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Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front and its Violence: Liberia’s Charles Taylor, Colonial Legacies, and Oppressive Rule

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by Edit Kruk

“The Slaughterhouse” where rebel civil war victims were butchered. Kailahun, eastern Sierra Leone, pictured on 23 April 2012 (Image credit: Reuters/Finbarr O’Reilly)

Proxy warfare and warlord politics in the African region, symptomatic of longstanding colonial legacies, play out in states that are on the brink of collapse and where the state leader, desperate to preserve a grasp on power, will privatise security in exchange for natural resources whilst neglecting other essential functions of the state. This article will argue that under the conditions of proxy warfare and warlord patronage, the Civil War that raged in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2002 can be linked to the figure of Charles Taylor, a Liberian warlord financed by the trade of illicit blood diamonds.

In March of 1991, a group of rebels known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) crossed the Liberian border and entered the Kailahun District in neighbouring Sierra Leone. This action initiated a civil war that lasted over a decade, displacing two million people. Its body count of 75,000 and another 20,000 mutilated renders it one of the most violent conflicts in history. As a force, the RUF specialised in the hacking of limbs and tongues, rape, and the wide use of child soldiers (with estimates of recruited children under the age of 14 being around 10,000). The faction was organised by Foday Sankoh, who met Taylor at an insurgency training camp in Libya. Both warlords shared a keen interest in Pan-Africanism—a movement that promoted a politically unified Africa and criticised the neo-colonial regime—which formed the backbone of the RUF’s ideology.

During the Sierra Leone Civil War, Sankoh received resources, arms and troops from Taylor in return for a physical extension to the Liberian Civil War (1989-96). Even though Charles Taylor was most commonly known for initiating the first Liberian Civil War in an attempt to liberate the state from the fraudulent and corrupt government of Samuel Doe, the connection between Taylor and the Sierra Leone Civil War was indisputable. The warlord’s interest in the region was as early as the 1980s as indicated by his request to Joseph Momoh (President of Sierra Leone during 1985-1992) to use Sierra Leone as a launchpad for his rebellion, but Momoh refused. Taylor’s warlordism solidified as a result of Momoh harbouring Nigerian forces (ECOMOG) that intervened in Liberia in 1990 and in so doing posed a direct challenge to Taylor’s control of the region. Therefore, through the provision of leadership and weapons to the RUF, Taylor crafted the neighbouring state’s instability to his advantage, effectively making it his proxy.

These signposts of Taylor’s influence with the RUF are due an analysis, paying special attention to the ways it shaped strategical decisions and terror tactics. Whilst Taylor was never in effective command of the RUF he was found guilty for the sponsorship of the faction and by default the abetting of the rebellion. However, between 1992-96, the RUF was forced to retreat into the bush and turn to guerrilla warfare, thereby increasing their use of terror to compensate for their lack of adequate equipment. The decline of the faction’s military sophistication came as a result of Taylor no longer sending sufficient resources, a result of a revolt in Liberia which blocked the RUF’s main feeding line. Whilst there was a sufficient link between Taylor and the RUF during the conflict, a deeper structural crisis was already harbouring further violence. This article will study this development through the analysis of the socio-political environment as a product of colonialism and an oppressive regime.

Colonial Legacies

The violent behaviour of Sierra Leone’s rebels becomes less reprehensible when perceived as a means of rebellion against years of colonial rule, rather than a tool of proxy warfare. In 1787, Sierra Leone was established as a settlement for freed slaves and by 1896 it was proclaimed a British protectorate. Creole people, upon their arrival, dominated the civil service employment sector which forced the indigenous population to the periphery of the state, creating the blueprint for a two-class society. The colonial suzerainty of the state can be criticised for embedding a weak bureaucracy and neglecting the local dynamics which divided Sierra Leone into chiefdoms, thereby decentralising the state and fuelling inter-ethnic rivalry by elevating the status of freed slaves above the Temne and Mendi people which made up sixty per cent of the local population. Unsurprisingly, the resulting two-class society and a raging welfare gap were carried into the post-independence period and, thus, an environment predisposed to patrimonialism emerged. Marginalisation and subsequent frustration amongst the youth of Sierra Leone manifested as hypo-aggressive tactics and was symptomatic of colonial legacies.

The feeling of hopelessness that accompanied the youth living in the harsh environment of Sierra Leone was tactically encouraged to manifest as acts of aggression by the RUF leadership. Indeed, the youths’ ideological barrenness when coupled with RUF leaders taking advantage of their lack of knowledge, through the spread of disinformation, was able to fuel drug use, removing their ability to consent, and, ultimately, dehumanising them. Moreover, the extreme violence deployed by the RUF was, in fact, a reflection of a deeper structural crisis of youth and modernity which were facilitated by the removal of Cold War constraints. Subsequently, whilst Taylor’s link to RUF attributes for some of the violent behaviour, colonial grievances set the conditions for the successful appropriation of long-standing local frustrations by warlords, to fulfil their agenda, and thereby create proxies. The Sierra Leonean rebel faction was able to augment considerable support from areas that failed to be emancipated from domestic slavery, itself remnants from the project of decolonisation. However, whilst historical grievances enabled mobilisation, they also proved unsustainable as the violence grew more acute and made the faction an unpopular one.

Oppressive Rule

Siaka Probyn Stevens, leading Sierre Leone from 1967 to 1985, oversaw a regime of aggressive policing that propelled frustration amongst the marginalised population and consequent outbursts of violence. By 1978, Stevens and his All People’s Congress (APC) were able to consolidate one-party rule, that resembled a dictatorship characterised by brutality and totalitarianism. In particular, Stevens closed railway networks that connected the North and the South East of the country in an attempt to prevent civilians from voting against the APC and passed the Killer Bill in 1980 which removed all media outlets other than those that were state-owned. These draconian measures granted Stevens control of the political discourse. Due to the historical context, patrimonialism thrived and Stevens’ rule was defined by a disparity in the dissemination of scarce resources, nepotism, and the subsequent rise of a shadow state.

Resentment towards the oppressive government quickly resulted in the formation of an insurgent people’s army, which exponentially garnered support through its critique of the neo-colonial regime, promising a coup, and the subsequent return to a multiparty democracy. Whilst this argument is convincing in its attribution of the violence committed by the RUF, as a response to the oppressive rule, the same rationale does not account for 9 to 10-year-old children being victims of revenge. For this reason, it is essential to view colonial history, the political context, and potential actors as inseparable and as enabling each other, when attempting to analyse the roots of violence in the Sierra Leonean conflict. Nonetheless, an oppressive regime was a trigger for civilians and radical students to initiate a rebellion in which violence was treated as a vehicle of change. Means of terror have been commonly known to be a response to the collapse of patrimonialism, and symptomatic of new barbarism, both key features of an insurgent movement.

To conclude, Charles Taylor successfully instrumentalised the neighbouring conflict into proxy warfare, thereby perpetuating the Sierra Leonean conflict, while physically extending the Liberian domain. Taylor did not intend to carry the RUF to victory, as the cessation of a stronger connection in 1992 proves. Meanwhile, the violence did not discontinue. Colonial grievances ensured widespread fragmentation and a sense of hopelessness while oppression fostered a desire for change and revenge which ultimately came to fruition in the form of terror, a means of achieving the rebel’s goals. Sierra Leone resembled a microcosm of the conflict that pervaded the rest of the continent, indicating a need to draw stronger parallels between African states for a better understanding of eruptions of violence in the region.

Edit Kruk is a final year (BA) War Studies student with a keen interest in modern slavery and the African region. Narratives through art and the history of early modern Imperial Spain, have been life-long areas of fascination.

Book review: ‘Making Sense of Proxy Wars: States, Surrogates & the Use of Force’ by Michael A. Innes

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Reviewed by: Lauren Dickey

Michael A. Innes (ed.), Making Sense of Proxy Wars: States, Surrogates & the Use of Force (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012).

making-sense-of-proxy-wars

A Futile Attempt to Make Sense of Proxy Wars

At the end of the Cold War, and especially in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the study of war gradually shifted from a realist-dominated, state-centric discourse to emphasise instead the role of non-state actors and asymmetric dynamics in conflict. The ‘old wars’ were increasingly being replaced with arguments in favour of a new sort of warfare, with explanations pointing to ‘new’ or different motivating factors, support (state versus non-state), and/or forms of violence.[1] Despite this shift, a crucial gap in the literature on war persists: proxy warfare.

Michael A. Innes edited a volume which boldly sets out to ‘make sense’ of proxy wars, poising the text to make an important and timely contribution to the history of conflict itself. Once seen as superpower-induced wars fought on the soil of a third party, proxy wars have since appeared to be shaped instead by regional powers and the cross-border dispersion of armed groups. The growth of proxy warfare is a direct threat to state sovereignty, and a challenge made even more real through the growth of robotics and cyber technologies that enable an inclusion of non-state actors on the battlefield. Proxy warfare is thus a highly fluid concept; it is undefined insofar as there is much about it that remains unknown.

The most significant shortcoming of Innes’ edited volume rings clear within its attempt to lay the groundwork for the contributions of other scholars. Nowhere in the text is ‘proxy war’ explicitly defined. Each successive chapter evades the very concept this book endeavours to parse apart. A brief preface is offered in place of a literature review, as it seems in Innes’ attempt to address the complexities of proxy war, he opted for a brief analysis of the text’s central concept. However, in choosing to omit this critical component, the volume skirts around explanations of why the text should be taken as more than a disjointed compilation of case studies.

Each of the case studies offered by the eight contributing authors is informative when examined on their own. The first chapter, places the concept of proxy warfare at the beginning and end of the analysis with a stated intention of explaining why terrorism creates space and opportunity for proxy wars. Yet the chapter never details how a proxy relationship can come into being; nor does it devote any space to explaining the structure of a proxy conflict, the benefactor, proxy agent, and target agent.

The following chapters offer rich case studies, but little conceptual clarity on the role of non-state actors in proxy warfare. The second chapter on the IRA’s proxy bomb campaign of 1990 challenges basic assumptions about suicide bombing, arguing that scholars and analysts alike should question the intent of the action, rather than assuming such attacks are always acts of martyrdom. The authors believe that the IRA’s main purpose in shifting to proxy bomb operations was to shift tactics and ‘teach British security forces a lesson they would not soon forget.’[2] But public opinion ultimately checked the growth of the IRA’s proxy tactics, angering the community and ultimately weakening the overall legitimacy of the IRA’s struggle.

Chapters three and four offer respective interpretations of proxies in historical context, each drawing comparisons to US counterinsurgencies in Iraq or Afghanistan. Both argue, in one form or another, that the mistakes of the past can be lessons for the US and its coalition partners in the present; yet, both simultaneously fail to recognize the unpredictability of current events and the often subjective interpretations of history. The only true lesson to be garnered from history is that no two wars – not to mention proxy conflicts – are cloned images.

Chapter five makes the closest attempt to anything that has ‘made sense’ of proxy warfare in the volume. Proxyization is traced briefly from classical times when rulers preferred to hire trusted foreigners as mercenaries through to present-day use of private military and security companies (PMSCs). A case is made to assess the activities and services of PMSCs to ascertain what policy and governance mechanisms should be implemented, but does not move its policy recommendations any further. The final chapter is adopted from a RAND report on Shell’s activities as a ‘proxy’ in the oil-rich Nigerian Delta, tactics of both hard and soft security that enable it to maintain its profit margins, but still do not ‘sway the operating environment in the Delta.’[3] The singular study of Shell as a multi-national corporation (MNC) proxy highlights the role of non-state actors stepping in to provide public goods in areas where the government is largely absent, thereby removing some of the sovereign authority of the state.

The case studies within this edited volume unfortunately equivocate proxy strategy with proxy tactics, failing to acknowledge important differences therein.[4] It further neglects an acknowledgement that proxy warfare describes a specific mannerism involving the interaction between benefactor, proxy agent, and target agent. The manuscript was framed by the need to more actively and accurately account for non-state proxies in counterinsurgency and war alike. But in failing to paint a clear picture of what proxy warfare actually entails, there is little meat on the bones of the book. The in-depth case studies make for a compelling read, but its approach to the phenomenon of proxy warfare is lacklustre at best; and, ultimately, the Innes volume falls far short of its attempts to ‘make sense’ of this contemporary facet of warfare.

 

 

Lauren Dickey is a PhD student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and the Political Science Department at the National University of Singapore. Her research focuses on Chinese strategy toward Taiwan in the Xi Jinping era. She is a member of the Pacific Forum Young Leaders program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] See the notable work of Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 3rd ed. (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2013).

[2] Bloom and Horgan, ‘Missing Their Mark: The IRA’s Proxy Bomb Campaign,’ in Innes (ed.), pp. 49.

[3] Rosenau and Chalk, ‘Multinational Corporations: Potential Proxies for Counterinsurgency?,’ in Innes (ed.), pp. 149.

[4] Akin to the mistake of employing strategy as a synonym for strategy. On this point, see, e.g., Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013), pp. 11-14.

A ‘Second Hezbollah’: The strategic value of Iran’s proxy warfare policy in Syria

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By: Robert Andrea

Sardar_Qasem_Soleimani-01
Qassem Suleimani - commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force. Source: Wikimedia

Throughout the past thirty years, Iran has arguably been the world’s foremost expert in the use of so-called ‘proxy’ warfare as a tool of statecraft. Whether in Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, or Iraq, Tehran has displayed a degree of discipline about its use of ‘proxy’ sponsorship hitherto unmatched by few, if any, other states. Furthermore, Iran seems to have learned, far better than anyone else, that proxy warfare is most strategically valuable when used as a tactic of statecraft and not as a general foreign policy strategy.

And now today, the utilization of this tactical-strategic relationship between ‘proxy warfare’ and macro-level foreign policy by Iran is once again on display- this time in Syria.

Iran in Syria

As of this writing, the fifth year of the Syrian Civil War is now nearly a month old. With casualty figures approaching 500,000, a tenuous ceasefire is seemingly near to a collapse and portending a fresh round of fighting. And with seemingly no party with the capability to secure a victory on the battlefield, all signs point to both a military, and a diplomatic stalemate.

However, by replicating a strategy of ‘proxy warfare’ it has used in the past, Iran seems to have positioned itself better than any other actor. It is thanks to this strategy that Tehran will likely be able to emerge from any kind of endgame in Syria with their strategic interests in the region intact.

Generally, the narrative holds that Iran’s interests in the Syrian Civil War are tied directly to the survival of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.[1] The Iranians themselves, at least publicly, seem to have confirmed this. In a December 2015 statement, Ali Akbar Velayati (top foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei) reaffirmed that the fate of Assad was a ‘red line’ for Iran. This seems to indicate that any diplomatic solution to the war in Syria would, from the Iranian perspective, be assessed as a zero-sum appraisal.

In other words, if Assad stays, Iran ‘wins’, but if he were to be forced out, the general consensus would be that Iran would ‘lose’.

Regarding the long term fate of Assad, Brett McGurk (U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL), said in a March interview, ‘there is no way conceivable that Assad’s writ will ever extend throughout the country again. It’s just not realistic after everything that’s happened’. If this is assumed to be true, the prevailing assumptions would also suggest that it’s no more realistic that Iran will be able to secure its foreign policy goals in Syria.

Unfortunately, this narrative overlooks the more long-term geopolitical goal that Iran has in Syria.

The Beirut-Damascus highway

Masked with rhetoric about protecting Shi’a shrines and fighting terrorism, the reason Iran has been so invested in the survival of Assad is that, until now, he has been the guarantor of Iran’s supply lines, through Syria, to Hezbollah in Lebanon.[2] With its ally Hezbollah being the only real apparatus (in the absence of Assad) with which Iran is able to project power in the Levant (particularly via-à-vis Israel), the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran is, by any metric, much more vital to Tehran’s long-term foreign policy in the region than is their relationship with Bashar al-Assad. It is therefore incorrect to assess Iran’s success or failure in Syria relative to the survival of Assad. Rather, ‘success’ on a strategic level for Iran in Syria ultimately depends on whether or not the supply conduit to Hezbollah is maintained.

To that end and through the use of ‘proxy’ by armed organizations, Iran has provided itself with a strategic fallback for their long-term interest in the Levant. This fallback retains its strategic value for the Iranians even if Assad and/or his regime were to be removed from power, either militarily or as part of a diplomatic agreement.

A ‘Second Hezbollah’

This fallback revolves around the creation of pro-Assad and, more importantly for this discussion, pro-Tehran militias. These militias, a myriad of whom exist, each go by different names and are based in different regions of Syria. Often (for brevity’s sake), these militias are collectively referred to as the National Defense Forces (NDF) and are estimated to have a combined strength of anywhere between 100,000-120,000 fighters.[3] It’s not always clear to whom these militias report, Assad or their Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) sponsors, but it is clear that they have been instrumental in bolstering/supporting Syrian government forces.[4] These paramilitary militias, as well as the IRGC and Hezbollah, have been critical to the preservation of the SAA due to the latter’s struggle with attrition and reliability.[5]

This proxy warfare policy replicates a previous Iranian policy used, beginning with Hezbollah in 1982-83, throughout the past three decades. The comparison of the NDF to Hezbollah is not an idle one. IRGC general Hossein Hamedani (since killed in Syria) was reported to have said in 2014 that Iran had created a ‘second Hezbollah’ in Syria.[6]

Although many factions of the NDF are multi-ethnic and cross-sectarian, some of them are comprised of only Allawi and/or Shi’a fighters, from inside or outside Syria. The amalgamation of militias that comprise this ‘second Hezbollah’ do, in fact, bear striking organizational and ideological resemblances to Hezbollah in Lebanon and many of the Shi’a militias in Iraq, both of whom are assisting Iran in training these NDFs and in actual combat operations in Syria.[7] Most of these Shi’a groups fight under the banner of Liwa Abu al-Fadhl al-Abbas, commonly referred to as the LAFA network or, simply, the al-Abbas Brigades.[8]

It is through their sponsorship of these proxy militias, Shi’a or otherwise, that Iran is seeking to ensure the future of their foreign policy goals in Syria and the Levant.

As tactically successful as this militia sponsorship policy has been in preserving the survival of Assad, none of the NDF militias, not even the LAFA network, provide Iran or Assad any sort of military dominance at the moment, or even in the foreseeable future.[9] So how does Iran’s sponsorship of these militias on a tactical level afford it strategic value with respect to their foreign policy objectives in Syria?

Militia diplomacy

The strategic value lies in the diplomatic leverage that Iran has obtained through its sponsorship of the various militias, NDF or otherwise.

Assuming any hypothetical peace negotiations would be earnestly conducted, none of the anti-regime actors can realistically hope to ignore the strategic considerations Iran has in Syria, as Tehran now essentially commands a force of 100,000 strong on the ground. Obviously, it is highly unlikely that all NDF factions would remain loyal to Iran in a negotiated endgame scenario. However, even if only 1%-2% of NDF members maintained their links to Tehran, this would still be more than enough fighters to seriously destabilize any peace efforts. Thus, the Iranians wield a favorable negotiating position. Of course, how much influence the NDF provides Iran at the negotiating table is certainly debatable. It would seem, however, that Iran believes that it will be enough to bargain for, at minimum, a post-Assad regime that isn’t hostile towards Tehran. Combined with the fact that Iran would have thousands (perhaps tens of thousands) of loyal fighters on the ground, its strategic foreign policy imperative – the supply line to Hezbollah in Lebanon – would be secure.[10] While this hypothetical outcome wouldn’t be optimal for Iran, their understanding of using ‘proxy’ capabilities to pursue foreign policy goals on the strategic level would still provide them with a result they could live with in Syria- with or without Assad.

 

 

Robert is an incoming student at King’s College Department of War Studies and will begin pursuing an MA in War Studies this September. His research interests include U.S. and Iranian foreign policy, diplomatic strategy, and proxy warfare. He can be found on Twitter at @Bob__Andrea

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] Diehl, Jackson. “Why Iran Won’t Give up Syria.” The Washington Post, August 2, 2015. Accessed April 6, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-iran-wont-give-up-syria/2015/08/02/b9269fa2-360c-11e5-9d0f-7865a67390ee_story.html.

[2] Fulton, Will, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer. Iranian Strategy in Syria: A Joint Report by AEI’s Critical Threats Progect & Institute for the Study of War. Report. May 2013. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-1MAY.pdf. pg. 21.

[3] Lund, Aron. “Who Are the Pro-Assad Militias?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 2, 2015. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=59215

[4] Ibid.

[5] Kozak, Christopher. “An Army in All Corners”: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria. Institute for the Study of War’s Middle East Security Report. Report. April 2015. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/An Army in All Corners by Chris Kozak 1.pdf. pg. 4.

[6] Chandler, Adam. “An Iranian General Is Killed in Syria.” The Atlantic. October 9, 2015. Accessed April 6, 2016. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/an-iranian-general-killed-in-syria/409963/.

[7] Smyth, Phillip. “How Iran Is Building Its Syrian Hezbollah.” - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. March 8, 2016. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-iran-is-building-its-syrian-hezbollah.

[8] Anzalone, Christopher. “Zaynab’s Guardians: The Emergence of Shi`a Militias in Syria | Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. July 23, 2013. Accessed April 6, 2016. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zaynabs-guardians-the-emergence-of-shia-militias-in-syria.

[9] McInnis, J. Matthew. “How Many Iranian Forces Are Dying in Syria?” Newsweek. October 28, 2015. Accessed April 06, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/how-many-iranian-forces-are-fighting-and-dying-syria-388004.

[10] Fulton, Holliday, and Wyer. Iranian Strategy in Syria. pg. 21.

PROXY Capabilities - A Renewed Strategy of the 21st Century

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By: Cheng Lai Ki

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Photo credit: Diaz,J. ‘Russia is developing a drone army – including amphibious models’, SPLOID, January 16, 2014.

This is the first of a series of articles we will be featuring on Strife in the coming week looking at the role of Proxy Warfare in the 21st century by Series Editor Cheng Lai Ki.

The technological advancements over the last decade have allowed for the development of new tactics and strategies for security, intelligence and warfare options. These ‘advancements’ have undoubtedly augmented multiple state capabilities within those domains. In his book, War Made New, military historian Max Boot charts the technological developments supporting warfare throughout human history.[1] Through the lens of the book, an argument can be made that mankind has consistently improved at one thing, warfare. However, a second consistency can be identified. This is an increase in the operational distance and capabilities of states. This phenomenon can be identified through modernised versions of traditional strategies or emerging technology centric methods. Regardless of the method employed, the warfare strategy for states to use either a willing third party actor or remote control ordinance can be categorised under the broader term: ‘proxy warfare’. This series explores this exact phenomenon and the collaboration between a state and its utilisation of non-state (or remote control) actors.

The term ‘proxy’ possesses multiple definitions depending on its associated strategy, tactic and theatre. Within the context of warfare, ‘proxy’ capabilities can be analysed against the three overarching levels of: Strategic, Operational and Tactical.[2] Expanding on the concept of ‘proxy’ capacities of both state and non-state actors has raised several debates over the decades, mainly around the areas of impacts, accountability, effectiveness and oversight. However, the objective here is not the deliberate these considerations but more to explore the broadening scope of ‘proxy’ capabilities themselves; which would range from large state level proxies to small individual private contractors or unmanned ordinances. When applied effectively, ‘proxy’ capabilities could provide benefits such as plausible deniability, increased distance from harm and the augmentation of existing skills. The utilisation of ‘proxies’ is however, not a new phenomenon and has been around for centuries. Its earliest form can be represented by mercenaries. Mercenaries were (and still are) groups of ex-soldiers who contract out their skills to lords and kings with a force-limitation in a certain domain.[3] The trend has only continued to expand and broaden in scale and associative categories through the years, leading to the development of the Private Military and Security Company (PMSC) and probably one of the most classic examples of ‘proxy’ warfare.[4] There are of course other forms, as mentioned, these can be in the forms of a remote control ordinance.

Strategically, ‘proxy’ capabilities can refer to the involvement of entire organisations (state or non-state) as an extension of power to influence distant geopolitics. Although the utilisation of a weaker state by a global super-power could be situated as a ‘proxy’ capability. Such partnerships could not just influence national security policies but also potentially the strategic considerations of other states. Operationally, ‘proxy’ capabilities would refer to the involvement of private organisations as either an extension of power or augmentation of existing capabilities. Traditionally, this can be represented by the involvement of corporate or non-state actors who provide security, intelligence or consultancy services to government agencies that would enhance existing capabilities. Within ‘operational’ domains, ‘proxies’ are fundamentally used to empower existing state-capabilities. For example, consider a state that wants to increase its capabilities to gather intelligence in inaccessible regions, they could deploy unmanned aerial vehicles or commonly referred to as drones for the conduct of surveillance operations.[5] Finally, on a tactical level, the effects of ‘proxy’ capabilities would have been the most evident. This can primarily be represented by the application of unmanned ordinances to tactically support military operations through the provision of critical and live battlefield information or fire support (i.e. Russian Uran-9 Ground Combat Drone).[6] More recently, the world has experience a surge in cyber augmented scenarios attributed to either supporting existing warfare capabilities or espionage operations conducted by states.

Despite the technological augmentations currently available to states, the concept of ‘proxy’ capabilities as explained earlier is not a new phenomenon. However, the number of capabilities that can be encompassed under the concept has now broadened; evident from efforts of awareness initiative such as the Remote Control Project – a project hosted by the Oxford Research Group stationed in London.[7] It is advisable that we under the notion and expansion of what can be considered ‘proxy’ capabilities available to states. State-actors are obtaining more effective ordinances to arm their unmanned systems to conduct more effective information gathering and strike missions. Cybersecurity companies and security/intelligence agencies are collaborating with skilled non-state agents to empower their existing capabilities to tackle advanced persistent treats.

This series explores this consistently broadening cope of ‘proxy’ capabilities within the 21st century and various associated issues towards their respective categories through a three-part series entirely written by Master students currently studying under the King’s College London, War Studies Department. Part One of the series addresses the most traditional form of ‘proxy’ capabilities of involving a third non-state actor to support existing state activities in conflict or contested zones. Gregory Wilson will kick off the series by exploring the role of Russian Private Military Companies and their involvement within pro-Russian activities within recent theatres.

Part Two of the series takes a further step back and explores the technologically enhanced hardware dimensions of ‘proxy’ capabilities through an analysis of surveillance techniques by Saher Naumaan; and followed by a study of the application of unmanned ordinances by various countries by Rian Whitton.

Part Three of the series finally embarks into the most recent form of ‘proxy’ capabilities available to states. Elmer Hernandez first bridges the gap between the physical and cyber realms by analysing how state agencies are collaborating with non-state ‘hackers’ to support their ongoing counter terrorist operations. Finally, this series wraps up with an analysis of the current Investigatory Powers Bill in the United Kingdom and the involvement of private telecommunication companies by Mustafa Batuhan Albas.

The objective of this series is to reveal the broad – and expanding – capabilities for state-actors to have their existing powers augmented through ‘proxy’ capabilities. With modernisation and technological advancements, the world in locked into a cycle of consistent change. These trends slowly distance the capability of states away from symmetrical and more towards asymmetrical strategies. It is therefore vital that we understand these expansive dimensions before it completely redefines state strategies in warfare, intelligence and geopolitics.

Formerly with the Singapore Armed Forces, Cheng is currently reading for an MA in International Intelligence and Security at King’s College London where his academic interest revolves around private military and security companies and their roles as security by proxy in the contemporary security theatre. During his military service, he was a senior tactical and operational instructor for the Armour Formation. He was the researcher and coordinator for the 2016 King’s College London Crisis Simulation that replicated tensions in the South China Sea.

[1] Boot, M. War Made New: Weapons, Warriors and the Making of the Modern World, (New York: Gotham Books), 2012.

[2] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the Untied States, (25 March 2013).

[3] Singer, P. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of Privatized Military Industry, (New York: Cornel University Press), 2003.

[4] Kinsey, C. Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies, (New York: Routledge), 2006.

[5] Kreps, S & Kaag, J. Drone Warfare, (Cambridge: Polity), 2014.

[6] Mizokami, K., ‘The Kremlin’s Tiny Drone Tank Bristles With Weapons’, Popular Mechanics [Online], Available from: http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a18948/russias-new-ground-combat-drone-uran-9/, Accessed 26 March 2016.

[7] Remote Control Project, (London: Oxford Research Group) [Online], Available from: http://remotecontrolproject.org/about/, Accessed 12 March 2016.

Syria: A Proxy Battleground

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By Pezhman Mohammadi

Almost two years after unrest began in Syria, not only has the ‘popular revolution’ not borne fruit, but also many of the ‘freedom fighters’ have turned out to be non-Syrian, foreign-funded terrorists. What made Syria a target of a foreign-backed insurgency? And what could be the solution to the crisis?

Since 2011, Syria has become a target of indirect foreign intervention to topple the Assad’s regime. Various motives have been suggested for such aggression against the secular state. First, Syria is strategically important for many countries, including the United States, Israel, Iran and Russia. Second, Syria is Iran’s strongest ally, Israel’s long-time adversary, and a channel for Iranian arms transport to resistance organisations in Palestine and Lebanon.

Has a new ‘Cold War’ emerged in the Middle East? Putting Russia aside for the moment, Syria can be argued to have become a battlefield for a clash between Iran and the United States. The US, assisted by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, is arming the Free Syrian Army (FSA) terrorists against Assad. Meanwhile, Iran is providing financial assistance and military know-how to the Syrian President through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) shadowy Quds Force, hence the reason the Syrian President is still standing.

To some analysts, the current Syrian turmoil is as part of a US plan to contain and further isolate Iran by removing Islamic Republic’s only Arab ally in an era of increasing Arab-Iranian regional rivalry. Assad’s regime is considered as a fundamental pillar in Tehran’s policy approach towards Israel and hostile Arab states. Clearly, in his absence, Iran loses significant influence in that arena. In this context, Michael Hanna of Century Foundation in New York stated that “Syria is a central player in Iranian power projection”. Nevertheless, this would be an attempt to correct an earlier American miscalculation, namely the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which significantly strengthened Iran’s position in the region. This is a textbook proxy conflict scenario in which the laws of war appear to be absent, causing mass civilian casualties.

Some believe that Syria without Assad would be an ideal state, a liberated society. But this is wrong. Syria is currently witnessing a sectarian clash, thanks to the emergence of extremist Wahhabi ideology in the Free Syrian Army. According to this ideology, other religious sects, whether Jewish, Christian, or Islamic factions such as Shiites, are all considered as ‘infidels’ and must either accept the fanatic organisation’s ideology or be persecuted and killed. In the absence of Assad, a once secular country is likely to disintegrate as sectarian conflicts intensify. This provides an explanation for the loyalty of the Alawite-dominated Syrian army to President Assad: they prefer his rule to that of the FSA.

The solution to the Syrian crisis is far from straightforward. I would suggest that bilateral talks between Iran and the US would be a step in the right direction. Improved US-Iranian relations would contribute to improved regional stability.

Moreover, in late-2012, Iran proposed a ‘Six-Point Plan’ to solve the Syrian Crisis. The Plan’s steps include immediate cease-fire; initiation of a ‘national dialogue’; establishment of a united government which; humanitarian assistance to the citizens of Syria; freedom for all prisoners who have not committed a crime against the country; and full and unbiased media access to Syria. Although this has been widely rejected by the ‘anti-Syrian coalition’ for obvious reasons, Russia and China may be able to enforce the Plan using their influence in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Further, states must stop arming the terrorists in Syria. In this context, the United Nations (UN) is obliged to issue a firm resolution against the terror-sponsoring bodies. After all, these are the same gang of radicals that the West is fighting against in different corners of the world. A related practical, but extremely difficult, measure would be to place punitive economic sanctions on countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar that financially and militarily sponsor such groups.