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Europe’s Options for the Boogaloo

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by Michael C. Davies

US Civil War redux? (Image credit: The Trumpet)

Moe: ‘Oh ho, an English boy, eh? You know we saved your ass in World War Two.’
Hugh: ‘Yeah, well, we saved your ass in World War Three.’
- ‘Lisa’s Wedding,’ The Simpsons, S6E19.

In the past few weeks, U.S. President Donald J. Trump, and the Republican Party more generally, have made it clear they are willing to do anything to remain in power in the aftermath of the 2020 election, including possibly starting a civil war. Both Trump himself and numerous Republican Party elected officials and apparatchiks have stated they will neither acknowledge the outcome of the election if they lose, an election Trump already decries as illegitimate, nor participate in it fairly. Even more concerning is that a contested result could light a spark many on the American right are hoping for. White supremacists groups have grown exponentially during his Administration, and declare any event other than a Trump victory to be grounds to start the Boogaloo—the white supremacists’ slang term for a second American civil war. The question therefore becomes, what will Europe do if America fractures? Should this happen, Europe, broadly, will have four options to consider.

The roots of a possible second American civil war have been identifiable since the end of the first civil war in 1865. While the Confederacy was military and politically defeated in 1865, it re-emerged soon after and took back control of the South, imposed Jim Crow laws and social regulations, and expanded into the West. Certainly not for the last time, the United States chose white supremacy and strategic failure rather than engaging in effective state-building to achieve a new birth of freedom. This time, with forty years of free-market fundamentalism having stolen $50 trillion from the American people and collapsing the American middle class, the lack of quality health care and student loans collapsing birth rates, and decades of sectarian media blaming it all on ‘others,’ a large percentage of the American populous is armed, ready, and willing to wash the country in a genocidal and politicidal cleansing fire, just as the Confederacy did during the Civil War.

In Donald Trump, the Confederate element of American society has found their saviour. Trump’s approval rating has rarely moved regardless of how many more failures pile up exactly because he treats politics as his favourite movie, Bloodsport. He antagonizes large swathes of the populous because they refuse to love him and treat him with the respect he believes he deserves. After all, this was the man who did not really care about the number of COVID-19 deaths until the virus started affecting ‘his’ people—citizens in Republican-leaning states. 225,000+ dead, ever-rising, and he is more than happy to say it ‘affected virtually nobody.’ To Trump, he is only the President of those who love him. And a pox on all others—now, literally.

It is precisely because far right-wing groups praise him that Trump has allowed them to flourish under his Administration and reach the mainstream. Individually and collectively, they all pine for the Boogaloo. Groups like the Oath Keepers, the Boogaloo Boys, the Proud Boys, and now, the incredible rise of the mind-melting QAnon conspiracy, together with the ever-present militia movements that all have their basis in white supremacist violence, give form to the battle lines being drawn. Their goal, broadly, is to impose a right-wing anarcho-capitalist white supremacist state in America using extreme mass violence. Their intentions are so clear even establishment centrists who bemoan any act of revolt against these groups and their political handmaidens have finally begun to see the writing is on the wall.

The question therefore remains, what will Europe do should conflict break out? During the last US Civil War, because of America’s distance and Europe’s own problems, it largely left the war alone, preferring to see who emerged on top. This time, distance and impact are meaningless. Should the US divide into a years-long brawl, Europe’s own security blanket—conventional and nuclear via the NATO alliance—will be torn asunder with it. European states, individually and collectively, therefore have a direct stake in the outcome. The closeness of Trump to Russia, after all, regardless of the causation, is a daily worry for those who share a border with Russia and rely on NATO, especially American, military forces for deterrence. Without it, RAND estimates, they will last barely 60 hours.

Under the worst scenario of a breakout of a new civil war, Europe has four basic options: First, Do nothing. As scholar Edward Luttwak previously suggested, the option always exists to just ‘give war a chance’ and see what happens and adapt to the new circumstances at the end. Second, Lend Lease. As the US did during the Second World War before it engaged, it provided material for the war effort. Third, volunteers. Like the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War, Eagle Squadrons of the Second World War, The Crippled Eagles in Rhodesia, or more recently as the ISIS and anti-ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria, Europe could allow its citizens to fight in America. Whether it would allow fighters for both sides is another question altogether, however.

Or, finally, would the satirical epigraph at the start of this post prove prescient—would Europe mobilize to defeat this new Confederacy? Would it make a stand on its own values and strategic interests? Suffering under a long history of continual strategic failure, with Iraq and Afghanistan only being the latest examples, it would take a significant shift in elite, military, and popular imaginations to make this happen. Regardless of what choice could be made, each option comes with its own risks and rewards. But with greater risk comes greater reward. And choosing the lesser options can mean Europe will further erode its ability to secure itself, and perhaps fall (further) into its own pit of darkness once more.

As Cathal Nolan made clear in his estimable history of battle, ‘moral and material attrition’ are the ‘main determinants of outcome in wars among the Great Powers.’ Simply, those who mobilise the most usually win. Without a doubt, the right-wing in the US, both government and non-government, remains the most ready, willing, and able to engage in large-scale violence. But they are also the smallest demographically, weakest economically, and the obedience of large parts of the US Government to Trump can no longer be counted on, let alone in the event of a full outbreak of violence. Thus, the choices Europe makes early on matters. And the decision, to reverse Churchill’s hope, for the Old World to ‘step forth to the rescue and the liberation of the [new]’ might be required if it is to avoid conflagration on its own soil.

Michael C. Davies is a Ph.D. candidate in Defence Studies at King’s College London, focusing on the theory and practice of victory. He previously conducted lessons learned research at the U.S. National Defense University where he co-authored three books on the Wars of 9/11 and is one of the progenitors of the Human Domain doctrinal concept. He is also the Coordinating Editor with the Strife Journal.

The Burmese Civil War: Seventy Years and Counting

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By Ed Nash

20 May 2019

Kachin militiaman watching Burma Army outposts for activity. Kachin State, 2018. (Ed Nash)

The world’s current longest running war, the internal conflict in Burma (also known as Myanmar) receives but limited attention in the outside world. Considering the complexities of the conflict, as well as the growing importance of neighbouring countries and an increasingly assertive China, it may be useful for any watcher of international affairs to develop an understanding of the current events in Burma. This article aims to provide a basic grounding of the situation to those who may be interested in a conflict that has killed an estimated 130,000 people.

Since 1948 the Burmese Civil War has carried on largely unabated and today finds itself on the verge of escalating violently, as groups negotiating as part of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) become further disillusioned. Despite seventy years of bloodshed under an oppressive military dictatorship, the year 2015 signalled a break-through for democracy, as the famous prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD party rose to power. The NCA negotiations began promisingly, however the last few years have seen growing discontent from several Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) stemming both from the lack of progress in talks with the central government and the actions undertaken against them by the powerful Burmese military, the Tatmadaw

Since January 2019, the Arakan Army (AA) has been battling against the Burmese Army in Rakhine State, situated on the western coast of Burma. The AA, formed in 2009, have been employing both conventional and guerrilla tactics against the army and police units and experienced a surge in support with around 7000 volunteering to fight. Although months of fighting have led to an estimated 33,000 civilians displaced, the AA appear committed to resistance. On 17 April 2019, their leader Tun Myat Naing, speaking at a military parade in Wa State, said: “We are not the ones to give up. We have to fight the war. We will not get peace by praying.”

Meanwhile, in Kachin and Shan States, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) continues to fight a guerrilla war in the mountains and dominate large sections across the Burma-China borderline. The Burmese Army have deployed their Light Infantry Division 99 (LID99) into the region, a unit notorious for brutality and its role in the Rohingya genocide of 2017 that saw over 10,000 civilians murdered and another 700,000 displaced into neighbouring Bangladesh.

Additionally, two of the AA’s allies in the east, the MNDAA and the TNLA have both issued threats that they “have to take necessary action” in support of their alliance. The last time there was extensive combat between the Tatmadaw and the MNDAA, an errant Burma Air Force bomb killed four Chinese citizens, provoking an angry response from Chinese officials. Therefore, there is no doubt that a flare-up in that sector will draw the watchful attention of China’s People’s Liberation Army, which is speculated to be informally assisting the MDNAA.[1]

Further south-east of Burma, in Kayin State, the Karen are also experiencing a series of attacks. Despite guarantees given during NCA negotiations between the Burmese government and the Karen National Union (KNU), the KNU have accused the Burmese Army of breaking faith by building roads in areas under Karen control. Also, there are reports of Kayin civilians being murdered by Burma Army personnel. To add to the growing internal conflict, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) – considered to be the strongest of ethnic minorities within Burma – have just celebrated their thirtieth anniversary with a deliberate display of their military might and statements that mark a more belligerent tone than usual.

An estimated 25,000 soldiers at their disposal, the Wa have generally been circumspect of antagonising the central government since they signed a truce in 1989. But on 17 April, a spokesman stated that he was doubtful the agreements would remain in effect after the general elections of 2020. Such a development would represent a substantial change in the Wa’s situation as “flexibility and compromise have long been crucial to the UWSA”[2] but a collapse of their current accord with the Tatmadaw could well mean the Wa becoming aggressive to protect the considerable business empire they have created, especially if other ethnic forces are also fully engaged.

With the NLD government appearing increasingly autocratic or powerless to rein in the military, it’s likely the next few years may see a return to the widespread warfare of the kind that blighted Burma in the past, as the EAOs abandon any hopes for peace through talks. If the Tatmadaw continues to push its presence into ethnic areas in defiance to the residents wishes, they will see no other recourse but to fight. Such an event would likely spell a complete disaster for any hopes of a lasting peace for another generation.

Ed Nash has spent years travelling around the world and, on occasion, interfering as he sees fit. Between June 2015 and July 2016 he volunteered with the Kurdish YPG in its battle against ISIS in Syria. His book Desert Sniper: How One Ordinary Brit Went to War Against ISIS was published in September 2018.

[1] Beehner, Lionel; “State-building, Military Modernization and Cross-border Ethnic Violence in Myanmar”, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, Volume: 5 issue: 1 (January 30, 2018); p.24

[2] Ong, Andrew, “Producing Intransigence: (Mis) Understanding the United Wa State Army in Myanmar.” Contemporary Southeast Asia vol. 40, no. 3 (2018); p. 462

Who will rule in Syria? Fragmented sovereignty and the problems of transition

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By Nicholas Barker:

Blog entry for Strife revised 20.03.2014
Zones of control in Syria

‘Who rules when the fighting stops? … When political groups resort to war, it is because they cannot agree on who gets to call the tune in peace.’[i]

The Geneva II peace talks have foundered on the questions of a political transition and what will replace Assad and his regime. Determining who will control the instruments of state power – and thereby monopolise the use of force – is the greatest challenge in negotiating an end to a civil war: overwhelming existential fear and mistrust between the warring parties limits the chances of reaching an agreement and then committing to and implementing it.[ii] But these questions of who rules, where, and how cannot be answered only at the national level. The war in Syria is a war for control of the state but it is also intensely local, made up of multiple small wars. ‘Several struggles are rolled into one’, according to the International Crisis Group. What began as ‘an internal conflict pitting the regime against a broad popular uprising with multiple, separate flashpoints has broken into several battlefields and front lines, shaped by local characteristics’.

These dynamics are common in civil wars: political authority fragments, control of territory and people is divided between competing armed groups, and mutually exclusive claims of the right to rule create conditions of ‘multiple sovereignty’ and the formation of ‘states-within-states’.[iii] Rebels must secure territorial and social control to further their military objectives. They face a ‘territorial imperative’ to establish a stronghold, but civilian support – or acquiescence – is essential to all sides, so the population under their control must be ruled effectively in order to prevent defection. Consequently, civil wars are not exclusively destructive phenomena but are violent processes of ‘competitive state building’,[iv] forming and transforming political, social and economic relations between armed groups and civilians. This not only shapes the course of the war, but will also shape the subsequent peace.

War, governance and the struggle for control

Reports from Syria portray a fractured polity with violent competition between the government, rebels, and civilians for control of territory and the right to rule. A diverse range of political actors now control different parts of Syria, with varying degrees of coercion, effectiveness, and legitimacy, and with ongoing battles to seize contested territory. The effort to control the population is as much a part of the war as military combat. In the town of Shadadi, for example, Jabhat al-Nusra provided extensive services to the population, including food, electricity, water, healthcare, and ‘the promise of swift justice, delivered according to sharia law’. In Raqqa – under rebel control since March 2013 – rebels have competed with the regime and with each other for control over civilians, and for their loyalty. Reports from activists tell of the government cutting supplies of electricity to ‘punish’ armed groups when they began taxing the populations’ electricity use, and jihadists compete with each other to provide local services, with local governance a ‘prime site for the battle for Syrian hearts and minds’.

There is a strategic logic driving these efforts. ISIS has consolidated control over Raqqa by closing down media outlets and the foreign exchange office, and taking control of food supplies in order to create a dependent population. Their aim is to change dependence ‘into loyalty and gain popularity among the community’ and thereby expand their control of territory in eastern Syria and Iraq. ISIS have also adopted a strategy of sectarian cleansing, with violence against Christians increasing as ISIS took control, leading to a majority of the city’s Christian population fleeing.

The Assad regime has adopted a similar approach. Sunni civilians in Alawite areas tell of threats and intimidation, and being driven from their homes in fear of sectarian cleansing, and claim that the Assad regime is trying to ‘to reshape the area’s fragile ethnic mix’ to an extent that exceeds the consolidation of a loyal stronghold. Furthermore, wartime population displacement has led to sectarian segregation in cities, and instances of sectarian cleansing in the countryside, shattering the historic tolerance that once existed between Syria’s sects.

These wartime transformations will have consequences that last beyond the fighting, and the actors on the ground know their political actions may have greater impact than any tactical victory. ‘I have been fighting for two years and a half’ one rebel leader is quoted as saying. ‘Tell me: what have I achieved? In all this time did I ever think of establishing governance? Did I consider working with the civilians in the areas under my control to get electricity or provide anything? The jihadis are better: they provide governance. In two and a half years, I have built nothing. Kill me, and my battalion collapses. Kill the jihadis, and the institutions they have founded will survive.’ It will be years before we know the full implications of these wars within wars over governance, but the transition to peace will have to take account of the enduring effects of institutions forged in war.

Prospects for peace?

Some analysts argue that governance of rebel-controlled areas is key to the resolution of the war. Baczko et al claim that the ‘solution’ to the crisis is to build a state in territory held by the rebels that can eventually replace the Assad regime. They propose strengthening national institutions rather than more parochial actors and armed groups through establishing ‘coordination committees’ and argue that the main priority should not be assisting the military progress of the opposition, but effective institution building in ‘liberated’ areas. Others also emphasise the importance of legitimate governance in rebel-held, or ‘liberated’ territory. Moustafa et al argue that building a democratic post-war Syria depends on establishing civilian police to provide protection and law and order in such areas, which should be controlled by civilian councils that have been democratically-elected.

Such proposals are not without their risks, though, and creating legitimate governance in rebel-controlled territory presents enormous challenges. Civil wars elevate ‘specialists in violence’ to positions of political authority, militarising local governance, and many studies have explored how these violence entrepreneurs are generally unwilling to relinquish wartime gains in power and status once the fighting has stopped. Rebels who become politicians and bureaucrats do not just relinquish wartime practices or institutions, which can be sustained even when the armed conflict has come to end. The same is true of the government, and the Syrian regime has adapted in ways that will affect how post-war Syria is governed. The demands of waging war have forced the Assad regime to ‘reconfigure its social base, tighten its dependency on global authoritarian networks, adapt its modes of economic governance, and restructure its military and security apparatus’.[v] If these adaptations are entrenched the chances of a post-war transition to democracy are slim.

The problem is that, ‘[a]s with most civil wars, those who will emerge empowered from the turmoil [in Syria] will likely be those who, having accumulated power through force but also ideological and sectarian mobilisation, will be most reluctant to cede it’.[vi] The longer the conflict continues, the more deeply entrenched these wartime power structures will become and the more profoundly they will shape the political order that emerges from the war. This will make the relationship between the main, national conflict and the multiple local conflicts crucial to how the transition to peace unfolds. There can be both sharp divergences and close connections between the national ‘cleavage’ and the local conflicts of a civil war. Even with a national settlement, these local conflicts may run on,[vii] with local warlords ruling over fragments of Syria, clinging on to power and privilege accrued through violence and the control of people and territory, making the peace as fragmented as the war.

Nicholas is currently a London-based independent researcher with postgraduate degrees from Birkbeck, University of London and Central European University. His research focuses on the termination and aftermath of civil wars, and British foreign policy. He has worked at an international affairs think tank, and as a commissioning editor for an international relations website.
NOTES

[i] Richard K. Betts, ‘The Delusion of Impartial Intervention’, Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (November 1, 1994): 21, doi:10.2307/20046926.
[ii] Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2002); Caroline A Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007).
[iii] Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1978), 192; Stathis N Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 12; Paul W. T. Kingston and Ian Spears, eds., States-within-States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era, 1st ed (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
[iv] Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 218; See also Paul Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders’, Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 02 (2012): 243–64, doi:10.1017/S1537592712000655.
[v] Heydemann, ‘Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism’, 60.
[vi] Emile Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant, Adelphi Series (Abingdon: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013), 11.
[vii] This is what Autesserre has called ‘local violence, national peace’ in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Séverine Autesserre, ‘Local Violence, National Peace? Postwar “Settlement” in the Eastern D.R. Congo (2003-2006)’, African Studies Review 49, no. 3 (2006): 1–29, doi:10.1353/arw.2007.0007.

Syria: A Proxy Battleground

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By Pezhman Mohammadi

Almost two years after unrest began in Syria, not only has the ‘popular revolution’ not borne fruit, but also many of the ‘freedom fighters’ have turned out to be non-Syrian, foreign-funded terrorists. What made Syria a target of a foreign-backed insurgency? And what could be the solution to the crisis?

Since 2011, Syria has become a target of indirect foreign intervention to topple the Assad’s regime. Various motives have been suggested for such aggression against the secular state. First, Syria is strategically important for many countries, including the United States, Israel, Iran and Russia. Second, Syria is Iran’s strongest ally, Israel’s long-time adversary, and a channel for Iranian arms transport to resistance organisations in Palestine and Lebanon.

Has a new ‘Cold War’ emerged in the Middle East? Putting Russia aside for the moment, Syria can be argued to have become a battlefield for a clash between Iran and the United States. The US, assisted by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, is arming the Free Syrian Army (FSA) terrorists against Assad. Meanwhile, Iran is providing financial assistance and military know-how to the Syrian President through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) shadowy Quds Force, hence the reason the Syrian President is still standing.

To some analysts, the current Syrian turmoil is as part of a US plan to contain and further isolate Iran by removing Islamic Republic’s only Arab ally in an era of increasing Arab-Iranian regional rivalry. Assad’s regime is considered as a fundamental pillar in Tehran’s policy approach towards Israel and hostile Arab states. Clearly, in his absence, Iran loses significant influence in that arena. In this context, Michael Hanna of Century Foundation in New York stated that “Syria is a central player in Iranian power projection”. Nevertheless, this would be an attempt to correct an earlier American miscalculation, namely the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which significantly strengthened Iran’s position in the region. This is a textbook proxy conflict scenario in which the laws of war appear to be absent, causing mass civilian casualties.

Some believe that Syria without Assad would be an ideal state, a liberated society. But this is wrong. Syria is currently witnessing a sectarian clash, thanks to the emergence of extremist Wahhabi ideology in the Free Syrian Army. According to this ideology, other religious sects, whether Jewish, Christian, or Islamic factions such as Shiites, are all considered as ‘infidels’ and must either accept the fanatic organisation’s ideology or be persecuted and killed. In the absence of Assad, a once secular country is likely to disintegrate as sectarian conflicts intensify. This provides an explanation for the loyalty of the Alawite-dominated Syrian army to President Assad: they prefer his rule to that of the FSA.

The solution to the Syrian crisis is far from straightforward. I would suggest that bilateral talks between Iran and the US would be a step in the right direction. Improved US-Iranian relations would contribute to improved regional stability.

Moreover, in late-2012, Iran proposed a ‘Six-Point Plan’ to solve the Syrian Crisis. The Plan’s steps include immediate cease-fire; initiation of a ‘national dialogue’; establishment of a united government which; humanitarian assistance to the citizens of Syria; freedom for all prisoners who have not committed a crime against the country; and full and unbiased media access to Syria. Although this has been widely rejected by the ‘anti-Syrian coalition’ for obvious reasons, Russia and China may be able to enforce the Plan using their influence in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Further, states must stop arming the terrorists in Syria. In this context, the United Nations (UN) is obliged to issue a firm resolution against the terror-sponsoring bodies. After all, these are the same gang of radicals that the West is fighting against in different corners of the world. A related practical, but extremely difficult, measure would be to place punitive economic sanctions on countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar that financially and militarily sponsor such groups.