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Vietnam: a power on the rise?

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By Carlotta Rinaudo

The lush vegetation of the Mekong Delta (Credit: Carlotta Rinaudo, 2017)

In April 1975 the Vietnam War was over. Roads and bridges were left in rubble, and orphans were walking barefoot in the streets of Saigon. Following the war, the US had imposed a trade embargo prohibiting any commercial dealings with Vietnam, isolating the country from international trade.

Unsurprisingly, in the early 1980s Vietnam was one of the poorest places on earth. The Vietnamese Communist Party adopted a centrally planned economy that led to stagnant agricultural production, explaining why a country covered with lush paddy fields had to import rice from abroad. One-fifth of the Vietnamese population was on the brink of starvation, and electricity was available only 4 hours per day.

This situation changed in 1986, when the country opened to the world. Vietnam launched a set of reforms known as “Doi Moi”, successfully replicating the Chinese model: the country would preserve its single-party system while shifting towards a market-based economy. These reforms quickly boosted the economy and attracted massive Foreign Direct Investments. If a few years before Vietnam had had to import rice from abroad, by 1989 it had become the second largest rice exporter in the world.

Over recent decades, Vietnam has presented itself as a good international citizen, earning recognition and respect within the ASEAN group. It has signed a wide array of bilateral trade agreements, while joining the WTO, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and recently, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In 2019 it took a mediating role in global diplomacy by hosting the second Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi, and in 2020 it assumed the ASEAN chairmanship while successfully handling the Covid19 pandemic. Hanoi was in fact praised for giving one of the world’s best responses to the pandemic, quickly introducing a massive program of contact tracing while mobilizing the Vietnamese society in a collective fight against the virus.
These factors suggest that Vietnam is walking the path of a rising middle power, demonstrating a growing ability to shape international events in three particular areas: the global supply chain, the South China Sea, and the realm of 5G technologies.

Vietnam’s place in the global supply chain

Amidst the China-US trade war, many multinational companies have been looking to relocate their supply chain outside of the Chinese mainland, adopting a “China Plus One” business strategy. In this context, Vietnam has emerged as the ideal “Plus One” candidate, thanks to its ability to offer solid infrastructure coupled with a large low-wage workforce. Nike and Samsung have been outsourcing their production to Vietnamese factories for years, and recently Apple has started to assemble its AirPod earphones on Vietnamese soil too. This is not to say that “Made in Vietnam” will ever be able to replace “Made in China”: Vietnam doesn’t have the capacity to become the new factory of the world. To Vietnam’s 55 million manufacturing workers, China has 800 million; and while Ho Chi Minh City’s container port can accommodate 6 million containers annually, Shanghai reaches 40 million. Yet, in a “China Plus One” world, Vietnam has been able to emerge as a valid alternative, thereby securing an important position in the global supply chain.

Vietnam in the South China Sea

According to scholar Do Thanh Hai, Vietnam’s psyche has been shaped by its cyclical and perennial struggle against Chinese invasions from the North. This traditional Vietnamese perception of China remains in the country’s consciousness. Vietnam often sees China not as a conventional neighbor, but, rather, as a force of nature - “like floods and storms that feed into the deltas (…) to which Vietnamese, like reeds, must at once bend while remaining firmly intact.”

Aware of its military inferiority, Vietnam does not seek direct confrontation with its northern giant, instead it resists, “firmly intact”, protecting Vietnamese interests.

When, in 2014, China deployed one of its oil rigs in Vietnamese waters, Vietnam responded with a policy of “cooperation cum struggle”, displaying extraordinary pragmatism. First, Vietnam resolutely responded by raising global media attention to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, therefore internationalizing and securitizing a bilateral issue. Then, when China pulled the oil rig back, Hanoi sent its officials to Beijing to heal their diplomatic ties.

Although this approach might appear unusual, Vietnam only revived an old tradition of the past, when, after a territorial dispute, it used to send symbolic homages and annual tributes to Chinese emperors in order to secure peace, harmony, and recognition. This policy of “cooperation cum struggle” is a mix of soft and hard methods that helps Vietnam escape a battle it cannot win, while vigorously standing up for its own territorial sovereignty.

While other Southeast Asian countries like Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines have now softened their attitude in the South China Sea, Vietnam is increasingly perceived as the ASEAN champion that can contain Chinese maritime ambitions. This security leadership role has been widely acknowledged by the international community, with countries like Japan offering their support and providing offshore patrol vessels to Hanoi. With regards to China, Vietnam is indeed “bending like reeds, while remaining firmly intact.”

Vietnam in the technological race

Not only did Vietnam not include Huawei in its 5G network: Hanoi built its own domestic infrastructure and appears ready to deploy it for commercial use by 2021. Viettel, a Vietnamese state-owned telecom company, has collaborated with Ericsson to create its own 5G technology, and plans to expand the product to Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. Hanoi has also provided a cheap mass access to the Internet for its citizens, while aiming to become a key player in e-commerce and online payment methods. After Ericsson, Nokia, Huawei, Samsung and ZTE, Viettel is the sixth producer in the 5G race, an impressive result for a country that 40 years ago was not able to keep up with food shortages.

Conclusion

A latecomer to the international community, Vietnam is now increasingly emerging as a regional middle power: it is well-integrated in the world economy, it operates on the front lines in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, and it is one of the only domestic producers of 5G technology. ASEAN was deliberately created to survive without a formal leader to ensure equality between its 10 member states – yet this has translated into mutual weakness rather than collective strength. For this reason, many scholars see in Vietnam a country that will be able to fill this leadership vacuum. From its isolation in the 1980s, Vietnam has come far: today, the vibrant streets of Hanoi tell the story of a place of possibilities.

 

Carlotta is a MA candidate in International Affairs at the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London. After completing her BA in Interpreting and Translation, she moved to the Middle East and developed a strong interest in the MENA region, North Korea, Cybersecurity, and the implications of the rise of China. Carlotta has written on a number of Italian publications on the Hong Kong protests and other forms of political unrest.

The EU and the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Test of Legitimacy

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By Jack Cross

(From left to right: Ursula VON DER LEYEN, President of the European Commission; Charles MICHEL, President of the European Council. – 19/02/2021)

It’s safe to say that it has been a difficult few years for the EU. And while the process of an ‘ever closer union’ has never been a straightforward one, the European project has nevertheless endured. In recent months, however, the EU has had to grapple with the most serious challenge it has faced since its inception, the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Coronavirus is simultaneously the European Commission’s greatest test and opportunity to date, its appearance has offered the chance to demonstrate an ability to act as a federal executive for all 27 member states. The performance of the Commission has consequences both in its members national localities and internationally, as it will show to the rest of the world whether or not it is able to perform effectively as a single actor. Success here would help project the image that non-member states around the world should do business with the Commission, not individual member states.

Despite high hopes, the roll-out of COVID-19 vaccines across Europe has been fraught with difficulty. Many have directed blame towards the European Commission for problems with region-wide distribution efforts and the delays or halts to various national vaccination programs.

So, what exactly went wrong with the vaccine roll-out and how does this reflect on the European Commission? The EU’s approach mirrored that of most federal governments, which retained powers concerning vaccine contracts and distribution, while sub-federal bodies oversaw lockdowns and other restrictive measures. The EU wide scheme for vaccine purchase and distribution was optional, though all 27 member states chose to opt-in . This was a vote of confidence in the Commission’s plan.

The defining error in the Commission’s plan was the placing of an order for 300 million doses of the Astra-Zeneca vaccine in August 2020. Given the scale of the production required, this was a relatively delayed decision. By direct comparison, the UK government had placed an order for 100 million doses of the same vaccine in May. This late decision caused significant problems with the vaccine supply chain, with the EU and Astra-Zeneca being forced to reduce their targets for vaccinations in the first quarter of this year to 31 million a reduction of 60% on the original target. One consequence of the troubled vaccine procurement process was the decision by the Hungarian government to begin trialling the Russian Sputnik vaccine, a clear blow to the EU’s collective approach.

Now it is certainly true that the EU are not alone in having problems with the vaccine rollout, the Biden Administration in the United States has inherited a situation in which the US roll-out plan was non-existent. However, no one has questioned the viability of American federal governance, while the same cannot be said for the position of the European Commission. As long as there are doubters within and without the EU, the European Commission and Parliament has to constantly prove it is capable and offers reliable partnership, both for its member states and on the international stage. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, admitted in a necessary act of contrition, that there had been failures in the Commission’s handling of the vaccine roll-out. It is crucial now that the Commission can lead the region out of the pandemic and the accompanying financial crisis, thereby reasserting its ability to present the union as a single actor. Already the Commission has proposed a recovery fund worth €750 billion and it will likely offer further assistance to member states as the focus turns towards the post-COVID landscape.

Pushing beyond the specific problems of the vaccine roll-out, the challenge of the current pandemic comes at a crucial time for the EU and the Commission. In the post-Brexit landscape, creating a renewed purpose and vision for the union has been central to the work of senior European politicians. Upon assuming the Presidency of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen pledged to transform the body into a ‘geopolitical commission’ with a new sub-commission group to work on ‘external coordination’. This is no small ambition, and will likely become a key part of the Commission’s role in the coming years.

Though, a problem remains, in that no one is yet to work out exactly what that role would be. The European Commission has laid out an impressive array of policies concerning the climate crisis, an area in which the EU could become a global leader. But the Commission will be reliant on the co-operation of the EU’s national governments in order to achieve its climate goals. Only time will tell if the fallout from the vaccine roll-out has shaken the faith of member states in the viability of the European Commission as a single actor for the whole region.

While it is yet to be seen if Brexit will trigger a domino effect of EU secessionism, the union still faces huge challenges going forward, particularly in projecting itself as a single actor on the world stage. This is not to say that the vaccine roll-out has dashed any hope of the EU being treated as a legitimate single actor, simply that doubts in its ability to do so have grown. Unlike most nation states, regional organisations and supranational bodies must constantly reaffirm their legitimacy through demonstrable utility. The glitches in the vaccine roll-out have been a setback but one that the European Commission will be able to overcome, repairing the damage to its reputation through leading the region in its post-pandemic recovery.

 

Jack Cross is currently pursuing a masters in the History of War in the War Studies Department at King’s College London. His main research interests are diplomatic history, the role of great and middle powers within current international politics, as well as the politics of the Balkans and Middle East.

The United States, Saudi Arabia and Yemen: Same Crisis, Different Administrations

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By Philip Mayne

 

US DOD, 2019.

The outcome of the civil war in Yemen matters to the United States. Geographically, the country sits on the Maghreb Straits, a major trade route. Instability within the region has economic implications for the United States. The outcome of the conflict affects other key interests of the US, such as influence within the region and the containment of Iran.

The United States has been, and continues to be, concerned with an increase in Iranian influence and power within the region. The US and Iran have had a tense relationship for decades. In 2015, tensions were lifted slightly following a nuclear deal between the US and Iran, however President Trump abandoned this deal in 2018 and reinstated sanctions. Relations worsened following the assassination of General Soleimi in 2020 and Iran has vowed that it will seek revenge. The US sees Iran as potentially destabilising the region, which could affect US trade. US policy in Yemen has been guided by its wider interest of containing Iran.

In 2015, Saudi Arabia launched an intervention into Yemen to restore the Government. Since then, Saudi Arabia has been at the heart of US policy towards Yemen. Saudi Arabia provides an important Middle Eastern ally to the United States, as both seek to contain the influence of Iran within the region. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been in competition for dominance within the region for decades. Aggravated by religious tensions, the Saudi Arabia and Iran relationship can be perceived as a regional Cold War. The Yemen crisis can be perceived as part of the wider Iran-Saudi Proxy war. Saudi Arabia has backed the Yemeni government and Iran has supported the Houthi rebels, also known as Ansar Allah. Therefore, US-Yemen policy has revolved around one of its key Middle Eastern allies, Saudi Arabia.

What has US-Yemen Policy Looked like?

In 2015 the Obama administration, which had a tense and difficult relationship with Saudi Arabia, supported its intervention in Yemen. At the heart of this support has been trade. In 2010, Obama authorised a significant trade deal with the country. By the time he left office $115 billion worth of arms had been sold to Saudi Arabia.

The trade with Saudi Arabia increased under the Trump Administration. A major arms trade deal was secured with the Saudis in 2018, worth up to $380 billion across 10 years. By 2019, guided missiles and bombs made up the majority of the Saudi purchases. US officials have insisted that selling American weapons, such as precision air-to-ground Paveway Missiles, to the Saudis would help to avoid civilian casualties. However, the World Peace Foundation reported that Saudi Arabia has been deliberately targeting civilians with these ‘smart’ weapons. According to Security Assistance Monitor, continued weapons sales from the US has “enabled the Saudi regime to wage a brutal and indiscriminate bombing campaign in Yemen”. Infrastructure, such as fishing and farming, has also been targeted by the Saudis in an effort to starve the population into compliance.

Following reports of war crimes early in the war, the decision to continue to trade with Saudi Arabia, essentially enabling the Saudis to fight in Yemen, has become a controversial issue. The United Nations, in September 2019, urged all states to refrain from “providing arms that could be used in the conflict”. Despite this, Trump continued to sell arms to Saudi Arabia.

In 2019, Trump vetoed a resolution, which would have forced an end to US support of the War, on the grounds that the US must show commitment to its allies. He continued to make the weapons trade deals and integral part of US foreign policy, to counter Iran, boost US jobs and the US economy. Trump’s foreign policy ultimately elevated economics over other concerns. Trump’s reluctance to cut ties, or halt the arms trade with Saudi Arabia, has been perceived as giving the country the ‘green light’ for more atrocities, and the US has been criticised for looking the other way as one of its staunch allies has committed war crimes; such as the deliberate bombing of civilians. According to Human Rights Watch, the Saudi-led coalition have bombed hospitals, markets, mosques, detention centres, school buses and fishermen.

Biden’s Policy

The Biden administration has set out to transform US foreign policy. Biden has set out to rebuild US relations and rebuild “moral leadership”. Last week, the new administration has announced changes to its policy on the war in Yemen, and its relationship with Saudi Arabia. On 4 February 2021, Biden made his first speech on US foreign policy. Within the statement he said that he will be stepping up diplomacy efforts, to bring a ceasefire, open humanitarian channels and begin peace talks. Biden reiterated that the US would continue to support Saudi Arabia to defend its territory and sovereignty. But, importantly he said “to underscore our commitment, we are ending all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arms sales”.

The following day, Biden announced that his administration would revoke the terrorist designation of the Houthis. During his last few weeks in office, Trump designated the Houthis a terrorist organisation, in a move to “further malign activity by the Iranian regime”. However, the move was met with widespread condemnation. The move was opposed because designating the group as a terrorist organisation makes it harder to broker a resolution. The Financial Times expected that the designation would likely push the Houthi movement closer to Tehran, hardening the stances of both sides. Trump’s decision was met with condemnation by the UN, who argued that this would worsen the already dire humanitarian crisis. Since the start of the War, it is expected that more than 230,000 Yemenis have died due to war, mostly due to a lack of food, health services and infrastructure. The UN shared its concerns that the situation would worsen, as links to food and medical supplies could be interrupted. David Beasley, the Executive Director of the World Food Programme, warned that the designation could “be a death sentence to hundreds and thousands if not millions”.

The state department has said that Biden’s announcement does not mean that the US supports the Houthis, and nor does it support the conduct of the Houthis; who have used child soldiers and committed war crimes as well. Instead, it has been decided based on the humanitarian affects that the designation may have had. The UN has welcomed the change in policy calling it a “positive development” towards negotiations.

How important is this transition in policy?

Biden’s policy is a significant change from the last two administrations. He is reversing the policies of the Obama administration and he is trying to distance Washington from Riyadh, overturning the direction of Trump’s foreign policy. No longer will the US position be solely on supporting Saudi Arabia to keep Iran in check, instead it is to focus on human rights abuses on both sides of the war.

However, this policy change has come early in his administration and the effects are not yet clear. The freezing of the flow of US arms to Saudi will put the country under pressure. However, there are no immediate details on what the freeze means. It is not clear what “relevant” arms sales are. William Hartung, the director of the arms and security programme at the Centre for International Policy, said “To be effective, the new policy should stop all arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both proposed and in the pipeline, including maintenance and logistical support”. Therefore, if Biden does want to put pressure on Saudis to come to the negotiating table, the “relevant” arms sales freezes must be significant and wide ranging.

However, the US decision to freeze arms not only puts Saudi Arabia under pressure, but it also ramps up the pressure for other countries, such as Canada, France, Italy, Spain and the UK, selling arms and providing technical support to Saudi Arabia. The UK may be reluctant to do this, as the UK has a trade deal, which includes Typhoons and missiles, worth up to £5.4 billion.

However, if the UK and other allies continue to supply the Saudis, they appear to be out of line with the US. Even more so, due to Biden’s emphasis on the humanitarian issues of the war. Time will tell the impact of Biden’s change in policy.

However, early into his administration Biden has not hesitated to show his commitment to ending the war. In early February, he announced Timothy Lenderking as the US special envoy to Yemen, to open up diplomatic channels. On 7 February, Lenderking was sent to Iran to try to broker a cease-fire between then Yemeni government and the Houthi rebels. On 22 February, Lenderking began another humanitarian trip to several countries in the Gulf with the intention of bringing about a lasting political solution, and humanitarian relief to the people of Yemen.

The Biden Administration has taken a different approach to the Yemen crisis. The President appears to be committed to bringing peace to the country. Although the change in policy is welcome, it is premature to celebrate. It will take a continued commitment to stopping the war and applying pressure to its allies. There is still a long and uncertain road ahead for the people of Yemen, who have already suffered years of war, crisis, and hunger.

Philip Mayne is a final year PhD candidate at the University of Hull. He has a special interest in strategy, counterinsurgency, military ethics, military history, international security and relations. His thesis examines the relationship between military ethics and military effectiveness. Specifically, his work focuses on adherence to the Just War Tradition, and success in counterinsurgencies; through analysing the case studies of the Malayan Emergency, the Kenyan Emergency, the Algerian War and the Vietnam War. Philip has contributed to the Huffington Post and is an active member of the Hull University War Studies Research Group. Find him on Twitter @phil_mayne.

The Other ‘Two-States’ solution: Cyprus and its Peace Process

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By Rafaela Piyoti

Road Block (Roman Robroek/ Urban Photographer)

The island of Cyprus has been divided since the 1974 Turkish Invasion. On one side, there is the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) which stands unrecognised by any nation-state but Turkey, and on the other, there is the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) which, by contrast, is internationally recognised and occupies a seat in the United Nations General Assembly. Since 1974, the UN has facilitated talks to attempt to reconcile the island’s bifurcation, but the two sides have resisted reconciliation, leading to the current status quo, or what is called, the Cyprus Problem.

Since the partition of the island the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities have grown further apart. The UN Peacekeeping force has established a Buffer Zone between the two communities and has been the mediator of all peace negotiations and political developments on the island since. The TRNC declared its independence in 1983 under the presidency of Rauf Denktas, although the UN deemed the declaration illegal. Crossing from the TRNC into the RoC and vice versa was not allowed until 2003, when the first borders opened marking a historic moment for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem.

Amongst solutions to this problem, the most widely discussed proposal is a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Whilst another, and increasingly possible, alternative is the recognition of two states, one that is Greek Cypriot and another that is Turkish Cypriot. So far, the two-states solution has never been discussed in the UN-led peace talks. However, the election of Ersin Tatar, a known hardliner and supporter of a two-states solution, as the President of the TRNC, has marked the first time a political figure has proposed the consideration of the two-states solution as part of the UN-led negotiations.

For 47 years, bi-communal discussions have failed to solve the Cyprus Problem despite the numerous UN calls for the two Cypriot communities to negotiate a solution. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom serve as guarantor powers responsible, under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, to ensure the independence and territorial integrity of the island. The Declaration of Independence of Cyprus signed in 1960, proposed a federation with a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot PM. The Cypriot federation collapsed in 1963, following the first bi-communal tensions in the wake of the islands independence.

Major discussions on the unification of the island and the establishment of a new federation were made between 1989 and 1992 with the Boutros-Ghali Plan, and in 2004 with the Annan Plan. The failure of the plans to lead to the unification of the island is attributed to domestic disagreements between the two Cypriot communities.

The Boutros-Ghali Plan failed, as, according to each sides leaders at the time, there was a lack of ‘confidence-building’ measures between the two communities. When the Annan Plan was proposed by the UN the two Cypriot communities had already grown politically distinct. According the Greek Cypriots, the Annan Plan was an indirect partition of the island as it imposed restrictions on the resettlement of Greek Cypriots in cities under the control of the TRNC. Thus, in a referendum held in the RoC a majority of 75,83% voted against the plan.

In addition to the domestic differences between the two Cypriot Communities, the role of foreign powers was also crucial in the failure to reach a solution. The Greek and Turkish governments, as guarantor powers, have supported the RoC and the TRNC respectively. Greece and the RoC, although closely allied, act as two independent states, maintaining independent foreign policies on the Cyprus Problem and on foreign affairs. Greece, like the UK, does not actively participate in the discussions, other than what is obliged through its role as guarantor power. In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot government relies on Turkey in order to form its foreign policies. For Northern Cyprus, Turkey is the main economic contributor and their only foreign ally. Turkey in turn views the TRNC as a geopolitical advantage which gives them access to the Eastern Mediterranean natural resources.

Political disagreements between the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish government have also contributed towards the previous collapse of the peace talks. Recent tensions over the Eastern Mediterranean oil crisis and Turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the region could potentially have a negative impact on the next round of negotiations as well.

Since the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus, representatives from neither of the two Cypriot Communities have met to discuss the two-states solution. The election of Tatar as the president of the TRNC could mark the first time that the two-states solution will enter official peace negotiations. President Tatar, backed by Turkey, has stated that although he is willing to attend a new round of discussions on the Cyprus Problem, he refuses to discuss any other proposal than the two-states solution – which would entail the official recognition of the TRNC as an independent state. This would inevitably mark a political defeat not only for the Cypriot government but also for Greece and the UN, which have repeatedly called for the unification of the island.

The UN called the two Cypriot governments to a five-party meeting, to discuss the future of Cyprus peace talks. A five-party meeting format will include the presence of the two Cypriot leaders, representative from Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom – as the island’s guarantor powers – and the UN as the moderator of the talks. Jane Holl Lute, the UN special envoy, was sent to Cyprus on the 11th of January 2021 to meet the two leaders separately in advance of discussions beginning in February. The Cypriot President, Nicos Anastasiades, welcomed the UN initiative to resume the negotiation process and restated that a bi-communal federation is the most favourable solution to the Cyprus Problem. Tatar, on the other hand, expressed his willingness to participate in the five-party meeting but stated that a federation is no longer a realistic solution for the island. The UN did not make any official statements for either of the meetings, but the next round of negotiations is expected to take place in late February, in New York.

February 2021 will mark the first official negotiations between Ersin Tatar and Nicos Anastasiadis, the Cypriot president, under the supervision of the UN. It is yet unclear whether the two presidents will discuss the two-states solution or if the Greek Cypriot government would veto such a proposal. So far, the official Greek Cypriot stance is against such a solution.

The Cyprus Problem has remained unresolved for 47 years despite the numerous bi-communal talks held by the UN to find a solution. So far, the two Cypriot communities have discussed several variations of a federation that would unify the island. Disagreements between the two Cypriot communities, and the extensive involvement of the Turkish government in the affairs of the TRNC have led to the collapse of all the negotiations that took place since 1974. Greece is a close ally of the RoC but does not have an active role in the negotiation process. Turkey supports the split of the island into two states and has repeatedly called for the international recognition of the TRNC. The newly elected president of the TRNC, Ersin Tatar, has been the first leader of the Turkish Cypriot community who has officially proposed the two-states solution. With the next round of talks taking place in February, the RoC has two options; either to comply with Tatar’s request, meaning a political defeat, or to refuse his proposal, leading, once again, to the collapse of the negotiation process.

 

Rafaela is a part-time MA student in the Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies programme at King’s College London. She received her BA in War Studies and Philosophy. She is a Staff Writer for the Shield and writes for a Cypriot newspaper. Currently, she is a Research Analyst for London Politica. Her main academic interest is on the role of intelligence in policymaking. She also has a passion for Human Rights and has interned at the Cyprus Refugee Council. Rafaella enjoys traveling and learning about new cultures in her free time.