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Owen Saunders

Resuming Nuclear Talks with Iran: Too Late to Renegotiate?

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By Owen Saunders

Source: Antony Blinken’s confirmation hearing: 5 things to know about Biden’s secretary of state nominee

The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran have endured continued tensions over the last forty years. The relationship has often been strained by disagreements over values, government structures, foreign interference, and ideological beliefs. A primary threat perceived by the United States in recent years has been Iran’s emerging capacity to produce enriched uranium, which can be used in the creation of nuclear weapons. The formulation and negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) which ended successfully in 2015, principally as a result of track two dialogues beginning in the early 2000s, was intended to address these latest pressures.

As background to the JCPOA, the election of President Hassan Rouhani in 2013 and the re-election of President Obama in 2012 presented an opportune moment wherein both sides were looking for new ideas and new ways forward in order to kickstart formal discussions around reaching a nuclear agreement. The JCPOA, in essence, was a deal whereby, in exchange for the lifting of the US’s longstanding and crippling economic sanctions, Iran agreed to limit its nuclear capabilities. For example, the agreement stated that Iran could have no more than 300 kilograms of enriched uranium at a maximum of 3.67 percent, and that the attainment of such quantities was to be verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Besides the two disputants, other parties to the JCPOA included all members of the Security Council (China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom) and Germany.

After the election of President Donald Trump in 2016, his Administration targeted the JCPOA as one part of its agenda of projecting American strength and embracing isolationism. Trump was opposed to what he saw as the unnecessary compromises made by Obama, in much the same way that he was committed to undoing much of Obama’s domestic and other foreign initiatives. In regard to the JCPOA, Trump stated that:

‘The Iranian regime supports terrorism and exports violence, bloodshed and chaos across the Middle East. That is why we must put an end to Iran’s continued aggression and nuclear ambition. They have not lived up to the spirit of their agreement.’

Trump went on to say, that if these issues were not resolved, the United States would withdraw from the agreement. Israel was another harsh critic of the deal, with Prime Minister Netanyahu arguing that Iran was able to circumvent the deal and would significantly increase production of a nuclear weapon.

American and European supporters of the JCPOA argued that the agreement was critical in upholding four objectives: nuclear nonproliferation, regional stability in the Middle East, restoration of U.S.-Iran bilateral relations (as well as the reintegration of Iran into the international community), and the promotion of ‘western’ human rights and democracy inside Iran. Critics, however, argued that the primary problem did not lie in the details of the agreement, but rather in what was left out of it, that being the threat posed by Iran’s geopolitical ambitions towards U.S. allies in the region. As for providing regional stability, they argued that Iran could not even effectively stabilize itself. Other criticisms focused on the possibility of U.S.-Iranian normalization, with some arguing that the animosity from and toward the United States would constitute an intractable obstacle in attempting to rectify their relationship. Finally, critics also purported that the Iranian regime was unreformable when it comes to human rights and democracy. As one critic noted, Iran is “a police state, incapable of reforming itself while drowning in corruption and economic ineptitude.”

These latter views had attracted little support during the Obama administration, but found strong support in the Trump administration, and the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. Once withdrawn, Trump not only re-imposed the previous sanctions but added new ones as well. As a result, Iran began to breach the constraints outlined within the JCPOA and has, since 2018, exceeded numerous limits on the stockpiling of low enriched uranium.

U.S. disengagement and the concurrent reaction by Iran has raised major concerns for the remaining signatories of the JCPOA and has led to increasing tensions between Washington and Tehran. Most recently, the Trump administration’s assassination of Iran’s General Qassim Soleimani, a powerful figure in Iran’s politics, sparked outrage and inflamed relations. After his death, Iran announced that it was abandoning the “final limitations in the nuclear deal,” which prevented Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. However, Iran also stated that it would continue to cooperate with the IAEA and return to the original agreement should an American administration lift the economic sanctions and abide by the JCOPA. Iran’s Foreign Minister Zavad Zarif said that if the Biden administration lifts the sanctions imposed by the Trump administration, and provides assurance that the United States will not leave the agreement in the same manner as the previous administration, the Iranian government would be willing to re-enter negotiations.

On the U.S. side, Biden is open to re-joining the pact, but the issue is under what conditions and how to do so. The new U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken is expected to meet with the foreign ministers of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom to discuss the United States’ re-entry into the agreement. The Biden Administration has also appointed Robert Malley, a senior official under both the Obama and Clinton Administrations, as an ‘Iran Envoy’ to aid in the effort. The primary challenge as re-negotiation moves forward will be to what extent the Biden Administration can push amendments to the original agreement, what degree of pushback will there be from the other parties to the JCPOA?

A successful re-entry into the agreement is, however, still uncertain. President Biden seeks to continue to rebuild the reputation of the United States on the world stage. The challenge will be to negotiate and successfully re-enter the agreement within a very short time frame – by the 2022 midterms, the domestic landscape, international challenges, and congressional makeup could likely look very different. Although Biden is still in the first weeks of his mandate, time is already running out. Biden’s recent authorization of offensive air strikes on Iranian backed militias in Syria could create further tensions between the US and Iran, impacting the successful re-negotiation of the JCPOA.

 

Owen is pursuing his MA in International Peace and Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. His interest in researching this topic developed from a Track Two Diplomacy course by Dr. Peter Jones at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. Find him on Twitter @owensaunders26

Realigning the Five Eyes (FVEY) Intelligence Alliance against China’s Threat

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By: Owen Saunders

The Five Eyes Alliance, also known as FVEY: Protectors of Terror or Invaders of Privacy?

Originally created as a bilateral US-UK agreement in 1946, the “Five Eyes” intelligence alliance (FVEY) allows for mutual access to classified signals intelligence (SIGINT). Canada entered into the agreement in 1948, followed by Australia and New Zealand in 1956. The initial intention of the alliance was to gather information on foreign states that presented threats to its members through various intelligence collection and sharing methods. The formal expansion of the FVEY alliance last occurred in 1956 but there are other, less formal, extensions of the FVEY alliance, such as the Nine Eyes and Fourteen Eyes.

In recent years, due to China’s significant expansion of their telecommunications sector, driven by the “Made in China 2025” initiative, the FVEY alliance has placed greater attention on understanding and addressing the rising state’s ambitions and international strategy. The two focal issues for the alliance currently are China’s implementation of the controversial National Security law in Hong Kong, and their drive towards global superiority within the information and telecommunications technology (ICT) sector as exemplified by, though not limited to, Huawei, a global ICT company based in China. Allegations of close connections and cooperation between the company and the ruling Chinese Communist Party have been made, though these are denied by both parties.

The alliance’s perception of China as a threat is rooted in its pursuit of dominance over international telecommunications. Tensions have heightened recently over the measures undertaken by its members to prevent Huawei technology from being part of important new domestic 5G networks, and this past year over the FVEY alliance’s overt criticism of China’s authoritarian interventions in Hong Kong. The alliance’s actions can been seen as efforts not only to thwart Chinese global cyber ambitions but also to counter any spread of illiberalism. Although the National Security law itself does not affect the global telecommunications market directly, concern around it reflects fears of the potential dissemination of antidemocratic values through Chinese technological dominance.

The primary concern of the FVEY Alliance is Huawei’s potential to relay information and data that the company collects, through its global operations, to the Chinese government. Some members within the alliance have taken firm stances to prevent this by either banning Huawei technology altogether and, most recently, adopting more stringent security laws aiming to protect networks on a broader level. Such protections have expanded to include government, industry and civil society, as opposed to the original strategies of blocking the technology from only core government networks which transfer sensitive information. To date, Canada is the only member that has not made an affirmative decision to ban or restrict the Huawei technology, despite significant pressure from the United States.

China’s new National Security Law targets the autonomy of Hong Kong by giving the Chinese government greater control over the region’s internal affairs. The law aims to exert greater influence by establishing criminal sanctions for any activities dealing with “secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign or external forces.” Many have claimed that this new law demonstrates a complete disregard for the “one country, two systems” arrangement established in 1997 when the UK returned Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty. Since the implementation of the new law, the FVEY alliance has taken a strong stance in condemning the law, with the five foreign ministers releasing a joint statement “[urging] the Chinese central authorities to re-consider their actions against Hong Kong’s elected legislature and immediately reinstate the Legislative Council members.” The statement was heavily criticized by the Chinese government which argued that the alliance has no right to interfere in its internal affairs.

These two examples highlight what appears to be the changing nature of the FVEY alliance and its willingness to expand its reach and functions beyond its original purpose of intelligence sharing. There is also the possibility of expanding the current membership to seven by including Germany and Japan, both of whom have expressed a desire to join. Geographical and historical significance is important in assessing a FVEY expansion given the current Sino-Japanese relationship focused on bilateral trade. The formal inclusion of Japan would likely sow greater distrust and escalate tensions with China. Expanding the FVEY alliance would also, however, help counter the support of seventy nations in the 44th session of the UN Human Rights Council for China’s National Security Law. Importantly, in line with its original mission, a formal expansion to include more states would strengthen the alliance by bringing new and vital information to the table from different governments on new security and intelligence matters, both generally and specifically regarding Chinese activities and Huawei.

In light of these collective moves directed at China, coupled with the possible expansion of the alliance, the question is raised whether the alliance is at risk of diverting from and even subverting its original, practice-focused mandate of information collection and sharing? Specifically, in attempting to use its communal influence to pressure China through collective diplomatic and policy measures, does it risk diverging from the initial technical intentions of the organization?

By making collective statements such as those condemning China’s national security law, the alliance appears to be moving toward a more proactive and overtly political mode of operating on the global stage in contrast to its initial intentions and decades-old practices. Furthermore, adding another two (or more) formal members to the coalition could be seen as establishing a new, more powerful and politicized threat, potentially resulting in escalating tensions with an ever more economically and politically powerful China. After years of operating in the shadows, this new role for the alliance could threaten the old by its very visibility and assertiveness, increasing the likelihood of retaliatory responses. While it is not possible to accurately predict whether the data sharing ambitions of the alliance will be detrimentally impacted by the changes, the imperatives behind such changes can be understood.

The dynamics of the world have changed with the increasing and more varied use of digital technology, both in intelligence gathering and in the importance of technology in economic growth. It can be argued that this new role on the part of the alliance, whether it be through expansion, coordinated domestic policies, or greater diplomatic pressure, is a recognition of the growing importance of digital intelligence and power. The FVEY alliance has, in this author’s view, shifted accordingly to address the novel challenges of today.

Owen is currently pursuing his MA in International Peace and Security at King’s College London, Department of War Studies. He found interest in this topic in writing his undergraduate thesis and through the completion of an Undergraduate Student Summer Research Fellowship (USSRF) at Queen’s University, supervised by Dr. Christian Leuprecht.

Owen is a Staff Writer at Strife.

Insurrection and Chaos in the United States: Capitol Crimes at the Centre of Government

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by Owen Saunders

Swarms of Trump supporters storm the U.S. Capitol. Source: Reuters

If there was anyone left following 2020 that still held to T.S. Eliot’s words that the ‘world ends/Not with a bang but with a whimper,’ then the events at the U.S. Capitol on 6 January will have cured them of this misconception. In the course of an unprecedented mayhem, the seat of U.S. representative democracy was assaulted by a violent insurrection of Trump supporters intent on preventing the certification of the 2020 U.S. Presidential election in a bizarre attempt to keep Donald Trump in power. The event will undoubtedly consume the opinion pages in the days to come. It is therefore crucial to provide a clear account of the events as they happened and situate them within their context of the wider U.S. democracy.

What happened

The morning of 6 January 2021 began with all eyes focused on the run-off elections for Georgia’s two Senate seats. As no candidate had succeeded in reaching 50% of the vote in the general election of 3 November 2020, these plebiscites offered Democrats the opportunity to carry on the momentum of a victorious Presidential campaign and secure a Senate majority. Raphael Warnock and Jon Ossoff will be Georgia’s first Democratic Senators in seventeen years, having won by razor-thin margins.

On 6 January, Vice President Mike Pence and members of both Houses of the U.S. Congress began the process of formally certifying electoral college votes. Pence did so in spite of immense pressure from President Trump to reject the outcome of the election, with the President explicitly encouraging him to invalidate the results in the Senate. During the count, soon-to-be Senate Minority Leader, Mitch McConnell and the current Minority Leader Chuck Schumer gave similar speeches defending democracy. However, Schumer warned how some on the Republican side might ‘darken this view of democracy.’ Republicans more recently, according to The Washington Post, are displaying dangerous authoritarian tendencies, including Senator Ted Cruz of Texas who argued his colleagues should not ‘take the easy path‘ and should reject the election’s outcome.

Historically, the United States has transferred power peacefully, even when the opposing party won the election. This is why in a normal election year these counts rarely attract any attention; indeed, in the course of this year, with the rejectionist rhetoric of Trump, there was little widespread significance attached to these proceedings. This changed following the 3 November election as President Trump made increasingly strident calls for Congress to refuse to certify the Electoral College votes after losing over sixty legal cases attempting to overturn the election results

Just as Congress had begun debating a motion to reject the Electoral College votes from the State of Arizona, President Trump concluded a rally on the National Mall by urging his supporters to pressure Congress to reject the Electoral College results, overtly encouraging insurrection. Thousands flocked from the rally towards the Capitol and, upon arriving, were met with a relatively small force of United States Capitol Police – a significantly smaller force in comparison to the National Guard troops deployed in advance of a June 2020 Black Lives Matter protest at the Lincoln Memorial. The assembled Trump supporters eventually overran the security protections and took possession of the United States Capitol for several hours. As a result, the formal process certifying the vote came to an immediate halt.

Though eventually forced out of the building, thousands of protesters remained outside the Capitol, with the precinct formally under lockdown. The decision to deploy the District of Colombia National Guard, was made by Army Secretary Ryan D. McCarthy and Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher C. Miller, and the order was approved by Vice President Mike Pence following multiple requests from the Mayor of Washington and Congressional leaders. Interestingly, Trump as the Commander-in-Chief would have been expected to give this order, however, according to press accounts he failed to do so.

Later that evening, after the 6:00 PM curfew imposed by the DC Mayor that evening, Congress reconvened and voting resumed to certify the outcome of the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election. Other major takeaways from this disruptive day, which ended in the deaths of five people, included the significant delays by the President and Department of Defense to authorize the activation of the DC National Guard, the failure by the United States Capitol Police to adequately plan for an obvious threat, and the stark dissimilarities in the way law enforcement handled this event versus the Black Lives Matter protests in the summer after the death of George Floyd.

How did the United States get here?

The United States has always portrayed itself as a global leader and champion of democratic values, especially after World War II and again after the fall of the Soviet Union, where US power and influence became unparalleled. Over the last decade, however, with global power dynamics in shift, rapid advancements in technology, and the 2008 financial crisis, this position began to witness a dramatic transformation. The ‘Tea Party’ movement, a far-right branch of the Republican party, began to manifest during the Obama administration, notably in 2009 as a backlash to the Affordable Care Act, also known as ‘Obamacare’. The 2010 U.S. elections saw 87 Republicans elected to Congress in what was known as the ‘tea party wave’. They were known for anti-regulation and obstructionist domestic policies, an isolationist foreign policy, and a distinct lack of reverence for many democratic institutions and the role of the state in society.

As Donald Trump came onto the political scene as a serious candidate for President in 2015, he took advantage of what remained of the tea party movement, appropriating their populist rhetoric as his own. Throughout his 2016 campaign, he fed his growing base a populist message that appealed to the far-right elements of the Republican party. Trump’s populist approach, direct criticism of his opponents and President Obama, and self-styled image as a ‘fighter’ proved impossible to beat by his primary opponents or in the general election, Hillary Clinton. His victory represented an accumulation of a number of a number of grievances by Middle America, grievances which he continued to perpetuate and exacerbate throughout his presidency.

President Trump throughout his presidency pushed a narrative that the democratic election processes and institutions could not be trusted, that elections are ‘rigged,’ and that the ‘fake news media’ never reported the facts of his administration accurately. He used his impeachment in early 2020 to reinforce his narrative about the ‘fake news media’ and the alledged persecution of his administration. He set the stage for the post-election turmoil by stating in August 2020 that ‘the only way we’re gonna lose this election is if the election is rigged’.

His supporters have adopted his recent, far more deranged, and unhinged views which were disseminated through his constant stream of disinformation via his now-suspended Twitter account. This included spreading far right media misinformation from QAnon, giving OANN, another far right media outlet, priority to speak during presidential press conferences, and asking for the Proud Boys to ‘stand back and stand by‘ in the course of the campaign. These actions displayed a blatant disregard of the democratic process by the rejection of facts, the promotion of distrust of the media, and the removal of multiple members within his administration who stood up to his disinformation.

After this incident of domestic terrorism where thousands of Trump supporters, some of whom were armed, stormed the Capitol, Congress was forced to adjourn; the national guard was deployed and five people died. The media, Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, Speaker Nancy Pelosi and others have argued that the 25th amendment should be invoked to have the president removed from office immediately, as his inflammatory rhetoric and disregard for U.S. democracy have made him incapable of fulfilling the duties of his office. The unprecedented incident that unfolded this week is a true test of the more than 200-year-old democracy.

Where does the United States go from here?

The Electoral College vote has been certified but the riots and takeover of the United States Capitol by supporters of the outgoing president will undoubtedly remain as a painful reminder of and stain on his Presidency. The violent incident at the Capitol is but one of the tainted legacies of his administration.

Taking office on 20 January 2021 President-Elect Joe Biden has much to do – and much to undo. His priorities will surely include undoing many Executive Orders from the Trump Administration and working to pass comprehensive legislation for millions of Americans currently experiencing unprecedented losses, restrictions, and economic hardship due to the COVID-19 Pandemic. Most importantly, however, the Biden Administration must also work to repair the distrust, hyper-partisanship and extremism which have steadily spread and intensified throughout the United States over the past four years.

Biden will have to rebuild the reputation of the United States on the international stage, further damaged by the events of this week. Countries and international organizations around the world have reacted in disbelief and disappointment, releasing statements of shock and condemnation regarding the incident. Specifically, the Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau released a statement saying Canadians were ‘deeply disturbed by the violence that unfolded’, violence he stated that was incited by the president. Prime Minister Boris Johnson of the United Kingdom emphasised that it is ‘vital that there should be a peaceful and orderly transfer of power’.

The United States, the supposed beacon of democracy, the ‘shining city on a hill’ and self-proclaimed ‘leader’ of the free world, largely failed at upholding their promise and self-avowed values.

Trump’s legacy will be one of immeasurable division, an explicit rejection of democratic values and practices, and the denial of rudimentary facts. Unfortunately, these systemic issues will not simply vanish after his term expires on January 20th. Over the next four years, therefore, Biden must work closely with his cabinet, the Congress, Governors, and citizens across the country to undo the unprecedented division, mistrust, and right wing radicalization that Trump has sown and restore unity and trust in democratic institutions and traditions.

The challenge before President-Elect Biden is daunting. He inherits a highly divided country where one side believes he was democratically elected and the other side believes that he is the beneficiary of a stolen election. Finding a way to bridge that divide and heal the wounds created over the past four years will dictate the trajectory and prosperity of the United States and its place in the world for years to come.

Owen is an MA student in International Peace and Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He has taken advanced courses on U.S. Foreign Policy with Professors David Haglund and Joel Sokolsky during his time in Political Studies at Queen’s.

Whither America First: A New US Foreign Policy under Biden?

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by Owen Saunders

Joseph R. Biden (D) and Donald J. Trump (R), the candidates in the 2020 US Presidential Race (Image credit: BBC)

After a long election cycle, the US Presidential Election is almost concluded. In January, Joe Biden will become the 46th President of the United States. Whilst Democrats managed to retain control of the House of Representatives, the Republican Party looks likely to hold their Senate majority. The Senate has an important role to play in the ratification of treaties negotiated by the President and, thus, the successful execution of his foreign policy. Just as Trump’s foreign policy offered a break with the Obama-era, the question is now what change will Biden bring: a return to the goals of his former running mate, or a new unique path? As of 20 January 2021, a new foreign policy dynamic will be in place. The legacy of Trump’s ‘America First’ approach, however, may limit Biden’s ability to restore US leadership globally.

On environmental issues, Donald Trump had repeatedly criticised the Obama administration’s engagement in the 2015 Paris Agreement, arguing that the accord would unduly impact rustbelt states and American sovereignty. Consequently, last year Trump announced the formal withdrawal of the United States, a decision coming into effect the day after the election. Joe Biden has promised to rejoin the accord and can do so without Senate ratification. The problem sits with the Senate, who again must approve many of the measures required to meet the goals of the accord. Former President Bill Clinton experienced similar resistance in regard to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.

In the course of his presidency, Trump has also repeatedly turned a blind eye to human rights abuses, most recently in the case of China’s Uighur Muslim minority. He has refused to condemn or sanction China over the issue because it would threaten ongoing trade negotiations. The Biden campaign, in comparison, repeatedly called the treatment of the Uighur population ‘genocide’. Similarly, China has imposed national security legislation in Hong Kong, restricting freedoms and denying Hong Kongers of their sovereignty. In reaction, Trump signed an Executive Order in July of 2020 calling for “Hong Kong Normalization.” Biden, like Obama, can be expected to outwardly condemn these actions.

Bilateral and multilateral trade arrangements have been heavily criticised by Trump as damaging for American economic interests. One of Trump’s first foreign policy decisions was to withdraw from the Transpacific Partnership negotiated by Obama (TPP). Biden will presumably attempt to resuscitate the pact, though he will need Congressional approval and Senate ratification. Further, Trump successfully re-negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which he had repeatedly lamented for undermining the US auto-manufacturing industries. The new agreement, the Canada United States Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), was mainly a cosmetic change, however, it does enforce greater percentages of steel and aluminum produced in the US to be integrated in automobiles. Changes to CUSMA are unlikely under a Biden administration. Early on, Trump imposed trade tariffs on Chinese goods to force a better trade deal, but these initiatives largely failed to address trade disputes. Preliminary agreements to reduce tariffs had been reached by early 2020 but then the COVID-19 pandemic took hold. Biden has argued that the tariffs have only hurt US businesses and consumers and will likely pursue less confrontational methods of negotiation.

Regarding bilateral relations, Trump is boastful of his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, though the minutes of their five meetings are unrecorded. Russia has proven to be a central threat in the spread of misinformation across the United States and Trump has often been reluctant to criticize them. Given Russia’s role in the 2016 election and Biden’s criticism throughout the campaign of Trump’s “unknown diplomacy” with Russia, Biden will likely take a tough stance against Putin, including on the occupation of the Crimea. Similarly, despite Biden’s criticisms of Trump’s legitimising of North Korea,’ his administration would continue negotiations with North Korea on nuclear issues. Finally, the Anglo-American Special Relationship may be impacted by Biden’s election. While Trump remains an advocate for Brexit and a quick trade deal with the UK, Biden opposed Brexit and his administration will only approve a new deal if Brexit does not threaten the Good Friday Agreement.

The Trump administration has repeatedly criticised Western security alliances and agreements. As a result, the Trump administration abandoned the Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2018 and imposed new economic sanctions on Iran. Under a Biden presidency, removing those sanctions is a real possibility that could open re-engagement with Iran and lower bilateral tensions. A Senate approval of two-thirds vote is required for a new agreement or re-entry into the old one, which may prove difficult to achieve. Trump has also not been shy to criticize the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), mainly as European members fail to meet obligations to spend 2% of GDP on defense. The Biden administration will undoubtedly re-engage with and vigorously support the organization, as he championed the Obama administration’s commitments to the security alliance.

Regarding public health, Trump has repeatedly blamed China for the COVID-19 virus. In September 2020, announcing that the US would withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO), blaming the multilateral institution for the failure to recognize and react to the virus adequately. Under Biden, Trump’s commitment to withdraw from the WHO would not be honored.

President-elect Biden has a great deal of work to do in repairing damaged bilateral and multilateral organisations and relationships around the world. Although not every foreign policy decision made under the Trump administration is noted here, the evidence of an ‘America First’ policy is strong. Nonetheless, Trump himself is not the problem, he is a symbol of sentiments within the United States that are anti-trade, anti-immigration and pro-isolationism. Although Biden’s foreign policy will likely be a continuation of the Obama administration, which itself was not perfect, Biden is likely to be limited in his efforts to return American foreign policy towards multilateralism and globalization.

Despite the popularity of ‘America First’ casting a long shadow, Biden will continue seeking re-engagement with the world, despite the domestic political difficulties at home. President Biden can do so by focusing on re-entering environmental agreements and security deals, upholding human rights, and restoring the reputation of the United States as a leader of the liberal international order. Through bi-partisan negotiation, the undoing of President Trump’s executive orders, and the implementation of new executive orders himself; any successes will depend to a great extent on working with other states in regaining more effective US diplomacy and leadership in the world.

Owen is pursuing his MA in International Peace and Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. His interest in researching this topic developed from a US Foreign Policy graduate course thought by Dr. David G. Haglund, Department of Political Studies, at Queen’s University in Canada. Find him on Twitter @owensaunders26