Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

You are here: Home / Archives for putin

putin

Putin’s sleight of hand in Syria

by

By: Peter Kirechu

Russian_Sukhoi_Su-25_at_Latakia_(2)
Russian Su-25 Fighter Jets taking-off in Latakia. Source: Wikimedia

On March 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin unexpectedly announced the withdrawal of Russian forces from Syria as UN-sponsored peace talks began in Geneva. Putin’s withdrawal–however partial–challenged the Obama administration’s long-held quagmire sentence on the Russian role inside Syria. Putin showed that a limited military campaign could preserve the regime from collapse without committing to a costly ground campaign. Taking stock of the Russian intervention thus far, current evidence suggests that Russian influence is unlikely to diminish.

In deciding to intervene militarily in Syria, Putin concluded that an Assad victory (or accommodation) would likely buttress Russian interests in the region. He secured his current advantage by capitalizing on a divided armed opposition usurped by Salafi-jihadists and what many in the international community perceive as an incoherent US strategy.

As such, an assessment on where Russia’s influence has mattered the most unveils great insights as to Putin’s end-state agenda. Putin’s Syria strategy is tightly wedded to the eventual outcome of the war, and thus a commitment to an eventual negotiated settlement. Russia intends to maintain a pliable government in Damascus; one that ensures Russian military access inside Syria as a balance to other international powers.

Forcing a Rebel “Reset” to Russia’s Advantage

When the last round of UN-sponsored peace talks on the Syrian conflict collapsed in early February, members of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) scrambled to arrest the spiraling violence through the cessation of violence agreement completed in Munich on February 11. This accord set the conditions for a tenuous peace that has so far held despite numerous violations largely attributed to the Assad regime.

Significantly, the Munich agreement attempted to force a wedge between moderate and hardline Islamist groups­–principally between the Al-Nusra Front and other close affiliates. Since Russia vowed to continue its aerial campaign in territories occupied by both hardline and moderate groups, observers suggested that the truce was perhaps designed to force division within rebel ranks. Though evidence suggests that the ties between the Nusra Front and some of its allies such as Ahrar al-Sham­ are often fluid, the Munich agreement was a significant step towards addressing what role (if any) certain powerful Islamist groups may have in Syria’s future.

Through the Munich agreement, Putin ostensibly bound the United States in ipso facto agreement to the Russian perspective on the fractured opposition. By simply defining all opposition groups as irreconcilable terrorists, the Russian position advanced only two non-negotiable options: continued bombardment or a reprieve under ceasefire conditions; roughly 100 armed rebel groups joined the truce before implementation day on February 27. Ultimately, Russia’s discriminate targeting of the moderate opposition, combined with the regime’s collective punishment, exacted the desired concessions from the rebels and their external supporters.

Putin accurately assessed that the likelihood of the US-led coalition mounting a direct challenge to Russia’s aerial advantage was quite unlikely. Meanwhile, the regime parleyed its victories in Latakia, Deraa, and Aleppo to bolster its territorial gains in the event that the truce collapsed. Washington’s most viable relief to the beleaguered opposition rested on escalating arms provisions as an incentive for greater collaboration and unity among the rebels. This option, however, bore minimal benefit given Russian air superiority and the possibility that it would scuttle the developing ceasefire agreement.

But since the brokered ceasefire went into effect roughly one month ago violence has decreased by nearly 90 percent. This relative calm has also opened the space for peaceful protest as hundreds of thousands of local Syrians have again flowed into the streets demanding Assad’s departure. This return to peaceful assembly, however, occurs at a time when the moderate opposition is beset by dwindling prospects of an outright victory, or a favorable negotiating position in Geneva. This is precisely the outcome desired by Russia as peace talks resume: a militarily waning moderate opposition, undermined by the prominence of Salafi-jihadist groups, and thus pliable in any forthcoming settlement.

Managing Assad’s Potential Return to Intransigence

Prior to the withdrawal announcement, the regime was insulated in western Syria and the moderate opposition was increasingly battered and fractured as Assad appeared to have his way militarily. Assad’s resurgence translated into his regime’s growing intransigence on the diplomatic front. Days before talks resumed in Geneva, regime representatives revived the poisonous question of Assad’s political future, stiffening their position on Assad’s surviving role as head-of-state. Perhaps emboldened by their increasing military leverage, the representatives veered outside the primary focus of the talks, which is largely focused on developing a workable transition process.

These developments and the timing of the Russian withdrawal suggests that Putin’s drawdown may to some level curb regime behavior in Geneva. A slight panic within the regime may prove beneficial, though the fidelity of this particular claim is hard to discern. What appears clear is that the extent of Russia’s withdrawal will remain opaque for several weeks.

A complete departure of the Russian military presence is quite unlikely since the naval base at Tartus and the air base at Hmeimim will remain operational. The Syrian battlefield has certainly served as a testing ground for Russian military hardware. And it was (and will likely remain) an excellent proving ground for Russia’s execution of a high intensity aerial and ground campaign; allowing these capabilities to recede would be a gross error in Putin’s eyes.

The Russian Approach Post-Palmyra

Evidence from Russia’s military operations inside Syria revealed the disproportionate targeting of non-Islamic State aligned rebel groups. Nonetheless, Russian air raids have provided the necessary aerial cover for government troops to advance and retake the historic city of Palmyra which was seized by the Islamic State last May. Meanwhile, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition of Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen militias has in recent months wrested away swathes of territory from the Islamic State in a push towards the group’s de-facto capital in Raqqa.

The United States is intently focused on advancing negotiations between the regime and Syria’s main opposition bloc. Such an outcome, if appropriately harnessed, also provides the elusive ground component required to decisively challenge the Islamic State throughout Syria. That Russia floated the possibility of a federal post-war Syria is quite significant, though such an outcome is contingent on an elusive agreement between all parties involved. Given the current conditions, any power-sharing agreement that sets the outlines of a grand security infrastructure will likely be led by the regime, to Russia’s benefit.

The regime’s recent progress in Palmyra opened a new offensive corridor into Deir al-Zor which may extend north into the Islamic State heartland of Raqqa as conditions warrant. Russia calculates that a regime victory in both Raqqa and Deir al-Zor will secure remnants of the regime if Assad leaves in a transition settlement, however unlikely. What remains unclear is whether the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) has the manpower to effectively achieve this objective without substantial reinforcements from surrogate Shia militias from Iraq and beyond. But as Iran deepens its Syria involvement beyond the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) the regime’s manpower deficits will benefit from these reinforcements.

On the other hand, the United States will continue to face a tough challenge in galvanizing Sunni rebel resistance as regime forces move eastward. And despite the regime’s manpower shortages, Russia is likely to exploit this handicap to maintain its footprint inside Syria. That Russian commitment has slowly transitioned from fighter jet squadrons to close air support via attack helicopters suggests that Russian ground presence will continue.

In the past several days, the weeks-long ceasefire has fallen under immense pressure and mutual violations by both the regime and the armed opposition threaten to tear the deal asunder. Whether the ceasefire survives or falters, Russia’s military role inside Syria is unlikely to recede.

 

 

Peter Kirechu is Graduate Student at the Mercyhurst Institute for Intelligence Studies where he focuses on civil strife, insurgencies and counterterrorism. Mr. Kirechu was also a 2013 Boren Scholar to Jordan where he studied the security and humanitarian effects of Syria’s civil conflict. @PeterKirechu

After Ukraine, Part I - Sleepwalking into crisis: Britain, Russia and the Ukraine

by

By Michael Jones:

David Cameron meets Vladimir Putin in Moscow, September 2011. PA copyright (CC 2.0)
David Cameron meets Vladimir Putin in Moscow, September 2011. Photo: Number 10, PA copyright (CC 2.0)

Britain’s Defence secretary Michael Fallon said in February that the Russian Leader Vladimir Putin presented as much of a threat to Europe as ISIS[i]. It seems strange that to assert the seriousness of the threat from Russia – a major nuclear-armed power in Europe – Fallon had to compare it to a rebellion on another continent. Fallon was suggesting that people were seriously underestimating Russia’s power and misunderstanding its nature.

This is suggestive of both how the crisis in Ukraine arose and why our reaction to it has been so muted. The House of Lords said as much in a new report, stating that Britain, NATO and the EU had “sleepwalked” into the crisis with Russia in the Ukraine. Britain (as well as NATO and the EU) has consistently misread Russia’s perceptions and actions, and even now they seem confused over how to react to the Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine and the subsequent confrontation.

Fallon’s comparison of Russia to ISIS reflects the relatively minor attention this war in Europe has received in Britain. With the exception of the downing of MH17, the Ukraine conflict has generally garnered less media or public attention than ISIS or the threat of terrorism at home. Parliament has debated the subject several times but action has been limited to sanctions in line with the US and EU, sending one company of non-combat troops and a large amount of high-flying but ultimately hollow rhetoric.

Why the lack of interest?

The reason for this seems to be that Britain has had more immediate problems. It is easy to forget that seven months ago Britain came close to splitting up, which would have thrown the government, economy and military of Britain into uncertainty and crisis. Thus, for most of 2014, while the Ukraine crisis blew up into civil war, Britain was not sure if it would make it to Christmas in one piece (it did, unlike Ukraine). Britain could hardly commit to radical sanctions or military pressure when it was not sure if its treasury and armed forces would be split with an independent Scotland.

The haunting figure of the Londoner “Jihadi John” personifying the “Islamic State” (IS) on our TV screens hooked our attention and dominated debate. Horror reminiscent of the dark ages in a country we recently invaded, with large numbers of our (erstwhile) countrymen running enthusiastically to join in was hard to ignore. IS has not only stolen the headlines with its sweeping conquests and brutal TV executions, but it has provoked a serious debate about the role of extremism within the West. Radical Islam seems to be a brutal and terrifying enemy that is hard to understand and is at work amongst us, an impression fuelled by the Charlie Hebdo and Copenhagen attacks.

Finally, in the face of economic crisis, potential dissolution and domestic terrorism, Britain’s public has become reluctant to sanction actions abroad and the government has been duly circumscribed. The 2013 defeat in Parliament of David Cameron’s proposed intervention in Syria has made government reluctant to commit forces abroad; indeed, we have fewer aircraft fighting IS than Denmark. This all suggests that Britain’s government is preoccupied and its people unwilling to act.

Britain is involved, whether we like it or not.

With all of these distractions and weaknesses, perhaps conflict in Ukraine is a troublesome irrelevance. But Britain is involved, whether we like it or not. Britain is an EU and NATO member state, both of which are being challenged by Russia. Even without NATO and the EU, we are one of the three guarantors of the Budapest Agreement of 1994, which promised Ukrainian sovereignty would be inviolate in return for abandoning the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the USSR.

The UK supported NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, with seemingly little consideration of what the implications would be. NATO expansion brought with it Article V of the NATO treaty, meaning that an attack on one state is an attack on all. Britain is therefore bound by treaty to defend the states of Eastern Europe as much as it is bound to defend the Falklands. Russia’s consistent and vocal opposition to this expansion should not have left us under any illusions about what might happen. The states of Eastern Europe that joined NATO expected the protection of NATO’s Article V, because they did not want to be treated like Ukraine. Despite seeking and accepting these numerous responsibilities, we seem surprised that they should cost us anything. Sleepwalking is an apt description.

In terms of concrete action, Britain has joined EU sanctions against Russian banks, energy and defence companies, although the government policy states it has merely left its economic relations with Russia “under review”[ii]. British troops help form the NATO Rapid Reaction Corps, which has drilled in Poland and the Baltic states, while the RAF and the Royal Navy intercept Russian ships and jets near the UK.

Britain did unilaterally send 75 troops to Ukraine to help train the government forces, a move that no other EU states matched. But this was a gesture, nothing more, as it was too late to affect the training standards of troops already engaged in combat and the ceasefire of February has effectively created a frozen conflict already.

These lacklustre actions mean that at home and abroad we are perceived to lack the will to act. A growing chorus of generals, politicians and journalists are drawing attention to our underwhelming reaction. Generals are using the menace of Russia as an argument to stop or reverse defence cuts. So far in this election campaign, none of the UK’s main parties have pledged to maintain the commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence required of NATO states. This has drawn warnings from our American allies and will not have been missed in Moscow.

The Prime Minister was notably absent from the Minsk talks and has generally allowed Angela Merkel and Obama to lead the Western diplomatic efforts. Politicians have talked tough on Russia but musings about cutting Russia off from the SWIFT banking mechanism were quickly silenced by Medvedev’s claim that this would be an act of war. Russia has achieved escalation dominance and they are prepared to do more in Ukraine than we or our allies are prepared to do to prevent them.

The implications of sleepwalking.

The implications of this are considerable. Our actions here will affect our interests globally. First, Russia has redrawn European borders at gunpoint, a move that we have not prevented (although NATO also did this in Kosovo in 2008). The fact that the UK was unable to prevent the violation of the Budapest Agreement means that our ability to uphold our obligations will be called into doubt. This will mean our enemies show less respect for our interests or those of our allies. Our allies will view the UK as a less credible ally and think twice before admitting us to the negotiating table. If Russia feels emboldened by our weakness and NATO is indeed undermined by Russian actions, the security of the UK will be undermined because the reliability of NATO as a pillar of UK security will vanish.

The second issue is nuclear weapons. As Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons based on the promise of the protection of its sovereignty in 1994, what message does that send to Iran, North Korea and other would-be nuclear powers? Arguably it shows them that a nuclear weapon is more necessary than ever, that their sovereignty can be violated without it. This impression was exacerbated by the US-led invasion of Iraq. Powers like Israel and Pakistan are nuclear states that, despite many threats, remain intact; while non-nuclear Ukraine and Iraq have both suffered invasion. The logic behind nuclear non-proliferation will be irrevocably damaged.

What can the UK do?

It is easy to highlight problems and not proffer solutions, and clearly the UK has made some efforts in Ukraine which other states have not. It is extremely unlikely the UK would ever fight a war over Ukraine, whatever its treaty obligations. But what can the UK do?

First, the crisis in the Ukraine has taught us that we need to think carefully about taking on burdens we cannot support, specifically in terms of the implications of signing up to treaties and expanding alliances. Renewing our commitment to spending 2% of GDP on Defence would improve the means to act and signal to the rest of the world that we are not shirking our responsibilities.

Second, we should play Russia at its own game. Since Russia has violated the Budapest accords by invading Ukraine, we could, in turn, stop adhering to the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997. This Act stated that there would be no permanent NATO bases in Eastern Europe, only temporary deployments. Estonia’s president has called for NATO troops to remain in Eastern Europe on more long term deployments in violation of the act. By stationing troops in Eastern Europe for as long as Russia is in Ukraine, the UK and NATO would show that they are prepared to support and honour their obligations to their allies and that Russia would not be able to hide behind treaties if it was itself reluctant to honour them.

Whatever the wisdom or morality of NATO and EU expansion, and whether or not we have provoked Russia, the damage to UK-Russia relations is done and Russia cannot be appeased. We are now bound to support our allies. We cannot salvage our failure to keep to the terms of the Budapest Agreement by withdrawing from Eastern Europe, acknowledging a Russian sphere of influence and thereby forsaking our NATO responsibilities.

The world is shaped by powers that act. If we don’t, it will be shaped by someone else, quite probably to our detriment.

Michael Jones has a BA in History from the University of Oxford. He is currently reading for an MA in War Studies at King’s College London. His particular areas of interest include modern Russia and great power rivalry.

This article is part of a Strife series entitled ‘Russia and the World following Ukraine’. Over the next couple of weeks Strife will feature three more articles about the global reaction to the crisis in the Ukraine. Next, Conradin Weindl will look into the relationship between the European Union and Russia in the wake of the war in Ukraine. Then Andrzej Kozłowski will analyse Poland’s approach to the crisis and the implications for Polish security. Finally, Sebastian Åsberg, will examine the debate regarding NATO membership in neutral Sweden and Finland, which has intensified significantly as a result of the war in Ukraine.

NOTES

[i] I Magazine pp.4 20/02/2015

[ii] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/doing-business-in-russia-and-ukraine-sanctions-latest

Russia and the World following Ukraine: A Strife 4-part series

by

By Sebastian Åsberg:

Ukrainean tanks taking up positions in the city of Slovyansk, eastern Ukraine, July 2014. Photo: Sasha Maksymenko (CC 2.0)

“At last, Russia has returned to the world arena as a strong state - a country that others heed and that can stand up for itself” - Russian President Vladimir Putin, 2008.

While the overall strength of the Russian state, especially in the long-term, is still a subject of debate, Russia has increasingly become a power the international community must take not of once again. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 following the end of the Cold War, Russia suffered significant economic and social hardship and a loss of power as a result. The president of Russia at the time, Boris Yeltsin, was more mocked than respected.

When Vladimir Putin took office in 1999, he resolved to improve Russia’s stature in the world. Helped by a commodity boom, the country’s economy and standard of living improved notably during his time in office.[i] With material conditions in the country improved, the Russian leadership grew increasingly assertive in its regional sphere of interest, abandoning the earlier path of accommodation with the West. Richard Sakwa, professor of Russian and European politics at the University of Kent, argues that this turn towards what he calls “neo-revisionism” came at around 2007. By this time Putin had become increasingly embolden by the country’s economic growth, while there was a heightened sense of rivalry with the EU and US over their growing influence in the states bordering Russia.[ii]

The current Ukraine crisis is the latest in a series of incidents that have led to deteriorating relations between Russia and the West. The Ukraine crisis was preceded by the wars in Chechnya in 1999-2000 and Georgia in August 2008. The Chechnya campaign was perceived as being heavy-handed, exemplified by the carpet bombing of Grozny[iii], and it has been argued that Russia deliberately provoked the Georgia conflict.[iv]

International dismay has also accompanied Russia’s backing of the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in the country’s ongoing civil war in order to protect Russian naval installations in the country.[v]

Finally, domestic policies pursued by the Kremlin, such as discriminatory laws against homosexuals and a perception that the Russian state is cracking down on dissent and opposition, has also contributed to worsening relations between Russia and significant parts of the international community.

However, the Ukraine crisis can still be been seen as a major turning point. Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014 and its subsequent support for the Russian separatists in the Donbass region shocked large parts of the international community.

The Russian takeover of Crimea was the first annexation of another European state’s territory since the Second World War. It was met with accusations that Russia was breaking one of the most basic principles of the post-war international order - the sanctity of borders - by trying to redraw the map through force. The subsequent war in eastern Ukraine, a conflict which has killed an estimated 6000 people,[vi] where pro-Russian separatists have been aided by Russia, has provoked even further indignation in capitals across the world. Russia is seen as conducting a war of aggression by proxy. The downing of flight MH17 by the separatists, killing 298 people, added to the outrage as the conflict began to directly affect Western citizens. Comprehensive sanctions were imposed against Russia, and the United States even contemplated supplying Ukraine with arms before the Minsk II ceasefire in February.

The Ukraine crisis can arguably be viewed as sounding the death knell for the belief that Russia could be harmoniously integrated into a Western system following the end of the Cold War, like other post-communist countries in Eastern Europe.

Much has been written about the situation in Crimea and about the battlefields of eastern Ukraine, but what will be the geopolitical and diplomatic consequences of the Ukraine crisis?

Despite having declined in importance since the days of the Soviet Union, Russia remains a power of significance on the world stage. It still has a substantial population (140 million) and economy (the ninth-largest in the world) and retains close trade and diplomatic relations with other major actors. For example, it is the EU’s third-largest trading partner and many European countries rely on Russia for their gas supplies. It retains a large degree of influence in several areas of the world, in particular what is referred to as Russia’s “near-abroad”, the former republics of the USSR.

Given this, how is Russia’s relations with other states being affected by its perceived aggression in its neighbourhood and increasing revanchism? How are neighbouring states reacting to Russia’s conduct?

Over the coming weeks, Strife will examine how relations between Russia and various countries and international organisation are being affected and how they are approaching the Ukraine crisis, as well as looking at the possible geopolitical fallout of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Mike Jones will discuss Britain’s handling of the crisis and why the Ukraine crisis has not received more attention in the UK. Conradin Weindl will look into the relationship between the European Union and Russia in the wake of the war in Ukraine. Andrzej Kozłowski will analyse Poland’s approach to the crisis and the implications for Polish security. Finally, Sebastian Åsberg, will examine the debate regarding NATO membership in neutral Sweden and Finland, which has intensified significantly as a result of the war in Ukraine.

An increasingly assertive and antagonistic Russia, with its military of 800,000 personnel and vast nuclear weapons stockpile, has been described as one of the biggest challenges facing the world today.[vii] [viii] In this four-part series Strife hopes to provide a deeper understanding of how key countries and regions are reacting to this challenge.

Sebastian Åsberg holds a BA in International Relations from Malmö University, Sweden, and is currently reading for an MA in War Studies at King’s College London. His main interests include European security and defence policy, security cooperation within the EU and NATO, and the transatlantic partnership, as well as in Russia’s foreign policy in the region and beyond.

NATO

[i] Thornhill, John “Vladimir Putin and his tsar quality”, Financial Times, 6 February 2015

[ii] Sakwa, Richard, Frontline Ukraine – Crisis in the Borderlands, I.B. Tauris, 2015, p.30-32

[iii] Human Rights Watch, “War Crimes In Chechnya and the Response of the West”, http://www.hrw.org/news/2000/02/29/war-crimes-chechnya-and-response-west

[iv] Georgia began war with Russia, but it was provoked, inquiry finds, The Independent, 1 October 2009

[v] Fisher, Max “The four reasons Russia won’t give up Syria, no matter what Obama does”, Washington Post, 5 September 2013

[vi] United Nations, “Death toll in eastern Ukraine crosses 6,000, Zeid says, as UN releases new report”, 2 March 2015

[vii] Rachman, Gideon “Russia is a bigger problem than Isis for Obama” Financial Times, 10 November 2014

[viii] The Telegraph, “What is the biggest threat facing the world today?”, 17 April 2015

Debunking pro-Russian propaganda on the web

by

By Malyuta Skuratov:

Putin riding a horse. Photo: Jedimentat44 (CC 2.0)

“The real weapon was not the rifle but the megaphone. Being unable to kill your enemy you shouted at him instead.” – George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia

***

Conspiracy theorists of the world, unite! Scraping the bottom of the barrel, Russia has finally managed to re-establish herself as an ideological centre of gravity. Putin’s friends range from various far right movements to the anti-capitalist left. This transversal and bizarre coalition includes anyone who blames Western liberal democracy and the United States for all sorts of misdemeanours, like the emergence of ISIL in the Middle East. Russia is viewed as the last bastion that upholds unspecified “traditional values”, the rise of Russia as an alternative to the current world order. Basically, anyone who blames the Great Satan (USA) for anything that is wrong with the world is welcomed as a member of this club.

The enemies of Western liberal democracy have found an unlikely ally in the internet and social media. When used in the context of a free society, these new media are a powerful instrument of democratisation. Yet they are particularly vulnerable to the manipulation of undemocratic entities. We live in a Kafkaesque scenario, where the government of a semi-despotic country distorts reality by turning against us the very instruments of information that are the lifeblood of any liberal society, threatening checkmate on democracy. What is most worrying is that some of the most vocal backers of the Kremlin’s policies are found in the West.

Axis Sally and Tokyo Rose have reincarnated in the English-speaking presenters of Russia Today, the overseas television network that broadcasts the Kremlin’s point of view to the West. RT mixes news reporting with interviews and talk-shows that give space to those Western pundits that are particularly critical towards “Western hegemony”. Just as it was during the Cold War, a major theme broadcasted is racial inequality in the US, which is supposed to expose the alleged corrosion of the Western social fabric. Other classics include the above-mentioned American sponsoring of ISIL and police brutality in the US. Then there is the Ukrainian chapter. According to pro-Russian propaganda, there is absolutely no doubt that what happened in Kiev is nothing short of a neo-Nazi coup d’état.

The issue is not confined to RT. Sputnik, a Kremlin-sponsored news agency, even managed to imply American responsibility for the killing of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov. Sputnik stated that the murder could have been an attempt to fuel Western hostility against Russia or against Putin himself (a thin difference in the current state of things, it must be noted).

Then there is Russia Beyond the Headlines (RBTH), a website connected to Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the official newspaper of the Russian government. RBTH regularly features articles that are critical (or semi-critical) towards the Russian government, therefore presenting itself as an independent information resource. In this way, it can easily publish articles that try to disprove Amnesty International’s reports on Crimea. It is the mixture of reality and deceit that gives the Kremlin such a powerful weapon. Propaganda that incorporates counter-propaganda is sociological dynamite.

In a recently published book, Peter Pomerantsev exposes the control of the Russian government over the country’s television networks, and the impact this has on Russian society. We are now seeing the next step of that process, with the attempt to influence the Western public as well. In this phase, a new element is the prominence of internet-based propaganda. From pro-Russian trolling in the comments section of the Guardian’s website to elaborate videos that portray a bare-chested Putin riding a laser-eyed bear, the English-speaking internet is being injected with heavy doses of pro-Russian disinformation. The situation is worse in central Europe, where former communist bloc states are particularly susceptible towards Russian propaganda because of historic and economic ties.

Russian agit-prop represents a considerable threat for European security, so much so that some European countries have decided to increase their engagement with public information. But this is hardly going to be enough. Russian-financed media offer an alluring counter-narrative to the reality of a dissatisfied Western public prone to buy into easy explanations.

While independent journalist struggle to make a living, pro-Russian trolls are paid handsomely for their services. It is therefore unsurprising that the latter prosper in the current state of things. Russia must recognise that this is as detrimental for the West as it is for her. However, what is most dangerous is not this clique of professional propagandists, but the silent mass of those that further their message. Some do it artfully, others are naively conquered by the pro-Russian narrative. They all end up supporting a system that threatens the very foundations of our society.

A response at the institutional level is undoubtedly needed, and some steps have already been made in this direction. Civil society can do its part by debunking the fabrications of pro-Russian advocates. The weaponisation of information is an essential part of Russian hybrid warfare, and only an integrated approach can counter it.

Malta Skuratov is the pseudonym of a Doctoral candidate King’s College London.

The author would like to thank the government of the Russian Federation and its associates for kindly providing the material this article is based on.

Latvia: what the Russians left behind

by

By Leyla Aliyeva:

A sign in Latvia
A street sign in both the Latvian and Russian languages. Photo by Arseny Samsonov.

Latvia’s history is marked by occupation. Since the 15th century the territory has been controlled by Sweden, Poland, Germany and Russia. It declared independence from Russia in 1918, but was reincorporated into what was then the Soviet Union as a bulwark against Nazi Germany in the early days of the Second World War. The Nazis invaded the fledgling country in 1941, only to be pushed out by the Soviets three years later. It wasn’t until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 that Latvia could once again proclaim itself an independent state.

Yesterday was Latvian Legion Day, celebrating the day when the Latvian Legion, serving as part of the Nazi Waffen SS, repelled the Soviets in 1944. The commemoration saw Latvian Waffen SS veterans parade through the streets of Riga. This event faces a lot of criticism from Russia and from the international community for honouring Nazism and insulting the victims of its regime. But the Latvian Legion veterans say that they were fighting for Latvia’s freedom from the occupying Soviet power.

In a couple of months, on 9 May, Victory Day in Russia we will also see processions. Russians everywhere, including the substantial ethnic Russian minority living in Latvia, celebrate the end of the WWII on this particular day. Yet for ethnic Latvians, 9 May signifies the start of Soviet rule. These examples show the conflicted relationship that Latvia has with its powerful neighbour Russia. Recent events in Crimea and Ukraine have caused panic in the Latvian media and in political circles, with the government attempting to cut Latvia’s heavy economic dependence on the Russian market by imposing sanctions. This has led to widespread criticism from the Russian side.

Latvia is important because over a quarter of the 2.1 million people living in the country consider Russian to be their mother tongue and have an identity linked to Russia. The events in Ukraine have provoked emotional reactions within Latvian society. Some ethnic Russian representatives feel that minority issues have become more difficult to discuss in this climate.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 25 million Russians[1] remained in the former USSR territories, such as Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, the Baltic States and more. Other Russian-speaking or ‘russophone’ nationalities also remained. As a result, the Russian-speaking population in Latvia today is its largest linguistic minority. However, the historical background of the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia has its origins beyond the period of the USSR.

Russia ruled Latvia in two different periods: with the Russian Empire from the 17th century until 1919; then during the Soviet Union from the end of WWII until 1991. The different regimes facilitated a lot of development and growth in the country: Latvia was one of the top manufacturing and transit countries in both the USSR and the Russian Empire. However, both periods were characterised by ‘russification’ (sometimes known as obrusenie) which focused on enforcing Russian culture in controlled territories and did not allow for a high level of multiculturalism. The proclamation of independence in 1918 had a dramatic impact on Latvian national identity formation, even though the independence lasted for only 22 years.

But Russia was not the only ruling power in Latvia. The control of Latvian territory has shifted from one power to another since the 15th century. Germany, Sweden and the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth competed with each other to acquire the best chunk of Latvian land. These events led to the development of Latvian culture and the creation of the Latvian language. However, it came with a price. The ruling foreign-backed minority became the ruling elite in Latvia, and they put the ethnic Latvian majority into serfdom. These historical events served as a major factor in Latvian identity formation.

In 1991 Latvia restored its independence for the second time after almost 50 years of Soviet rule. Demonstrations by both Latvians and ethnic Russians to exit the Soviet Union had great significance. The 3 March advisory referendum showed that 75% of the total Latvian population strongly supported Latvian independence, which included a large part of the Russian-speaking population. But, unfortunately, the exit from the Soviet Union resulted in a cultural divide between ethnic Latvians and the post-USSR Russian-speaking residents.

This was partly due to Latvia restoring its pre-war citizenship legislation, a policy also followed in the neighbouring country of Estonia. According to the legislation, citizenship for the newly independent state of Latvia was granted to those people and their descendants who held Latvian citizenship in the pre-war period. Citizens of the former Soviet Union and their children rarely qualified for the automatic new citizenship, and thus had to undergo a process of naturalisation in order to get Latvian or Estonian citizenship. This procedure required individuals to demonstrate knowledge of the state constitution, history, national anthem, and pass exams, which tested their proficiency of the official language.

These measures resulted in a large part of the population becoming ‘stateless individuals’ or ‘aliens’, because they did not meet the high level of knowledge of the language, culture and history required for citizenship. Latvian and Estonian naturalisation requirements were repeatedly criticised by the international community as being too demanding and prejudicial. Several times authorities stated that there should be an emphasis placed on analysing the transparency and effectiveness of the work of the language inspectors.

The pattern is more visible in numbers: only 289,000 ethnic Russians have been able to acquire Latvian citizenship, leaving more than 500,000 without citizenship. Over time more former Soviet citizens have gained Latvian citizenship, although the official data in 2006 showed that Russian-speakers accounted for more than 66.5% of Latvia’s non-citizens.[2]

This ‘alien’ status excludes individuals from voting and participating, not only in local and national elections, but also in European elections (Latvia and Estonia became EU Member States in 2004). Such measures exclude Russian-speaking individuals from political affairs. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, former Soviet citizens also had to qualify to undergo the naturalisation procedure.[3] This created an issue, as an estimated 200,000 retired Soviet army officers, former KGB, Soviet Communist Party officials and their families (who were predominantly Russian or Russian-speaking) were excluded from acquiring Latvian citizenship.

The Latvian model of gaining citizenship should be contrasted with the third Baltic state: Lithuania. There a different path was followed. After the collapse of the Soviet Union Lithuania implemented the zero-option model of citizenship, which automatically granted Lithuanian citizenship to all permanent residents in the country, regardless of nationality, ethnicity, or knowledge of state language. But Lithuania’s different approach was understandable, the result of its larger indigenous population: the 1989 Soviet census demonstrates that Estonia and Latvia had a much lower share of titular population – 62% and 52% respectively - compared to Lithuania, of which 80% of the population were ethnic Lithuanians. Lithuania’s strategy did not put Lithuanian culture and language at risk because it had significantly lower number of Russian-speaking people in the country.

Language education laws in Latvia demonstrate the struggle to reinstate the Latvian language in its diverse population. In 2004 minority schools in Latvia were subject to new legislation, which proposed that minority schools should conduct 40% of its teaching for years 10 to 12 in Latvian; the other 60% could be in a minority language (i.e. Russian). The legislation initially required that only Latvian could be used to teach years 10 to 12, but was amended after protests and demonstrations by Russian-speaking minorities.

To this day Russian is not an official state language in Latvia, despite the significant number of Russian-speakers. In 2012 a Constitutional referendum took place in Latvia on whether to amend the constitution and add Russian as the second official language. Around 75% of voters said “no”. This result was expected, but it is interesting that the voter participation for this referendum was at an all-time high. This shows that cultural and linguistic concerns are amongst the most important issues in Latvia.

In terms of politics, in the 2011 Latvian elections the social-democratic party ‘Harmony Centre’ won the largest support from the voters, thereby gaining the majority of the seats in Saeima (Latvian Parliament). Harmony Centre is the only party with a focus on improving the conditions of the Russian-speaking minority. But despite its large support, the party has been excluded from the coalition government because of the suspicion that it is funded by the Russian authorities and represents pro-Russian interests.

Regardless of the fact that the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia have had a long history in the region[4], the recognition and integration of the Russian minority culture into Latvian social and political life has been inadequate. One could argue that this attitude is some sort of a ‘payback’ for all of Russia’s historic “wrongdoings”, or that it is motivated by the fear in Latvia of cultural and linguistic extinction of the titular nation. Whatever the case, these attitudes have led to prejudicial measures against ethnic Russians. Recent events in Crimea and Ukraine have only served to exacerbate the fears of ethnic Latvians. But continuing its prejudicial policies may encourage the Russian minority population in Latvia to turn towards Putin and his policy of ‘protecting’ Russians, wherever they might be.

Now it is essential to recognise the conflicted history between the ethnic Latvian and Russian populations in Latvia, but not be beholden to that history. Instead, we should focus on a careful implementation of the concept of national unity and the recognition of inter-ethnic relations, which may guide the Latvian population to a more integrated and interconnected society.

Leyla Aliyeva studied International Politics at Middlesex University and is currently an LLM student at the same university. Her particular focus is on post-USSR and Eastern European countries with a specific focus on human rights and minority rights. She also worked at the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre as an intern and worked on serious human rights violations in former Soviet states.

NOTES

[1] In this article I define Russians as those who either have ethnic, linguistic and cultural ties with Russia, because of the difficulty in identifying ethnic Russians after decades of mixed marriages and integration. The reasons for why someone is Russian-speaking is not important - be it due to the Rusification program or though cultural ties; what matters is that they identify themselves as Russian.

[2] Minority Rights Group, ‘World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous People : Latvia’ (minorityrightsgroup.org ) <http://www.minorityrights.org/4968/latvia/russians.html> accessed 13 January 2015

[3] Bridget Anderson, World Directory of Minorities (1st ed,Minority Rights Group International,1997) 226

[4] Minority Rights Group, ‘World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous People : Latvia’ (minorityrightsgroup.org ) <http://www.minorityrights.org/4968/latvia/russians.html> accessed 13 January 2015