the military by President Putin, but refused. He was aware of the problems an attempt to involve the military could bring.

So, what might Russia do? I have a hard time seeing Russia going beyond providing support and advice to Yanukovich unless there are threats to the Russian naval bases in Sevastopol, in which case Russian officals have said they would go in to protect them. The other scenario is that Russian minorities will be specifically targeted with violence, in which case the Russian constitution would oblige Russia to protect them (as in the case of Georgia). However, the latter looks unlikely given that the conflict so far has been political and shown few ethnic characteristics, but it is important to bear in mind moving forward.

In conclusion, it looks like Yanukovich is playing a losing game and as his desperation increases, so increases the temptation to wield the double-edge sword of military deployment. However, Yanukovich may at least have bought himself some breathing space by agreeing to a deal he knows the opposition will by-and-large refuse. Nonetheless, he is on a slippery slope.

______________
Oscar Jonsson is a PhD student in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London where his thesis, ‘Warfare and Peace; The Russian Understanding of War’ investigates how technological and organisational development impacts the Russian understanding of war. You can follow him on Twitter at @OAJonsson.

Wanted: Great thinkers for Europe!

March 12, 2013 by Strife Staff

by Mareike Kuerschner

Why follow moderate ideas, when you have a great one? Why give up on it, even you know, it can’t be reached? Churchill spoke in 1946 about the ‘United States of Europe’, which I consider as a great, but unfortunately unattainable idea. But that should not mean that we can’t pursue this idea as an ideal. We honestly have to question, what do we want Europe to be and what we are willing to contribute to a European community?

I attended a speech at the London School of Economics held by Professor Norbert Lammert, President of the German Bundestag, who promoted Churchill’s idea and does well to spread it especially among young people, the future leaders of Europe. His remarks were mainly focused around the statement that there is no crisis that can’t be overcome as the European Union is the product of the crises of two World Wars. We are experiencing a period of stability and prosperity – and, according to Lammert, we are overusing the term ‘crisis’ compared to what Europe has already gone through.

Europe’s (financial) crisis can be solved, when we disengage us from the assumption that today’s problems can be tackled on a national level. Like a mantra, the President of the German Bundestag repeats that – and he is right. If we want to regain control over the economic integration we pursued, European states need to integrate politically. There was a wish for a European market right at the beginning (implemented with the Treaty of Rome), we created it and now – better late than never – we need to cope with the consequences, which indicate a political community to get hold of the problems. Giving up sovereignty is not a new issue, but the tremendous challenges we are facing now give us new reasons to do so.

We should not be afraid of utopian ideas, if we can see them as ideals to lead us through turbulent times. Therefore, the ‘United States of Europe’ should be seen as an ideal on the way to an efficient European community, because economic integration demands a mutual approach on the political level. But it is neither the current institutional structure nor the fundamental differences between the 27 member states of the European Union, which worry me the most. It is the lack of capable individuals with a clear idea for the future of Europe, people who believe in Europe as a political, not only economic entity and are willing to contribute to it.

Crisis

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