Military History

Confederates in Ethiopia: American industrial warfare and Egyptian imperialism in central Africa

May 6, 2017 by James A. Fargher

By James A. Fargher

Loring’s recollections of his time in Ethiopia provide a fascinating glimpse into one of the 19th century’s intra-African wars, fought in an area of the world virtually unknown to Europeans and Americans at the time.

The 1874-1884 Egyptian-Ethiopian War is one of the 19th century’s more obscure conflicts. One of the most surprising aspects of the conflict is that it involved a group of ex-Confederate officers who had been hired by an Ottoman viceroy to conquer an empire in central Africa. These Confederate veterans had fought in the US Civil War, in part to preserve a social system based on the enslavement of Africans and their descendants. However, along with some Union officers, less than five years after the fall of the Confederacy they found themselves posted over 6,000 miles away from home, in new uniforms and leading columns of African troops into the Ethiopian highlands.

Though technically a self-governing province of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt was ruled by the ambitious Khedive Ismail (1863 – 1879) who dreamed of elevating his kingdom to the stature of one of the great European powers. In order to do so, he planned to push Egypt’s borders south to Lake Victoria and to encompass everything above the Equator between the Sahara Desert in the west and the Indian Ocean in the east.[1] This included consolidating Egypt’s grip over the vast territory of Sudan, which was already ruled as an Egyptian colony, and establishing Egyptian hegemony over the east coast of Africa from Suez to Somalia.

Ismail became convinced that the new methods of warfare pioneered by the Americans could make his vision a reality by modernising the Egyptian army. Egypt was the wealthiest and most developed state in northeastern Africa in the 1870s, but less powerful empires and kingdoms in the region, including Ethiopia, were still capable of meeting the Egyptian challenge. The armies of Emperor Yohannes IV of Ethiopia, for example, vastly outnumbered Egyptian expeditionary forces. Ismail recognised that he would need to introduce technological innovations and reforms into his army before he could begin his conquest of the African interior. The khedive was therefore somewhat ahead of his time, as contemporary Europeans continued to look to the wars of the 18^th century for guidance on all matters tactical and strategic.[2]

The Khedive was originally introduced to the idea of hiring American officers to reorganize his army when he met Thaddeus Mott, an ex-Union artillery officer, and adventurer in the sultan’s court in Constantinople in 1868.[3] Mott regaled Ismail with testimonies about the advances the Americans had achieved in technology and tactics during the US Civil War that he convinced the Khedive to hire American veterans to oversee the modernisation of Egypt’s armed forces. In 1870, the first of these military overseers, ex-Confederate officers Henry Hopkins Sibley and William Wing Loring, arrived in Egypt on the recommendation of General William Tecumseh Sherman.[4]

Initially, these men were put to work designing coastal fortifications and lighthouses, with later arrivals helping to conduct surveys of the African territory already under Egyptian control.[5] In 1874 the Khedive launched an invasion of the ancient Christian empire of Ethiopia, Egypt’s principal rival in northeastern Africa, with his armies led in part by American officers.

One of these officers, William W. Loring, published a memoir of his experience in the Ethiopian War. A North Carolinian, Loring sided with the Confederacy during the Civil War and was put in command of an army in northwestern Virginia. He subsequently served in the western theatre until the collapse of the Confederacy in 1865. In 1870, he was appointed by the Khedive as Inspector-General of the Egyptian army, and in 1875 he was promoted to become the chief of staff to the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian military expedition in Ethiopia.

Loring’s recollections of his time in Ethiopia provide a fascinating glimpse into one of the 19th century’s intra-African wars, fought in an area of the world virtually unknown to Europeans and Americans at the time.[6] Twice, Egyptian columns marched deep into the interior of Ethiopia, once from the Red Sea coast and once from the Sudan, only to be met by an overwhelming number of enemy forces. Although the Egyptians were better equipped than their medieval Ethiopian counterparts, who were often armed with swords and chainmail, they operated on extended supply lines deep inside enemy territory. On both occasions, the Egyptian columns were crushed by the sheer weight of Ethiopian numbers.

American officers played a small but noteworthy role in orchestrating these campaigns. At the Battle of Gura in 1876, for example, William Loring may have altered the course of the war by taunting his Egyptian commanding officer into action. Confronted by an Ethiopian detachment which outnumbered his column, the Egyptian commander was goaded by Loring into leaving the safety of a local fortress and marching out to meet the Ethiopians in the open plain.[7] The ensuing battle was a disaster as the Egyptian column was overwhelmed, forcing a general retreat. The war subsequently lapsed into a stalemate until the British admiral Sir William Hewett brokered a final peace treaty in 1884.[8]

Egypt’s attempts to conquer Ethiopia were effectively extinguished after the Battle of Gura. The involvement of US Civil War veterans in the Egyptian-Ethiopian War has ended only as a fascinating footnote in the history of Egypt’s failed attempt to forge an African empire. The legacy of these American officers, however, is intertwined with the memory of Egyptian imperialism which continues to overshadow regional relationships in northeastern Africa in the present day.

James is a second-year doctoral candidate in the Laughton Naval Unit specialising in British imperial and naval history.

Notes:

[1] Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, 1876-1912 (London: Abacus, 1991), 77.

[2] Margaret MacMillan, ‘Thinking About War Before 1914,’ Lecture, Humanitas Lectures from University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 10 February 2014.

[3] Cassandra Vivian, Americans in Egypt, 1770-1915: Explorers, Consuls, Travelers, Soldiers, Missionaries, Writers, and Scientists (Jefferson: McFarland & Co., 2012), 171.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., 172.

[6] William Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1884).

[7] Ibid.

[8] Bennet Burleigh, Desert Warfare: Being the Chronicle of the Eastern Soudan Campaign (London: Chapman and Hall, 1884) 235.

Feature image: Miniature toy figures depicting the Egyptian confrontation with Ethiopian warriors (1875), available here: https://agrabbagofgames.wordpress.com/2017/01/12/a-ridge-too-far-the-egyptian-invasion-of-ethiopia-1875/

Book Review: Belfast to Benghazi

October 10, 2016 by Andrea Varsori

Reviewed by: Andrea Varsori

Rupert Wieloch, Belfast to Benghazi: Untold challenges of war, (Cirencester: Mereo Books), 2016; ISBN-13: 978-1861515667

War is a notoriously complex event. It impacts the life of thousands of individuals, each of which with her own different perspective on the conflict. For this reason, personal records are invaluable in helping to grasp the multifaceted reality of war. Rupert Wieloch’s book, Belfast to Benghazi, is important in this respect. It is an account of contemporary conflict through the eyes of a British officer. The author aims at telling his experience, as he hopes that “this book [may open] eyes on some unheralded escapades”, as well as adding “colour to some historical events”^[1]. Thus, the book eschews the theoretical debates of academia as well as the short-term attitude of the daily news cycle. The book is a detailed account of Wieloch’s experiences. During his military career, he took part in some of the most important deployments of the British Army in the last thirty years.

Each of the six chapters focuses on a particular operation and, more briefly, on the years in-between. The first chapter relates Wieloch’s activity as a Rifle Platoon Commander in Belfast in 1981. The second deals with his deployment in Cyprus in 1989 and his involvement in the Gulf War, dealing with the logistical effort as well as with the actions of his men in Kuwait. The third chapter reports his squadron’s deployment in Maglaj, Bosnia, in 1995. The second half of the book is instead devoted to the post-9/11 world. Wieloch details his contribution in shaping the United Kingdom’s response to 9/11, in the frantic last months of 2001, as a member of the “concept team” that operated between Shrivenham and Whitehall for Operation Veritas. After experiencing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he volunteered for the role of Commander of the British contingent and Chief of Staff of the NATO Mission in Baghdad, serving in the place for six months in 2008. In his last role, he acted as Senior British Military Commander in Libya, starting some days before the death of Gheddafi until April 2012.

Throughout the book, Wieloch consistently delivers a detailed report of the events in which he was involved. However, care in relating his activity may at times seem excessive, as the author is keen on including several small, isolated episodes in his narration. These episodes are sometimes hardly necessary, other than for completeness’ sake. Yet, those who are interested in the campaigns in which Wieloch was involved will surely be drawn to understanding how his regiment contributed to each particular operation. For instance, with regard to Northern Ireland, the account covers such important aspects as the organisation of patrols in West Belfast^{^[2]}, the importance of collecting intelligence from the population^{^[3]}, and the reaction to terrorist attacks^{^[4]}. Besides the less important anecdotes, a positive aspect of the book lies in avoiding becoming a romanticised autobiography or an overly ambitious reflection on abstract concepts. Opting instead for sharing with the reader the real tasks and options for a British officer in conflict.

The completeness of Weiloch’s account includes not only the facts, but also a heathy degree of criticism, whose object changes depending on the areas and activities narrated. In chapter 3, he reveals the corruption and vanity of Bosnian politicians^{^[5]}; in the chapter on the post-9/11, he notes the reluctance of British policymakers in accepting changes to potentially wrong decisions on which their minds are already set (for instance, the importance of capturing Osama Bin Laden^{^[6]}). The overwhelming influence of the United States on Whitehall’s stance since late October 2001 is also duly noted^{^[7]}. In the chapter on Iraq, the inadequacies in managing post-conflict reconstruction take centre stage^{^[8]}. While Wieloch underlines the positive results in providing military training to Iraqi security forces, he also consistently points out the inefficiency and setbacks of the British presence in Basra^{^[9]}. Finally, in the chapter on Libya, the author explains how the government’s choice of not recognising the presence of British troops on the ground (choice on which the author does not express any judgement) nonetheless meant that the British contingent was formally without budget or mail deliveries.

Weiloch maintains a clear, coherent writing style with a critical drive. Despite covering a varied range of activities, such as managing humanitarian operations, shaping policy response, or coordinating entire military missions. As a result, the book equally reveals a view from the inside of policy-making and military management. The attempt to translate policy or mission objectives into a set of actions and practices clashes often with the reality on the ground. Wieloch has thus to face the need to take into account local powerbrokers (as in Bosnia^{^[10]}), to request vital new equipment for his soldiers (as in Iraq^{^[11]} and Afghanistan^{^[12]}), or to consider the role of culture and religion in engaging with the local elites and population (as in Libya^{^[13]}).

This last point is particularly emblematic. In the chapter on Libya, the author underlines how essential for him was the familiarity with local culture, religion, and political practices. In this way, Wieloch effectively conveys the fundamental importance of knowing the people that are involved in conflict. The book emphasises this stance and supports it with real examples, leading us to forgive its several small digressions. By doing this, Wieloch also gives an advice that will be helpful for many commanders in the wars to come. As for the book on its whole, another aspect of its importance lies in the disclosure of the complex work of those who operate between politically-dictated strategy and action on the ground. As the wide range of operations of the British Army goes often unrecognised, Belfast to Benghazi may raise the public’s awareness of the difficult work of officers and of the multifaceted role of the armed forces in the world today.

Andrea is an MPhil candidate at the Department of War Studies. His research project focuses on security issues in mega-cities of the Global South: in particular, he is interested in understanding the role of the urban environment in shaping organized political violence. Andrea holds an MA in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Bologna; he is also an alumnus from the Institute of Advanced Studies at the same university. His main interests include the evolution of insurgency, urban riots, the crisis of classic state sovereignty, civil wars and, generally, all forms of global mayhem.

Notes:

^{^[1]} R. Wieloch, Belfast to Benghazi. Untold challenges of war, Cirencester, Mereo Books, 2016, IV-V.

^{^[2]} Ibid. pp. 6-8, 11-12.

^{^[3]} Ibid. pp. 9-10. Interestingly, a similar point is raised later in the chapter on Bosnia. Talking profusely with the local population is presented as paramount in securing the inhabitants’ respect and ensuring the regiment’s freedom of movement. ibid. p. 109.

^{^[4]} Ibid. pp. 18-23.

^{^[5]} Ibid. pp. 95, 103, 118.

^{^[6]} Ibid. p. 151.

^{^[7]} Ibid. p. 159.

^{^[8]} Ibid. p. 194.

^{^[9]} Ibid. pp. 198-199, 207-208. A point emphasised by Wieloch in these pages is the effect of the high turnout of soldiers in the city, which “prevented the British forces from developing the meaningful relationships” that would have avoided a hike in insecurity and insurgent attacks.

^{^[10]} Ibid. pp. 99-100, 104-105, 107.

^{^[11]} Ibid. pp. 199-200.

^{^[12]} Ibid. pp. 203-205.

^{^[13]} Ibid. pp. 247, 249-250, 288-89.

Image Credit: US Army Europe (2014), Available from: https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyeurope_images/14445596924 (Accessed Oct 10 2016)

With rifle and bibliography: General Mattis on professional reading

May 7, 2013 by Strife Staff

By Jill R. Russell

In late 2003 a colleague of General James Mattis wrote to him asking for a few words on the
importance of reading and military history for the officer, even where it might seem that one was
“too busy to read.” His response went viral over email – had it been in the time of Twitter this
blog piece would be unnecessary. But it enjoyed a wide distribution within the Marine Corps,
and eventually arrived in my inbox. As a military historian, I cannot minimize my appreciation
that he wrote so eloquently on the subject. If it were only for that, the essay would be valuable.
But his writing is valuable also because we rarely have opportunities to hear the unfiltered
thoughts of leaders as well for his role in the history of recent conflicts.

Much is written and [believed to be] known about the General as a warrior. Less is known about
him as a true student of his profession. I would submit that it is quite impossible to correctly
understand the former without a proper interrogation of the latter. By this I mean that one must
first accept that a significant body of intellectual material sustains his actions and opinions –
as is indicated in the messages, he devotes real effort to this aspect of his work. So, there is a
base of knowledge that is always growing. On top of that are the benefits which accrue to those
who think and critically engage with such material. Furthermore, there is his consideration of
the views of others – as in the breadth of his reading or response to my comments – suggesting
that he had not fallen prey to the hubris of the powerful, which is to believe they have all of the
answers. Good leaders don’t only hear “yes” from the people around them. Thus, the insight
these words give to his thinking and interests is invaluable.

I also have to note that from a historian’s perspective this professional practice is fascinating.
It is Hegel hurled at the maelstrom of emergent Clio, a manifestation of E.H. Carr’s “unending
dialogue between past and present.” There is an awful popular tendency to try to use history
prescriptively. This is a bad, bad idea. Very often the lessons relied upon are incorrect or
inappropriate. However, history – from quality works – as a critical thinking process, whose
substance also furthers understanding [of regions, types of events, etc.] can inform posterity to
good effect. The General’s essay is an exposition of this principle.

Published with his permission, I would like to make perfectly clear that except where I excised
personal details regarding his correspondent, these messages are as he wrote them. I have,
according to the current practice in the historical community, left them as they were in the
originals. If there is shorthand, abbreviations or minor errors, they reflect the reality that these
were originally private correspondence. It was not the General’s expectation at the time that they
would be made public. In return for the odd aesthetic wobble, what you get is a rare insight into
the thinking of a general officer, an experienced and battle tested commanding officer, on how
he thinks about materials and issues critically important to his profession and (by virtue of the
public nature of his profession) posterity.

Finally, note that these messages were written in the months leading up to his deployment to
Iraq in command of I MEF in February of 2004.

Message 1: from General James Mattis, on the matter of professional reading, 20 November
2003

….The problem with being too busy to read is that you learn by experience (or by your men’s
experience), i.e. the hard way. By reading, you learn through others’ experiences, generally a
better way to do business, especially in our line of work where the consequences of
incompetence are so final for young men.

Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation, never at a loss for
how any problem has been addressed (successfully or unsuccessfully) before. It doesn’t give
me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead.

With TF 58, I had w/ me Slim’s book, books about the Russian and British experiences in AFG,
and a couple others. Going into Iraq, “The Siege” (about the Brits’ defeat at Al Kut in WW I) was
req’d reading for field grade officers. I also had Slim’s book; reviewed T.E. Lawrence’s “Seven
Pillars of Wisdom”; a good book about the life of Gertrude Bell (the Brit archaeologist who
virtually founded the modern Iraq state in the aftermath of WW I and the fall of the Ottoman
empire); and “From Beirut to Jerusalem”. I also went deeply into Liddell Hart’s book on
Sherman, and Fuller’s book on Alexander the Great got a lot of my attention (although I never
imagined that my HQ would end up only 500 meters from where he lay in state in Babylon).

Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face NOTHING new under the sun.
For all the “4th Generation of War” intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of
war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc, I must respectfully say… “Not
really”: Alex the Great would not be in the least bit perplexed by the enemy that we face right
now in Iraq, and our leaders going into this fight do their troops a disservice by not studying
(studying, vice just reading) the men who have gone before us.

We have been fighting on this planet for 5000 years and we should take advantage of their
experience. “Winging it” and filling body bags as we sort out what works reminds us of the
moral dictates and the cost of incompetence in our profession. As commanders and staff
officers, we are coaches and sentries for our units: how can we coach anything if we don’t
know a hell of a lot more than just the TTPs? What happens when you’re on a dynamic
battlefield and things are changing faster than higher HQ can stay abreast? Do you not
adapt because you cannot conceptualize faster than the enemy’s adaptation? (Darwin has
a pretty good theory about the outcome for those who cannot adapt to changing
circumstance — in the information age things can change rather abruptly and at warp
speed, especially the moral high ground which our regimented thinkers cede far too quickly
in our recent fights.) And how can you be a sentinel and not have your unit caught
flat-footed if you don’t know what the warning signs are — that your unit’s preps are not
sufficient for the specifics of a tasking that you have not anticipated?

Perhaps if you are in support functions waiting on the warfighters to spell out the specifics of
what you are to do, you can avoid the consequences of not reading. Those who must adapt to
overcoming an independent enemy’s will are not allowed that luxury.

This is not new to the USMC approach to warfighting — Going into Kuwait 12 years ago, I
read (and reread) Rommel’s Papers (remember “Kampstaffel”?), Montgomery’s book (“Eyes
Officers”…), “Grant Takes Command” (need for commanders to get along, “commanders’
relationships” being more important than “command relationships”), and some others. As a
result, the enemy has paid when I had the opportunity to go against them, and I believe that
many of my young guys lived because I didn’t waste their lives because I didn’t have the vision
in my mind of how to destroy the enemy at least cost to our guys and to the innocents on the
battlefields.

Hope this answers your question…. I will cc my ADC in the event he can add to this. He is the
only officer I know who has read more than I.

Semper Fi, Mattis

———-

Message 2: from Jill Russell to General Mattis, 26 November 2003

Sir,

Your message to [the] Colonel…was forwarded to me by a colleague - as I am a military
historian he knew I would appreciate its content. I offer here a response to one portion of your
message, which, taken as a whole, was as eloquent a statement on the value of history as I’ve
come across.

You wrote: “For all the “4th Generation of War” intellectuals running around today saying that
the nature of war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc, I must respectfully
say… ‘Not really’ ….”

I would submit that the 4GW thinkers do not at all eschew the study of military history. If you
take Van Creveld’s On Future War as an example of the genre, his entire case is based on an
examination of aspects of war across the full span of military history. Take as an example of
this his treatment of the changing ideas about prisoners of war, who were at one time in history

allowed “parole” to travel home to collect a ransom payment. If there is any concern amongst
4GW thinkers regarding the use of military history to inform current thoughts on military affairs,
it is directed at the dead hand of recent operational and strategic history, where past success
and dominance are used to define the future, even if [the] future of warfare seems headed
elsewhere.

If I were going to Iraq in the winter of 2004, I might include a few books on the CAP and Evans
Carlson. (It’s a pity that the new bio of him will not be out in time.) I think of these not because
they are particularly or specifically prescriptive for the current situation, but rather as examples
of Marines in history who looked at a situation and arrived at an answer that differed from
the standard. (Are the donkeys a sign of genius rather than weakness?) That each of these
unorthodox answers turned out to be correct in many respects is gravy. Also, Evans Carlson
was himself an avid reader, bringing many varied volumes with him on his travels throughout
China during 1937/8. My favorite amongst his selections was The Education of Henry Adams.
Of course, I would be more than just curious to hear your selections.

Best wishes for a very happy Thanksgiving to you and your Marines.

V/R

Jill Sargent Russell

——-

Message 3: from General Mattis to Jill Russell, 26 November 2003

Dear Ms Russell: Thank you for taking the time to write. I quickly scratched my note off to [the
Colonel] in response to a question and regret if my comments about 4th Generation of Warfare
stuff touched a raw nerve on some folks. I did not intend it personally or to anyone who studies
war; I have a problem with those who carry an ahistorical view of war into acceptance of the
latest bumper sticker; war in its various permutations is not new to me and some folks have
glommed onto 4th Generation of War concepts to say everything is new, history has little (no?)
place anymore because of how different things are, etc.

I regret any misunderstanding that my hastily written note has caused, wholly my responsibility.
That said, I appreciate your reading suggestions (obviously you don’t triangulate using bumper
stickers). My own “list” changes from mission to mission, location to location, etc, and perhaps
one day we can shoot the breeze about good books (my best new ideas, of course, come from
the old books, which are a passion with me). Until then, I am happy to know that we have folks
like you studying military history, engaged in deciphering what is going on from an
unregimented, intellectually rigorous perspective.

Best wishes and Semper Fi, Mattis

Jill S. Russell is a military historian and doctoral candidate at King’s College London who writes frequently on contemporary foreign policy and security issues. She is a regular contributor to Strife, Kings of War and Small Wars. You can follow her on Twitter @jsargentr.

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