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South East Asia

Henry: a wounded soldier forgotten by all in an American jail – by all except his brothers who fell beside him in Vietnam – Part II

August 7, 2018 by Charles Bloeser

By Charles Bloeser

U.S. Army Operations in Vietnam (Credit Image: R.W. Trewyn, Ph.D. - WikimediaCommons)

The former soldier grimaced for just an instant as he lowered himself into a Spartan metal chair opposite mine in this cramped space we shared. A chair like the one he’d lowered himself into for his monitored telephone call with his wife. Their relationship described in Hebrew scriptures as one in which they cling to each other, becoming “one flesh.” Separated here for legitimate security reasons by a thick sheet of glass. Those of us in “the biz” prefer to call that kind of visit a “no contact visit.” It just sounds a little better than “no human touch.”

Once he was seated, Henry and I greeted each other with mutual respect, but the veteran’s words were narrow and thin. He wore a state court detainee’s bright orange coveralls. But he couldn’t fill them out.

I glanced again at the booking photograph from six months earlier. And I looked back at this veteran. These couldn’t be the same person. They mustn’t be the same person.

Henry confirmed the basic facts that his wife had given me out in the lobby. He said he’d been arrested before. For the same thing. Henry told me it wasn’t that way before he was sent to Vietnam.

I assured him that I’d get in touch with the D.A. to jump start his legal process. And I suggested that he might want to visit with an attorney who specializes in 42 U.S.C. §1983 suits, a type of litigation used to seek redress for violations of a detainee’s or an inmate’s constitutional rights while incarcerated. This is the type of case that by federal statute would give Henry’s lawyer a way to get paid if they win. And at the time I met Henry, state and federal law had already begun to make sure that a Section 1983 suit would survive Henry’s death and perhaps provide financial support for his widow.

Before I talked to the D.A., I told Henry, I wanted to check on his medical status. I pulled a legal pad from my brief bag and handwrote the authorizations to release information that I would need to find out what the hell was going on. Henry labored to lift his arm, and each time he signed his name it took a while. For documents that required a notary to witness a detainee’s signature, you could usually find one among the jailers on shift.

I started by getting in touch with a nurse who worked on the jail’s medical floor. She told me that jail staff had put Henry on her floor but that for four months she had tried in vain to get Henry transferred to a hospital. “What’s wrong with him?” I asked.

“I don’t know for sure, but that weight loss isn’t a good sign.”

Henry had authorized me to get his medical records, and for a day or two jail staff gave me the run around. But I kept calling and made sure that jail administration understood that if they didn’t get Henry to a hospital soon, they could count on another lawsuit. Three days after his wife begged me to check on Henry, I went to visit him again. Henry was gone.

The jail had finally transferred him to a local hospital, where, by contract, detainees deemed worthy of hospital medical care received it under the watch of Sheriff’s deputies. But when I got there to see Henry, I learned he wasn’t there either.

Medical staff at hospital ran some long overdue tests. When the county’s bean counters learned the veteran had terminal cancer, Henry was promptly moved to the Veterans Administration hospital where he would soon die. A criminal assault charge against him had finally shown up, and an assistant D.A. I hadn’t met dismissed the case against the soldier that morning.

What could I do for her Henry now that he was about to enter an eternity I had been raised to believe exists but which I knew nothing about? Ask about his faith and if he had a favorite pastor? A priest? A rabbi? Make sure the hospital chaplain had been to see him? Whatever might be waiting for Henry was something far beyond the knowledge and expertise of this “attorney and counselor.”

I sat wordlessly next to Henry’s hospital bed and tried to see this man who was fading away inside an outsized hospital gown as the combat infantryman he was. But it was hard. I knew so little about this soldier I’d been asked to just check on. I learned early on that he had served in the U.S. Army and was honorably discharged.

Henry was one of 1,857,304 men inducted through the selective service system into the U.S. armed forces during the ten years designated as the Vietnam War.[i] That this man from the American Midwest was never the same after Vietnam was beyond question.

But I knew none of the specifics which Henry may have shared with the other vets who sometimes attended group downstairs in the VA hospital. I don’t think I ever saw Henry’s service record. Documents that I would have asked his wife for had it proved necessary to file for a writ of habeas corpus, I never saw.

For a lawyer whose life is all about asking questions, it seemed immoral to ask Henry anything more than what I had to know to help the man. This wounded husband and father had barely enough breath left to answer questions from medical staff. Henry now seemed to me like a man being washed down a drain, bit by bit, ever more rapidly falling away until there’s nothing left to see.

But as his days ran out, this Army veteran who had done what his country asked of him seemed to exude a measure of peace. And if it wasn’t peace that I saw, then perhaps it was the confidence that nothing he might encounter in a life hereafter could be nearly as bad as what he lived through in Vietnam. Recently departed British Historian Ben Shephard writes in his seminal work on the psychological price of war that “[i]t is futile to quantify the scale of atrocities in Vietnam, though historians have tried. We do better to heed the words of the most eloquent apologist for what went on there. Philip Caputo was the sensitive, bookish son of a middle-class Chicago household who came to find himself facing court martial for the cold-blooded murder of two innocent Vietnamese civilians. ‘The aspect of the Vietnam War which distinguished it from other American conflicts,” Caputo wrote, was ‘its absolute savagery. I mean the savagery that prompted so many American fighting men – the good solid kids from Iowa farms – to kill civilians and prisoners.’”[ii]

“Why are you so scared?” Henry’s words and his aim were as true as his fast-approaching death.

“I don’t know.”

Henry wanted his story told. “They can’t be doin’ this to th’ other folks they lock up,” he wheezed. So during a return visit he had me photograph him as he stepped ever closer to whatever lay beyond. I took several photos, had them enlarged, and carried them, along with a blown-up copy of Henry’s booking sheet with the veteran’s puffy faced booking photo, to the county commissioners.

Doing justice to Henry’s story, doing right by a wounded warrior’s death-bed mission to force others to do right, weighed heavy on me. One of the most important things I already did for every client I could was to tell his or her story. To introduce a living, breathing fellow human being to a court that possesses the power to judge and impose life-altering sentences. To urge that court to see the person standing next to me or seated with me at the defense table or shackled to a dozen others dressed in identical coveralls and stuffed in a courtroom’s jury box, as more. As more than just a number on a case file. As more than the next defendant on the court’s docket. But as the statistics cited by Andrew Cohen, whose 2013 article in The Atlantic I quote from in the part I’s third endnote scream out, that can be damned hard to do in America’s state courts if the State isn’t trying to kill your client.[iii]

You do the best you can, though, because you swore you would and because the outcome of a criminal case – regardless of whether a client goes to prison - frequently inflicts significant consequences on the lives and fortunes of not just your client but also your client’s family. A criminal conviction, the criminal record that follows it, and any collateral consequences from the conviction, e.g., loss of professional license, reduction in amount of VA disability compensation, termination of VA pension payments, deportation, denial of access to public housing and federal student aid, etc., can hurt and even destroy families.

The story of a combat veteran left to die on the medical floor of a modern, urban jail had to be told well-enough to encourage the kind of changes needed to save lives then and to save lives yet to come. And Henry trusted me to do that. He had no one else.

I don’t remember what I told the county commissioners that day. And it wasn’t important for them to remember my words anyway. If these elected officials who are charged with the responsibility for the County’s jail remembered the images of a dying veteran and in those images remembered well the story that Henry tasked me to deliver to them, then Henry is the one who should get credit.

He’s the wounded warrior who’s responsible for any good that came from a story that he should never have been forced to write. He’s the combat veteran who tried to save the men of his platoon on the other side of the planet. He’s the American soldier who insisted that by his death here at home, others jailed – no matter the reason - must not be left to rot and to die.

From Henry’s arrest more than a half-year earlier until his death in a VA hospital, the law never stopped assuming that Henry was innocent.

 

Charles Bloeser, the author and ‘Henry’ ‘s lawyer (Credit Image, Charles Bloeser)

 

Combat stress in America

Common law courts in the United States have decreed that persons like Henry – who are jailed before they’ve been convicted of a crime – and those imprisoned pursuant to a criminal conviction, have a right to “adequate” medical treatment while held. That right is, according to American courts, based in the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States’ written constitution. At least in theory, state and federal legislative and regulatory law abide by the courts’ decisions. They also determine what steps a detainee or inmate must follow in order to get a shot at having these rights enforced.

This right to treatment applies to those persons who suffer from shell shock aka combat stress aka PTSD. It also applies to persons who suffer from PTSD despite the fact that they’ve not personally been in combat.

Scholars have looked hard for answers to a question repeated in a 2014 article in New Republic:[iv] “The U.K. Understands How to Treat PTSD. Why Does the U.S. Lag Behind?”

London-based researchers from King’s College and the Western Education Centre found some possible reasons for these differences during their analysis of studies from several countries that examined veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan deployments, as well as some from the Gulf War:

“US and UK forces deployed are demographically different from each other. US forces tend to be younger, of lower rank, and contain more reservists, who are to have increased vulnerability to post-deployment mental health problems in both countries. The US forces have a lower leader to enlisted soldier ratio, which may be a meaningful factor as good leadership appears to be protective of mental health.”[v]

Differences among research methodologies employed in the studies they examined are among other reasons cited for reported differences.

More than twenty suicides per day among active-duty military, national guard troops, reservists, and separated veterans from U.S. Armed Forces[vi] prompt experts to ask, “how did we get the data we’re using to find solutions?”

The author of A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century, British historian Ben Shephard argues that PTSD’s inclusion in the psychiatric communities’ diagnostic bible led to an ‘objectivication’ of the condition, in the sense that symptoms, diagnostic questionnaires and psychometric devices has been ‘standardised’. The whole process has become ‘all ‘objective’, taken out of the clinician’s hands.’[vii]

One resulting threat to acquiring good data and to effectively treating those who suffer from combat stress is, one psychiatrist told this researcher, a “lack of nuance” in what, exactly, we say that PTSD is.

Decades of medical practice have allowed the physician to see the signs of trauma in a broad range of patients who’ve served in the military and those who haven’t. In patients who’ve been in combat and those who have not. And while he does not suggest that a survivor of domestic violence has no claim to the label or resources associated with a PTSD diagnosis, there is, he agrees, a clinically meaningful difference between the kind of trauma that person suffers and the nature of the trauma experienced by members of the armed forces who must decide again and again which of the identically dressed men, women, and children in a dust-soaked, IED-laced town square can and might kill you or those you’ve sworn to protect.

 

This is the second instalment of a two-part article that relates these events in Henry’s life. The first part is available here

 


Charles Bloeser is the creator of combatresearchandprose.com, a new open-source applied research initiative that will continue to contribute to bridging the gap in experience, knowledge, and understanding that divides those who’ve never served under arms from those who have. He’s the civilian son and grandson of veterans and a lawyer who’s spent most years arguing criminal and constitutional issues in America’s state and federal trial and appellate courts. Among his published research are works re Libyan-supported Jihadi terrorism in the Western Hemisphere, civilian-military law enforcement relations in the U.S., and the demands that an increasingly complex national security environment make for special operations forces. His research agenda includes national security/defense/veterans issues, with special attention to those facing challenges from combat stress/PTSD/TBI etc.

 


Notes

 

[i] Selective Service System. www.sss.gov. Data accessed May 9, 2018.

 

[ii] Ben Shephard. A War of Nerves: soldiers and psychiatrists in the twentieth century 371. Harvard University Press (Cambridge, Massachusetts 2001) (quoting Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War (London, 1978), pp. xvi-xvii.): “The evil was inherent not in the men – except in the sense that the devil dwells in all of us – but in the circumstances under which they had to live and fight. The conflict in Vietnam combined the two most bitter kinds of warfare, civil war and revolution, to which was added the ferocity of jungle war. Twenty years of terrorism and fratricide had obliterated most reference points from the country’s moral map long before we arrived. . .. The marines in our brigade were not innately cruel, but on landing at Da Nang they learned rather quickly that Vietnam was not a place where a man could expect much mercy if, say, he was taken prisoner. And men who do not expect to receive mercy eventually lose their inclination to grant it.” Id.

 

[iii] Death-penalty law in the United States guarantees a defendant the right during the sentencing phase of a capital trial (“stage 2”) to tell his/her story in the form of “mitigating evidence” that jurors may take into account as they decide whether to sentence to death a defendant they’ve found guilty.

 

[iv] Sarah Sloat. “The U.K. Understands How To Treat PTSD. Why Does the U.S. Lag Behind?” New Republic. February 28, 2014.

 

[v] Elizabeth J. F. Hunt, Simon Wessely, Norman Jones, Roberto J. Rona, and Neil Greenberg. PTSD in The Military: Prevalence, Pathophysiology, Treatment: the mental health of the UK Armed Forces: where facts meet fiction. European Journal of Psychotraumatology 2014 (2014) 5: 23617. http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/ejpt.v5.23617

Among additional resources is Kimberly A. Hepner, Carol P. Roth, Elizabeth M. Sloss, Susan M. Paddock, Praise O. Iyiewuare, Martha J. Timmer, and Harold Alan Pincus, Final Report on Quality of Care for PTSD and Depression in the Military Health System. RAND National Defense Research Institute 2017.

 

[vi] In June 2018, the U.S. Veterans Administration released its newest National Suicide Data Report. VA Press Secretary Curt Cashour explained that this new report reflects greater precision in reporting the VA’s suicide data for U.S. veterans. “The report shows the total is 20.6 suicides every day. Of those, 16.8 were veterans and 3.8 were active-duty service members, guardsmen and reservists.

 

[vii] A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century at 385. Harvard

University Press 2001. [author notes in chapter 27, fn. 3 that, “I have stolen the phrase

‘Chinese menu’ from G. E. Vaillant, ‘The disadvantages of DSM-III outweigh its advantages’, AJP 141 (1984), p. 543.]

 


Image Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:US-Army-troops-taking-break-while-on-patrol-in-Vietnam-War.jpg

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: PTSD, South East Asia, USA, Vietnam War

Henry: a wounded soldier forgotten by all in an American jail – by all except his brothers who fell beside him in Vietnam – Part I

August 2, 2018 by Charles Bloeser

By Charles Bloeser

According to the US Dpt of Veterans Affairs, over three million Americans served in Vietnam (Credit Image: history.com)

Henry[i] was a veteran who nearly died from combat injuries in Vietnam. In his dreams, his platoon mates repeatedly kicked him and struck him, screaming at Henry that it was his fault that they were dead. His fault that their children were now orphans. When it all became too much for him, Henry exploded like the hand grenades he’d counted on to keep his platoon alive.

The last time Henry exploded led to another arrest for domestic violence. He’d again been booked into the county jail. Taken in through the concealed sally port of an uninspired structure in a city whose architects knew better. Just a stack of a dozen oversized orange Lego blocks with box windows that were easily missed by the person on the street with bad eyesight. Orange Lego blocks of all the same size and shape.

Same size. Same shape. Same cellular structure devoid of human senses and lacking a soul. Really not that different from the way a lot of folks think of the men and women inside. Veteran or not. No different from any other county inmate wearing orange coveralls and shackled one to another, waiting in line each morning to board the bus that will carry them to the county courthouse and another court appearance in an elegant structure built around a cattle yard. Words about justice or some such thing carved in stone high across its facade.

But not Henry.

“Are you a lawyer?”[ii]

The woman who asked the question was African American and appeared to be in her early 50s. She was slightly overweight and wore a simple beige dress and flat soled shoes that had begun to fray. Her purse had slipped off the fashion cycle years ago and was well-worn, its contents pushing hard against something its manufacturer had tried to pass off as leather.

“Yes, ma’am, but I’m very busy right now.”

“D’ya think ya could take just a few minutes to talk with my Henry?”

“’afternoon’s gettin’ on, ma’am, and the federal courthouse is quite a hike.”

“My Henry’s been ‘ere six months and he still ain’t got no lawyer.”

Six months? Shit. The constitution guarantees the folks shackled inside this jail a lawyer if they can’t afford one themselves.

The U.S. Supreme Court said so. ‘back in 1963. In a case that arrived at 1 First Street NE by handwritten letter from a state inmate with an eighth-grade education. The letter’s author, Clarence Earl Gideon, was serving a five-year sentence after defending himself and losing at trial; the judge presiding over his trial determined that Florida state law did not give him the authority to grant Mr. Gideon’s request for an attorney.[iii]

This woman’s Henry had fallen through the cracks.

“What’s he in for?” I said.

“They say he hit me. But he didn’ mean it, mister. He’s sick, real sick.”[iv]

Most of the violent crimes inflicted on folks we’ve shared our lives with are often hard to punish and prevent, especially if a case lives or dies on the testimony of the victim. I learned as an assistant district attorney fresh from law school and the bar exam that the State’s effort to enforce the rule of law in this arena would often fail right out of the gate. State legislatures tried to improve a State’s chances of “delivering justice” to these perps by emphasizing that it’s the State - not the victim - who decides whether to prosecute these crimes. But that technicality mattered little to the victims whose rights we sought to vindicate. Frequently, a woman who had finally managed to report her latest beating would by the time she signed her name swearing to the facts that she just wrote, decided that she couldn’t go through with it.

And both the DA’s office and the victim we hoped to help knew why: the devil we might know only on paper was the devil she knew personally all too well. And a prosecutor’s or victim-witness coordinator’s claim that “we’ll keep you safe” was aspirational, at best. Other than when the WITSEC folks said those words to one of my federal clients with a price on his head, they were just that. A few words that we all very much hoped would prove true.

But for this combat veteran’s wife, Henry was never the kind of man who could be distilled into simple words like “defendant” and “perpetrator and “abuser.” There was no black and white in being struck by a man she knew had always loved her but whose best efforts to get relief from the symptoms of war had proved little more than the American version of a snipe hunt.[v]

No good v. evil. No right v. wrong. No criminal defendant and victim.

What this woman knew all too well was that her husband was still paying what Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health Professor Emerita Dr. Jeanne Stellman calls the “lifelong cost of war.” A man who did what his country asked of him and who now suffered in silence like a lot of other veterans.[vi]

For Henry and far too many veterans wounded in wars visible and wars concealed, the lifelong cost of war includes a criminal record to make their lives and those of their families even harder than they already are. As explained in a 2013 Daily Beast article titled “From PTSD to Prison: why veterans become criminals,” “[a]fter Vietnam, the number of inmates with prior military service [in U.S. armed forces] rose steadily until reaching a peak in 1985, when more than one in five was a veteran. By 1988, more than half of all Vietnam veterans diagnosed with PTSD reported that they had been arrested; more than one third reported they had been arrested multiple times.”[vii]

“We can’t ‘fford no lawyer, let alone bond. Henry’s not goin’ anywhere anyway. He’s dyin’ here. Please, Mr. Lawyer, will you check up on ‘im?’”

I went back through security and down a long hall to a compact office shielded by glass. I asked for a copy of Henry’s booking sheet. Ever-rotating young, poorly-paid, scared-by-their-shadow detention officers shared tightly clustered desks with those who knew what they were doing.

Henry’s booking sheet from six months earlier included a booking photo and basic identifying information, along with the offense name and statutory citation for the law the arresting officer was recommending Henry be prosecuted for.

I asked the officer at the desk to have Henry brought down to one of the locking attorney meeting booths. Allegedly soundproofed metal and glass chambers not much larger than a traditional London telephone box and with none of the elegance. None of us who met clients in these spaces had cause to claim that they were bigger on the inside than the outside.

I studied a client file while waiting to meet the veteran in the booking photograph, a pudgy, middle-aged, African-American man with short cropped hair on a balding head.

But that was not the man the jailer brought me.

Yes, this was the Henry whose wife asked me to check on him. The Vietnam veteran she said had been here six months without a lawyer. The man she told me was real sick and didn’t mean to hit her. The wounded warrior she said was dying inside this oblivious stack of orange Legos from which no guttural cry, no anguished scream could escape.

The Henry I met that day could barely hold his own weight. What little I could see of Henry’s skin hung loosely. His face hollowing out.

 

 

This is the first instalment of a two-part article that relates these events in Henry’s life. The other part is available here.

 


Charles Bloeser is the creator of combatresearchandprose.com, a new open-source applied research initiative that will continue to contribute to bridging the gap in experience, knowledge, and understanding that divides those who’ve never served under arms from those who have. He’s the civilian son and grandson of veterans and a lawyer who’s spent most years arguing criminal and constitutional issues in America’s state and federal trial and appellate courts. Among his published research are works re Libyan-supported Jihadi terrorism in the Western Hemisphere, civilian-military law enforcement relations in the U.S., and the demands that an increasingly complex national security environment make for special operations forces. His research agenda includes national security/defense/veterans issues, with special attention to those facing challenges from combat stress/PTSD/TBI etc.


Notes:

[i] “Henry” is a pseudonym for a now deceased Vietnam veteran who was introduced to me and whose brief relationship with me was, as best I can confirm, the same way that I report it here, except for minor nonessential details and limited artistic license. Having over the years lost independent recollection of certain events, though, I’ve used as an accuracy check other writings that I made about these matters much closer in time to the events which I report here.

By sins of commission or omission, “Henry” had been left to rot and die on the medical floor of a midwestern city’s urban jail. Because informal persuasion got Henry transferred from the jail to hospital in mere days, there was no need for me to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus or anything else in either the local state court or in the U.S. district court. There was no need for me to enter my appearance or show up in court for him. Henry knew about Section 1983 litigation. Henry’s wife told me up front that the couple didn’t have money for a lawyer, and I quickly came to believe that it would be immoral for me to charge them a fee.

Almost nothing I did for Henry fits the technical definition of “practicing law.” Still, my brief relationship with the combat-wounded soldier remains among those experiences that most remind me that it’s a sobering privilege to list among the items in my skill set the tools and lenses of a lawyer.

 

[ii] The events that are reported in this essay occurred during the years that the author practiced law in Oklahoma, prior to his return to Tennessee.

 

[iii] Clarence Earl Gideon v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to answer the question of whether the right to counsel found in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution also applies to defendants facing felony charges in state courts. Subsequent developments in the law extends this Sixth Amendment right to counsel to state criminal defendants who face any possible imprisonment. “Reason and reflection,” Justice Hugo Black wrote for a unanimous court, “require us to recognize that, in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided to him.”

The idea that criminal defendants are entitled to legal counsel was a no-brainer for the second president of the United States. “Though he struggled at times with the lawyer’s challenging charge, [John] Adams kept his hand to the plow. He did not let go even when appointed to represent British soldiers who had killed five Bostonians after a shouting, cursing crowd ‘pelted the despised redcoats with snowballs, chunks of ice, oyster shells and stones.’ Adams represented those who threatened the very liberty he loved, ‘firm in the belief, as he said, that no man in a free country should be denied the right to counsel and a fair trial.'” Charles Bloeser, Confessions of an American Lawyer, 74 Oklahoma Bar Journal 608 (2003)(quoting David McCullough, John Adams 66 (2001)).

Well, that’s the way it’s supposed to work: “. . . Today, there is a vast gulf between the broad premise of the [Gideon v. Wainwright] ruling and the grim practice of legal representation for the nation’s poorest litigants. Yes, you have the right to a court-appointed lawyer today - - the right to a lawyer who almost certainly is vastly underpaid and grossly overworked; a lawyer who, according to a Brennan Center for Justice report published [in 2012], often spends less than six minutes per case at hearings where clients plead guilty and are sentenced. With this lawyer – often just a “potted plant” – by your side, you’ve earned the dubious honor of hearing the judge you will face declare that this arrangement is sufficient to secure your rights to a fair trial.” Andrew Cohen. “How Americans Lost the Right to Counsel, 50 Years After Gideon.” The Atlantic (March 13, 2013).

 

[iv]“Although PTSD can arise after a variety of traumatic events, war trauma made a substantial contribution to the current conceptualization of PTSD. While the terminology for PTSD only appeared in the psychiatric classification system in 1980, knowledge of battle-related psychological problems goes back to antiquity. Mythical Greek heroes Ajax and Hercules both succumbed to their emotional wounds, not injuries of combat. In 1688, Swiss physician Johannes Hofer wrote about an unusual grouping of symptoms in Swiss mercenaries fighting in France or Italy, which he termed nostalgia. Irritable heart, also called soldier’s heart or Da Costa’s syndrome, was described in soldiers of the American Civil War by Jacob Mendes Da Costa, an American physician. . ..” Dr. Angelica Staniloiu and Anthony Feinstein. “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in Canada.” The Canadian Encyclopedia (2017). https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/post-traumatic-stress-disorder-ptsd-in-canada/ accessed March 18, 2018.

 

[v]Thefreedictionary.com: “snipe hunt”: an elaborate practical joke in which the unsuspecting victim hunts a [non-existent] snipe and is typically left in the dark holding a bag and waiting for the snipe to run into it; “in the South a snipe hunt is practically a rite of passage.” But see, Joe Smith. “The Snipe Hunt: Myth and Reality.” Cool Green Science at blog.nature.org. January 14, 2014.

 

[vi] “’Our data show a lifelong cost of war,” said [Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health Professor Emerita Dr. Jeanne] Stellman who estimates the actual figures may be higher. “One of the hallmarks of PTSD is withdrawal and avoidance. Countless numbers of people have spent their lives suffering and don’t know how or why to seek help.”

 

“. . . From 1997 to 2005, mental health – service use among veterans of the Persian Gulf era has greatly increased, especially in the last five years and among younger veterans. Veterans from early service eras surprised researchers with a fivefold increase in use, especially among Vietnam vets with PTSD. The system is straining at the seams, the researchers observed. The increased demand seems to be met by fewer visits per veteran.” Carol Cruzan Morton. “PTSD: The Suffering Continues for Vets.” Harvard Medical School (news) March 21, 2008. https://hms.harvard.edu/news/ptsd-suffering-continues-vets-3-21-08 accessed April 12, 2018 (citing a then recent report on trends in VA treatment of PTSD published in the journal Health Affairs).

 

[vii] Matthew Wolfe. “From PTSD to Prison: why veterans become criminals.” thedailybeast.com (July 28, 2013). This article also examines the inner workings of one of the many veterans’ courts established in the U.S. and a vet-dedicated correctional environment being tested in the state of Virginia.

 


Image Source: https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/vietnam-war-history/pictures/vietnam-war/two-us-soldiers-helping-wounded-third-2

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: PTSD, South East Asia, USA, Vietnam War

A Glimmer of Hope for Burma’s Peace Process?

March 27, 2018 by Anna Plunkett

By Anna Plunkett

As two new parties sign Burma’s National Ceasefire Agreement, are we witnessing a new stage in Burma’s peace process? (Credit Image: Xinhua/U Aung)

 

On February 13, 2018, the number of signatories on Burma’s National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) grew from eight to ten with the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) officially joining at a ceremony held in the state capital Naypyidaw. Peace and reconciliation have been the primary focuses of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) since its landslide victory in the 2015 election. The cornerstone policy has been the NCA, which was established under President Thein Sein’s government and aims to negotiate between the government and the numerous Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) throughout Burma. Despite multiple peace conferences since 2015, the addition of two new signatories to the NCA in February has been the first tangible development in Burma’s peace process under the new NLD-led government. So, is this development the breath of life the beleaguered peace agreement has needed – or has it simply masked the larger problems within Burma’s peace process?

Either way, it has brought a glimmer of hope to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s peace and reconciliation aspirations that have not only been her primary objective since 2015 but a lifelong cause. Best known for her years under house arrest, Daw Suu is internationally recognised as a symbol of non-violent struggle against oppression. However, since taking office in early 2016 she and the NLD have struggled to make any progress on this central objective despite inclusive peace conferences with a variety of armed actors. Thus, the signing of two new armed groups to the NCA is the first substantial and official development within a highly-coveted peace process.

The NCA itself was developed under the leadership of President Thein Sein, Burma’s first civilian leader, elected in 2011. A former general, President Thein Sein brought mass political and economic reforms to Burma – among them the NCA. The National Ceasefire Agreement aimed to bring peace to Burma and unify multitude bilateral ceasefires that have been previously established around the country. Although it failed to meet its national aspirations, eight of the fifteen invited groups signed the agreement in October 2015. This progress was marred with criticism after the main active armed opposition groups remained among the groups unwilling to sign the NCA.

This challenge to peace remains – Burma’s strongest opposition groups continue to oppose rather than negotiate with the government. Since 2011, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is actively engaged in combat with the Tatmadaw (Burmese Army). This war continues, mostly forgotten in the wake of the Rohingya crisis in the south of the country, which has seen the mass forced migration of almost 700,000 civilians into Bangladesh among claims of horrendous and systematic crimes against humanity. These crises within Burma’s borderlands highlight not only obstacles to the NCA but to Burma’s transition from war to peace.

The signing of two more groups to the NCA, the first substantial development since the original signing in late 2015, should be a cause for celebration. It represents long awaited progress in a war of almost seventy years. At the signing ceremony, Daw Suu confirmed the government’s commitment to fostering peace with the ten or so EAOs yet to sign the NCA. Nevertheless, the central concern remains the same – the largest EAOs still refuse to sign and conflict continues to plague many communities within the borderlands. There is no doubt that steps towards a more comprehensive NCA represent not only success for the peace process but for the NLD government, struggling to live up to citizen’s expectations as it is.

As things stand, these successes are more superficial than lasting. Less than one month on, cracks are beginning to show in this newly reconfigured ceasefire. At the end of February, a skirmish was reported between the NMSP and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in Ye Township of Mon State. Although fighting between the two groups is known to occur over land disputes, their newly forged alliance through the NCA provides a disconcerting backdrop to the escalation. This point is perhaps underlined by the Mon leadership’s refusal to give up their arms despite signing the NCA last month. A commitment to the peace process has been made, but the trust in it to work has yet to be forged.

Mistrust continues to undermine further agreements with non-members of the NCA. The Karenni National People’s Party (KNPP) has stated that it will delay its decision on whether to sign the ceasefire agreement until it can be established if the Tatmadaw were responsible for the deaths of three party members and a civilian. Although the Tatmadaw launched an investigation, the KNPP leadership remains unsure of its validity given the nature of the incident.

These proceedings demonstrate the fragility and complex environment in which the government attempts to forge nationwide peace and reconciliation. The signing of the NMSP and LDU has been a major step forward and may provide some momentum to what has been a beleaguered peace process. However, major obstacles to the NLD’s central objective persist. Fighting within the country continues between ethnic armed groups and the Tatmadaw, the Rohingya Crisis has taken on new proportions with villages now flattened within Rakhine State, and general mistrust of the army throughout the country remains high. Until the government can resolve some of these long-term underlying mistrust issues between the actors involved, it is unlikely that the peace process can be anything but tenuous.

 


Anna is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. She received her BA in Politics and Economics from the University of York, before receiving a scholarship to continue her studies at York with an MA in Post-War Recovery. She was the recipient of the Guido Galli Award for her MA dissertation. Her primary interests include conflict and democracy at the sub-national level, understanding how transitions are implemented at the local level. You can follow her on Twitter @AnnaBPlunkett


Image Source

Banner: http://home.bt.com/news/world-news/two-rebel-groups-join-burmese-government-peace-process-11364250153132

Image 1: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1089677.shtml

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Burma, feature, Myanmar, peace process, South East Asia

Islamist Extremism in the Philippines

January 9, 2018 by Jamie Matthews

By Jamie Matthews

 

ISIS media had released this image of one of their militants waving the group’s flag in Marawi in May 2017

On October 17 2017, Philippine President Duterte declared that the city of Marawi had been ‘liberated from terrorist influence‘. The city, located on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao, had been under siege by militant groups fighting under the flag of the so-called Islamic State (IS). While the Government’s victory is a welcome success, the five-month siege exposed the vulnerability of the Philippines to the continued threat of jihadist extremism.

 

Islamic State’s Pivot to Asia

The battle for Marawi represents the escalation of Islamist militancy in the Philippines and, more broadly, in South East Asia (SEA). The island of Mindanao has a history of Islamic separatism, with both peaceful and violent attempts to gain autonomy. However, the more violent elements of the movement have been given a boost by recent global changes. The most obvious change has been the rise of IS, which has attracted a growing number of Muslims to the creation of an Islamic caliphate. While IS has lost ground in Syria and Iraq, the group has sought to extend its influence elsewhere. This change has involved encouraging terrorism in the West, and the establishment of wilyats (IS provinces) in regions such as SEA and North Africa. With a sizeable Muslim minority often living in harsh poverty, the Philippines provides a particularly attractive target for the formation of a wilyat. The attack on Marawi therefore represented the beginning of IS’s ‘pivot to Asia’, meaning the actions of extremists in Marawi was part of a long-term strategic goal of IS. The threat of further attacks across the Philippines and SEA is high.

 

Impact of the Marawi Siege

Despite the militants’ eventual defeat in Marawi, the conflict has heightened the risk from extremist groups inspired by IS. Over five months, a small number of militants resisted government forces and controlled large parts of the city. At one point, it is thought that as few as 70 militants were keeping some 7000 troops at bay. The effectiveness of such a small number of dedicated fighters emboldened IS over the strategic potential of occupation in Mindanao. Some security analysts even believe that IS won the battle strategically because they showed their ability to resist powerful military forces. Success during the battle for Marawi has provided Islamists with a martyrdom to inspire others.

The siege also assisted the radicalisation of young Muslims in the region and attracted extremists from around the world to the cause in Mindanao. The attack was well-documented in the media and IS publications. Images of militants raising black IS flags across Marawi were broadcast across the world and are thought to have had a similar impact as the images of IS’s 2014 victory in Mosul. The heavy-handed and ineffective approach of the Philippine military further aided the recruitment of young Muslims into IS ranks. IS recruiters utilised the Philippine military’s reliance on airstrikes to claim that it was the Government that destroyed the city and its residents’ homes. These publications by IS were made in conjunction with information on the historic plight of Muslims in Mindanao, highlighting previous governments’ attempts to oust Muslims from the region. These messages have encouraged radicalised Muslims to sympathise with the cause in Mindanao. The Island has even been described as “the new land of jihad”.

In the aftermath of the siege, the risk of Islamist extremism remains high. Civilians in Mindanao are growing increasingly wary that the militants will regroup and overrun surrounding rural areas and towns. The likelihood of lone-wolf terrorist attacks has led some Christian groups in Mindanao to arm themselves. The arming of Christians against Islamists is particularly worrying because previous rounds of sectarian violence in the Philippines began in a similar manner. President Duterte is aware of the severity of the danger, shown by the recent extension of martial law in Mindanao until the end of 2018. This extreme course of action taken by Duterte, and ratified by the Congress in Manila, demonstrates the difficulty of providing security and rule of law in a region which is extremely vulnerable to civil unrest.

 

Future Policy

The threat of Islamist extremism is clearly ongoing and serious in the Philippines. There are numerous ways in which the Philippine Government can mitigate these risks. Firstly, investment is required to rebuild the city of Marawi. Failing to do so would heighten poverty and resentment towards the government. Such conditions would prove fertile for the radicalisation of young Muslims by IS propaganda. Secondly, sufficient intelligence and policing resources are required to track down and capture extremists. This is particularly important given recent accusations that Duterte has not dedicated enough time, energy and money into countering Islamist extremism. Instead, he has been accused of diverting precious military and policing resources to his infamous war on drugs. Finally, the Philippines should take a more collective approach to countering extremism alongside their South East Asian neighbours. Tighter security checks on movement between borders and improved intelligence sharing would prove particularly helpful. The threat from IS in SEA is becoming increasingly apparent which should encourage cooperation between states. The Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia have already demonstrated over the past year their willingness to tackle the threat collectively with joint military and security operations. Further collective action is required if they wish to stem the surging tide of Islamist extremism across the region.

 


Jamie is a postgraduate reading Intelligence and International Security at King’s College London. He has a degree in Politics and International Studies as Warwick University. He is interested in a wide range of international and domestic security issues including the rise of Islamist extremism, the use of drones for targeted killing and intelligence related issues.

 


Image Source:

http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2017/05/25/09/40C5C47900000578-0-image-a-25_1495700147350.jpg

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: feature, ISIS, Philippines, South East Asia, terrorism

The Rohingya Need More International Protection

October 24, 2017 by William McPherson

By William McPherson

Displaced Rohingya people in Rakhine State, Myanmar (Source: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, via Wikimedia Commons)

 

In August/September 2017, around 500,000 Rohingya Muslims fled to Bangladesh, trying to escape a violent crackdown by the Myanmar military. The latest round of violence towards the Rohingya people began at the end of August — after the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) militant group attacked and killed 12 Myanmar security personnel. There have been reports from fleeing refugees of elite Myanmar soldiers killing or violently forcing Rohingya Muslims from their homes, stealing and burning properties as they move from village to village.

The Myanmar civilian government, led by State Counsellor (Prime Minister) Aung San Suu Kyi, and the military leadership have rejected the accusation of targeting civilians, saying the army is just conducting anti-terrorism raids against militant groups. As human rights groups, the media, and international observers are unable to gain access into Rakhine state, where most of the violence has taken place, verifying the claims and reports been made either by the fleeing Rohingya Muslims or the military has been impossible. The only evidence are photos and videos from refugees in camps in Bangladesh and satellite images of burning villages.

The Military operation in August/September 2017 has shown how weak Ms Suu Kyi is when dealing with internal security issues, as the civilian government does not have control over the military and police. The real power is still in the hands of the generals, not the civilian government. As such, the military are the perpetrating actors in committing these human right abuses — and more emphasis on their actions is required, rather than criticism toward Ms Suu Kyi. Even if personally Ms Suu Kyi, a former human rights and democracy campaigner, might want to advocate for the protection of the Rohingya Muslims, she seems to lack political, military and public support.

Although Ms Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won the 2015 elections, the constitution bestows real power to the military, who are allocated 25 percent of seats in parliament, and also are not under the authority of the civilian government. The NLD have to be causes when dealing with such a delicate issue as minority groups, as apart from the military dislike, there is also hatred for Muslims by a majority Buddhist population. In recent decades there has been an increase in Buddhist nationalist groups, such as the Ma Ba Tha, who have fuelled tensions between the two communities since its founding in 2013. With no authority over the military and a hatred by some of the Buddhist population, Ms Suu Kyi has been balancing between trying to enact reforms on the one hand and appease the military and nationalist groups on the other.

To make the crisis even more direr for the Rohingya Muslims, the latter do not hold citizenship rights neither in Myanmar (where they are called Bengali Muslims) nor in Bangladesh. In essence, the one million Rohingya Muslims are stateless. In Myanmar, Buddhist nationalists — who view them as Bengali migrants — have persecuted this group for decades. Without recognition or rights, they have become a forgotten ethnic group, with limited recourse to basic healthcare, education, and employment.

Since the latest military crackdown, human rights groups and the United Nations (UN) have condemned the violence and called for the halting of security operations against the Rohingya Muslims. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Raad Al Hussein, has said that the security operation against the Rohingya Muslims ‘seems a textbook example of ethnic cleansing’. The UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, has also spoken of a need to halt the violent military operations.

At a recent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting, member states further condemned the military for the violent crackdown, with French President Emmanuel Macron calling the actions of the military as ‘genocide’. U.S Vice President Mike Pence also condemned the military violence and called for the UN and UNSC ‘to take strong and swift action to bring this crisis to an end — and give hope and help to the Rohingya people in their hour of need.’ There has been condemnation by some world leaders towards the Myanmar government and military, but no joint agreement on how the international community could place further pressure on these institutions.

If Ms Suu Kyi is correct in her claim that the military have stopped ‘clearance operations,’ the current situation in the region will hopefully stabilise, allowing refugees to return. The issue now is how the international community and the Myanmar government can work together to prevent future violence and improve the lives of Rohingya Muslims.

In the near-term, the international community needs to place pressure, through the threat of economic sanctions or other embargos on both the civilian government and military, aimed at the immediate halt to the violent crackdown. There also needs to be an increased role for UN and other humanitarian agencies to assist the Myanmar government in its responsibility to protect. This could be undertaken by acting as a mediator between the government and the Rohingya Muslims. An ideal situation would be an agreement between the Myanmar government/military and the international community to send a UN observer mission to Rakhine state to oversee the repatriation of returning refugees and the delivery of aid. The UN mission should also have the mandate to observe the military operations and report back to the UNSC on any human rights abuses.

The second way forward in dealing with the crisis is for the international community to work with the Myanmar government to carry out the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State. The Myanmar government-established commission, led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, outlines a list of recommendations to improve living conditions for Rohingya Muslims, including ending restrictions on citizenship, marriage, and freedom of movement; and improving health care and education. To undertake these recommendations by the commission, the Myanmar government has established a Committee for Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine State. In a statement released by the Myanmar President’s office, the committee has been given a list of duties: including, improving living condition, equal access to education and healthcare, and efforts to bring peace and security to the region. Many of the duties outlined by the government, do not specifically adhere to protecting or improving the lives of the persecuted Rohingya Muslims, just to the population in Rakhine state in general. As the Kofi Annan led commission’s recommendations were only released in August 2017, there has been no major reforms, except for the establishment of an implementation committee. So far the Myanmar government have indicated that the reforms will be conducted in-house, with a planned formation of an advisory commission, with international experts. These are all good steps, but the international community should be more involved in the implementing the recommended reforms.

These recommendations are the ideal process for preventing future violence and improving the lives of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, although the military and its major international supporter, China, would likely block a UN observer mission. For instance, due to China’s national interest, they might block any UN-led mission in the case of objection by Myanmar military. Even the civilian government would be powerless to agree to an UN-led mission without the support of the military leadership.

In the short term, the only option available to the international community to protect Rohingya Muslims displaced in Myanmar and returning refugees is to monitor the situation from afar and continue to place pressure on the Myanmar government and military. We will need to see if the civilian government has enough power and political will to effectively carry out the recommendations of the advisory commission.

As for the long term, if the situation for the Rohingya Muslims does not improve and they still face human right abuses and discrimination, the international community may require more forceful measures to put pressure on the Myanmar military. Even though sanctions on the military would lack China’s support, placing more unilateral embargoes by the U.S, European countries, and other states could be a measure to be considered.


William McPherson is a MA: International Relations and Security graduate from University of Westminster, London. He is interested in many topics within the field of international relations and security, but his main focus is on humanitarian intervention, and the Responsibility to Protect. He has previously worked in the defence and security sector, including an internship at Risk Intelligence Solutions (RIS), based in Perth, Australia.


Image sources:

Image 1: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Displaced_Rohingya_people_in_Rakhine_State_(8280610831)_(cropped).jpg

Feature image: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/07/Displaced_Rohingya_people_in_Rakhine_State_%288280610831%29.jpg

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: feature, Myanmar, Refugee Crisis, South East Asia

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