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Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics: Understanding the 2013 Verizon DBIR

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By David Grebe

Every year, Verizon publishes the Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR). This report, while far from perfect, gives us a glimpse into the state of the field, and allows us to challenge some common misconceptions about cybersecurity.

Firstly, it should be noted that the datasets used in the report are far from normally distributed. Firms and organizations freely volunteer the data used to create the report. Because of this, and the fact that Verizon is only partnered with organizations in the US, Europe, Australia, and Malaysia, the data can be expected to be skewed at certain points. Verizon makes a note of this in the report, but then still presents some bizarre data because the validity of the datasets is left unquestioned. For example, the claim that the Chinese government and its affiliates make up around 95% of all espionage cases seems a very bold claim. Another problematic claim by the report, that Romania is the second largest perpetrator of cyberattacks (as the origin of 28% of all external attacks), also seems fishy.

In addition, the report makes use of two separate datasets (one is larger, while the other uses better described security incidents), which ends up presenting problems. For example, one dataset claims that social means to gain access made up 29% of all attacks – the other claims 1%. This is because the report includes many cases of credit card fraud, misuse of equipment, and the user error of sending emails to the wrong people in the larger, rarely used dataset. As these types of cases make up over half of the dataset (and previously took up about one percent), it overwhelms the dataset as well as creating a mixed picture by having different sets of definitions. However, this reminds us that little changes in what a “data breach” consists of drastically affects the data that is presented. Thus, because of the nature of this data, the percentages in the findings ought to be taken with some salt – the importance of this data is to begin to understand about broader trends and possible misconceptions, not the individual values themselves.

As this report has been going on for several years, some trends have emerged that challenge our previous conceptions. For one, external attacks are far more prevalent that internal ones. If true, this turns a common fallacy taught to most of our IT professionals on its head. According to the report, in 2012 only 14% of breaches we committed by insiders, a trend that has held up for the last 5 years. While disgruntled employees striking back at their workplaces may be flashy and costly, most of the cases (92%) appear to be external (keep in mind that a breach may be both internal and external). That being said, once the data includes various extra types of misuse and error (such as namely, losing devices, mis-delivering emails, and misuse of equipment), this picture becomes murkier.

Secondly, people interested in cybersecurity often hear too many buzzwords about massive plans by states to exploit backdoors and use logic bombs to infiltrate their opponents. However, ‘95% of all state-affiliated espionage attacks relied on phishing’. While I doubt that the popularity of phishing is that high, I think it is safe to conclude that even states rely on simple means to steal data. Likewise, of the 631 reports that make up the main dataset, only one required significant customizations and advanced skills to perform. Over 75% of the attacks fit into the low or very low difficulty ratings, demonstrating that a hacker could perpetrate the attacks with little or no knowledge, and with little adjustment to existing hacking tools. In fact, just over half all data breaches studied involved hacking at all to gain access to the targeted computer(s).

Thirdly, even computer illiterate end users can make a simple change to help protect themselves. 76% of network intrusions exploited lost, stolen or weak passwords. Thus, simply taking a step such as two factor authentication (where a person does not just provide a password, but also a code sent by text to their phone or their thumbprint), while a hassle, could solve a large portion of all data breaches.

We thank Verizon and its various partners for making this report public. Open statistical data is incredibly difficult to come by in the field. While the report certainly has its problems, it is usually clear about them. From the data, hopefully we can start to understand some of the areas where our conceptions are not meeting reality, and start to change our tactics because of it.

The 2013 DBIR can be found here: http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2013/

With rifle and bibliography: General Mattis on professional reading

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By Jill R. Russell
USMC-060914-M-5585B-009
In late 2003 a colleague of General James Mattis wrote to him asking for a few words on the
importance of reading and military history for the officer, even where it might seem that one was
“too busy to read.” His response went viral over email – had it been in the time of Twitter this
blog piece would be unnecessary. But it enjoyed a wide distribution within the Marine Corps,
and eventually arrived in my inbox. As a military historian, I cannot minimize my appreciation
that he wrote so eloquently on the subject. If it were only for that, the essay would be valuable.
But his writing is valuable also because we rarely have opportunities to hear the unfiltered
thoughts of leaders as well for his role in the history of recent conflicts.

Much is written and [believed to be] known about the General as a warrior. Less is known about
him as a true student of his profession. I would submit that it is quite impossible to correctly
understand the former without a proper interrogation of the latter. By this I mean that one must
first accept that a significant body of intellectual material sustains his actions and opinions –
as is indicated in the messages, he devotes real effort to this aspect of his work. So, there is a
base of knowledge that is always growing. On top of that are the benefits which accrue to those
who think and critically engage with such material. Furthermore, there is his consideration of
the views of others – as in the breadth of his reading or response to my comments – suggesting
that he had not fallen prey to the hubris of the powerful, which is to believe they have all of the
answers. Good leaders don’t only hear “yes” from the people around them. Thus, the insight
these words give to his thinking and interests is invaluable.

I also have to note that from a historian’s perspective this professional practice is fascinating.
It is Hegel hurled at the maelstrom of emergent Clio, a manifestation of E.H. Carr’s “unending
dialogue between past and present.” There is an awful popular tendency to try to use history
prescriptively. This is a bad, bad idea. Very often the lessons relied upon are incorrect or
inappropriate. However, history – from quality works – as a critical thinking process, whose
substance also furthers understanding [of regions, types of events, etc.] can inform posterity to
good effect. The General’s essay is an exposition of this principle.

Published with his permission, I would like to make perfectly clear that except where I excised
personal details regarding his correspondent, these messages are as he wrote them. I have,
according to the current practice in the historical community, left them as they were in the
originals. If there is shorthand, abbreviations or minor errors, they reflect the reality that these
were originally private correspondence. It was not the General’s expectation at the time that they
would be made public. In return for the odd aesthetic wobble, what you get is a rare insight into
the thinking of a general officer, an experienced and battle tested commanding officer, on how
he thinks about materials and issues critically important to his profession and (by virtue of the
public nature of his profession) posterity.

Finally, note that these messages were written in the months leading up to his deployment to
Iraq in command of I MEF in February of 2004.

Message 1: from General James Mattis, on the matter of professional reading, 20 November
2003

….The problem with being too busy to read is that you learn by experience (or by your men’s
experience), i.e. the hard way. By reading, you learn through others’ experiences, generally a
better way to do business, especially in our line of work where the consequences of
incompetence are so final for young men.

Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation, never at a loss for
how any problem has been addressed (successfully or unsuccessfully) before. It doesn’t give
me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead.

With TF 58, I had w/ me Slim’s book, books about the Russian and British experiences in AFG,
and a couple others. Going into Iraq, “The Siege” (about the Brits’ defeat at Al Kut in WW I) was
req’d reading for field grade officers. I also had Slim’s book; reviewed T.E. Lawrence’s “Seven
Pillars of Wisdom”; a good book about the life of Gertrude Bell (the Brit archaeologist who
virtually founded the modern Iraq state in the aftermath of WW I and the fall of the Ottoman
empire); and “From Beirut to Jerusalem”. I also went deeply into Liddell Hart’s book on
Sherman, and Fuller’s book on Alexander the Great got a lot of my attention (although I never
imagined that my HQ would end up only 500 meters from where he lay in state in Babylon).

Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face NOTHING new under the sun.
For all the “4th Generation of War” intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of
war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc, I must respectfully say… “Not
really”: Alex the Great would not be in the least bit perplexed by the enemy that we face right
now in Iraq, and our leaders going into this fight do their troops a disservice by not studying
(studying, vice just reading) the men who have gone before us.

We have been fighting on this planet for 5000 years and we should take advantage of their
experience. “Winging it” and filling body bags as we sort out what works reminds us of the
moral dictates and the cost of incompetence in our profession. As commanders and staff
officers, we are coaches and sentries for our units: how can we coach anything if we don’t
know a hell of a lot more than just the TTPs? What happens when you’re on a dynamic
battlefield and things are changing faster than higher HQ can stay abreast? Do you not
adapt because you cannot conceptualize faster than the enemy’s adaptation? (Darwin has
a pretty good theory about the outcome for those who cannot adapt to changing
circumstance — in the information age things can change rather abruptly and at warp
speed, especially the moral high ground which our regimented thinkers cede far too quickly
in our recent fights.) And how can you be a sentinel and not have your unit caught
flat-footed if you don’t know what the warning signs are — that your unit’s preps are not
sufficient for the specifics of a tasking that you have not anticipated?

Perhaps if you are in support functions waiting on the warfighters to spell out the specifics of
what you are to do, you can avoid the consequences of not reading. Those who must adapt to
overcoming an independent enemy’s will are not allowed that luxury.

This is not new to the USMC approach to warfighting — Going into Kuwait 12 years ago, I
read (and reread) Rommel’s Papers (remember “Kampstaffel”?), Montgomery’s book (“Eyes
Officers”…), “Grant Takes Command” (need for commanders to get along, “commanders’
relationships” being more important than “command relationships”), and some others. As a
result, the enemy has paid when I had the opportunity to go against them, and I believe that
many of my young guys lived because I didn’t waste their lives because I didn’t have the vision
in my mind of how to destroy the enemy at least cost to our guys and to the innocents on the
battlefields.

Hope this answers your question…. I will cc my ADC in the event he can add to this. He is the
only officer I know who has read more than I.

Semper Fi, Mattis

———-

Message 2: from Jill Russell to General Mattis, 26 November 2003

Sir,

Your message to [the] Colonel…was forwarded to me by a colleague - as I am a military
historian he knew I would appreciate its content. I offer here a response to one portion of your
message, which, taken as a whole, was as eloquent a statement on the value of history as I’ve
come across.

You wrote: “For all the “4th Generation of War” intellectuals running around today saying that
the nature of war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc, I must respectfully
say… ‘Not really’ ….”

I would submit that the 4GW thinkers do not at all eschew the study of military history. If you
take Van Creveld’s On Future War as an example of the genre, his entire case is based on an
examination of aspects of war across the full span of military history. Take as an example of
this his treatment of the changing ideas about prisoners of war, who were at one time in history

allowed “parole” to travel home to collect a ransom payment. If there is any concern amongst
4GW thinkers regarding the use of military history to inform current thoughts on military affairs,
it is directed at the dead hand of recent operational and strategic history, where past success
and dominance are used to define the future, even if [the] future of warfare seems headed
elsewhere.

If I were going to Iraq in the winter of 2004, I might include a few books on the CAP and Evans
Carlson. (It’s a pity that the new bio of him will not be out in time.) I think of these not because
they are particularly or specifically prescriptive for the current situation, but rather as examples
of Marines in history who looked at a situation and arrived at an answer that differed from
the standard. (Are the donkeys a sign of genius rather than weakness?) That each of these
unorthodox answers turned out to be correct in many respects is gravy. Also, Evans Carlson
was himself an avid reader, bringing many varied volumes with him on his travels throughout
China during 1937/8. My favorite amongst his selections was The Education of Henry Adams.
Of course, I would be more than just curious to hear your selections.

Best wishes for a very happy Thanksgiving to you and your Marines.

V/R

Jill Sargent Russell

——-

Message 3: from General Mattis to Jill Russell, 26 November 2003

Dear Ms Russell: Thank you for taking the time to write. I quickly scratched my note off to [the
Colonel] in response to a question and regret if my comments about 4th Generation of Warfare
stuff touched a raw nerve on some folks. I did not intend it personally or to anyone who studies
war; I have a problem with those who carry an ahistorical view of war into acceptance of the
latest bumper sticker; war in its various permutations is not new to me and some folks have
glommed onto 4th Generation of War concepts to say everything is new, history has little (no?)
place anymore because of how different things are, etc.

I regret any misunderstanding that my hastily written note has caused, wholly my responsibility.
That said, I appreciate your reading suggestions (obviously you don’t triangulate using bumper
stickers). My own “list” changes from mission to mission, location to location, etc, and perhaps
one day we can shoot the breeze about good books (my best new ideas, of course, come from
the old books, which are a passion with me). Until then, I am happy to know that we have folks
like you studying military history, engaged in deciphering what is going on from an
unregimented, intellectually rigorous perspective.

Best wishes and Semper Fi, Mattis

 

Jill S. Russell is a military historian and doctoral candidate at King’s College London who writes frequently on contemporary foreign policy and security issues. She is a regular contributor to Strife, Kings of War and Small Wars. You can follow her on Twitter @jsargentr.

North Korea – more of the same, but where is it heading?

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By Michael Jefferson

For those who follow North Korea the pronouncements of 30 March that it was entering a “state of
war” with South Korea followed by the 2 April declaration that it will restart its Yongbyon nuclear
complex were the latest in a set of provocative acts that the secretive regime has performed over the
past couple of decades. Looking at the media reaction you would think that it was a Cuban Missile
Crisis take two and we are on the brink of nuclear war. However, although they are undoubtedly
closer to an aggressive nuclear weapons capability, there is little evidence to suggest that North
Korea has the capacity to deliver any nuclear weapons beyond its own borders. In fact I contend
that these actions point to growing domestic instability in the country, which when combined
with the fledgling state of the Kim Jong-un’s regime are designed to cement and enhance power
structures in Pyongyang.

During the 90s and 00s North Korea used its nuclear programme, the ratcheting up and down of
its rhetoric and military actions such as missile tests, as a way to secure international concessions.
However, North Korea’s inability or more likely lack of willingness to meet commitments it has
made over the years means such offers are now unlikely. In recent times Pyongyang’s provocative
acts have been met firmly by economic sanctions from the international community while China
has quietly provided enough support to allow the regime to survive. I cannot imagine that even the
leadership in Pyongyang could have imagined that these recent moves would successfully secure
concessions such as food aid, or even North Korea’s stated aim to hold bilateral talks with the US.

All of these actions should serve to remind us that there has been very little outside contact, even
with China, since Kim Jong-un took power. It is still not clear whether he, his aunt and uncle (Kim
Kyong-hui and Jang Sung-taek) or a faction within the Armed forces are calling the shots. I think
this recent escalation is designed to elevate Kim Jong-un and secure his position among both the
Pyongyang elite and wider North Korean public, but the information mismatch makes it very hard
to ground analyses with certainty.

What is, however, certain is that North Korea is more porous with mobile phones now seemingly
available and some citizens able to access external radio and TV shows. In response to this, it
seems those in power have fallen back on their tried and tested way to demonstrate their value – the
protector against the capitalist threat. Here we need to remember that the ability of Pyongyang to
control information means that many North Koreans are genuinely petrified of capitalism and what
might happen without the Juche philosophy that they believe serves them so well.

The principal point of interest of this crisis is that it comes at a time with relatively new regimes in
China, South Korea and Japan and a new US Secretary of State. It was a new experience for them
and communications, protocol and expectations over North Korea have not yet been established
between them, I would hope that such communications are now being set up. The ultimate
achievement for Pyongyang would be securing bilateral talks with the US on their terms and,
although ruling out talks on North Korean terms, the seriousness of the situation was demonstrated
by US Secretary of State John Kerry even mentioning talks in a press conference -with numerous
conditions attached.

In a strange way, this may actually benefit wider East Asian relations. An ever more unpredictable
North Korea means that South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and USA, the countries who primarily
need to manage Kim and North Korea, may build the lines of communication and relationship that
forms the basis of improved diplomatic relations. This can then be hopefully be leveraged for other
issues such as territorial disputes -and here the South China Sea looms large.

In the long run I think there is little doubt that North and South Korea will unify, however the
timeline and method of this unification is still very much up in the air. The key issues on this
prospect will be how to pay for it, and how to manage a population that is, as yet, unready to
join the consumer societies of East Asia. The population issue is one of particular interest as the
collapse of the current regime will undoubtedly unleash a wave of migration which will be hard
to manage in a ‘liberated’ country. South Korea will be most affected most by unification, but the
aforementioned regional powers and the international community will need to contribute to make
any integration plan viable.

Ultimately the timing of this collapse will probably come down to the time when China is either
ready to let the regime fall or Kim goes so far that it poses a danger to China itself. In the meantime
we can only expect more provocative actions from Pyongyang and an increased focus on the
military at the expense of the rest of the population as the economic and social situation further
destabilises the country.
—
Michael Jefferson

Michael works in public affairs for an international bank. He has extensive experience in public policy and
international relations from his current role as well as from his time working for the UK Government on
international trade. He has an MA in Japanese from St Catherine’s College, Oxford specialising in Japanese
politics and international relations.

Failed, failing, failure - Is Africa disgracing our family?

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By Tim Glawion

All five of the most failed states in the world lie in Africa, calculates the Fund for Peace in its 2012 Index. Mali, as a case in point, has been failing for months now, the army even went as far as fleeing when the Islamist insurgency attacked them. Only mother France’s troops have turned the tables and are leading the recapture of the country’s North with astonishing swiftness and ease. After all we have done for you Africa, why do you prove us a failure time and time again? At least so the popular narrative reads.

Unlike the recent events in Mali suggest, however, Africa has not disappointed us. We have disappointed Africa. In light of the apparent failure of our imposed mode of order in form of a state system we persist and refuse to change our ways. In fact, most African countries never had a state system, at most borders and institutions left behind by colonialism. Africa’s political order, therefore, has neither failed, nor is it failing. Africa’s political orders are evolving and we might see states emerging from this evolution. But if we opened our minds and our international system, we might just witness new forms of political order different from what we know. While we condemn colonialism for the slavery and abuses it brought about, we still silently praise it for bringing order to a continent of anarchy. State systems with clear boundaries, infrastructure, and powerful governments. However, when independence movements kicked out European imperialists, indigenous rulers seemed incapable of containing their abusive and extractive measures to an economically viable level, as the former colonizers had been able to. The economy and the state quickly collapsed. It seems as though the circle began closing itself, when Mali called upon its old masters to bring about the stability they were unable to provide for themselves.

But does this patronizing viewpoint stand the test of reality?

To begin with, can we speak of states, in the European sense, in Africa? While the 1884 Berlin Conference painted lines on the ‘blank’ African drawing board, which have stayed surprisingly untouched for almost 150 years, is this enough to become a state? Were infrastructure developments, coercive rulers and ideological indoctrination, which came about as by-products of colonialism, enough to fill these borders with a common people? Unlikely. Colonial institutions did not create unifying causes and processes for the emergence of states, instead they were meant to increase the efficiency of exploitation. If any moment in time can be seen as a possible spark for state building during the twentieth century, it was not when Europeans entered the continent. It was rather when Africans in each country collectively decided to kick them out.

Along with the common enemy, disappeared the common cause. Identities and institutions other than the state persisted, such as tribes, kin-groups, clans and kingdoms. But the centralizing apparatus left behind by the imperialists and international incentives to uphold the central state empowered exclusive groups to exploit the rest of the population. Somalia’s dictator Siyyad Barre, propped up first by the Soviets, then by the Americans, went as far as starting massacres against north-eastern tribes simply to boost his grip on power. The same region declared independence in 1991 as Somaliland, and who could blame them after a history of violent discrimination under the pretence of a centralized state? Well, we are blaming them, as no state so far has recognized Somaliland’s independence.

Anglo-European powers did not bring about statehood, but these same powers upheld a ‘quasi-state’ system as a pretext to justify violent repression and avoid the emergence of an organic political order. How, then, can we believe that Western intervention is the key for peace and stability? When recognising a central Somali government for the first time in 20 years the United States took credit for supporting the transition to a central state. What kind of support did the US mean exactly? Propping up Barre’s regime for 12 years? Leading a failed attempt at pacification in 1993, and retreating in haste after the infamous Black Hawk Down incident? Supporting warlords against Islamist groups during the civil war? Encouraging the Ethiopian invasion in 2006 that toppled the only stable Somali regime since 1991 because it was “Islamist”? Or does it indeed refer to the most recent move to acknowledge as the sole representative of Somalia a government that itself effectively controls no more than the capital city?

With the French forces reporting one military success after the next, and newspapers’ daily self-congratulatory headlines on what a great impact we Europeans have on our ailing little brother Africa, as a European I must disagree: Africa has not failed us, we have failed Africa.

On the Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union

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By Adriano Mancinelli

It does not seem to be a good time for the European Union. During the last 5 years, the Euro-zone and the whole Union has been facing an economic crisis that has brought Greece to ruin and – some say – to give up democracy. A month ago, David Cameron announced that he wants to have a referendum on the membership of the United Kingdom in the EU. A few days ago, during messy national elections, the majority of the Italian people voted for anti-European candidates. Yet, at the beginning of this year, the EU received the Nobel Peace Prize 2012, a decision which has been heavily criticised.

Who’s right, then? People in Italy, the UK and Greece, who see Europe as a big evil and a risk for democracy to be halted as soon as possible? Or is it the Norwegian Nobel Committee, which thinks that the EU ‘for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe’?

Maybe surprisingly, I stand with the Nobel Committee: the European Union fully deserved the prize. In order to understand why, it is necessary to start from two crucial observations.

1) The debate on the European Union, both in the press and the pubs, is incredibly narrow-minded and poorly informed. The vast majority of the public considers the EU as some (imperfect) economic organisation – even in the UK, which is not part of the Euro-zone;

2) Because of this narrow view, the vast majority of the public forgets that the EU is much more than that, the EU being a great – perhaps the greatest in history – political experiment, and quite a successful one.

The first European Community was created to overcome Franco-German bitterness and suspicions in 1951. Since that moment, the political project for a more united Europe developed quite steadily until the birth of the European Union proper in 1992 and the re-negotiation of the Treaties between 2007 and 2009. The process has been successful for so many reasons that it is easy to miss some of them.

After 30 years of total war (1914-1945), Europe is experiencing the longest period of peace since the Peace of Westphalia. At the same time, the members of the EU experienced incredible economic growth, and improved their standards of living at an unprecedented pace. Europe has become the biggest market in the world, and there is even more: it has become the most democratic region of the world, and its member states are usually in the first positions on the lists for freedoms and human rights. Since its creation, the EU has attracted more and more states: from the 6 founders, there will be 28 member states this summer; all of which freely joined the Union. Europe was able to control and help the re-union of East and West Germany, to dialogue first and then to welcome the post-communist countries, making stable democracies of them. Thanks to Europe, millions of young people – I myself being one of them – have been able to study, live, and fall in love in different countries; 350 million people are accorded more civil, social, and political rights than any other part of the world, thanks to the European court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. No other individual or organisation that has received the Nobel Prize can claim to have achieved so much, hence deserving the price more than the European Union – certainly not Obama, I daresay.

The EU comes with deficiencies and ineffectiveness, it would be unfair to conceal that; nonetheless, there is no future in leaving Europe, or dismissing it as a (failed) economic entity. The future lies in recognising EU’s countless merits, and working to change its several flaws. It is not realistic to address the economic problems of the Euro-zone in such an article, but it must be clear that the major reason for the situation is that there is not enough Europe. Moreover, Europe needs stronger political links with regard to foreign policy; in order for the EU to become a real international actor, the member countries must find common objectives and shared interests to pursue – and stronger legal mechanisms to abide by those objectives and interests.

These challenges require action and uneasy changes. The necessary measures and steps needed to strengthen the Union must be explained clearly to the European citizens: one crucial tasks is to create a system of effective information and communication to EU citizens, in order to destroy the idea of obscure technocrats working in Brussels’ bubble. It is fundamental to (re)create legitimacy in the European institutions; it is fundamental that the peoples of Europe know that the EU cannot be dismissed, and that nobody should raise eyebrows at the EU winning the Nobel Peace Prize.