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Strife Series on Human Rights, Security, and Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific - Introduction

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by Anna Tan

(Image Credit: Shannon Stapleton/Reuters)

 

Editorial

In recent years, the world has seen a rising number of civil protests and movements globally. The eruption of the Hong Kong crisis in mid-2019, where mainstream political dialogues reached a new level of fixation on the increasingly looming authoritarian power of China that pervades well beyond its mainland territories, shook many of us. The rise of China has been overwhelmingly redefining the overall regional security of the Asia Pacific, and how that development influences the shift in the nature of international relations is undoubtedly dependent on the alliance of the Asian countries with the West, especially with the United States.

Reflecting on Müllerson’s theory on the relationship of intrastate human rights and international security[1}, it is indisputable that China under Xi Jinping’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a very strong authoritarian state, and its overtly aggressive policies against Hong Kong’s mass civil resistance not just made headlines for an incredibly sustained period of time throughout the year, but also threatens the international stability by means of possible similar aggressions. It threatens liberal democratic values that are upheld by many free and democratic nations from across the world, especially in a time where American influence has been on a rapid decline since the assumption of the Trump administration. In the Asia Pacific, while nations such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea face new challenges in manoeuvring through the changing dynamics of international security now jeopardised by the “America first” policy of the United States, other countries such as Myanmar welcome the rising Chinese hegemony. Why and how does this happen?

This Strife Series explores the interplay between human rights and security through diplomatic exchanges in the Asia Pacific. The series analyses how in some countries, addressing human rights, democratic freedom and maintaining status quo national and/or regional security seem to be mutually exclusive at times instead of being mutually reinforcing, despite sharing the common factor of China’s domineering economic leverage.

Publications:

In the first article (12/2019) “China’s Turbulent Year: 2019”, Professor Kerry Brown analyses how China’s aggression in response to the Hong Kong protests and its draconian policies to the Uighur population in Xinjiang have both comparable ‘tit-for-tat’ elements that the Chinese leadership may not have thought through carefully, but will have detrimental consequences to the international opinion on China’s usually very cautious and deliberate efforts on maintaining its diplomatic image.

In the second article (01/2020) “China, Myanmar, War Crimes and the Issue of National Sovereignty”, Anna Tan looks at how Myanmar under Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership, has strangely shifted from being a Western ally during the landmark victories of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 2015 elections to an even stronger adherence to China’s orbit than ever before. She describes how the Sino-Burmese relations have evolved dramatically under the light of the Rohingya conflict in Rakhine and Myanmar’s subsequent genocide trial at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

The third article (03/2020) “Taiwan Elections: Continuity, Change and the Cross-Strait Conundrum”, Evita Liagka explores what the victories of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) under the leadership of Tsai Ing-wen could mean for the future of Taiwan and its cross-strait relations. She points out that the China-Hong Kong crisis came in a convenient timing for DPP’s mobilisation of garnering greater support than ever before and since the public consensus on maintaining the status quo international diplomatic status of Taiwan has remained largely unchanged, we might not see a drastic shift in DPP’s policies from its previous term. However, KMT’s recent decision to swerve away from its pro-China stances might pose newer challenges for Taiwan in the years ahead.

The final articles are contributed by Yeseul Woo, analysing North Asia’s security issues from the perspective of South Korea.

  • In Part 1 (02/2020) “South Korea’s Dangerous Silence on Human Rights Abuses in North Korea”, Yeseul Woo argues why the US lack of sponsorship in the UN Security Council meeting on the discussion of North Korea’s human rights issues should not mean that South Korea should remain silent. Ms Woo explains why, in fact, South Korea’s silence justified by the importance of the nuclear security framework would actually be counterproductive in regional security in the long run.
  • In Part 2 (03/2020) “The First Tech War? Why the Korea-Japan Tensions are about US-China Competition on AI”, Ms Woo further explains that South Korea’s silence on North Korea’s human rights issues for the sake of North Asia’s nuclear security (described in Part 1) is actually the result of the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations which has led to South Korea withdrawing from the GSOMIA pact. Though Seoul retracted its decision last minute, Ms Woo argues that the tensions between Seoul and Tokyo are less about the debate surrounding comfort women and wartime forced labour, and is actually influenced by the US-China competition on Artificial Intelligence (AI) in nuclear surveillance technology.
  1. Müllerson, R. (1997). “Human Rights Diplomacy.” Routledge.

Anna Tan is a postgraduate student for MSc Global Affairs at King’s College London. Her research is focused on how Western human rights diplomacy affects democracy and authoritarianism in Asia Pacific. She has previously worked for UNDP Myanmar and the American Red Cross, and is a member of the Programme Committee of the Conflict, Security and Development (CSD) Conference 2020 hosted by the Department of War Studies and the Department of International Development (DID). Anna holds a BSc in Neuroscience. You can follow her on Twitter: @AnnaTanGTW.

 

The rule of law or rule of politics? Narratives from Timor-Leste on tip-toeing the “law”

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By Sapna Reheem Shaila*

May 20th- Restoration of Independence day in Timor Leste, when the Constitution came into force in 2002, and Timor-Leste was given its sovereignty (credit image: Sapna Reheem Shaila)

 

Eighteen years ago, Timor-Leste was on the tip of the tongue of every international law enthusiast along with Kosovo, when the UN set its transitional administration in the country. After Timor-Leste restored its independence, international partners, especially the UN, assisted the country in adopting new laws and institutions as part of the ‘state-building’ initiatives.[1]Similar to other ‘state-building’ exercises in transitional states, it also emphasised on institutional building, and introducing laws to establish a society based on rule of law. These initiatives funded by bilateral and multilateral aid donors often set out to create a secure environment, build a society that respect the rule of law and restore stability within the state.[2] There are already various indices that exist globally to measure and assess how far these rule of law reforms have been consolidated in transitional states.[3] Often these global indicators measure a society’s commitment to rule of law, by analysing the extent formal institutions or legal frameworks are adopted within the state .This approach of analysing the success of rule of law interventions is what this article problematizes. The article argues that such an approach fails to capture the local realities in assessing how institutions or the individuals within the institutions pursue the true ends of ‘law’. In this article, the author takes a position that in order to truly capture to what extent a transitional society has embraced the goals of its rule of law reforms, one needs to pose different questions. Questions like what legal frameworks or institutions have been adopted?; or whether the legal processes were followed within the state?; do not give a clear picture as to how ‘laws’ can be manipulated or used as a tool by powerful individuals[4] who want to pursue their interests. Rather one needs to probe further as to the contexts wherein decisions were made within the confines of the legal provisions. This approach is particularly required in societies where law and its legality are still fluid.

As any other transitional state which is rebuilding its institutions with the assistance of the international community, Timor-Leste also commits to the rule of law. There is an emphasis on separation of powers, and how the different organs of the state are to co-operate yet respect the independence of each institution. It follows with a comprehensive constitutional text that lays the foundation for the constitutional identity of the State. [5] The presence of the international community has guaranteed a way for legal ideas and terminologies in international conventions to percolate into the local legal structures. However, laws do not create the certainty that they propound. The structures of law that are adopted as part of state-building exercises within the country are extensively based on the socio-political structures in Western democracies. As a result, law as an instrument that is transplanted in transitional societies attempts to rearrange power structures and re-order hierarchies of institutions (and along with it individuals), often overlooking how power is already vested locally.

Using the recent example of the political (rather constitutional) impasse evidenced after the opposition of the President against the Change for Progress Alliance (AMP)[6] nominees for the cabinet, this article highlights the double edged narratives on law and its institutions within Timor-Leste. Similar to other transitional societies, Timor-Leste also has its ‘heroes’[7]- individuals who played a significant role within and outside the country during the resistance struggle between 1975 and 1999. Many of these high-profile resistance ‘heroes’ have taken top political positions within the country post-independence,[8] and their differences are often fought out politically. But the presence of the international community and civil society has ensured that any controversial decision, which is made politically is neatly placed within the confines of the law.[9] What is not captured within the text, is how the law can be construed and used in different ways to compete by the revered figures in the society. In this reality, there is no absolute right as prescribed by the law, but just varying positions that receive legitimacy before the eyes of the ordinary citizens, who will follow the version of law as dictated by their favourite leaders. This dichotomy of the law or the fluidity of legal norms indicate the perceived legality of the political actions and decisions within the country are achieved by tip-toeing the true essence of rule of law. And from the interviews with the local stakeholders this became apparent that the ends of the law is dependent on the individual espousing it -leading to varying explanations as to how the law is ‘applied, conceived and lived rather than as universal truths’. [10]

 

Billboard congratulating the newly elected constitutional government after the elections in May. Xanana Gusmao ( left ) and Taur Matan Ruak ( right) played significant roles as resistance leaders during the struggle for Independence (Credit Image: Sapna Reheem Shaila)

 

On 21st June,2018 President, Lu Olo opposed eleven names on the list of nominees submitted by the newly elected AMP coalition for its cabinet[11] on the grounds of corruption and pending legal action.[12] The President invoked his opposition under Art. 106 (2) and Art. 86 (h) of the Constitution stating that members’ with impending charges and investigations cannot take public office. The President’s letter was opposed by Mr. Xanana Gusmao[13] - one of the most revered political figures in the country and one of the significant faces of the AMP coalition. Gusmao questioned the constitutional validity of the President’s opposition, on the grounds that the President had arbitrarily exercised his powers.[14] He argued that the President’s reasons for opposing the names were weak under the law. Xanana highlighted that there were no pending investigations or cases against the opposed nominees, and those who were convicted for various charges had already served their punishment under the law. [15] Therefore , he observed this an injustice and abrogation to the principle of presumption of innocence and double jeopardy.[16] He made a televised statement, with an official letter from the District Court in Dili to substantiate his claims as to how there are no ongoing charges against the proposed members, as suggested by the President.[17] Recent political discussions by legal scholars within the country identify this as a legal impasse and have appealed for political resolution on the issue.[18] Ordinarily, when there is a constitutional question similar to this, it is resolved legally by the Constitutional court- in Timor’s case the jurisdiction lies with the Court of Appeal. But in the absence of a precedent, or clarity as to how the President’s power should be interpreted, this situation has been left with no legal solution.

It is true, any law student or practising lawyer will expound the importance of the principles to ensure that the innocence of an individual is not questioned until convicted by a court of law or to guarantee that no one is tried twice on the same fact. Gusmao’s discontents seem to stem primarily from the fact that the President did not exercise his opposition earlier when the VIIth Government led by FRETILIN’s Mari Alkatiri nominated individuals with questionable integrity. A sentiment resonated by many of his supporters as well.[19] This allegation on the President’s impartiality and legality of his action becomes even more problematic when he has a conflict of interest as the President of the opposition party FRETILIN, since 2001.[20] Earlier, questions were raised on the impartiality of the President when he did not dissolve the minority FRETLIN government for failing to pass their budget in the Parliament for 10 months after the 2017 elections.[21] Despite these allegations, the civil society organisations(CSOs) have supported the President heralding his move as inspiring, and guidance for the future.[22] Finally, they find someone who is ready to stand against corruption. This impasse between the two charismatic resistance leaders (three- depending on where one would place PM Taur Matan Ruak), highlights the concerns expressed by one of the interviewees in an earlier discussion-“until all the ‘ema boot’[23] are in power, there will be no rule of law within the country.” [24] In July, the Parliament had retaliated legally by rejecting the travel plans of the President to Portugal under Art. 95 3 (h) of the Constitution, until a settlement was made on the issue. Almost three months after the swearing in of the new government, no resolution has been found on the matter. Even though this is the case, the Prime Minister has been successful in presenting his budget on 30th August 2018, with 53 votes supporting the motion. The President has approved the budget on 7 September 2018[25] albeit with an incomplete cabinet-[26] the implications of which are highlighted by the CSOs.[27] For the government staff and the local citizens this comes as a relief as many of them expressed how the budget is the most crucial part and that they are not concerned about anything else.[28] It looks like the recent success with the budget will bury the discontents of the June decision, with no substantial discussions on how such constitutional impasse should be resolved for the future. As of now, it has established an “unclear” precedent at best, within the country, wherein the President can oppose nominations for the cabinet from the PM. In a young democracy like Timor-Leste, it is essential to debate and negotiate how constitutional provisions should be interpreted and powers should be divided so that the value of democracy is strengthened for years to come. But this concern has definitely taken a back seat. And this will also provide a precedent to make controversial political moves under the veil of legal provisions, which are vague and which assume legality without any substantive deliberations from the judicial institutions. Thus in a way resulting in a paradox of the rule of law paradigm of establishing societies where application of laws are predictable.

In Timor-Leste as these events indicate, the excess of executive or political power is exercised within the ambit of law, and its legality argued under the veil of legal provisions. In these situations where the law is vague, and its legality fluid – it’s final stance is often determined by those who wield power socially within the country. In order to shift this power, a re- evaluation of social norms of what is acceptable and unacceptable has to be carried out. Until then, it is essential that ‘contexts’ are read along with the actions undertaken which are otherwise legal, and conform to the legislative texts.

 

Sapna is a Ph. D researcher in Law at King’s College, University of London. Her research focuses on the role of international actors in strengthening judiciaries in transitional states. Sapna worked as a research assistant to Centre for Small States, Queen Mary University of London, as well as with Bingham Centre for Rule of Law in London. She completed her B.A/ LLB Hons. from NALSAR (India) and LLM in Law, Development and Governance from SOAS, University of London.

Notes:

*The author wishes to express her gratitude to Mr. Bertanizo Ghuro da Costa, her research assistant who helped immensely with translations during the interviews, as well as collecting information from popular media in Timor-Leste.

[1] There is an extensive literature on democratic state building that looks at the importance of building legal structures and laws to lay the foundation for democracy within a transitional state, see for instance [1] Office of Democracy and Governance- USAID ‘Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality’ (2002) Washington; Legal Vice Presidency- World Bank, ‘Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform’ (2002), World Bank, Washington; Asian Development Bank, ‘Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank (2003) ADB, Philippines, .Timor- Leste’s initiatives on gaining assistance through UNDP for justice sector for instance dates back to 1999, see here http://www.tl.undp.org/content/timor_leste/en/home/governance.html is since the beginning, see

[2] Paris, Roland (2004), At Wars End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;

Connolly, William E. (2000), “The Liberal Image of the Nation,” in Ducan Ivison; Paul Patton; Will Sanders (eds.), Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 183-198

 

[3] See World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, here https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2017%E2%80%932018; Fund for Peace- Fragile State Index here http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/- see indicator P3 (Justice).

[4] For more discussion, see academic scholarship on Critical Legal Studies, for a brief introduction see here https://cyber.harvard.edu/bridge/CriticalTheory/critical2.htm

[5] Art. 1, Art. 69, Art. 2. Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor- Leste, available here http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Constitution_RDTL_ENG.pdf

[6] AMP is the continuation of the coalition party formed by the three opposition parties CNRT, PLP and Khunto after the July elections in 2017 when FRETLIN formed a weak minority government. See details here https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/a-new-era-of-political-coalitions-in-timor-leste/.

[7] See a discussion on the Timor-Leste’s veterans here: Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea and Pacific Islands Country Management Unit East Asia and Pacific Region, ‘ Defining Heroes: Key Lessons from the Creation of Veterans Policy in Timor-Leste’, September 30, 2008, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTIMORLESTE/Resources/DefiningHeroes.pdf

[8] Timor-Leste presidential election: revolutionary hero v new generation https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/20/timor-leste-presidential-election-revolutionary-hero-v-a-new-generation

[9] Within the legal literature, there is a distinction that is made between Rule of Law and Rule by law. The latter representing how law and legal structures are used to create a legality.

[10] For a more detailed discussion see Nelken, David ‘Using the concept of legal culture’, available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Nelken_-_Using_the_Concept_of_Legal_Culture.pdf

[11] Michael Sainsbury and Jose Belo, ‘ Turmoil for new Timor-leste PM as 11 ministerial nominations nixed’, available at https://www.ucanews.com/news/turmoil-for-new-timor-leste-pm-as-11-ministerial-nominations-nixed/82638

[12] Names of 11 cabinet nominees were initially opposed and at the time of writing this piece in August, this was reduced to 9.

[13] Xanana is often referred as ‘Maun Boot’ ( colloquially meaning Big brother) by the locals. He is often mentioned as the Father of the nation, for leading the armed resistance group against the Indonesians especially after the death of Nicolau Lobato. See details about his activities here https://www.xananagusmao.org/#raising

[14] A sentiment expressed by Ms. Carmelita Moniz in her interview with GMN on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6I8VrmsyIpY&t=2206s on 27 August 2018.

[15] Letter by Xanana Gusmao to the Prime Minister Taur Matan Ruak on 22 June 2018 (Portuguese), in file with the author.

[16] Ibid.

[17] See GMN discussion with Xanana Gusmao here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oRs7fEGxLPU on 12 July 2018.

[18] Interview with local lawyer Manuel Tilman with GMN on 12 July 2018, see here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K7xqpitAo0Y; Discussion with Carmelita Moniz and Dr. Aniceto Guterres in GMN, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6I8VrmsyIpY

[19] Interview with local citizen on 27th June; interview with a civil society representative 10th July, 2018.

[20] Informal conversation with local citizens on 26th June, 2018, 4th July 2018, 9th July 2018.See Michael Leach’s post to understand how the two major political parties are surviving to keep up their interests- ‘ A First Test for Timor-Leste’s Cohabitants’, available here https://insidestory.org.au/a-first-test-for-timor-lestes-cohabitants/

[21] Jose Sarito Amaral, ‘ Xanana Calls for Lu Olo to End Fretlin Influence’, 18th May 2018, Available at https://www.independente.tl/en/national/xanana-calls-for-lu-olo-to-end-fretilin-influence

[22] Meeting with CSO participant working on Anti- Corruption on 18th July, 2018; GMN Diario Nacional, ‘MERSAK encourages Lu Olo to keep his decision’, July 6, 2018; Interview with Joao Boavida on RTTL , available on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=98krp_AMGc8 ( Tetun) on 1st June 2018.

[23] Tetum word for respect, which literally translates to ‘big people’ and here indicative of the political leaders who were active during the resistance period and who play a significant role in the daily politics within the country.

[24] Interview with CSO Participant working on Justice Sector on 09 April, 2018.

[25] See a detailed discussion on the recently passed budget here, http://www.laohamutuk.org/econ/OGE17/16OGE17.htm#OGE2018

[26] Including key positions like Minister of Finance and Minister of Health are vacant.

[27] https://suara-timor-lorosae.com/governu-lakompletu-implika-ba-ezekusaun-oje/

[28] Interview with a staff member at Legal Training Centre 24 April 2018; Interview with staff member from Ministry of Justice 25 April 2018, interview with local citizen on 9th July 2019.Meeting with civil society member 10th July, 2018, informal discussions with local citizens on 23th July, 3rd August 2018.

 

Image Source: The pictures used in this article were taken by the author and provided to Strife Blog.

Sino-North Korean relationship: a rivalry in brewing?

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By Yiming Yu

 

The Sino-DPRK relationship has arguably gradually declined (Credit Image: 38north.org)

Interactions between China and North Korea always attract attention, particularly in the time of crisis. When Song Tao, a senior Chinese diplomat, visited the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in November 2017, to inform the outcome of Communist Party’s 19th Congress, the reports on this visit raised many observers’ eyebrows because these reports remained silent on whether the envoy had met with Kim Jong-Un, the leader of DPRK. Following the visit were the reports that China has been constructing a refugee camp next to the Sino-DPRK border. These are the latest controversial developments on the Sino-DPRK relationship amid increasing possibility of military confrontation between the US and North Korea over the latter’s nuclear programme. These tensions further fuel the speculation that the Sino-DPRK relationship, after decades of close connection, has been gradually in decline.

It is widely perceived that the friendship between China and DPRK, is ironclad, and that China is the latter’s closest ally. However, there have always existed tensions during the history of this bilateral relationship. According to Shen Zhihua, one of the most prominent Chinese Cold war historians, the Chinese military’s participation in the Korean War brought frustration instead of gratitude to Kim Il-sung’s, as he has hoped to achieve greater independence, in the fear of China’s influence. Despite a warmer relationship between 1958 and 1976, China’s efforts to forge a closer relationship with the US to both promote domestic reforms and counter the USSR resulted in isolating North Korea. After the end of the Cold War, China broke the promise of not establishing formal diplomatic relationship with South Korea and this symbolized betrayal in the eyes of DRPK. These events, as believed by Shen, while accommodating China’s needs to pursue its own strategic interests – normalisation of diplomatic relations and economic reforms – also contributed to shape North Korea’s determination to develop nuclear weapons, with the goal of being capable to defend itself.

China’s attitudes towards North Korea’s behaviours violating its interests have been extraordinarily moderate in comparison with the responses to other states’ similar acts. China has shown a relatively gentle tone when some violent incidents involving hostile behaviours by North Korean troops against Chinese civilians took place. For instance, a North Korean deserter committed, such as a robbery in 2014. The year before, the DPRK authorities had captured capture a Chinese fishing boat in 2013. China’s efforts in organizing the Six-Party meeting, which enlisted participation of the US, Russia, Japan, South Korea and DPRK, to find a peaceful solution to the nuclear crisis indeed showed China’s commitment to a denuclearized Peninsula though the most recent meeting was held in 2009 before DPRK withdrew. However, in the arena of the UN Security Council, China tried hard to ease punitive sanctions on DRPK. Beijing conditioned their support to UN resolutions imposing sanctions on North Korea to the removal of the toughest proposed measures, such as a full oil embargo, from the resolution’s draft. Also, while claiming to effortlessly push for denuclearisation, China’s economic ties with the DPRK – which have accounted for 90% of the latter’s foreign trade –had been closer before 2017 with the establishments of the Guomenwan border trade zone and of new trade routes. Only in the wake of the recent sanctions in 2017 did Sino-DPRK economic relationship start to decline. The latest figures from Chinese authorities showed that as of January 2018, China’s overall trade with DPRK has fallen to the lowest level since June 2014. After the Security Council passed the latest resolution imposing oil sanctions on North Korea in last December, an oil tanker linked with China was caught smuggling oil to a North Korean ship. The PRC was subsequently accused by US President Donald Trump of being involved in illicit oil trade. It is such self-contradictory attitude that leads to doubts regarding China’s commitments to addressing North Korea’s condemned behaviours. This also indicates the dilemma between regime stability and denuclearization now faced by China, which is shaped by a long history of relationship, geopolitics and even ideology.

It is fair to suggest that, the experiences of fighting together in the Korean War and providing countless aids to North Korea amid efforts against the “US imperialism” have laid historical and ideological foundation for the Sino-North Korean relationship. Among the Chinese population, it can be observed that pro-DPRK opinions still enjoy popularity among those who endorse socialism and those who hold anti-Western beliefs. The idea of abandoning North Korea will certainly spark resistance and criticism, not only because this may symbolize renouncing a long history of friendship and self-sacrifice, but it would also indicate subordination to the US’ request.

The geopolitical value of North Korea to China has always been cited among China’s domestic audience and even policymakers as the reason to stand behind its rogue neighbour. One of the reason why Mao Zedong was willing to concede disputed border territory to DPRK, as suggested by Shen, was that he hoped the latter would become a loyal ally to China in the Cold War. A similar trend of strategic thought has prevailed afterwards. With America’s presence in South Korea and Japan, there remains in China a prominent strand of vision that should the US successfully unifies the Peninsula into a pro-US liberal democracy, American forces would subsequently be deployed at the Sino-Korean border. Furthermore, it is believed that in the potential circumstance of a collapse of Kim’s regime, the flow of refugees, armed North Korean soldiers and fissile materials may wreak havoc at the Sino-DPRK border, threatening China’s own stability.

All these factors determine China’s preference towards the stability of Kim Jong-Un’s regime. While prioritising stability of Kim’s regime, it seems China is willing to achieve this goal at the expense of denuclearization in the short term. However, China is dealing with two other actors who do not share similar visions. China understands DPRK’s security concerns and thus points finger at the US in its official stance, blaming the US for escalating tensions. According to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the essence of tension lies in the US-DPRK relationship and Fu Ying, former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and currently chairing National People’s Congress Foreign Affairs Committee, claims that Washington refuses to address DPRK’s security concerns to solve the root cause of the crisis. Meanwhile, China is facing North Korea, which believes the development of nuclear weapons will independently ensure survival of the regime; and the USA which prioritises ending DPRK’s nuclear programme and which views regards DPRK’s efforts as a mean to develop offensive weapons. In other words, China, DPRK and the US fail to reach a consensus regarding the balance between regime stability and denuclearisation. With such a fundamental disagreement, it is impossible for China to achieve both a stability as well as an acceptance of DPRK as a nuclear state at the same time. If North Korea carries on developing nuclear weapons and conducting missile tests, with greater expectation from the international community and increasing possibility of US military strikes on DPRK, China will be facing greater pressure to influence Pyongyang. Even though, in reality China may not be as influential as expected. This will certainly challenge the likelihood of the Sino-DPRK relationship to remain on friendly terms. China’s strict implementation of sanctions as well as a growing displeasure over DPRK’s continuous defiance will inevitably result in deepening the latter’s resentment and insecurity.

Traditionally-prevailing opinions about the relationship with North Korea are now increasingly challenged in China. In addition to Shen, Jia Qingguo, a professor at Peking University, also surprisingly raises the point that China should prepare for the potential collapse of Kim’s regime and hence needs to cooperate with the US on a contingency plan. His opinion was harshly criticized by another Chinese scholar, Zhu Zhihua, who believes Jia’s proposals will in fact play into America and South Korea’s hands. This debate is actually a periscope of a larger argument among Chinese scholars on who should be held responsible for the current crisis and what China should do in the future, which is labelled as a left-right battle. Zhu’s opinions represent those leftists who, while supporting denuclearization, believe the US have sole responsibility in the crisis and are therefore suspicious about the US’ real intentions in solving it. In contrast, rightists in the likes of Jia believe China should reconsider or even abandon its close partnership with DPRK. While the debate does not signify any shifts in China’s policy towards DPRK, the widening room for different voices on this once-taboo subject actually echoes the ambivalence and dilemma of China’s policy towards North Korea.

The participation of North Korea in Winter Olympics held in PyeongChang, South Korea, in February and the prospect of US-DPRK talks seem to have appeased the recent tensions. However, it is too early to label these developments as a turning point. While it is certain that China and North Korea will maintain their relationship on surface, it is hard to expect whether China will continue to tolerate an increasingly out-of-control North Korea whilst the USA is still likely to maintain military pressure in the Korean Peninsula as response. With China increasingly facing the dilemmas between DPRK’s regime stability and denuclearisation process in the Peninsula, and the fact that its influence over DPRK is declining, amid outside pressure, it runs a greater risk of alienating DRPK to brew a potential rivalry.

 

Yiming Yu is currently a MA student from Conflict, Security and Development programme at King’s. His main academic interests are insurgency/counterinsurgency and peacekeeping but he has always been keeping an eye on East Asian security and China.

Image Source: https://www.38north.org/2017/09/jperson092617/

 

Strife Series on National Perspectives in North-East Asian Rivalries, Part III – The Taiwan issue and mismatching identities: an ontological security perspective

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By Dean Chen

The 2014 Sunflower Movement in Taiwan was widely seen as a societal backlash against further rapprochement between Mainland China and Taiwan, as well as an affirmation of Taiwanese identity (Credit: Lam Yik Fei / Getty Images)

The Taiwan issue is concerned with the political status of Taiwan: whether it should reunify with Mainland China, declare independence as Republic of Taiwan, or maintain the status quo of being de facto independent but de jure remaining within the ‘One China’ framework. While mainstream perspectives focus on Taiwan’s geopolitical significance and power politics involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC), United States, and Japan, this article looks at this issue from an angle of identity mismatch. The ‘national identity’ is concerned with how a nation perceives the ‘self’. The PRC’s identity as the representation of Chinese national rejuvenation with national reunification as an integral element is in contrast with the gradual development of Taiwanese identity as a separate country.

‘Ontological security’ provides inspiring theoretical perspectives to understand this identity mismatch. It is security of the self, the subjective understanding of who oneself is, which enables and motivates actions.[1] For individuals, having relatively stable understandings of the self enables them to make sense of their lives and act independently. When one is faced with ontological insecurity, connected to deep fear of uncertainty, one struggles to ‘get by in the world’[2]. Like individuals, nations also have identities. Similarly, they need certainty and security of the self. In the context of cross-strait relations, i.e. the relations between PRC and Taiwan (officially Republic of China, ROC), with both sides challenging each other’s ontological security, the insecurity of identity within both societies underlies their respective narratives and actions. Therefore, as argued in this paper, ontological security can contribute to understanding entrenched cross-strait divisions.

 

Credit: Wikimedia Commons

For the PRC, the ‘Taiwan issue’ is a matter of reunification. Mainland and Taiwan belong to ‘One China’, but are currently governed by two different authorities. National reunification has been an integral part of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) pledge since the establishment of the PRC in 1949. The ‘reunification narrative’ has created strong path dependency, to an extent that any change in direction of the unification policy would seriously undermine the CCP’s legitimacy. This strong commitment to reunification also prevails in the general public. Being taught in school that Taiwan is an ‘inalienable part of China’[3], while the notion of Mainlanders and Taiwanese being ‘compatriots’ is disseminated by official statements and state media[4], it is no wonder that the Chinese public strongly believes in reunification. In fact, Beijing has never ruled Taiwan, and the island basically functions like an independent country. But in the PRC’s official historical narrative, Taiwan was a province of Chinese dynasties, but was lost during the ‘century of humiliation’. This narrative associates this era, stretching from 1840 to 1949, in China with foreign invasion, subjugation and civil unrest. For instance, during this period, Taiwan was allegedly lost the Japanese Empire and separated from the Mainland due to communist-nationalist rivalries. Taiwan is one of the lost ‘seven sons’, a scar of China’s painful memories of colonialism and civil war which should be healed by reunification. In other words, Taiwan’s reintegration is an indispensable part of China’s national identity – a China without Taiwan is incomplete, and China’s ‘national rejuvenation’ could not be done without reunification.[5] Accordingly, the Taiwan issue is a matter of ontological security for the PRC.

On the other side, the story is very different. The political parties and the electorate are deeply divided on the issues of national identity (Taiwanese or Chinese) and Taiwan’s future political status (declare independence or unify with Mainland China). These cleavages created an identity crisis within Taiwanese society. Identity and the future status of the country are highly politicised, often being focal points in elections. Hence, Taiwan’s self-identity bears a conflicting nature and threatens its ontological security. The absence of consensus regarding Taiwan’s status and future not only undermines domestic social cohesion, but also weakens Taiwan’s coherence facing the external world.

Amid this debate, Taiwan’s public opinion diverged from Mainland China. Although Taiwan maintains the ‘Republic of China’ legal framework, the percentage of Taiwanese identifying as ‘Chinese’ has significantly declined since mid-1990s, while exclusive ‘Taiwanese’ identity has risen significantly. According to a more recent survey, 58% of Taiwanese prefer to maintain the status quo, followed by 23.6% supporting independence, and 11.8% supporting reunification (see chart below[6]). In addition to external factors such as Taipei’s loss of representation in the UN and pressure from the PRC, the domestic process of ‘de-sinicisation’, i.e. the policy of diluting ‘Chinese-ness’ has also contributed to this shift. The then pro-independence president Lee Tung-hui initiated this process in the mid-1990s. For instance, during pro-independence Chen Shuibian’s presidency, between 2000 and 2008, the government changed the history curriculum: Taiwanese history and Chinese history were taught separately, so as to differentiate Taiwan from China. This reflects the narrative of Taiwan as ‘Asia’s orphan’ – ruled by successive external forces but never by the Taiwanese themselves.[7] Pro-independence politicians disseminate the idea of Taiwan, as an immigrant society, is comprised of diverse cultures, rather than Chinese culture as the prevalent one[8]. By diluting the ‘Chinese-ness’ of Taiwan, pro-independence forces seek to distance Taiwan from China. These actions can be explained by the deep controversies in Taiwanese society: in order to assert that Taiwan is different from - and to avoid the unification with - China, especially facing the PRC’s rise as a great power, it is necessary to create an alternative narrative. The manifestation of anti-Chinese sentiment was especially evident during the Sunflower movement in 2014, to protest against a cross-strait trade deal. Activists accused Taipei’s government of colluding with Beijing. More specifically, their concerns were economic integration being used as a mean to integrate Mainland China’s political orbit.

 

(Credit Image: Election Study Centre National Chengchi University)(Credit Image: Election Study Centre National Chengchi University)

 

The identity mismatch linked to ontological security underlies cross-strait relations. For both the Chinese government and the majority of its citizens, Taiwan being a part of China is a given. In contrast, many Taiwanese people no longer identify as Chinese. Deeply engrained identities and narratives on both sides lead to in comprehension and misunderstandings, evident in ‘online nationalism’; Mainland Chinese netizens posted pro-China content on Taiwanese Facebook pages after the 2016 Taiwanese elections. The entrenchment of insecurities about the ‘self’ and conflicting narratives lead to protracting cross-strait division.

So, what is the way forward? To address deep ontological insecurities is not easy. Cross-strait relations in its current tense state is harmful to both sides and regional stability. In order to break the cycle of reinforcing incomprehension and conflict, it is vital to tap into ordinary citizens’ minds and encourage people-to-people exchange. It is only when both sides are open to genuine understanding of each other’s concerns and identities (and why they are so) that Mainland China and Taiwan can transcend this vicious cycle and pursue sustainable peace.

 

Dean Chen is a third year BA IR student at King’s. His main academic interests are China-EU relations, European integration, Chinese Foreign Policy, and global governance. You can follow him on Twitter on @itsDeanChen

Notes:

[1] Jennifer Mitzen, 2006. Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma. European Journal of International Relations. Vol. 12 (3): 341-370.

[2] ibid.

[3] Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC, “The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/WhitePapers/201103/t20110316_1789217.htm (Accessed December 18, 2017).

[4] ibid.

[5] Li Zhengguang, “Taiwan integral to national rejuvenation,” China Daily, Oct 20th, 2017.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/newsrepublic/2017-10/20/content_33509757.htm

[6] Election Study Centre National Chengchi University, “Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with Mainland Trend Distribution in Taiwan 1992/06 – 2017/06,” http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=167# (Accessed December 18, 2017)

[7] 給下一代的承諾書-十年政綱 (“Promise for the next generation – Ten Year Policy Framework”) http://iing10.blogspot.co.uk/ (Accessed December 18, 2017)

[8] ibid.

 

Images source:

Feature image: https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/event/taiwanese-students-gather-to-protest-against-china-deal-481478069#protestors-holds-signs-as-over-two-hundred-thousand-people-rally-on-picture-id481468403

Image: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/01/China_map.png

Chart 1: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=166#

Chart 2: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=167#

 

 

 

Strife Series on National Perspectives in North-East Asian Rivalries, Part II – The view from Tokyo

by

By Andrea Fischetti

Pacifist Pro-Article 9 Demonstration in Tokyo, May 2014 (Credit: Wikimedia Commons)

Characterised as a peace-loving nation, Japan has earned this favourable international reputation through a combination of its culture and society. Also, the Constitution does not allow the country to possess offensive military capabilities.[1] Nonetheless, it is involved in territorial and political disputes with most of its neighbours, and at times, its foreign policy is perceived as assertive by other regional actors such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Therefore, this article will explore the reasons why a so-called pacifist country such as Japan is involved in so many disputes. From a geopolitical perspective, Japan is situated in a region where history and historical memories still resonate politically, and continue to drive regional actors’ foreign policies, resulting in territorial and diplomatic disputes as well as long-lasting rivalries. In fact, the national perspectives of Japan and its neighbours are inseparable from their past experiences.

The “abnormalcy” concept

Firstly, in order to understand Japan’s perspective, it is necessary to consider the nature of its “abnormalcy”. Realist scholars believed that the phenomenal economic development that Japan experienced during the second half of the 20th century would inevitably result in rising military ambitions. This was seen to be especially true, considering Japan’s imperialistic and militaristic past. However, Japan did not try to translate its economic might into military capabilities, nor did it attempt to challenge the hegemony of other powers. As a consequence, Japan has been considered an “abnormal” country, due to its “pacifist” behaviour.[2]

The idea that Japan is not a “normal” country, has been reinforced by its US-drafted constitution, implemented in the aftermath of the Second World War by American occupying forces. Japan’s Constitution, not only contains a peace clause, but is also considered rare due to its longevity.[3] In other words, Japan may be considered an abnormal country because despite its economic power, it has not tried to develop modern offensive military capabilities; instead, the country has preserved a foreign-drafted pacifist constitution for over seven decades.

Whether it deserves the title of “abnormal” is debatable, as it would imply the existence of some sort of international standard;[4] nonetheless, considering its legal framework, society, and behaviour on the international stage, it is understandable why Japan is considered a pacifist and exceptional country.

Yesterday’s rivalry, today’s dispute

Domestically, Japanese society has been able to overcome its wartime experiences thanks to policies that guaranteed “peace and prosperity”. During the post-war period for example, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida developed the “Yoshida Doctrine”, which included a number of “pacifist” policies that were aimed at preserving peace while focusing the country’s capabilities on achieving economic prosperity.[5]

However, while Japan has been enjoying decades of “peace and prosperity”, the spectre of its behaviour in wartime has remained very much alive among its neighbours. After the war, Korea was divided in two different countries. Not only did this division result in numerous diplomatic and strategic issues, but also, as ‘halved’ parts of a single country, neither ROK, nor the Northern side – the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) – have managed to equal Japan’s economic development. This is perhaps unsurprising, considering the long-lasting effects of Korean War, in combination with economic sanctions, and trade restrictions. Furthermore, the diplomatic and strategic issues on the Korean peninsula have been exacerbated by the DPRK nuclear programme, and more specifically the recent missile tests.

Similarly, the PRC has been dealing with its own problems following the Second World War, despite the fact they were on the winning side, unlike Japan. Yet, it did not feel like a victory for Beijing: as numerous social and economic issues affected the country, China had to watch Japan’s remarkable growth and development. While the Land of the Rising Sun was enjoying peace and prosperity, the PRC was dealing with the trouble of overcoming the “century of humiliation”, a period of foreign occupation, territorial losses, and military defeats that took place between the 19th and the 20th century.

Northeast Asian rivalries fuel many disputes: all actors in the region have, to different extents, disputes with their neighbours, and Japan is no exception. What is notable is the vital role that historical memory plays in this volatile regional context. Accordingly, Japan’s involvement in disputes with other regional actors can be very largely be attributed to history.

Following the war, Japanese society welcomed the advent of peace and prosperity, quickly adapting to the new image that Japan projected of itself at international level. The Japanese military was totally discredited, and with the help of US occupation, the country developed anti-militaristic norms.[6] Japan’s national identity of a pacifist country is also demonstrated by public opinion polls on the country’s priorities[7], and the influence that the strong popular support for peace and prosperity has on the policy making process.[8]

As a result, at the dawn of the 21st century, Japan’s domestic memories of war were not forgotten, but were instead relegated to the past. By contrast, wartime memories were still vivid in among the populations of local neighbours including China and Korea. A fact that has been reflected in the Chinese “obsession” for power balance between the United States, Japan, and China[9], or in the long-lasting dispute on the comfort women issue between South Korea and Japan, inciting several diplomatic incidents regarding Japan’s apologies for sexual slavery during the Second World War.

In the case of China, for example, the dispute on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has been emblematic in defining its approach to Japan: China has to show strength, to overcome its past “humiliations”. China sees the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) as an occupant of its territory, namely the ‘Diaoyu Islands’ (considered Chinese according to Beijing’s historical view).

Conversely, Tokyo’s official stance is that ‘the Senkaku Islands are under the valid control of Japan. There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Island’.[10] Furthermore, as Japan’s military capabilities are intended for self-defence purposes only, what the Chinese consider an aggression, is seen as self-defence in Tokyo, a legitimate “resolute stance” (kizen to shita taido), also considering that the Senkaku Islands (Senkaku-shotō) are controlled by Japan as per the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement. The Japanese perspective on this issue, which does not involve acknowledging a dispute due to the above reasons, only appears to be even more assertive in the eyes of Beijing. This is the essence of the regional security dilemma facing North-east Asia today.

Similarly, Japanese society finds it difficult to justify the ROK’s continued emphasis on the comfort women issue. On the one hand, Japanese occupation and wartimes memories have not been forgotten in South Korea, and they remain a highly debated topic. On the other, having apologised multiple times, and considering itself a pacifist country and a “contributor to peace”[11], Japan sees South Korea’s insistence on this matter as unjustified. Further to social, cultural, and political differences, the divergence in perspective among these countries is also a result of the different kinds of narratives and government-led propaganda they are subject to.[12]

Conclusion

Japan’s national identity is that of a pacifist country, and one who is far more interested in promoting diplomatic relations than remembering historical disputes or rivalries. Despite its geopolitical role in a number of disputes, the country has enjoyed peace and prosperity for many decades, its society identifies itself as pacifist, and its behaviour on the international stage reflects its pacifist values. From alternate perspectives, it could reasonably be argued that its neighbours are generally more prone to fuel disputes, yet Japan’s conviction in its pacifist national identity might also mean it is failing to address these issues properly. In order to fix the conflictual relationship with its neighbours and prepare for future challenges, Tokyo should focus on taking into account its international image from the viewpoint of countries such as China or South Korea.

Andrea (@A_Fischetti) is a MEXT Scholar researching on Japan and East Asian Security at The University of Tokyo. He is also a Series Editor for Strife. Andrea earned his MA in War Studies from King’s College London, following a BA with First Class Honours in International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies. He was a visiting student at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University, and worked in the House of Commons.

Notes:

[1] Berger, 1998; Katzeinstein, 1996.

[2] Kennedy, 1994; Waltz, 1993; 2000.

[3] Comparative Constitutions Project, 2017; Elkins et al, 2009.

[4] Soeya et al, 2011.

[5] Yoshida and Nara, 2007.

[6] Berger, 1993; Katzenstein, 1996.

[7] Asahi Shimbun, 2012.

[8] NHK, ‘Seiji ishiki getsurei chōsa’, 2007.

[9] Rozman, 1999.

[10] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016.

[11] Japan National Security Council, 2013.

[12] Pugliese and Insisa, 2017.

 

Image Source:

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Proarticle9demo-may2014nearginza.jpg

Bibliography:

Asahi Shimbun (2012) ‘Abe Naikaku Sijiritsu 59%’, Asahi Shimbun, December 2012.

Berger, T. U. (1993) ‘From sword to chrysanthemum: Japan’s culture of anti-militarism’. International Security. 17(4): 119-50.

Berger, T. U. (1998) ‘Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan’. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Comparative Constitutions Project (2017) Timeline of Constitutions. Available at http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/chronology/ [Accessed on 13 August 2017]

Elkins, Z., Ginsburg, T. and Melton, J. (2009) ‘The Endurance of National Constitutions’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Japan National Security Council (JNSC) (2013) ‘National Security Strategy’, provisional translation, December 2013.

Katzenstein, P. J. (1996) ‘Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan’. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Kennedy, P. (1994) ‘Japan: A twenty-first-century power?’ in C. C. Garby and M. Brown Bullock (eds) Japan: A New Kind of Superpower? Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, pp. 193-9.

King, A. and Taylor, B. (2016) ‘Northeast Asia’s New ‘History Spiral’.’ Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 111–119.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2016) Senkaku Islands Q&A. Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html#q1 [accessed on 12 November 2016]

NHK (2007) Seiji Ishiki Getsurei Chōsa (政治意識月例調査) Available at https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/yoron/political/2007.html [Accessed 11 March 2017]

Pugliese, G. and Insisa, A. (2017) ‘Sino-Japanese Power Politcs: Might, Money and Minds’. London, Palgrave.

Rozman, G. (1999) ‘China’s Quest for Great Power Identity’. Orbis, 43,3, 383-402.

Soeya, Y., Tadokoro, M., Welch, D. A. (eds) (2011) ‘Japan as a ‘normal country’? A Nation in Search of its Place in the World’. Toronto, University of Toronto Press.

Waltz, K. N. (1993) ‘The emerging structure of international politics’, International Security 18(2): 44-79.

Waltz, K. N. (2000) ‘Structural realism after the cold war’. International Security 25 (1): 5-41.

Yoshida, S. and Nara, H. (2007) Yoshida Shigeru: Last Himeji Man. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield.