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The HMS Defender Incident: Russia, the Crimea and the Insecurity of an Illegal Annexation

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HMS DEFENDER transits through the Suez Canal. Picture: LA(Phot) Dan Rosenbaum. Licensed under Creative Commons.

On the 23rd of June, when it was reported that Russian ships fired warning shots at HMS Defender, a British Type-45 destroyer several miles of the Crimean coast, the world was reminded of the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine as well as the continuous Russian occupation of Crimea since 2014. The presence of British naval forces in the Black Sea is not a new phenomenon, as NATO conducts annual exercises in the region, often hosted by Romania. While the incident saw no casualties, it has generated novel Russian paranoia regarding its position in the Black Sea. The Kremlin has accused NATO of unprovoked aggression in the Black Sea and has pledged a strong response – although it is not clear what long-term steps Russia can take. It is important to remember that the Russian annexation of Crimea receives limited international recognition and that the peninsula is almost entirely surrounded by Ukrainian territory. Crimea is therefore vulnerable to the probes and prods of NATO forces who wish to test the Russian military. Incidents such as this expose the fact that despite the annexation being in its seventh year, Russia’s position in the region remains weaker than it appears. But is this an issue that the Kremlin can resolve? They cannot suddenly turn their illegal annexation into a legal one and NATO shows no signs of backing down in its competition with Russia in the Black Sea.

Historically, the Black Sea region has been a crucial part of Russian grand strategy, throughout the imperial, soviet and republican eras. It represents the possibility of a year-round warm water port at Sevastopol, and the ability for Russian maritime commerce and military assets to move through the Straits of the Dardanelles, into the Mediterranean. Since the reign of Catherine the Great, Russia has used numerous conflicts and crises to expand its control in the Black Sea and when this was lost during the breakup of the Soviet Union it was not long before the new Russian state sought an opportunity to regain a foothold. This was achieved in 2014 with minimal difficulty as the Russian military occupied the Crimean Peninsula, while Russian backed separatists in eastern Ukraine began and still continue to wage a civil war. The illegality of Russia’s annexation is straightforward: no state has the right to change the borders or territorial integrity of another, by force. Simply put, the right of conquest has no legal standing in the 21st century. Western states may have condemned the annexation and leveed sanctions against Russia, but they have taken no military steps to force Russia out of Crimea. Now that Russia once again holds a position in the Black Sea, they will not surrender it easily.

The HMS Defender incident is not an isolated occurrence. In recent days, the Dutch vessel HNLMS Evertsen had a close run in with several Russian fighter jets, described as a ‘mock attack’. This has all come as NATO commences Operation Sea Breeze 21, a series of joint naval exercises with Ukraine across the Black Sea. This year’s Sea Breeze exercises will also be the largest in the program’s history. They will involve five thousand personnel and thirty-two ships, with more than thirty countries participating. Naval incidents between Russia, NATO and its allies are nothing new as in April it was reported that Royal Navy vessels were deployed in the English Channel to escort a group of Russian ships as they passed through the Dover Strait. Individual NATO states such as the UK have also signed new naval agreements with Ukraine, providing training support as well as new defensive equipment. Rather than leave Ukraine to an uncertain and likely unpleasant fate, NATO is clearly seeking to bolster the state as a crucial partner against Russian expansionism. The new war of words between Russia and NATO over the incident with HMS Defender will likely to do nothing to deter the western allies from maintaining their position in Ukraine and the Black Sea.

The problem that Russia faces is that as its annexation of Crimea was illegal, it cannot claim jurisdiction over the region’s territorial waters, so NATO vessels can continue to move through these waters provided they have permission from Ukraine. This was the primary justification for NATO to conduct the Sea Breeze exercises so close to Russian territory. Russia has also responded to the NATO exercises with its own live fire drills in the Black Sea, these following on from the land-based exercises they conducted in Crimea in April. While it is highly unlikely that NATO or any individual power will try to reverse the Crimean annexation by force, it presents an opportunity for Russia’s opponents to demonstrate their military reach and their continued opposition to the Russian presence in Ukraine.

For all its shows of strength in Ukraine, Russian policy is flailing . The separatists they back in eastern Ukraine may still hold territory, but they have not achieved a resounding victory. The government in Kiev continues to enjoy western backing, which shows no signs of declining and while NATO views Russian Black Sea presence as vulnerable, they will continue to conduct naval exercises. Essentially, this issue is unresolvable for the Kremlin: Russian strategic aims prevent scaling back their position in Crimea and western policy, alongside international law, hampers their attempts to solidify their hold on the region. Under international law, Crimea is Ukrainian, therefore the waters surrounding Crimea are Ukrainian. It does not matter how much military hardware Russia dispatches to the Crimea, it will not change this legal reality. Ultimately, it will be this fact that Russia will continue to be unable to escape.

A second Crimean War is not on the horizon. The five hundred will not charge again into the valley of death and the Thin Red Line will not have to hold. However, the ongoing disputes over Crimea will continue to simmer, with incidents similar to HMS Defender bound to happen again. This is something that the Russians will likely be forced to tolerate, while still displaying its military strength, both in response to NATO actions and their domestic audience. The impasse between the two sides shows no signs of being resolved. Neither Ukraine nor NATO will use force to expel Russia from Crimea, but they’re sure to make the annexation as uncomfortable for the Kremlin as possible.

Volodymyr Zelenskiy and the Donbas Conflict in Ukraine

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by Daria Platonova

5 June 2019

Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Zelenskiy was elected President of Ukraine in May 2019 (The National Interest)

Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s[1] election to the presidency in Ukraine[2] has taken everyone by surprise. A former comedy actor and producer, Zelenskiy is widely seen as someone “outside the system,” despite having connections to the Ukrainian oligarchs. In the few interviews that he granted prior to the election, he acknowledged that the conflict in the Donbas is the most serious problem facing Ukraine. In this article, I discuss Zelenskiy’s views on how to resolve the conflict and his options.

During the presidential campaign, Zelenskiy appealed to the softer, compassionate side of his voters and detractors by saying that he did not want Ukrainians to continue dying in the Donbas, therefore a ceasefire and the return of all prisoners of war to Ukraine is essential. In the televised debate with the outgoing President Petro Poroshenko on 19 April 2019, he blamed Poroshenko for the massive loss of life in Iloviask (August 2014) and Debaltseve (February 2015), when the Ukrainian forces were repulsed by the separatist and Russian state forces. In his inauguration speech on 20 May, Zelenskiy reiterated these ideas. It can be argued that this appeal to the “war weariness” of Ukrainians has won Zelenskiy so many votes, especially in the east.

In relation to more concrete proposals, Zelenskiy’s position has been more vague. Contrary to the political premise of the Minsk Agreements, Zelenskiy has ruled out an autonomous status for the separatist republics within Ukraine. He argues that Ukraine should re-establish its sovereignty over the entire territory of the Donbas and Crimea, he supports the idea of a peacekeeping force in the Donbas, and proposes “reformatting” the Minsk Agreements, which presupposes the inclusion of the US and Great Britain in the negotiations. To Ukrainian commentators, these proposals are not radically different from those made by the previous administration. Moreover, they are somewhat contradictory, in that, on one hand, Zelenskiy wants a dialogue with Russia and the separatists and, on the other, he wants to “fight until the end” to regain what belongs to Ukraine.

Several developments have taken place since Zelenskiy’s victory. His stance towards Russia has somewhat hardened. For example, he reacted vitriolically towards Vladimir Putin’s decree to simplify the issuance of Russian passports to the residents of separatist-controlled parts of Ukraine, pointing out flaws in the current Russian regime. As of now, he refuses to launch direct talks with Russia. At the same time, it is significant that, despite the pressure from international representatives, such as the US Special Representative in Ukraine Kurt Volker, Zelenskiy has not spoken of complete disarmament and elimination of the local separatist administrations in Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. He however continues to believe that the separatists are “not independent actors”.

When considering Zelenskiy’s options as to resolving the conflict, we must take into account that, despite the seeming simplicity of how the conflict has been reported (low-intensity fighting, both Russia and Ukraine alternately depicted as aggressors and fighters for sovereignty/freedom), the developments in and around the conflict zones have reached an unprecedented complexity. The rebellious republics have amassed significant resources – even if many are imported from Russia, especially military hardware - and demonstrated considerable legislative and state-building capacity. They are now deeply entrenched, while the republics’ people are not at all eager to be integrated back into Ukraine.[3] The republics’ leaders are highly sceptical about Zelenskiy’s proposals. If we recall the situation back in May 2014 when “launching a direct dialogue with the separatists” was one of Poroshenko’s campaign promises, and he failed to follow it through, even if the nascent break away states were still in their infancy and their military capacity was small, we can expect that Zelenskiy is unlikely to suddenly start talking to the separatists directly.

Secondly, the understanding of how to follow the Minsk Agreements and whether they actually work differs between Russia and Ukraine. One suspects that both sides misinterpret the agreements deliberately because they see to take advantage of the current situation and promote their own agendas. All these years, Russia has kept insisting – as do the separatist leaders – that Ukraine must stop its “punitive operation,” in the Donbas and grant it a special status within Ukraine. This is Russia’s main objective. Ukraine insists that Russia must stop supporting the republics militarily and free the territories of the Donbas. Amid the flurry of diplomatic talks at many levels along these lines, both sides continue attacking each other positions and people continue to die. It seems that, for Ukraine under Poroshenko, the Donbas conflict turned into an opportunity to build a powerful military force and disassociate itself from Russia completely. Therefore, the separatists had a point when they argued that Poroshenko sought to use the conflict to “salvage his regime”. For Russia, the Donbas is a military and state-building project, a testing ground for new military technology and an attempt to exert its influence on the politics in Ukraine. Ukrainians therefore are right when they say that Putin is using the conflict to keep up his regime.

Zelenskiy therefore is likely to continue relying on diplomatic talks. Perhaps, he would be less insistent on the major international players’ roles in resolving the conflict as Poroshenko was. Zelenskiy’s most recent decision to put the conflict resolution to an all-Ukrainian referendum indicates a move in this direction. In line with the “human side” of his campaign promises, he would try to contain the violence in the conflict zone and avoid a full-fledged war with Russia. When Poroshenko became president in 2014, straight after his victory, the most vicious fighting followed in Donetsk Airport. According to some reports, Poroshenko ordered an offensive aimed at retaking the airport, even before he was sworn. He then was caught up in the unenviable cycle of “action-response,” as the separatists built their armies and Russia provided them with support. Zelenskiy is much luckier in this respect in that no significant fighting followed his victory. He is therefore unlikely to suddenly ramp up the military effort in the Donbas.

Daria is a PhD student at King’s College London. Her research focuses on the political protests and conflict in eastern Ukraine, 2013 - 2014. She led one of the Causes of War seminars in the War Studies Department in 2017. Prior to joining King’s, she worked as a teacher. She graduated with a degree in History from the University of Cambridge in 2011. Her broader interests include European history, war studies, and interdisciplinary methods.

[1] The spelling is consistent with the English spelling as it appears in Kyiv Post, the major English-language news and opinion outlet in Ukraine.

[2] Zelenskiy won a landslide victory across the majority of Ukrainian regions, except in Lviv in the West of Ukraine, with 73.22% of the vote. Petro Poroshenko won 24.45%.

[3] See also comments on Vkontakte social media pages and my sporadic conversations with some people from Donetsk online.

Teasing the bear: NATO, Russia and the Baltic States

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By Leyla Aliyeva:

Latvian tanks in operation during NATO Operation Sabre Strike, 2013. Photo: Gatis Diezins, RYC (CC 2.0).
Latvian tanks in operation during NATO Operation Sabre Strike, 2013. Photo: Gatis Diezins, RYC (CC 2.0).

Russia’s President Putin statement a fortnight ago made on a conference with Finland’s President Sauli Niiniste sent a signal that Moscow is aware of NATO’s recent activities near Russia’s borders in Eastern Europe, and in the case of an attack Russia will strike back at the source of the attack.

Eastern European states, such as the Baltic States Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, are looking to put their NATO membership to use as fears rise over further Russian expansionism. The Baltic authorities have expressed deep concerns over Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the recent Russian military activity in the Baltic Sea and Baltic airspace. In May 2015 the Baltic countries made a joint request for a permanent detachment of NATO troops within their borders to serve as a counterweight to Russia’s military activities. United States deployed troops to the Baltic region and Poland following the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Germany has promised to deploy rotating troops to Estonia in early 2016. Also, NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system drones will be used in Baltic airspace from 2017.

Indeed, NATO continues to ramp up its presence in the region. NATO allies are taking up air patrols for a four-month rotation in the Baltic region. Until the end of August fighter jets from Belgium, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom are on duty in the Baltic air policing mission against Russian aggression. Scores of ships and aircraft from 17 countries recently took part in Baltic Sea naval drills as part of exercise ‘BALTOPS’, involving 5600 servicemen between 5-20 June. The NATO and U.S Army Europe-led ‘Saber Strike’ operation in the three Baltic States and Poland wound down on 19 June. It is the largest such operation since 2010, with more than 6000 troops from 13 NATO allies[1]. Indeed, the Baltic states seem determined to increase NATO’s presence in the area.

But should the Baltic States really feel threatened?

There is no doubt that Russia has increased its presence in the Baltic region. There has been an overall increase in Russian aviation activity in the international airspace and high military activity from Russia near Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian border and exclusive economic zones. Poland’s Minister of Defense Tomasz Seimoniak stated in 2014 that Russia’s military activity is a demonstration of strength and is a test of NATO.

This seems to be a view widely held by officials in the area. Lithuanian Defense Minister Juozas Olekas wants to station heavy US equipment in Lithuania, after Polish and Lithuanian governments stated that they are currently in discussion with Washington about a potential increase of US military presence in Eastern Europe.

In turn, a Russian Defense Minister official has said that the cozying up of the Baltic region with NATO has left Russia with no option but to seek military re-arrangements on its strategic Western front, such as Kaliningrad and Belarus. These standoffs do not help to build good relationships.

Background of NATO expansion: the Baltic States

The NATO enlargement in eastern Europe originally occurred in the absence of the threat that produced NATO in the first place. It occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Russia was left weak and unstable.

NATO took cautious steps towards its expansion to the east of Europe. In 1999 the Alliance perceived the three countries out of the Visegrad group (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) as the most significant potential members in eastern Europe. The three former Warsaw Pact countries were left economically and military weak after the dissolution of the USSR; by joining NATO and then the European Union Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic established security, integration into the European community, and signaled the formal end of the Soviet domination which had lasted approximately half a century. None of the Visegrad group countries border Russia and therefore the 1999 expansion did not constitute a direct threat to Russia.[2]

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania all had aspirations to join NATO right after the break up of the Soviet Union. Since gaining independence in 1991 the Baltic Trio for more than a decade tried as hard as they could to move further away from Russia towards Europe and the West. They succeeded in 2004 by joining both the European Union and NATO.

Russia’s reaction to their joining NATO was anger. One of the most important issues was that NATO expansion in the Baltic region would inevitably increase the likelihood that the Alliance would station troops closer to Russia’s borders than ever before. Border disputes between the Baltic States and Russia added danger to the overall situation. Lastly, a particular concern was the large number of long-term Soviet citizens who are disenfranchised in independent Estonia and Latvia – to this day they experience problems with obtaining Estonian and Latvian citizenship.[3]

NATO, the Baltics and Russia today

NATO activities in the Baltic States today is a demonstration of Western strength, rather than a response to a direct identified threat. The suspension of all practical cooperation between NATO and Russia, including the NATO-Russia Council, only contributes to further tensions between the Alliance and Kremlin.

Of course, the Soviet past plays a major role in the reaction towards Russia coming from the Baltic States. By looking at Ukraine’s fate, the Baltic trio feels threatened by Russia. The Ukraine conflict demonstrated that Russia believes that the existence of ‘ethnic Russians’ abroad can justify intervention in former Soviet states. The fears over Russia fomenting rebellion among ethnic Russians in the Baltic states has led to NATO shifting its focus from Russia’s military activities to its information war. Indeed, Lithuanian President’s Dalia Grybaiskaite and Latvia’s interior minister Mikhail Kozlovskis recently raised concerns that Kremlin may try to influence and form a pro-Moscow rebellion in the Baltic states, just as they did in Eastern Ukraine, by manipulating the media.

Despite the significant part of the Baltic population that has ethnic Russian origin, the situation is different to Ukraine. Firstly, the ethnic Russian population is decreasing. From 1989 to 2011, the amount of ethnic Russians in Latvia decreased from 34% to 26.9%, in Lithuania from 9.4 % to 5.4%, and in Estonia from 30.3% to 25.5%. In comparison, the Russia-speaking population in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine makes up more than half of the population of Ukraine.

Secondly, modern Russian-speakers residing in the Baltic region are also different from their Russian counterparts. The Baltic Russian diaspora in each of the Baltic countries has its own characteristics. The Latvian Russian community is more or less united; the other two Baltic Russian communities are not. This makes it difficult for Russia to be able to formulate attractive policies or influence through propaganda for Baltic Russian-speaking communities, let alone to form a rebellion.[4]

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the Baltic States are concerned with Russia’s military activity and capability. While conflict is still ongoing in Ukraine, the Baltic States will feel threatened by Russian expansionism and will use their NATO membership as much as they can. Despite the fact that Russia has repeatedly stated that it has no interest in invading the Baltic States.

Although the Baltic states are unlikely to follow Ukraine’s fate of becoming the battlefield of the great powers. The authorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania authorities are right to be wary. Russia may state that it has no interest in invading the Baltic States, but the 50-year long Soviet past, and the more recent actions of Russia in Eastern Ukraine play an important part in heightening the fear and suspicion of the Baltic States towards Russian bear, the bear that has been edging closer and closer in recent years.

Leyla Aliyeva studied International Politics at Middlesex University and is currently an LLM student at the same university. Her particular focus is on post-USSR and Eastern European countries with a specific focus on human rights and minority rights. She also worked at the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre as an intern and worked on serious human rights violations in former Soviet states.

For a more detailed look at the way that Russia’s relations with the world have changed since the Ukraine crisis, check out our recent 4-part series entitled ‘Russia and the World following Ukraine‘.

NOTES

[1] Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States

[2] (1995) NATO and the Baltic States, American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 17:5, 22-22,

[3] (1995) NATO and the Baltic States, American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 17:5, 22-22,

[4] Victoria V. Panova (2015) , Russia’s ‘Soft’ Policies towards the Baltic States Latvian Institute of International Affairs p.86

Russia and the World following Ukraine: A Strife 4-part series

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By Sebastian Åsberg:

Ukrainean tanks taking up positions in the city of Slovyansk, eastern Ukraine, July 2014. Photo: Sasha Maksymenko (CC 2.0)

“At last, Russia has returned to the world arena as a strong state - a country that others heed and that can stand up for itself” - Russian President Vladimir Putin, 2008.

While the overall strength of the Russian state, especially in the long-term, is still a subject of debate, Russia has increasingly become a power the international community must take not of once again. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 following the end of the Cold War, Russia suffered significant economic and social hardship and a loss of power as a result. The president of Russia at the time, Boris Yeltsin, was more mocked than respected.

When Vladimir Putin took office in 1999, he resolved to improve Russia’s stature in the world. Helped by a commodity boom, the country’s economy and standard of living improved notably during his time in office.[i] With material conditions in the country improved, the Russian leadership grew increasingly assertive in its regional sphere of interest, abandoning the earlier path of accommodation with the West. Richard Sakwa, professor of Russian and European politics at the University of Kent, argues that this turn towards what he calls “neo-revisionism” came at around 2007. By this time Putin had become increasingly embolden by the country’s economic growth, while there was a heightened sense of rivalry with the EU and US over their growing influence in the states bordering Russia.[ii]

The current Ukraine crisis is the latest in a series of incidents that have led to deteriorating relations between Russia and the West. The Ukraine crisis was preceded by the wars in Chechnya in 1999-2000 and Georgia in August 2008. The Chechnya campaign was perceived as being heavy-handed, exemplified by the carpet bombing of Grozny[iii], and it has been argued that Russia deliberately provoked the Georgia conflict.[iv]

International dismay has also accompanied Russia’s backing of the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in the country’s ongoing civil war in order to protect Russian naval installations in the country.[v]

Finally, domestic policies pursued by the Kremlin, such as discriminatory laws against homosexuals and a perception that the Russian state is cracking down on dissent and opposition, has also contributed to worsening relations between Russia and significant parts of the international community.

However, the Ukraine crisis can still be been seen as a major turning point. Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014 and its subsequent support for the Russian separatists in the Donbass region shocked large parts of the international community.

The Russian takeover of Crimea was the first annexation of another European state’s territory since the Second World War. It was met with accusations that Russia was breaking one of the most basic principles of the post-war international order - the sanctity of borders - by trying to redraw the map through force. The subsequent war in eastern Ukraine, a conflict which has killed an estimated 6000 people,[vi] where pro-Russian separatists have been aided by Russia, has provoked even further indignation in capitals across the world. Russia is seen as conducting a war of aggression by proxy. The downing of flight MH17 by the separatists, killing 298 people, added to the outrage as the conflict began to directly affect Western citizens. Comprehensive sanctions were imposed against Russia, and the United States even contemplated supplying Ukraine with arms before the Minsk II ceasefire in February.

The Ukraine crisis can arguably be viewed as sounding the death knell for the belief that Russia could be harmoniously integrated into a Western system following the end of the Cold War, like other post-communist countries in Eastern Europe.

Much has been written about the situation in Crimea and about the battlefields of eastern Ukraine, but what will be the geopolitical and diplomatic consequences of the Ukraine crisis?

Despite having declined in importance since the days of the Soviet Union, Russia remains a power of significance on the world stage. It still has a substantial population (140 million) and economy (the ninth-largest in the world) and retains close trade and diplomatic relations with other major actors. For example, it is the EU’s third-largest trading partner and many European countries rely on Russia for their gas supplies. It retains a large degree of influence in several areas of the world, in particular what is referred to as Russia’s “near-abroad”, the former republics of the USSR.

Given this, how is Russia’s relations with other states being affected by its perceived aggression in its neighbourhood and increasing revanchism? How are neighbouring states reacting to Russia’s conduct?

Over the coming weeks, Strife will examine how relations between Russia and various countries and international organisation are being affected and how they are approaching the Ukraine crisis, as well as looking at the possible geopolitical fallout of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Mike Jones will discuss Britain’s handling of the crisis and why the Ukraine crisis has not received more attention in the UK. Conradin Weindl will look into the relationship between the European Union and Russia in the wake of the war in Ukraine. Andrzej Kozłowski will analyse Poland’s approach to the crisis and the implications for Polish security. Finally, Sebastian Åsberg, will examine the debate regarding NATO membership in neutral Sweden and Finland, which has intensified significantly as a result of the war in Ukraine.

An increasingly assertive and antagonistic Russia, with its military of 800,000 personnel and vast nuclear weapons stockpile, has been described as one of the biggest challenges facing the world today.[vii] [viii] In this four-part series Strife hopes to provide a deeper understanding of how key countries and regions are reacting to this challenge.

Sebastian Åsberg holds a BA in International Relations from Malmö University, Sweden, and is currently reading for an MA in War Studies at King’s College London. His main interests include European security and defence policy, security cooperation within the EU and NATO, and the transatlantic partnership, as well as in Russia’s foreign policy in the region and beyond.

NATO

[i] Thornhill, John “Vladimir Putin and his tsar quality”, Financial Times, 6 February 2015

[ii] Sakwa, Richard, Frontline Ukraine – Crisis in the Borderlands, I.B. Tauris, 2015, p.30-32

[iii] Human Rights Watch, “War Crimes In Chechnya and the Response of the West”, http://www.hrw.org/news/2000/02/29/war-crimes-chechnya-and-response-west

[iv] Georgia began war with Russia, but it was provoked, inquiry finds, The Independent, 1 October 2009

[v] Fisher, Max “The four reasons Russia won’t give up Syria, no matter what Obama does”, Washington Post, 5 September 2013

[vi] United Nations, “Death toll in eastern Ukraine crosses 6,000, Zeid says, as UN releases new report”, 2 March 2015

[vii] Rachman, Gideon “Russia is a bigger problem than Isis for Obama” Financial Times, 10 November 2014

[viii] The Telegraph, “What is the biggest threat facing the world today?”, 17 April 2015

Canada’s NATO response: A missed opportunity

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By Zachary Wolfraim:

Meetings of the Defence Ministers at NATO Headquarters in Brussels - Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) (Source: Reuters)

Earlier this May I analysed Canada’s tentative re-engagement with NATO given its full-throated defence of Ukrainian sovereignty and its commitment of military assets to NATO’s reassurance mission in Eastern Europe. The deployment of F-18s, the participation of a Canadian frigate in NATO’s Standing Naval Maritime Group, as well as additional headquarters staff, raised the profile of Canada in the NATO alliance and is a welcome step given that Canada was seen to be somewhat disengaged after the end of the Libya campaign and its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper was one of the longest-serving leaders of one of the founding NATO member states at the Wales Summit, however there was no distinct Canadian ‘stamp’ on any initiatives adopted. Now, in the wake of the NATO Summit in Wales this past week, can this still be characterised as a significant re-engagement with the Alliance? More broadly, does this signal any kind of change in direction for Canadian foreign policy?

Over the weekend Prime Minister Harper made a number of foreign policy announcements related to Canada’s commitment to international security. He grudgingly committed Canada to spending more on defence, however, he had previously noted that increasing spending to the NATO target of 2% of GDP would be unpalatable to Canadian taxpayers. By the Harper government’s reckoning, the Canadian public is not overly keen on spending on foreign policy or defence and moreover, spending on defence has not been a guarantee of international influence. Given that Canada’s defence spending currently lies around 1% of GDP it represents a disconnect for the government with regards to its previous public commitment to supporting and investing in the Canadian military. The current government had been withering in its criticism of the previous Liberal governments who slashed defence spending during the 1990s (to a comparable 1%). This disconnect between investment and rhetoric undermines Canadian credibility as ultimately, Canada has little ability to back up its threats with actions and raises questions about the actual priorities of Canadian foreign policy.

NATO and the Afghanistan mission were paramount up until they were no longer politically tenable and Canada unceremoniously withdrew from combat operations in 2011, pushing aside the ‘in-together, out-together’ mantra. The Conservative government had been keen to stress its links with the military and a willingness to utilise ‘hard power’ in response to crises unlike preceding governments which had favoured multilateral, diplomatic solutions. Nonetheless, the current Conservative government has been willing to follow the lead of other nations when it comes to determining a response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. This however, remains a fundamentally reactive response and reflects a wider shortcoming in the current government’s approach to diplomacy. Though this government has eschewed the idea of ‘going along to get along’ it appears to be willing to do so provided some conditions and coalitions are right and as long as it allows for strong rhetoric. This has been the case with Canada’s recent deployment of the Canadian Special Operations Regiment to northern Iraq to assist multinational efforts against ISIS. That said, while a positive contribution this once again reflects a reactive response to international affairs and ultimately a solely military response.

Years of disengagement from the UN along with other multilateral partnerships mean that Canada while certainly still respected for its contributions to various initiatives, is left out in the cold when it comes to actually influencing international affairs. While content to offer ‘bullhorn diplomacy’, and making bellicose statements, it has done little of the behind-the-scenes diplomatic work to actually try and remedy these issues. This naturally absolves the government of any failures when it comes to major foreign policy initiatives. However, it also means that Canada’s influence in the world is also diminished. The government needs to acknowledge that influence in the world does not come only through military contributions and trade, but that diplomacy and development also matter.

NATO requires the diplomatic and military capabilities of all its members in the face of growing threats from Russia as well as the Middle East, on top of its current NATO commitments in Afghanistan, the Balkans and off the Horn of Africa. While the NATO Summit in Wales reaffirmed and reinvigorated the Alliance, the real work has yet to be done – namely staffing, basing and supplying the Rapid Reaction Force along with continuing to put pressure on Russia for its invasion of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Indeed, the Alliance needs countries like Canada to not only remain staunch supporters, but also to undertake vital public diplomacy and communicate the value of the Alliance in order to maintain its momentum and relevance. Given that the Harper administration has focused largely on headline diplomacy it seems unlikely that there will be a concerted effort to rebuild the NATO relationship to levels it once reached, nor to regenerate Canadian diplomacy more broadly.

Canada’s attitude towards NATO is indicative of a fickle approach to world affairs which has focused more on immediate public diplomacy rather than any kind of overarching strategic aim or narrative. The government has stressed trade but thus far its crowning achievement, a Canada-EU free trade agreement, has languished since it was signed in principle last October and has yet to be fully concluded. While the importance of trade shouldn’t be underestimated, using this as a central platform for diplomacy does not offer many avenues for future crisis management or leveraging Canadian influence in other forums. Ultimately, the current government has not articulated a clear vision of Canada’s place in the world and by failing to seize on the initiative leading up to the Wales Summit, has lost an opportunity to reinvigorate Canadian diplomacy and reinforce Canada’s international influence.

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Zachary Wolfraim is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. You can follow him on Twitter @ZachWol.