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Do we need a European Army?

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By: Sarah Katharina Kayß

The EU Parliament passed a resolution in November 2016 to create a defense union in the wake of numerous threats to the continent and also calling for increased defence spending.

The 2016 White Paper[1], concerning the development of German defensive interests, defined an inter-European military coalition to be at the centre of Germany’s role within the European Union (EU). The opinions of young officer cadets in the United Kingdom and Germany, however, were highly divergent in relation to a European defence alliance. The results of a study carried out in 2014 with 755 officer cadets from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and the Military Officer School (Offizierschule des Heeres) in Dresden did not only reflect the Euro-skeptic position of the British people (which reached its peak in 2016 with “Brexit”), but also the German soldiers’ sceptical position in regards to a Europeanisation of military matters.

Approaches Towards a European Army

More than half of the British and German army officer cadets were unable to imagine the creation of a transnational European army serving as a supplement to their existing national forces. Although more British than German cadets were able to imagine the creation of a European army, considerably more British (65%) than German cadets (40%) opposed such an enterprise overall.

The majority of British cadets who were not in favour of the establishment of a European army referred to language and educational barriers between Europe’s soldiers and were not able to imagine being commanded by officers from other European nations. Many of them also questioned the fighting strength of a European army, since they believed that most of their comrades’ occupational motivation was nationally focused, making it difficult for them to represent European and not primarily British interests. The majority of the German cadets, in contrast, felt no potential conflict of interest regarding this matter and referred to already existing commitments to NATO as well as collective interests within the EU.

Both British and German cadets reckoned that logistical and conceptual problems would hinder the realisation of a European army: soldiers from both countries referred to problems in terms of sovereignty, deployment issues, and the balance between family and work just as much as the cultural and economic differences within the EU, possibly hindering international cooperation in a European Army framework.

Noticeably, many of the British soldiers referred to Britain’s “special relationship with the continent”–“geographically we do belong to Europe, but mentally I feel that Britain is a separate state,” one of the British cadets explained, adding that many British people feared the establishment of a European super state. In such a state, according to the aspiring British officer, Britain would only be one of many countries, which would not do justice to Britain’s imperial history as a world power. Furthermore, the officer cadets at Sandhurst feared that increased cooperation on a European level could amount to the dissolution of British military traditions that have existed for centuries.

Although in total, more German than British officer cadets were positive about the establishment of a European army, the German soldiers also referred to cultural differences between European nations and their fear of a unified military due to the EU still being in its infancy. One German cadet noted that “many Europeans don’t perceive themselves as European and therefore cannot cooperate on a European [army].”

Joint Combat Training for EU officer cadets?

Regarding the costs and benefits of a European Army and the budget cuts in many European forces, the attitude of the British cadets was considerably more dismissive than that of their German counterparts. The biggest difference between the soldiers’ approaches related to the joint combat training of EU junior leadership staff–whereas more than half of the German cadets welcomed joint combat training, the same proportion of British cadets strongly opposed it.

The British cadets were only willing to accept a merging of the aspiring European officers’ training in the framework of direct operational preparation for deployment in missions abroad. Many of the German cadets, in contrast, welcomed joint military training within the EU in order to improve their level of interoperability. Officer cadets from both nations who advocated the merging of combat training on a European level referred to the chance to learn from the strengths of their counterparts in order to develop a better understanding of the culturally-shaped conduct of their future coalition partners.

Only German cadets, however, spoke about the development of a multinational camaraderie and the attainment of equal standards in the framework of this training. The British cadets referred to the dangers of potentially losing national identity through joint training and the danger of disclosing sensitive information and specific army tactics towards a potential enemy nation. The last point was also picked up by the German cadets, implying that some British and German cadets can still imagine a potential war between EU states.

The British cadets’ critical attitude towards joint military training was, however, not always attributable to a collective disinterest in cooperating with soldiers from other European nations, but rather directed towards their perceptions of a dysfunctional EU. One of the British cadets explained his generally critical attitude towards military cooperation on a European level by stating that, “everyone wants to do what they are accustomed to and barely anyone wants to give up their own traditions just to work as part of a collective.”

The officer cadets’ views of Europe’s past did account for a large proportion of their different perceptions towards the EU today. Whereas a large proportion of the British cadets saw the European community as a quarrelsome, unstable construct, the majority of the German cadets considered the growing European community as profitable and empowering.

The Perception of Europe and the EU

What first came to mind when the majority of British soldiers talked about European history was war, violence and destruction, as well as disunity and chaos. The German cadets, by contrast, placed concepts such as community, cooperation, and a strengthening of the continent after the Second World War at the centre of their perceptions of European history. Although the majority of the German cadets, like the British soldiers, did not class themselves primarily as Europeans, the German junior leaders considered themselves as a part of Europe, and interpreted the collective growth of European states within the EU to be a result of the continent’s history stamped out of war. Only a few Sandhurst cadets shared this attitude. For example, one cadet stated that his “perception of Europe is entirely based on my knowledge of European history, a (…) continent transfixed in a vicious circle of crises”.

The aspiring British officers frequently indicated that they lacked an understanding of and were confused about European history ̶ seemingly always pervading to claims of power and competitiveness. “What I have learned about Europe seems to me like a big mess. It could be said: British history went back and forth – but I see more durability here than with European history. (…) Perhaps the Europeans have a crisis of identity resulting from all these wars, crises, and conflicts, which they try to fill with their notion of a United Europe,” one of the British cadets explained.

Regarding the British people’s decision to leave the EU, the outcome of the referendum—the so-called “Brexit”—in June 2016 had already been alluded to in 2014. That is, in contrast to the majority of German cadets (71%), only one in four British cadets acted on the assumption that their country’s relationship with the EU would grow in the coming years. The result was similar regarding the EU’s role in military affairs. Whereas 62% of the German cadets assumed that the EU would play a bigger role in future military affairs, 44% of the British cadets dismissed such a change.

“Britain increasingly isolates itself from Europe. Unfounded anxieties are the basis for this. It has become trendy to talk negatively about the EU and to demand that we are able to trade and act with self-determination”, one British cadet reported in an interview in winter 2014. Whereas the  cadets at Sandhurst considered British history to be the foundation of their national pride, the majority of the German cadets considered German history as a lesson. For example, “I believe history helps us to recognise what we do not want again; namely a war between the nations of Europe,” one of the aspiring German officers explained. One of his comrades added, “I simply have to listen to the history of my parents and grandparents, and compare it with the current positive situation – the EU is a peace project.”

It remains to be analysed whether the ongoing refugee crisis, Brexit, the rise of nationalism in different European states, and the uncertain role of NATO after the election of Donald Trump to the White House have changed the British and German cadets’ perceptions towards European military defence. Should European politicians continue to call for a European army, not only should the possibility of implementing this army in the future be examined more thoroughly, but it should also be ascertained whether the soldiers and officers of European nations are actually willing to serve in such an army.

Dr. Sarah Katharina Kayß studied History and Comparative Religion at Ruhr-Universität Bochum and Modern History at King’s College London. Her PhD research at the War Studies Department at King’s College London examined British and German army officer cadets perceptions of history and their influence on the professional identity . She is currently teaching in the War and Conflict Studies Masters programme at the University of Potsdam, Germany.

This article was translated from German by Harry Prestwich (harry_prestwich@yahoo.co.uk) who is a student at the University of Manchester, studying History and German. You can read the article in the German version here.

Notes:

[1] http://bit.ly/2m5tNIf

[2] https://kcl.academia.edu/SarahKatharinaKay%C3%9F

Image source: http://www.awdnews.com/images/14670245351.jpg

Book Review: Belfast to Benghazi

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Reviewed by: Andrea Varsori

Rupert Wieloch, Belfast to Benghazi: Untold challenges of war, (Cirencester: Mereo Books), 2016; ISBN-13: 978-1861515667

belfast-to-benghazi
Background Image: British Army Soldier marching to his rally point during Saber Strike Exercise (Joint Multinational Training Exercise) at Adazi Training Area, Latvia on June 17, 2014. S. (Source: Flickr; US Army Europe)

War is a notoriously complex event. It impacts the life of thousands of individuals, each of which with her own different perspective on the conflict. For this reason, personal records are invaluable in helping to grasp the multifaceted reality of war. Rupert Wieloch’s book, Belfast to Benghazi, is important in this respect. It is an account of contemporary conflict through the eyes of a British officer. The author aims at telling his experience, as he hopes that “this book [may open] eyes on some unheralded escapades”, as well as adding “colour to some historical events”[1]. Thus, the book eschews the theoretical debates of academia as well as the short-term attitude of the daily news cycle. The book is a detailed account of Wieloch’s experiences. During his military career, he took part in some of the most important deployments of the British Army in the last thirty years.

Each of the six chapters focuses on a particular operation and, more briefly, on the years in-between. The first chapter relates Wieloch’s activity as a Rifle Platoon Commander in Belfast in 1981. The second deals with his deployment in Cyprus in 1989 and his involvement in the Gulf War, dealing with the logistical effort as well as with the actions of his men in Kuwait. The third chapter reports his squadron’s deployment in Maglaj, Bosnia, in 1995. The second half of the book is instead devoted to the post-9/11 world. Wieloch details his contribution in shaping the United Kingdom’s response to 9/11, in the frantic last months of 2001, as a member of the “concept team” that operated between Shrivenham and Whitehall for Operation Veritas. After experiencing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he volunteered for the role of Commander of the British contingent and Chief of Staff of the NATO Mission in Baghdad, serving in the place for six months in 2008. In his last role, he acted as Senior British Military Commander in Libya, starting some days before the death of Gheddafi until April 2012.

Throughout the book, Wieloch consistently delivers a detailed report of the events in which he was involved. However, care in relating his activity may at times seem excessive, as the author is keen on including several small, isolated episodes in his narration. These episodes are sometimes hardly necessary, other than for completeness’ sake. Yet, those who are interested in the campaigns in which Wieloch was involved will surely be drawn to understanding how his regiment contributed to each particular operation. For instance, with regard to Northern Ireland, the account covers such important aspects as the organisation of patrols in West Belfast[2], the importance of collecting intelligence from the population[3], and the reaction to terrorist attacks[4]. Besides the less important anecdotes, a positive aspect of the book lies in avoiding becoming a romanticised autobiography or an overly ambitious reflection on abstract concepts. Opting instead for sharing with the reader the real tasks and options for a British officer in conflict.

The completeness of Weiloch’s account includes not only the facts, but also a heathy degree of criticism, whose object changes depending on the areas and activities narrated. In chapter 3, he reveals the corruption and vanity of Bosnian politicians[5]; in the chapter on the post-9/11, he notes the reluctance of British policymakers in accepting changes to potentially wrong decisions on which their minds are already set (for instance, the importance of capturing Osama Bin Laden[6]). The overwhelming influence of the United States on Whitehall’s stance since late October 2001 is also duly noted[7]. In the chapter on Iraq, the inadequacies in managing post-conflict reconstruction take centre stage[8]. While Wieloch underlines the positive results in providing military training to Iraqi security forces, he also consistently points out the inefficiency and setbacks of the British presence in Basra[9]. Finally, in the chapter on Libya, the author explains how the government’s choice of not recognising the presence of British troops on the ground (choice on which the author does not express any judgement) nonetheless meant that the British contingent was formally without budget or mail deliveries.

Weiloch maintains a clear, coherent writing style with a critical drive. Despite covering a varied range of activities, such as managing humanitarian operations, shaping policy response, or coordinating entire military missions. As a result, the book equally reveals a view from the inside of policy-making and military management. The attempt to translate policy or mission objectives into a set of actions and practices clashes often with the reality on the ground. Wieloch has thus to face the need to take into account local powerbrokers (as in Bosnia[10]), to request vital new equipment for his soldiers (as in Iraq[11] and Afghanistan[12]), or to consider the role of culture and religion in engaging with the local elites and population (as in Libya[13]).

This last point is particularly emblematic. In the chapter on Libya, the author underlines how essential for him was the familiarity with local culture, religion, and political practices. In this way, Wieloch effectively conveys the fundamental importance of knowing the people that are involved in conflict. The book emphasises this stance and supports it with real examples, leading us to forgive its several small digressions. By doing this, Wieloch also gives an advice that will be helpful for many commanders in the wars to come. As for the book on its whole, another aspect of its importance lies in the disclosure of the complex work of those who operate between politically-dictated strategy and action on the ground. As the wide range of operations of the British Army goes often unrecognised, Belfast to Benghazi may raise the public’s awareness of the difficult work of officers and of the multifaceted role of the armed forces in the world today.

 

 

Andrea is an MPhil candidate at the Department of War Studies. His research project focuses on security issues in mega-cities of the Global South: in particular, he is interested in understanding the role of the urban environment in shaping organized political violence. Andrea holds an MA in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Bologna; he is also an alumnus from the Institute of Advanced Studies at the same university. His main interests include the evolution of insurgency, urban riots, the crisis of classic state sovereignty, civil wars and, generally, all forms of global mayhem.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] R. Wieloch, Belfast to Benghazi. Untold challenges of war, Cirencester, Mereo Books, 2016, IV-V.

[2] Ibid. pp. 6-8, 11-12.

[3] Ibid. pp. 9-10. Interestingly, a similar point is raised later in the chapter on Bosnia. Talking profusely with the local population is presented as paramount in securing the inhabitants’ respect and ensuring the regiment’s freedom of movement. ibid. p. 109.

[4] Ibid. pp. 18-23.

[5] Ibid. pp. 95, 103, 118.

[6] Ibid. p. 151.

[7] Ibid. p. 159.

[8] Ibid. p. 194.

[9] Ibid. pp. 198-199, 207-208. A point emphasised by Wieloch in these pages is the effect of the high turnout of soldiers in the city, which “prevented the British forces from developing the meaningful relationships” that would have avoided a hike in insecurity and insurgent attacks.

[10] Ibid. pp. 99-100, 104-105, 107.

[11] Ibid. pp. 199-200.

[12] Ibid. pp. 203-205.

[13] Ibid. pp. 247, 249-250, 288-89.

Image Credit: US Army Europe (2014), Available from: https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyeurope_images/14445596924 (Accessed Oct 10 2016)