Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

You are here: Home / Archives for North Korea

North Korea

Japan’s Role in the North Korean crisis will remain a marginal one

by

By Andrea Fischetti

A North Korean Hwasong-12 missile, the model fired on August 29th (Credit: KCNA)

 

The latest missile test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on September 15 was the second in a row to directly involve Japan. The Korean intermediate range missile flew over the land of the rising sun for the second time in two weeks, and these tests undoubtedly pose a new challenge to Japan’s institutional pacifism, reawakening the debate on whether Japan needs to possess offensive military capabilities. However, Japan’s role in the North Korean crisis remains limited, and the country is not likely to become a key actor alongside the U.S. and South Korea in tackling the regime of the Kim dinasty.

In the early morning of August 29, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched a ballistic missile: Pyongyang’s fourth test in four days (Held, 2017). The country has tested more than fifteen missiles since February (USPACOM, 2017), and their effectiveness gradually improved, a sign that its current weapons program will not stop until it reaches its goal. North Korea’s ultimate objective, is considered to be a nuclear warhead-topped missile capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. Such a weapon would secure the position of the Kim dynasty, as Pyongyang believes it would deter the U.S. from interfering in the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK conducted a further test on September 15, which flew once again over Japanese territories.

The August 29 test was the first to involve a missile going over Japan without being announced or preceded by any warning. The intermediate-range ballistic missile Hwasong-12, known as NK-17, was fired over Japan’s territory, specifically the northern island of Hokkaido. Residents were given a short-notice warning inviting them to take cover, and the missile flew in Japanese airspace for almost two minutes. The act was condemned by the US and its allies, including Japan and South Korea; while China stated that the North Korean situation had reached a “tipping point”. Pyongyang’s latest missile launch seemed to affect Japan more than any other country, as it passed over Japanese territory.

Nonetheless, the North Korean tensions are far more threatening for other countries than for Japan, and Tokyo’s role in this situation remains only a marginal one compared to that of the U.S. or South Korea. As reporter Kjeld Duits pointed out, since 1998, North Korea’s tests violated Japan’s EEZ and airspace many times, three of which during the last two months. Pyongyang’s declared ambition, however, is that of being able to hit U.S. territories. In fact, the NK-17 that travelled over Hokkaido broke up more than 1180 Kilometres from Japan’s mainland, suggesting that the country never was an objective in the first place. The missile’s range has been estimated to be 4000 Kilometres, which potentially makes Guam – and its American military base – a realistic objective. Furthermore, North Korea has a number of short-range capabilities which can cause significant damage to nearby potential targets such as Seoul in South Korea. Arguably, that is the biggest threat that North Korea poses in the short term, and the reason why the U.S. must be careful in dealing with Pyongyang.

Accordingly, South Korean President Moon Jae-in ordered a show of “overwhelming force” (Crabtree and Kemp, 2017) against North Korea, involving the dropping of bombs near the Northern border and joint drills of four South Korean F-15 fighter jets with four American F-35 stealth fighter jets and two B-1B American bombers, while U.S. President Donald Trump declared that “talking is not the answer”.

On the other hand, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe does not have the same freedom of operation. Firstly, although Japan has excellent missile defence systems, taking down high-altitude missiles fired from North Korea to territories beyond Japan – such as Guam – is legally challenging, and it would raise many questions about Japan’s stance on the use of military force for non-defensive purposes. This is due to Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, especially considering that Japan is not the target of the DPRK’s tests. Secondly, and more importantly, even considering the effectiveness of the modern Air Defence System MIM-104F (PAC-3) acquired by Japan, there would be technical challenges in shooting down Pyongyang’s missiles, as the system is designed to counter inbound offensive missiles at lower altitudes, instead of hitting the bottom part of the missile by chasing it at higher altitudes. In other words, for Japan it would be easier to shoot down a missile that is actually targeting Japan rather than one that is only flying over its territories.

Two days after Pyongyang’s test, Japan’s Defence Ministry requested a budget increase for 2018 (Pollmann, 2017) which would include enough funds for further developing its radar system and acquiring weapons capable of shooting down high-altitude missiles. The North Korea tensions, including the launch of a NK-17 over Hokkaido, come at a time when Prime Minister Abe’s approval rating is decreasing. Also, his plan to amend the Japanese Constitution, in particular its Article 9 which prevents Japan from possessing offensive military capabilities, is far from guaranteed to succeed. In order to meet popular demands of a country with strong anti-militaristic norms (Berger 1993; 1998) and which is more concerned with achieving peace and prosperity than security objectives, Abe’s rhetoric has been focusing on Japan’s role as a ‘proactive contributor to peace’. Whether this role involves shooting down North Korean missiles for non-defensive purposes, however, is unclear.

The decision to expand the country’s military budget and potentially have a more proactive role in Northeast Asian security could be partly justified by Pyongyang’s moves, in the eyes of the Japanese population, due to the perceived threat to Japan’s security. However, while Japan is involved in the North Korean crisis for geopolitical reasons, it is not Pyongyang’s main concern. Similarly, Abe is capitalising on the increasingly frequent North Korean tests to justify the need of stronger military capabilities, but increasing Japan’s involvement in this situation is not his ultimate goal. The challenge that Abe is facing is achieving a balance between rhetoric and moderate actions compatible with Japan’s current Constitution and the public opinion’s will.

While Japan’s public opinion has a negative view of North Korea, and this missile launch could influence the debate on Constitutional amendments, Japan’s public is ultimately more likely to support pacifist approaches to resolving this issue, and an overemphasis of the North Korean threat could end up being counterproductive for Abe’s goals. Kim Jong-Un’s behaviour seemed unaffected by the rhetoric of the U.S. and South Korea, their shows of force, and the UN sanctions; therefore, even by stepping up as a more central actor in the North Korea tensions, Japan would not be able change this trend.

In conclusion, Japan will keep honouring its alliance with the U.S., a country directly involved in the North Korea tensions. Abe will also attempt to emphasise the threat posed by Pyongyang for justifying his unpopular constitutional amendments. However, due to technical and legal constraints, it is unlikely that Japan’s role in this situation will significantly change in the short term.

Andrea Fischetti (@A_Fischetti) is an MA Candidate in War Studies at King’s College London specialising in East Asian Security and Japan. He recently earned a BA with First Class Honours in International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies and worked for a year in the House of Commons. Andrea was a visiting student at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University and studied Japanese at SOAS and King’s College London. More information about Andrea can be found at www.about.me/afischetti

 

Notes:

Berger, T. U. (1993) ‘From sword to chrysanthemum: Japan’s culture of anti-militarism’. International Security 17(4): 119-50.

 

Berger, T. U. (1998) Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

 

Crabtree, J. and Kemp, T. (2017) ‘South Korean President Moon tells military to toughen up, orders show of ‘overwhelming’ force’. CNBC Defense.

 

Held, A. (2017) ”Restraint’ Appears To Be Over As North Korea Launches Missile Test Again’, NPR. Available at http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/26/546344429/restraint-appears-to-be-over-as-north-korea-launches-missile-test-again

 

Pollmann, M. (2017) ‘What’s in Japan’s Record 2018 Defense Budget Request?’ The Diplomat.

 

USPACOM (2017) North Korea Policy, US Pacific Command. Available at http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1310112/north-korea-policy/

Military Exercises And The Necessity Of Practice

by

By Davis Florick

South Korea and US army top brass watch from an observation post as the likelihood of a real war breaking out grows by the day. Reuters.

As the North Korean crisis mounts, the utility of the joint military exercises in the region involving South Korea and the United States (US) has come under increasing scrutiny. Beijing has gone so far as to propose that Pyongyang could suspend its nuclear and missile activities in exchange for a moratorium on Seoul’s training activities with Washington. Regardless of how much value one may attribute to China’s offer and to North Korea’s credibility, understanding the utility of military exercises is prudent. Given Pyongyang’s history of inflammatory rhetoric and weapon tests in response to training activities, North Korea’s objections to South Korea and US exercises is unlikely to abate. For any government conducting multilateral exercises, at least five overarching reasons underlie its decision to do so: providing technical demonstrations, improving integration and transparency, addressing challenging strategic problems, assuring partners, and deterring adversaries. Exploring the benefits of military drills can provide valuable takeaways for different actors globally.

Military exercises provide an ideal opportunity to demonstrate new technological capabilities. Given long development timelines, the culminating step of utilizing a system in an operational setting carries considerable military and political value. Using new capabilities in a simulated environment helps strategists and operators to plan and train with their equipment. On the one hand, partners have tangible evidence of how their military equipment and training needs are being addressed. On the other hand, potential adversaries are presented with new potential forms of deterrent effects to their strategies and tactics. For instance, during Russia’s Vostok-2014 exercise in its Far East, Moscow test-fired the Iskander-M. While Russia had previously claimed the system had been used during the conflict in Georgia in 2008, this was the first public launch, and doing so near China undoubtedly carried political utility. The spotlight placed on multilateral exercises presents a distinctive opportunity to display new technological capabilities.

While showcasing advanced military technology is a strategic move, just as important are the personal relationships, integration, and transparency through joint training. During a crisis, there is little room to overcome language barriers, technical hurdles, or policy discrepancies. Simulating combat situations allows people and machines to harmonize and to develop ways to overcome natural impediments. Furthermore, by integrating capabilities and improving human communication prior to an actual conflict, forces are much more synchronized during a crisis, thereby reducing potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited by adversaries. In the process of strengthening synchronization, working partners are likely to find that transparency is a valuable by-product of engagement. When states demonstrate the willingness to work with one another such as through the sharing sensitive information, trust can develop. Similarly, leveraging personal commonalities is a unique way of engendering lasting relationships that can serve to benefit all parties involved. Multilateral military exercises thus serve to improve macro-level and micro-level cooperation.

Beyond improving coordination and transparency, addressing serious conceptual and strategic dilemmas is a critical component of multilateral exercises. As international affairs become increasingly complex, the challenges faced by senior officials are becoming more difficult as well. Given that tomorrow’s conflicts may involve multilateral aspects, different cultures and equities will lead partnering states to see problems in disparate ways which, if not addressed, may themselves lead to discord. To minimize the chances of divergence during a conflict, parties should undertake important discussions which may include uncomfortable and challenging scenarios since dialogue during peacetime – including a wider range of whole-of-government options that may incorporate considerations as diverse as economic impediments and nuclear exchange scenarios – and occur at a more measured pace than dialogue during wartime. Conceptually, the different perspectives we all possess increase the likelihood of innovation and reduce the risk of groupthink. Leveraging these qualities can have a profound impact on the options provided to senior officials during a crisis.

Although it may not seem readily apparent, military exercises have an important role in assuring allies and partners of security commitments. By conducting training events abroad, a state can demonstrate its willingness to participate in conflicts, or promote mutual defence elsewhere. Practicing and preparing for various situations signifies that officials are thinking through problems and are taking an active role in preparing for potential scenarios. Beyond the simple act of displaying a regional presence, joint exercises with foreign partners carry a powerful message to those states’ domestic audiences and can display equality in the relationship. Moreover, cooperation signifies that the parties involved are analyzing and preparing for potential conflicts. As a result, should confrontation emerge, a state’s partners can function more securely with the knowledge that they will likely have support. The assurance value of joint exercises comes in the form of day-to-day strategy and acquisition while also serving as a valuable means to reinforce support should conflict occur.

Parallel to its assurance utility, joint military exercises abroad are instrumental in deterring potential aggressors. To a considerable extent, the same qualities that contribute to bolstering ties with partners can also play an important role in shaping adversary perceptions. Practicing how states respond in a conflict scenario demonstrates to potential adversaries that a first strike option may not be in their favor. In conjunction with other opportunities, such as deploying units forward, exercises are an important tool in showing that costs will be imposed and benefits denied if another state(s) chooses an aggressive path. From a political standpoint, exercises serve as an ideal means to demonstrate commitment. Where an adversary to attempt an aggressive act, it would do so with the knowledge that its decision would be forcibly countered. The response may raise the threshold for an aggressive adversary who might otherwise prefer to take decisive action. As an example, the annual US-South Korea Foal Eagle and Key Resolve exercises reminds North Korea of Washington’s presence on the Peninsula – precisely the opposite of the US position prior to the Korean War. Ultimately, by deterring potential aggression, regional and strategic stability are stronger.

Multilateral military exercises play a significant role in shaping decision makers’ perceptions of benefits and costs of their choices. By practicing how partners may respond in the event of a conflict, those states will be more comfortable in their disposition. As a result, they may be less likely to pursue a first strike option. Conversely, a potential adversary may be less inclined to risk a first strike because the likelihood of a successful campaign might be decreased. Alongside the assurance and deterrence utility of multilateral exercises, there is value in cooperating with the militaries of partner states. For instance, collaborating on military strategies could prove invaluable for synchronizing forces during inherently time-sensitive and complex operations. There are even technological benefits to joint exercises as states are able to experiment with new capabilities and improve multilateral communication while reducing technical barriers. Invariably, perhaps one of the best assessments for the utility of multilateral exercises is the degree to which they are criticized and looked at with suspicion by other parties – whether in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s concerns over Russia’s Zapad, China’s objections to the US-India-Japan Exercise Malabar, or the North Korea’s anger over the US and South Korea’s Foal Eagle.

Davis Florick is a strategic policy analyst for the US Department of Defense, a Senior Fellow with the Human Security Centre, and a 2016 WSD-Handa Non-resident Fellow with the Pacific Forum. He earned a Master’s degree in East-West Studies from Creighton University. He specializes in North Korean strategic and human security issues.

 

Reforming China’s Refoulement Policy towards North Korea

by

By: Davis Florick

Korean refugees traveling through China towards Southeast Asia and freedom

The Chinese government’s policy concerning North Korean refugees represents a serious blight on human security and welfare. Through its ‘refoulement programme’, Beijing has expressed its willingness to send North Korean refugees back to Pyongyang. However, there are five key reasons as to why Xi Jinping’s administration should reconsider this policy.

Firstly, evidence suggests that those refugees who are returned to North Korea by Beijing face imprisonment or even death. Since refoulement was first implemented in 1998, tens of thousands of North Koreans have been forcibly repatriated. Unfortunately for these refugees, political crimes are considered by Pyongyang as a far more grave offence than common criminal acts. Considering the fact that it is a political crime to leave North Korea and the manner in which North Korea treats those who are forcibly repatriated, China’s decision to deport refugees back to North Korea would condemn these individuals to unspeakable suffering and even death. The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea has often highlighted the use of persecution, torture, and indefinite detainment of such individuals. In particular, those refugees who have made contact with external parties such as religious or foreign aid groups are sometimes executed as well. Among the worst atrocities that take place, infanticide is committed against children of mixed races and forced abortions are imposed on women carrying fetuses of mixed races. Many of these children are of Chinese heritage, yet Beijing’s insensitiveness to such an underlying current of racism in Pyongyang’s policy is surprising.

Second, many North Korean refugees are simply traveling through China to their intended destination of South Korea. Although the precise number of North Korean refugees living in China is unclear, analysts have expressed a widespread belief that most refugees use China as a gateway to South Korea or other parts of the world. While such refugees may initially seek to work in China, strict immigration laws motivate them to seek employment and refuge elsewhere. Other factors that deter North Korean refugees from remaining in China include the language barrier and poor economic conditions in China’s northeastern provinces of Jilin and Liaoning, where most of them reside. The lack of employment and a steady income have placed many refugees at risk of sexual exploitation and destitution. Due to a lack of options, many are coerced to accept low-wage jobs as farm laborers, household servants, or manufacturing labour. Subsequently, the low cost of North Korean labour results in further tensions among locals who are infuriated with an increased competition for employment. It is probably in China’s best interests to assist these refugees in reaching South Korea, which has expressed a willingness to accept them.

Third, potential security concerns and negative publicity stemming from incidents involving North Korean security personnel and foreign missionaries could be eliminated if refugees were better managed by the government. From an internal security perspective, the movement of North Korean refugees, security agents, foreign aid workers, and various other parties create a politically unstable environment in China. As it stands today, a significant number of undocumented migrants travel from the northeast of China to the Yunnan province in the southwest before making their way to other countries in Southeast Asia. On one hand, North Korean security personnel cooperate with China to capture their fellow countrymen and scuttle them back to the North. On the other hand, some foreign missionaries and other non-governmental organizations operating in China actively help refugees to escape. Such competing interests lend themselves to volatility and potential confrontations. It would make sense for Beijing to dodge this bullet by allowing these refugees to move to their desired destinations.

Fourth, Beijing has an obligation to assist these individuals as a signatory of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Recently, Beijing has obtained an elevated role as a global leader, particularly in terms of economic power and political prowess. As Xi Jinping’s administration accentuates China’s new role within the international system, abiding by human rights commitments would help Beijing establish a positive public image. However, it has largely overlooked its responsibilities pertaining to North Korean refugees. Given its own internal human security challenges with the Uighurs and the presence of political dissidents, providing North Korean refugees safe passage to Seoul seems like a strategic and politically viable solution for Chinese officials.

Finally, by aiding North Korean refugees, Beijing can subtly remind Pyongyang of their asymmetric relationship. North Korea is heavily dependent on trade with China, allowing Beijing to enjoy an asymmetric advantage in the relationship. For instance, China accounted for over 85% of North Korean trade as of 2014. By assisting refugees, the Xi Administration can remind Kim Jong-Un of his vulnerabilities. In fact, Xi Jinping’s government could go against Pyongyang’s wishes by abandoning the refoulement policy if only to demonstrate China’s superiority over the bilateral relationship.

Among the foreign relations challenges confronting Chinese officials today, refoulement is one that can easily be addressed without adversely impacting Beijing in a substantial manner. As Beijing continues its efforts to curb domestic volatility, this is one of the few areas where it can gain a victory on a human rights issue with minimal domestic drawbacks. By reforming its policy on North Korean refugees, China could improve relations with South Korea during this tense period while demonstrating a more responsible approach to human rights in the international community. At a time when Pyongyang seems willing to discard the impact its actions are having on Beijing’s prestige, this measure would remind North Korea of Beijing’s power asymmetry. Any response that North Korea can muster would likely come at the cost of Kim Jong-Un’s economic reforms designed to make his country stronger. The refoulement reform is thus a politically sound strategy for Chinese leaders.

Davis Florick is a strategic policy analyst for the United States Department of Defense, a 2016 WSD-Handa Non-resident Fellow with the Pacific Forum, and a Junior Fellow with the Human Security Centre. He earned a Master’s degree in East-West Studies from Creighton University and specializes in North Korean strategic and human security issues.

Image credit: http://www.libertyinnorthkorea.org/rescue-refugees/

North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and the Spectre of Enhanced Terrorism

by

By: Kyle R. Brady

hydrogen-bomb-63146_960_720

 

With yet another[1] illegal underground nuclear weapons test[2], North Korea has again flaunted the international community’s attempt to control what is quite arguably a rogue and/or failed state. A key difference in this test[3], however, is not its apparent yield[4] but, instead, the claim that this is part of a miniaturization process intended to produce nuclear warheads for internationally deployable missiles[5]. Despite well-regarded international treaties on the development of nuclear weapons programs and the testing of nuclear weapons, extraordinarily heavy international sanctions on this already-struggling state, and increasingly irritable neighbor states - namely, South Korea[6], Japan[7], Russia[8], and China[9] - North Korea seems intent on this nuclear path. The question remaining is why? The answer may be found in the minds of terrorists.

In developing nuclear weapons designed to thwart early detection and protection measures by other states[10], North Korea seems to be essentially demonstrating the seriousness of their program while simultaneously broadcasting their flexible nuclear weapons delivery mechanisms. If their claims regarding physical size, delivery vehicle, and detection-/destruction-avoidance abilities are true - as much of the analysis is suggesting - then one way to frame such a test is as “a sales pitch to other rogue states.”[11] The rogue states who may have been targeted for future sales deeply desire nuclear weapons and the cachet that comes with being a nuclear state, but lack the political will, financial means, or technological ability to develop them internally and in secret - an outside source is, therefore, required. This remains a highly plausible motivation, since it would inject desperately needed cash into the North Korean economy, continue to project the North Korean state as strong and militant, and avoid any entanglements or negotiations with their long list of stated enemies.

However, if such a test was designed to attract the purchasing power of rogue states, then it seems even more likely that terror actors were targeted, as well.

Rogue states, as their name suggests, have an inherent flaw in their operations that non-state terror actors do not: physical territory and state-run bureaucratic infrastructure. These two components of statehood make rogue states highly vulnerable to international sanctions and more conventional warfare, producing a sensitivity to the sentiment of the international community, even as the desires of this community may be eschewed. In contrast, terror actors lack these two components of statehood, among many others, which is part of what has made the suppression of large terrorist organizations so difficult. Without a territory to invade, formal trade to prevent, or official finances to freeze, terror actors are simply much more mobile and non-corporeal than states, even rogue ones; factors that correspondingly increase their interest in strategies and tactics otherwise impossible for a state to employ.

The nuclear ambitions of terrorists in the modern era are well documented, most recently including[12] the Islamic State[13]; the problem in all known acquisition attempts, however, was essentially a lack of viable products to purchase. Although some quantity of former Soviet nuclear material has disappeared over the years[14], logic dictates that such material would have explosively and catastrophically reappeared if it had fallen into the hands of terror actors. Furthermore, any nuclear states - both recognized and unrecognized - have inherent motivations to continue their nuclear weapons development programs and maintain their stockpiles, in part by ensuring these weapons are not placed into the hands of terrorists. Even unstable countries with questionable security practices, such as Pakistan[15], have no desire for nuclear weapons to be delivered to terror actors.

Enter North Korea.

With a long list of enemies that includes the most powerful states in the world, a failed economy, a people bound together by the sheer force of propaganda and fear, and a long-standing interest in cultivating international fears regarding its unpredictability, North Korea has nothing to lose from selling weapons on the black market[16] even if the ultimate buyers are terror actors. Whether these weapons are light arms, small arms, munitions, or nuclear does not matter to the North Korean regime - the all-important selling price is the only factor in this cash-starved state. If this motivational confluence is combined with a growing list of terror organizations and independent terror actors who have a defiant and remorseless dedication to their deadly cause, the sale of North Korean nuclear weapons to terror actors seems not only logical, but probable. This probability only increases when consideration is given to the apparent struggles of the Islamic State to maintain both its territory and its fighting force[17].

The conclusion that North Korean weapons programs may be seeking to connect with terror actors fundamentally changes the way in which the international community should view this rogue, failed state. The long-standing international policy of disapproving tolerance permissive of nuclear development and testing has now produced viable, and apparently adaptable nuclear weapons. Thus raising - once more - the spectre of enhanced terrorism. This is not to suggest that the infamous suitcase nukes[18] are of any real concern, but, rather, that the detonation of a nuclear warhead - of any size - in Baghdad, Damascus, Ankara, Cairo, or Tripoli would substantially change the worldwide understanding and fear of terrorism.

With the help of North Korea, this may now be a very real possibility.

 

Note: Any opinions expressed are directly and expressly the author’s own; they do not represent - unless stated - his employers (past, present, or future) or associated/affiliated institutions.

 

Kyle R. Brady is an imminent postgraduate student at King’s College London in the Department of War Studies, holds a Masters in Homeland Security from Pennsylvania State University, and has primary interests in terrorism, law enforcement, and contextualizing security concerns. Previously, he graduated with Departmental Honors from San Jose State University’s undergraduate Political Science program, where he focused on both international relations and political theory. All of Kyle’s work can be found online through http://docs.kyle-brady.com; he can be reached by email at [email protected] or, nominally, on Twitter as @KyleBradyOnline; and he occasionally blogs at http://blog.kyle-brady.com.

 

Online profiles:

http://docs.kyle-brady.com

http://blog.kyle-brady.com

 

 

Notes:

[1] “Timeline on North Korea’s Nuclear Program.” New York Times, November 20, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/20/world/asia/northkorea-timeline.html.

[2] Fifield, Anna. “Q&A: Everything You Need to Know about the North Korean Nuclear Test.” Washington Post, September 9, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/09/09/qa-everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-north-korean-nuclear-test/.

[3] Fifield, Anna. “North Korea Conducts Fifth Nuclear Test, Claims It Has Made Warheads with ‘higher Strike Power.’” Washington Post, September 9, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-korea-conducts-fifth-nuclear-test-as-regime-celebrates-national-holiday/2016/09/08/9332c01d-6921-4fe3-8f68-c611dc59f5a9_story.html.

[4] Lewis, Jeffrey. “Nuclear Test No. 5: How North Korea’s Compares to Other Countries’.” Defense One, September 11, 2016. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/09/look-how-different-north-koreas-fifth-nuclear-test-other-countries/131427/.

[5] Fifield, Anna. “With Each Test, N. Korea Inches Closer to Being Able to Send a Nuclear-Tipped Missile to the U.S.” Washington Post, September 9, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/with-each-test-n-korea-inches-closer-to-intercontinental-nuclear-capability/2016/09/09/b6823c0c-768e-11e6-9781-49e591781754_story.html.

[6] “North Korea Nuclear Test: South Would Reduce Pyongyang ‘to Ashes.’” BBC News, September 11, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37331852.

[7] Takenaka, Kiyoshi. “Japan’s Abe Says North Korea Nuclear Tests ‘Absolutely Unacceptable.’” Reuters, September 11, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-japan-idUSKCN11I059.

[8] Solovyov, Dmitry. “Russia Says North Korea’s Nuclear Test a Threat to Regional Security.” Reuters, September 9, 2016. http://in.reuters.com/article/northkorea-nuclear-russia-reaction-idINKCN11F17J.

[9] Merchant, Nomaan. “China Says It Can’t End North Korea Nuke Program on Its Own.” Washington Post, September 12, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-says-it-cant-end-north-korea-nuke-program-on-its-own/2016/09/12/5603bc16-78cd-11e6-8064-c1ddc8a724bb_story.html.

[10] Fifield, Anna. “These North Korean Missile Launches Are Adding up to Something Very Troubling.” Washington Post, September 9, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/these-north-korean-missile-launches-are-adding-up-to-something-very-troubling/2016/09/08/eae2c50a-743d-11e6-9781-49e591781754_story.html.

[11] Rathi, Akshat. “North Korea’s Nuclear Test Was a Sales Pitch to Other Rogue States.” Quartz, September 12, 2016. http://qz.com/778839/north-koreas-nuclear-test-was-a-sales-pitch-to-rogue-states-like-iran-syria-and-pakistan/.

[12] Cowell, Alan. “‘Low-Grade’ Nuclear Material Is Seized by Rebels in Iraq, U.N. Says.” New York Times, July 10, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/world/middleeast/iraq.html?_r=0.

[13] “Nuclear Smuggling Deals ‘Thwarted’ in Moldova.” BBC News, October 7, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34461732.

[14] Tirone, Jonathan. “Missing Nukes Fuel Terror Concern as Obama Drawn to Seoul.”Bloomberg, March 26, 2012. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-03-22/missing-nukes-fuel-terror-concern-as-seoul-meeting-draws-obama.

[15] Kerr, Paul K., and Mary Beth Nikitin. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons.” Congressional Research Service, August 1, 2016. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf.

[16] “North Korea’s Shadowy Arms Trade.” The Guardian, July 17, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/18/history-north-korea-arms-dealing.

[17] Witte, Griff, Sudarsan Raghavan, and James McAuley. “Flow of Foreign Fighters Plummets as Islamic State Loses Its Edge.” Washington Post, September 9, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/flow-of-foreign-fighters-plummets-as-isis-loses-its-edge/2016/09/09/ed3e0dda-751b-11e6-9781-49e591781754_story.html.

[18] “Suitcase Nukes? Probably a Myth.” NBC News, November 10, 2007. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/21723693/ns/us_news-security/t/suitcase-nuclear-weapons-probably-myth/.

North Korea – more of the same, but where is it heading?

by

By Michael Jefferson

For those who follow North Korea the pronouncements of 30 March that it was entering a “state of
war” with South Korea followed by the 2 April declaration that it will restart its Yongbyon nuclear
complex were the latest in a set of provocative acts that the secretive regime has performed over the
past couple of decades. Looking at the media reaction you would think that it was a Cuban Missile
Crisis take two and we are on the brink of nuclear war. However, although they are undoubtedly
closer to an aggressive nuclear weapons capability, there is little evidence to suggest that North
Korea has the capacity to deliver any nuclear weapons beyond its own borders. In fact I contend
that these actions point to growing domestic instability in the country, which when combined
with the fledgling state of the Kim Jong-un’s regime are designed to cement and enhance power
structures in Pyongyang.

During the 90s and 00s North Korea used its nuclear programme, the ratcheting up and down of
its rhetoric and military actions such as missile tests, as a way to secure international concessions.
However, North Korea’s inability or more likely lack of willingness to meet commitments it has
made over the years means such offers are now unlikely. In recent times Pyongyang’s provocative
acts have been met firmly by economic sanctions from the international community while China
has quietly provided enough support to allow the regime to survive. I cannot imagine that even the
leadership in Pyongyang could have imagined that these recent moves would successfully secure
concessions such as food aid, or even North Korea’s stated aim to hold bilateral talks with the US.

All of these actions should serve to remind us that there has been very little outside contact, even
with China, since Kim Jong-un took power. It is still not clear whether he, his aunt and uncle (Kim
Kyong-hui and Jang Sung-taek) or a faction within the Armed forces are calling the shots. I think
this recent escalation is designed to elevate Kim Jong-un and secure his position among both the
Pyongyang elite and wider North Korean public, but the information mismatch makes it very hard
to ground analyses with certainty.

What is, however, certain is that North Korea is more porous with mobile phones now seemingly
available and some citizens able to access external radio and TV shows. In response to this, it
seems those in power have fallen back on their tried and tested way to demonstrate their value – the
protector against the capitalist threat. Here we need to remember that the ability of Pyongyang to
control information means that many North Koreans are genuinely petrified of capitalism and what
might happen without the Juche philosophy that they believe serves them so well.

The principal point of interest of this crisis is that it comes at a time with relatively new regimes in
China, South Korea and Japan and a new US Secretary of State. It was a new experience for them
and communications, protocol and expectations over North Korea have not yet been established
between them, I would hope that such communications are now being set up. The ultimate
achievement for Pyongyang would be securing bilateral talks with the US on their terms and,
although ruling out talks on North Korean terms, the seriousness of the situation was demonstrated
by US Secretary of State John Kerry even mentioning talks in a press conference -with numerous
conditions attached.

In a strange way, this may actually benefit wider East Asian relations. An ever more unpredictable
North Korea means that South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and USA, the countries who primarily
need to manage Kim and North Korea, may build the lines of communication and relationship that
forms the basis of improved diplomatic relations. This can then be hopefully be leveraged for other
issues such as territorial disputes -and here the South China Sea looms large.

In the long run I think there is little doubt that North and South Korea will unify, however the
timeline and method of this unification is still very much up in the air. The key issues on this
prospect will be how to pay for it, and how to manage a population that is, as yet, unready to
join the consumer societies of East Asia. The population issue is one of particular interest as the
collapse of the current regime will undoubtedly unleash a wave of migration which will be hard
to manage in a ‘liberated’ country. South Korea will be most affected most by unification, but the
aforementioned regional powers and the international community will need to contribute to make
any integration plan viable.

Ultimately the timing of this collapse will probably come down to the time when China is either
ready to let the regime fall or Kim goes so far that it poses a danger to China itself. In the meantime
we can only expect more provocative actions from Pyongyang and an increased focus on the
military at the expense of the rest of the population as the economic and social situation further
destabilises the country.
—
Michael Jefferson

Michael works in public affairs for an international bank. He has extensive experience in public policy and
international relations from his current role as well as from his time working for the UK Government on
international trade. He has an MA in Japanese from St Catherine’s College, Oxford specialising in Japanese
politics and international relations.