• Skip to primary navigation
  • Skip to main content
  • Skip to footer
  • Home
  • About
    • Editorial Staff
      • Bryan Strawser, Editor in Chief, Strife
      • Dr Anna B. Plunkett, Founder, Women in Writing
      • Strife Journal Editors
      • Strife Blog Editors
      • Strife Communications Team
      • Senior Editors
      • Series Editors
      • Copy Editors
      • Strife Writing Fellows
      • Commissioning Editors
      • War Studies @ 60 Project Team
      • Web Team
    • Publication Ethics
    • Open Access Statement
  • Archive
  • Series
  • Strife Journal
  • Strife Policy Papers
    • Strife Policy Papers: Submission Guidelines
    • Vol 1, Issue 1 (June 2022): Perils in Plain Sight
  • Contact us
  • Submit to Strife!

Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

  • Announcements
  • Articles
  • Book Reviews
  • Call for Papers
  • Features
  • Interviews
  • Strife Policy Papers
    • Strife Policy Papers: Submission Guidelines
    • Vol 1, Issue 1 (June 2022): Perils in Plain Sight
You are here: Home / Archives for Propaganda

Propaganda

Lessons from the 20th century book war

March 31, 2021 by Joseph Bodnar

By Joseph Bodnar

 

Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union competed for international influence through coercion and persuasion with the world’s most capable and committed spy agencies on the front lines.

Among other things, these covert operatives wrote books. They gathered intelligence, drafted manuscripts, stood up publishing firms, and passed on information about each other to media organisations, government officials, and the public. These hardcover campaigns were effective and escalatory. They also led the United States to exploit the reach and legitimacy of the free press in an attempt to defend it.

The United States’ reactive and undemocratic tactics throughout the book war of the 20th century underscore the importance of developing a proactive and values-based approach for the information contest of the 21st century.

Hardcover campaigns – Escalation and Deception

In May 1963, Oleg Penkovsky, a senior Soviet intelligence agent, was convicted of high treason, sentenced to death, and shot at a prison on KGB headquarters. For the previous sixteen months, Penkovsky had worked with the CIA and Britain’s MI6, passing along photographs of nearly 5,000 highly sensitive documents, including Soviet military manuals, missile sites, and war plans.

The CIA logged 10,000 pages of reports based on Penkovsky’s information before he was caught and executed. They then used the material to write a memoir. Twenty-nine newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic ran excerpts of the Penkovsky Papers ahead of its release, and the memoir eventually became a bestseller.

Despite the book’s success, neither journalists nor the Soviets bought the idea that Penkovsky had written it. The Washington Post later asked whether the CIA’s deception of the American public was a “by-product or part of the intent”. The Soviets decided to escalate.

In the following years, Czechoslovakian and East German intelligence services worked together to research, write, and release the book Who’s Who in the CIA in both German and English. In 1968, the book cost 10.50 East German Marks, but the subtitle gave away the ending. It read “a biographic encyclopedia of 3,000 members of staff of civilian and military intelligence agencies in the USA in 120 states”.

Who’s Who listed details on thousands of agents from across the U.S. intelligence community, mixing facts, subtle forgery, and blatant falsehoods. The book also included six charts that “exposed” open-source information on things like the intelligence structure of the Pentagon.

The CIA responded in kind, feeding intelligence to an investigative reporter for Reader’s Digest who published KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents in 1974, after it was proofread and fact checked by the US intelligence agency. The book contained a 35-page appendix listing information on 1,557 KGB and GRU officers – 942 of which were “identified by classified sources only”, according to a CIA memo.

The Soviets were rocked by the book, writing as many as 370 internal reports assessing its impact on ongoing and future operations.

However, public opinion and the credibility of the media also took a hit. Victor Zorza, a Polish-British journalist, noted at the time that democracies “suffer from the grave disadvantage that in attempting to damage the adversary they must also deceive their own public”.

This Century Can’t Be Like the Last

The book war did not start in 1963 with the Penkovsky Papers or end in 1974 with The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents. The CIA financed the publication of at least 250 books during the Cold War and employed journalists around the world.

But this incomplete chapter of history details the United States’ embrace of authoritarian methods to advance democratic ideals. It tracks a race to the bottom that the United States cannot afford to run in the 21st century, with democracy on its back foot and authoritarians increasingly adept at exploiting emerging technologies to distort information realities to their advantage.

The United States and its democratic allies must address the relentless information offensives being launched by Russia, China, Iran, and others. But that doesn’t require democracies to enter a competition of values on terms set by autocrats.

A successful strategy will leverage the appeal of open, transparent, and responsive systems. Rather than adopting the book war model of state-directed journalism, the United States should increase support for independent media and investigative reporting. This asymmetric approach will help expose the weaknesses, corruption, and brutality of authoritarian regimes around the world.

Defensive tactics should also be rooted in democratic principles, rather than in attempts to control and surveil. This will require the United States to set clear content moderation and data protection standards for the private tech companies that now dominate the information landscape. Identifying, exposing, and building resilience against authoritarian information operations also demands increased coordination between the government, private sector, and civil society groups.

The right answers to the information challenges faced today cannot be found in the history of the book war. But there are plenty of mistakes to recognise and avoid repeating. Democracies cannot protect or advance open information ecosystems by embracing the tools, tactics, and doctrines of authoritarian adversaries.


Joseph Bodnar is a graduate student at American University. His writings have been published by the National Interest, the Dallas Morning News, the Atlantic Council, and Charged Affairs.

Filed Under: Feature Tagged With: Cold War, espionage, Propaganda, us, USSR

Art Review: “Red Star Over Russia: A Revolution in Visual Culture 1905-55” (Tate Modern, 8 November – 18 February)

February 2, 2018 by Natalia de Orellana

 

By Natalia de Orellana

 

 

Images are repositories of meaning. They are messengers of political ideals, social hopes and human values. Past images come to be read as documents embedded with historical significance, inexorably attesting to the rift between ideology and reality. When graphic designer David King (1943-2016) began to work on the book Red Star Over Russia, he was in fact enterprising a history of the Soviet Union that fused reality and ideology together. He assembled Russian and Soviet material worldwide, reuniting propaganda material, satirical representations and photographic documentation. Seen together, this material offers a complex, turbulent, persistently ambiguous vision of the Soviet Union.

Tate Modern’s Red Star Over Russia: A Revolution in Visual Culture 1905-55 draws on works from King’s archive to explore the tempestuous years between the October Revolution and Stalin’s death through small-scale objects and ephemera.

Photographs of Agitprop trains[1] from shortly after the Revolution mark the starting point of the journey. Multilingual posters cover the walls, furiously yelling at the viewer the slogans that once called the inhabitants of the vastest of territories to action: “Woman! Take Part in the Election of the Soviets”, ”Send Your Son to the Red Army, the Best and Foremost”. Slogans fused with images of the masses, spliced with the overarching red tones that dominate the majority unveil the politically oriented aesthetics of the Soviet avant-garde.

This was a militant aesthetic enterprise. Over the fifty-year period, visual production kept pace with socio-political changes, adopting a myriad of visual strategies allowing information to be mass-reproduced, easily dispatched, and ideally transmitting a message that would remain engrained in people’s minds. Among the most well know examples El Lissitzky’s Beat the Whites with the Red Wedge (1920) unveils Suprematist principles where the directness of geometrical forms and slogan are united into an organic unity, resulting in a work of art made for the masses at the service of the Soviets. By contrast Stepan Karpov’s Friendship of the People (Soviet Republic) (1923-4) offers a more academic approach depicting the hopes to unite the different ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups under the same Soviet flag.

Leaflets, magazines, books -to name but a few- projected Russia’s achievements. Varvara Stepanova and Aleksandr Rodchenko’s LEF, no.2 (1923) illustrate the use of productivist rigour advertising a new era of industrialisation that rejected bourgeois aesthetics. Lissitzky went a step further by composing a photobook, Industry of Socialism (1935), illustrating the progresses of Stalin’s industry program.

Some images matter for their absence. If the exhibition exposes the use of image as vitrine of the hopes of the rising Nation, it also makes an active effort to unveil the appalling truths of the political paranoia governing over Stalin’s regime and nowhere is this more evident than in the room dedicated to “deleting” fallen political figures. The room dedicated to the Soviet Pavilion at the 1937 International Exhibition (Paris) showcases images of the gold-medal pavilion celebrating the achievements brought by the Revolution. This was a bright and optimistic vision, one diametrically opposed to the brutality of the Great Purge, which is spatially translated in the exhibition by the placement of a series of mugshots of presupposed counter-revolutionaries (targets of the Stalin’s purges that culminated in 1937 Moscow trials) in the adjacent room.

This is a show that rejects polite conclusions on the complexity and humanly devastating facets of the subject, offering instead the possibility of looking at a constructed reality as much as at individual narratives. A must-see exhibition for its historical and aesthetic value.

 

PLATES:

 

El Lissitzky

Beat the Whites with the Red Wedge

1920

Lithograph

 

 

 

Stepan Karpov

Friendship of the Peoples

1923-24

Oil on Canvas

 


Curator and art historian, Tally de Orellana holds a dual Master’s degree in Arts Administration & Modern Art History from the School of the Art Institute of Chicago (2016) and an MA in Art History from The University of Edinburgh (2012). She was the 2016-2017 Hilla Rebay International Curatorial Fellow at the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, working in New York, Bilbao, and Venice. Her research interests target the role of institutions and curatorial practices in the systems of formation of cultural hierarchies and artistic identity. You can follow her @Tallydeorellana


Notes:

[1] Propaganda multi-functional trains equipped with exhibition carriages, classrooms and even cinemas.

 


Image Credits

Banner: http://www.mysticforms.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Banner_1000x750_Tate2.jpg

Image 1: http://www.theartstory.org/images20/works/lissitzky_el_2.jpg

Image 2: http://www.wikigallery.org/paintings/198001-198500/198498/painting1.jpg

Filed Under: Art Review Tagged With: Art, Exhibition, feature, Propaganda, Review, USSR

Debunking pro-Russian propaganda on the web

April 7, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Malyuta Skuratov:

Putin riding a horse. Photo: Jedimentat44 (CC 2.0)

“The real weapon was not the rifle but the megaphone. Being unable to kill your enemy you shouted at him instead.” – George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia

***

Conspiracy theorists of the world, unite! Scraping the bottom of the barrel, Russia has finally managed to re-establish herself as an ideological centre of gravity. Putin’s friends range from various far right movements to the anti-capitalist left. This transversal and bizarre coalition includes anyone who blames Western liberal democracy and the United States for all sorts of misdemeanours, like the emergence of ISIL in the Middle East. Russia is viewed as the last bastion that upholds unspecified “traditional values”, the rise of Russia as an alternative to the current world order. Basically, anyone who blames the Great Satan (USA) for anything that is wrong with the world is welcomed as a member of this club.

The enemies of Western liberal democracy have found an unlikely ally in the internet and social media. When used in the context of a free society, these new media are a powerful instrument of democratisation. Yet they are particularly vulnerable to the manipulation of undemocratic entities. We live in a Kafkaesque scenario, where the government of a semi-despotic country distorts reality by turning against us the very instruments of information that are the lifeblood of any liberal society, threatening checkmate on democracy. What is most worrying is that some of the most vocal backers of the Kremlin’s policies are found in the West.

Axis Sally and Tokyo Rose have reincarnated in the English-speaking presenters of Russia Today, the overseas television network that broadcasts the Kremlin’s point of view to the West. RT mixes news reporting with interviews and talk-shows that give space to those Western pundits that are particularly critical towards “Western hegemony”. Just as it was during the Cold War, a major theme broadcasted is racial inequality in the US, which is supposed to expose the alleged corrosion of the Western social fabric. Other classics include the above-mentioned American sponsoring of ISIL and police brutality in the US. Then there is the Ukrainian chapter. According to pro-Russian propaganda, there is absolutely no doubt that what happened in Kiev is nothing short of a neo-Nazi coup d’état.

The issue is not confined to RT. Sputnik, a Kremlin-sponsored news agency, even managed to imply American responsibility for the killing of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov. Sputnik stated that the murder could have been an attempt to fuel Western hostility against Russia or against Putin himself (a thin difference in the current state of things, it must be noted).

Then there is Russia Beyond the Headlines (RBTH), a website connected to Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the official newspaper of the Russian government. RBTH regularly features articles that are critical (or semi-critical) towards the Russian government, therefore presenting itself as an independent information resource. In this way, it can easily publish articles that try to disprove Amnesty International’s reports on Crimea. It is the mixture of reality and deceit that gives the Kremlin such a powerful weapon. Propaganda that incorporates counter-propaganda is sociological dynamite.

In a recently published book, Peter Pomerantsev exposes the control of the Russian government over the country’s television networks, and the impact this has on Russian society. We are now seeing the next step of that process, with the attempt to influence the Western public as well. In this phase, a new element is the prominence of internet-based propaganda. From pro-Russian trolling in the comments section of the Guardian’s website to elaborate videos that portray a bare-chested Putin riding a laser-eyed bear, the English-speaking internet is being injected with heavy doses of pro-Russian disinformation. The situation is worse in central Europe, where former communist bloc states are particularly susceptible towards Russian propaganda because of historic and economic ties.

Russian agit-prop represents a considerable threat for European security, so much so that some European countries have decided to increase their engagement with public information. But this is hardly going to be enough. Russian-financed media offer an alluring counter-narrative to the reality of a dissatisfied Western public prone to buy into easy explanations.

While independent journalist struggle to make a living, pro-Russian trolls are paid handsomely for their services. It is therefore unsurprising that the latter prosper in the current state of things. Russia must recognise that this is as detrimental for the West as it is for her. However, what is most dangerous is not this clique of professional propagandists, but the silent mass of those that further their message. Some do it artfully, others are naively conquered by the pro-Russian narrative. They all end up supporting a system that threatens the very foundations of our society.

A response at the institutional level is undoubtedly needed, and some steps have already been made in this direction. Civil society can do its part by debunking the fabrications of pro-Russian advocates. The weaponisation of information is an essential part of Russian hybrid warfare, and only an integrated approach can counter it.


Malta Skuratov is the pseudonym of a Doctoral candidate King’s College London.

The author would like to thank the government of the Russian Federation and its associates for kindly providing the material this article is based on.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Propaganda, putin, Russia

Why is everyone Hitler?

October 1, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Thomas Colley:

Why do so many political leaders seem incapable of analogising undesirable behaviour to anyone other than Hitler and the Nazis? Conflict in Ukraine has seen the protagonists base their propaganda on demonising the other side as ‘Nazis’ and ‘fascists’. David Cameron recently compared the dilemmas of dealing with Putin with those of Neville Chamberlain dealing with Hitler.[i] Tony Abbott recently claimed that The Islamic State (IS/ISIS/ISIL) were akin to Nazis and Communists. It is almost surprising that the Ebola virus hasn’t been compared to Hitler.

The extensive use of the Hitler analogy has fuelled debate over the extent to which such analogies are accurate.[ii] Arguably however, a more important issue is how useful such analogies are, and what they say about political leaders that they continue to use them.

An analogy is a comparison between two things based on some sort of shared characteristic. In politics, this tends to involve a comparison between current events or actors and those of the past, in order to make current events more easily intelligible, or even prescribe future action. Similarity cannot and need not be absolute, since focusing on the similarities in analogies tends to obscure differences. In this way, Al Qaeda may be immeasurably different to Imperial Japan, but focusing on the idea of ‘surprise attack on America’ makes 9/11 akin to Pearl Harbour, the differences obscured. In the same way, Putin’s annexation of Crimea is akin to Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland, while obscuring the obvious strategic differences between their aims.

The first way such analogies are used might be to prescribe strategy. If one likens Putin to Hitler, collective memories of the Second World War support the idea that Putin should be challenged, as appeasement will only fuel Russian aggression. Multiple European leaders have used rhetoric to this effect, arguing that Europe faces an existential threat if Putin is not stopped. Admittedly, the analogy is not wholly unfounded. Putin’s conduct in Ukraine has some similarities to the Nazi leader. Both his actions and rhetoric used in annexing the Crimea did resemble Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland. But Putin is not Hitler, and it is disturbing to think that such a crude comparison might be used for strategy-making.

Thankfully, based on the West’s response, it is relatively obvious that they know Putin is not Hitler, and are not acting as if he is even if they are saying so. After all, if Putin were Hitler, and to use another analogy, the West’s economic sanctions might be the equivalent of freezing the accounts of Himmler, Heydrich and Goering. Would this deter Hitler, once Goebbels, Bormann and Speer were added to the list, and are the West even thinking this way? Clearly not. There is little that indicates that Putin’s grand designs are in any way equivalent to Hitler. Bismarck would be a better comparison for his grasp of realpolitik; Stalin is a far more apt comparison in terms of his desire to maintain influence in states bordering Russia. However, this search for the least distorting analogy is of limited strategic use; the situation with Ukraine is unique and must be understood on its own terms.

If the Hitler analogy is not being used to prescribe strategy, it is being used to legitimise strategy. This is achieved through the most elementary level of playground logic: that Hitler was a bully; Putin is a bully, and as every child learns in primary school, if no one stands up to bullies they keep on bullying. This legitimises Western foreign policy towards Russia since states can at least claim they are acting against the bully. Whether their actions are sufficient to deter the bully is doubtful; only time will tell. Certainly the West’s rhetoric about what should be done has been extensive. But when faced with the West’s rhetoric, Putin can draw again from a primary school lesson recounted in Britain, that ‘sticks and stones will break my bones but words will never hurt me.’

Aside from Putin, the Hitler analogy continues to be invoked based on another metaphor, that of Hitler as ‘evil’. This appears by far the most common use of the Hitler analogy in political discourse; that through instigating the Second World War and perpetrating the Holocaust, Hitler epitomises human evil. Analogising to Hitler is therefore a common use of hyperbole to undermine an opponent, be it in the debating hall or in international politics. In fact, so popular is the ‘Hitler as evil’ metaphor that using it to demonise one’s opponent seems to be one of the first acts of many leaders’ propaganda playbooks. Putin repeatedly compared Poroshenko’s government to the Nazis; the Ukrainians responded in turn. Accusation and counter-accusation flowed, and the West joined in in what increasingly resembled the sort of name-calling found on exactly the same primary school playground from which the bullying analogy is understood.

The analogy was even more crudely exemplified by Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s claim that ISIS were comparable to the Nazis and the Communists based on the evil inherent in their provocatively public beheadings. Leaving aside the heterogeneity of global communism, the analogy seems only to function through the basic idea that ‘these people are evil, really, really bad, so we should stop them’. The ostensibly sagacious can then reinforce this with Burke’s dictum that ‘all that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing’, and action against the evil threat is justified. Faced with Burke’s eloquence, no one apparently notices that evil will presumably also flourish if ‘men do the wrong thing, or don’t do enough for long enough’. Still, this makes the Hitler analogy a simple tactic to secure public support – we must act, or evil (Hitlers) will win.

However, this basic tactic illuminates several troubling issues with our political leaders’ grasp of communication and their faith in their publics. First, if every state repeats the same analogy, then its persuasive effects are limited. If the aim of using Hitler is to evoke fear and stir collective memory, if both sides are constantly doing so, then what effect is it likely to have? Second, once strategy is shown to contradict the analogy, then the analogy is inevitably revealed as propaganda – as just another person playing the Hitler card, as if they can’t think of anything better to say.

So why does the Hitler analogy remain such a compelling rhetorical device for political leaders? The answer seems to be that those using it assume that such analogies will stir an emotional response from an irrational, volatile public that has limited knowledge of international affairs, but at least understands that ‘Hitler was an evil and a bully, and so evil bullies like Hitler should be stopped.’ This logic reflects the same assumption that it is enough to shout ‘terrorist threat’ to engender mass fear and secure extensive public support. There is some irony here. David Cameron’s statement that ISIS are ‘a greater and deeper threat to our security than we have known before’ appears currently to be a securitising move of immense hyperbole.[iii] Yet it is precisely the understanding of the existential threat posed by Hitler that highlights how unnecessarily hyperbolic Cameron’s claim appears.

This suggests that many political leaders continue to base their communication assumptions on those of almost a century ago, assuming like Lippman, Almond and Bernays that publics are emotional, volatile and ignorant masses.[iv] This ignores a vast body of research that has shown the public to be, if not highly knowledgeable, at least reasoning on matters of foreign policy.[v] Why, for example, did Abbott feel that it was necessary to compare ISIS with Hitler? Did he or his speechwriters assume that it was beyond the public to grasp the evil of blunt-knifed public beheadings without the need for lazy hyperbole and overused analogy?

In this way, the use of the Hitler analogy betrays the lack of faith political elites have in their publics. Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond’s comparison between the Scottish referendum and the post-apartheid elections in South Africa demonstrated a similar viewpoint. The analogy did support the otherwise persuasive narrative of oppressive Westminster rule over Scotland, but the comparison is tenuous at best, crass at worst.[vi] The only rational explanation for the choice of analogy is the assumption that the publics Salmond was trying to persuade are too ill-informed, or overwhelmed by nationalist fervour, that they would notice the difference between democratic Scotland and post-apartheid South Africa. The irony is that in using such crude analogies, politicians make themselves look as ill-informed as they assume their publics to be. This is probably not the case, but it contributes to the pervasive distrust between political elites and their publics.

I am of the view that if political leaders decide to use historical analogies, their choices should be carefully considered, grounded in a more optimistic perspective of the publics they are trying to persuade. Some might argue this is naïve, and that publics are largely ignorant of foreign policy matters and susceptible to crude analogies. However if one adopts this viewpoint, the tactic is still questionable, since governments would be better off trying to influence the active citizenry that are engaged in the political process. Surely these are the exact people that would expect more from their politicians than ‘everyone is Hitler’?

Perhaps the most telling indictment comes from one of the ‘rules of the internet’. Godwin’s law states that as online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison with Hitler or the Nazis increases.[vii] Interestingly, the person who first analogises to Hitler automatically loses the debate, for recourse to the Hitler analogy is to lack the ability to construct a more meaningful argument. Applied to political leaders, this would mean that the first person to be reduced to using a Hitler analogy loses the debate; the person who compares a peacetime democratic referendum to a people emerging from decades of racial oppression loses the debate; the leader who just lists ‘evil people we don’t like’ loses the debate.

As Hoggart wrote sceptically of the working classes, people may appear to have views on political matters, but they usually consist of

 

‘a bundle of largely unexamined and orally-transmitted tags, enshrining generalisations, prejudices
and half-truths, and elevated by epigrammatic phrasing into the status of maxims…. These are often contradictory of each other; but they are not thought about, not intellectually considered.’[viii]

In their use of analogies, many political leaders don’t seem to be doing much better.

 

______________________

Thomas Colley is a PhD student in War Studies at King’s College London. His research interests include propaganda, strategic communication and public attitudes to the use of military force. You can follow Thomas on Twitter @ThomasColley.

 

NOTES

[i] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/02/tony-abbott-says-extreme-force-needed-to-counter-isis-death-cult, 2 September 2014.

[ii] For reasons of brevity, ‘the Hitler analogy’ refers to analogies relating to Hitler and Nazism in general.

[iii] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/threat-level-from-international-terrorism-raised-pm-press-conference, 29 August 2014.

[iv] Almond, Gabriel A. The American People and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1950; Bernays, Edward L. Propaganda. Ig Publishing, 1928; Lippmann, Walter. Public Opinion. Transaction Publishers, 1946.

[v] Aldrich, John, Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, and Kristin Thompson Sharp. “Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection.” Annual Review of Political Science, 9 (2006): 477–502; Popkin, Samuel L. The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns. University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Page, Benjamin, and Robert Shapiro. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences. University of Chicago Press, 2010.

[vi] It is possibly that Salmond’s analogy may have been more thoughtless than calculating. However, he probably knew that he had been described as the ‘paler Mandela’ months before on social media, which suggests the analogy was deliberate. See http://www.scotsman.com/news/drumlanrig-gordon-brown-nelson-mandela-geoff-hurst-1-3224520, 29 September 2014.

[vii] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/6408927/Internet-rules-and-laws-the-top-10-from-Godwin-to-Poe.html, 23 October 2009.

[viii] Hoggart, Richard. The Uses of Literacy: Aspects of Working-Class Life. London: Penguin Classics, 2009, 86.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: al-Qaeda, conflict, fascist, Hitler, Nazi, Politics, Propaganda, rhetoric, Russia

‘There is something of the propagandist in everyone’: A Syrian Perspective

December 13, 2013 by Strife Staff

As this week sees the 1,000th day of conflict in Syria pass, Muttahir Salim reflects on the role of propaganda in the conflict.

The Editor

***

‘There is something of the propagandist in everyone’: A Syrian Perspective

by Muttahir Salim

“To plunder, to slaughter, to steal, these things they misname
empire, and where they make a wilderness, they call it ‘peace.”
Tacitus

You know it and I know it, ‘there is something of the propagandist in everyone’.[1] Human nature is, and always will be, bound by a jaded and prejudiced view of the world. No matter how we try, and without the proper checks and balances in place,[2] propaganda will always form an exceptional instrument of choice for galvanizing favourable public opinion, particularly in times of conflict. Indeed the notorious and brutal Syrian civil war is an exact proponent of this notion.

As was once a notion wholly utilised by 19th century anarchists,[3] select modern scholars have now coined this activity as ‘Propaganda of the Deed (POTD)’. The idea of POTD as suggested in Bolt and Betz’ 2008 Whitehall report[4] is that it is a form of mass media political marketing with the aim of forming sympathetic patronage by way of the patron’s representative client.[5]

In 21st century conflicts, POTD has shown to be an incredibly effective instrument for galvanising and mobilising public opinion. What has been especially remarkable in this rather unforgiving Syrian Civil War has been the prolific and successful use of POTD from all sides of the conflict including established media outlets. Indeed the swift media reaction and western governments’ spin, hastening affirmative military action over the chemical weapons attack on Ghouta in August of this year, was especially remarkable. Earlier claims relating to the use of chemical weapons declared Assad had crossed the ‘red line’ and claims of his irrefutable guilt, fed directly into a rapidly escalating western government media-blitzkrieg, mostly led by the US and the UK, for a ‘justifiable’ offensive on Syria.

While the UN has not yet established exact culpability, Syrian-allies Iran and Russia pointed the fingers at the rebels, and the US and its allies have blamed the Assad regime for the attack. Some could argue that the rebels had the motivation, the intent and plausible capability to gain the most from a POTD-related attack to mobilise favourable public opinion. However, uncertainty as to who carried out the Ghouta attacks remains.[6] What is sure though is that UN inspectors have confirmed that sarin gas was used on relatively large scale massacring hundreds of people. However, obtaining substantiated proof is fraught with difficulty, particularly when the issues of collection of verifiable hard evidence (i.e. chemical samples), human and image intelligence are complex and often gathered under ambiguous ever changing front lines.

According to UN reports, nearly 93,000 people have been killed, though current invalidated figures put the casualties much higher,[7] while millions have been driven from their homes due to the conflict. What began in March 2011 as an uprising against Bashar al-Assad that has now descended into a vicious civil war, where largely Sunni Muslim rebels are pitted against Assad’s forces (a Shi’ite Alawite). The onset of this is the potential to widen the conflict regionally (and to some degree it already has) and open up old cold war rivalries. Underneath the shadow of this forgotten Cold War contention,both sides have expertly utilised their patrons and have become connoisseurs in exploiting this rivalry to their distinct advantage.

As the civil war has gathered pace and both sides, the rebel forces in particular, have vied for international public opinion, it would seem that POTD ‘activity’ has become the mainstay tool of rebel fighters to correct deep-rooted grievances. By inference, when the resources of the protagonists differ significantly and there is no natural institutional outlet, POTD directive action looks at balancing the odds. Indeed, we know that the resources of the ‘belligerents’ differ significantly whilst both attempt to exploit each other’s weaknesses. The weaker of the two has attempted to use a strategy to offset deficiencies and given the lack of earlier unconvincing Superpower support (i.e. US Support) has arguably been left to the few ‘effective’ devices available to them, that being POTD.

There is still uncertainty as to which parties will be attending the UN-brokered Syrian conference scheduled for 22 January 2014 in Geneva, Switzerland. However one thing is for sure: in the run up to the conference there will be an upsurge of propaganda activity. Indeed, we expect the representatives that do attend the conference will be actively looking to optimise their preliminary negotiating position by way of mobilising the masses with a view to boosting favourable international public opinion. This may sadly involve further terrorist actions aimed at gaining support through their preferred choice of media outlets. It would seem that the protagonists of POTD acknowledge and agree that in ‘today’s fast changing political landscape where social and political agendas are being interpreted and shaped by global media’[8] it has become the latest vogue that which its protagonists expect rapid response times.

We would not want to overstep the mark here in terms of advocating responsibility of the use of such horrific weapons as there is yet no substantiated evidence to the fact. However, POTD would seem to be an effective asymmetric weapon of choice for the weaker of the two and the moral boundaries in which POTD is being used may have become inauspiciously blurred.

______________

Muttahir Salim is an MA postgraduate student (War in the Modern World) at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He is currently the Middle East lead for Arup’s Resilience, Security and Risk practice based out of Abu Dhabi.

___________________
NOTES

[1] Eugen Hadamovsky (1933), Propaganda und nationale Macht: Die Organisation der öffentlichen, Meinung für die nationale Politik (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling).
[2] http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Anarchism_and_violence.html
[3] Neville Bolt, David Betz & Jaz Azari (2008), Propaganda of the Deed 2008 Understanding the Phenomenon, Whitehall report 3-08, pp. 2, (The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies)
[4] Ibid. pp. 2
[5] ‘United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013’
[6] UN Report - http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45162 (accessed on 27 November 2013,-13:17hrs)
[7] Neville Bolt, David Betz & Jaz Azari (2008), Propaganda, pp. 1.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Media, Propaganda, Syria

  • Go to page 1
  • Go to page 2
  • Go to Next Page »

Footer

Contact

The Strife Blog & Journal

King’s College London
Department of War Studies
Strand Campus
London
WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

[email protected]

 

Recent Posts

  • Climate-Change and Conflict Prevention: Integrating Climate and Conflict Early Warning Systems
  • Preventing Coup d’Étas: Lessons on Coup-Proofing from Gabon
  • The Struggle for National Memory in Contemporary Nigeria
  • How UN Support for Insider Mediation Could Be a Breakthrough in the Kivu Conflict
  • Strife Series: Modern Conflict & Atrocity Prevention in Africa - Introduction

Tags

Afghanistan Africa Brexit China Climate Change conflict counterterrorism COVID-19 Cybersecurity Cyber Security Diplomacy Donald Trump drones Elections EU feature France India intelligence Iran Iraq ISIL ISIS Israel ma Myanmar NATO North Korea nuclear Pakistan Politics Russia security strategy Strife series Syria terrorism Turkey UK Ukraine United States us USA women Yemen

Licensed under Creative Commons (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivatives) | Proudly powered by Wordpress & the Genesis Framework