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Chinese Patriotic War Cinema and the Rise of China’s National Consciousness

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Photo Credit: Fay Lee on Unsplash

China’s growing assertiveness has become increasingly visible in recent years. These developments were most recently demonstrated by the success of the Chinese Korean War epic, The Battle at Lake Changjin (长津湖). Released on China’s National Day holiday on the 1st of October, the film recounts the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir in 1950, where the 9th People’s Volunteer Army under Peng Dehuai and Song Shilun drove the American-led United Nations forces out of North Korea, contributing to the stalemate that the war would become [[1]]. The film grossed U.S. $750 million at the Chinese box office, muscling out the latest James Bond outing, No Time to Die, as the highest grossing film of the year so far. It is the success of the film that is indicative of the political, social and economic shifts in China in recent years.

The Battle at Lake Changjin follows on the heels of a wave of patriotic war films that have been notable successes at the Chinese box office. Possibly the most notable example of this was 2017’s Wolf Warrior 2 (战狼2), where a former Chinese soldier, Leng Feng (Wu Jing), battles American and European foes in a fictional African nation as he hunts for the killers of his former commanding officer and lover.

The success of these films has demonstrated a notable break from the previous, more stilted state of Chinese military cinema, which had largely relied upon more professional younger actors and appealed more to older audiences. One of these is the greater quality of the action sequences, stunts and acting, with the directors of these new forms of Chinese war films seeking to thrill their audiences, in contrast to the staid fair that characterized previous films. This stands in direct contrast to previous efforts, such as 2017’s Founding of an Army (建军大业), which relied heavily on the photogenetic appearance and star power of its cast and drew criticism from Chinese netizens on the social media platform, Weibo, as well as the families of those covered in the film, such as Ye Daying, the grandson of the renowned general, Ye Ting, who called Founding of an Army “a reproach and distortion of revolutionary history” [[2]].

Another variation has come in the form of government involvement in these productions. While the state-owned China Film Group Corporation continues to be involved with the production of these new form of films, what has been notable is the involvement of private companies, most notably the social media giant, Tencent. This even extends to the cast, most notably in the case of 1921, which drew upon participants from online talent shows and influencers from the social media platform, Douyin, to play the role of key figures in the founding of the Communist Party of China. It is this development that illustrates the involvement of private firms in what had previously been a largely state run endeavor as well as the changing nature of star power, which has changed as a result of social media.

In addition, the box office success of these films has also illustrated the rise of nationalist sentiment in China as well as pointing to wider developments in China’s foreign relations, with the release of Wolf Warrior 2 coinciding with the modernisation and expansion of the People’s Liberation Army. All point to a China that is willing to stand up to its foes at home and abroad. However, the relationship between cinema and foreign policy has not been without precedent as Hollywood has demonstrated.

From Humiliation to Pride

The success of these films have been illustrative of the role of historical legacies in Chinese politics. This has been reflective in the choice of historical experiences invoked by Chinese cinema as well as Chinese officials. Previously, these typically focused on the period of China’s humiliation, as demonstrated by the glut of films covering China’s struggles with Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945.

Within this context, the setting of The Battle at Lake Changjin is a departure from this in recounting the Battle at the Chosin Reservoir. In doing so, the film’s directors have invoked a time where China was able to go toe-to-toe with the United States and emerge triumphant. Such a message has resonated with Chinese audiences against the backdrop of an increasingly contentious Sino-American relationship, which explains the film’s success.

This is also invocative of the famous words often attributed to Mao Zedong that “the Chinese people have stood up”, with China’s intervention in the Korean War being an action representative of Mao’s bold claim. In keeping with Mao’s words, the film’s release has also coincided with a wider sense of pride in China’s identity, as illustrated by the popularity of the Hanfu (汉服) among Chinese millennials as well as the use of China’s past glories as a source of national pride [[3]]. It is these wider trends that are reflective of how the Chinese perceive China’s role today.

Domestically, these films demonstrate the continued importance of historical legacies in the governance of China. This comes at a time where the Central Committee of the CPC has been tasked with reviewing a draft of a resolution that defines the party’s ‘major achievements and historical experiences.’ In doing so, the CPC’s actions further illustrates the role of historical legacies in cementing political legitimacy. Such a move was further demonstrated at the premiere of 1921, where footage of China’s most recent achievements, such as China’s ventures into space, were shown in a not so subtle way to link the CPC to China’s recent success. This in turn presents the CPC’s discourse of an ubroken lineage between the founding of the party and China’s growth as a Great Power.

However, this narrative has not been without its’ issues, as the reception of 1921 among other films have demonstrated. This was demonstrated by a hotline set up to report comments of ‘historical nihilism’ online being bombarded with complaints about 1921. These run the gamut from complaints over the casting of ‘immoral’ individuals to play key figures in the party’s history to the accusation that the film breached party values. This was further expressed by the hashtag #boycott1921 which gained 3.6 million views before being removed. Even seemingly safe subjects have been subject to controversy as demonstrated by audience reactions to The Eight Hundred, which drew criticism for seemingly glorifying the nationalist Guomindang while ignoring its’ class oppression and misdeeds. It is these aspects that illustrate how China’s nationalist fervour is not only the preserve of the CPC.

The Power of the Chinese Market

The success of films such as Battle at Lake Changjin and 1921 are not so much testaments to the power of the Communist Party but rather to that of the Chinese consumer. This was most notably demonstrated by the role of Chinese millennials in the success of these films, whose economic and consumer clout has led to them being labelled as the ‘new baby boomers’. In addition, these films have also been demonstrative of the consumer habits of this generation as well as the Chinese market as a whole, which is turning away from foreign brands in favour of domestic ones.

It is this shift that raises questions for Hollywood and other Western brands. Previously it had long been believed that brand recognition along with a few token casting choices and gestures towards China was enough to capture the wallets of Chinese consumers, who had become integral to the global success of several major pictures, most notably the Marvel series. However, the success of Battle at Lake Changjin has questioned the feasibility of this, with a local production muscling out one of the biggest and most widely recognized franchises in Hollywood to become the highest grossing film of 2021. As a result, this requires a rethink of how to recapture the Chinese consumer.

The success of patriotic war films in China has indicated a growing national consciousness in Chinese society, which has manifested itself in China’s growing confidence and sense of national pride. All these point to a poised and assertive nation that is willing to flex its economic and military muscle as demonstrated by the more combative stances taken by Chinese diplomats who engage in the aptly named ‘Wolf Warrior diplomacy’, which also shows a case of the silver screen influencing present geopolitics. It is of the success of these films that illustrates how Chinese nationalism has been a concerning but lucrative force. In addition, while these films demonstrate the necessity of controlling the past for political legitimacy, it is the control of China’s future that is the bigger question, the answer for which can be found in these.

[1] Philip J. Greer, Chosin Reservoir: The Battle That Stalled a War, Sabre and Scroll, Vol.9 No.3, Winter 2020, p. 169

[2] Mimi Lau, Film about founding of China’s military slammed by grandson of one of its central characters, South China Morning Post, 28th July 2017 (https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2104519/film-about-founding-chinas-military-slammed-grandson-one-its)

[3] Pan Xiaodie, Zhang Haixia and Zhu Yongfei, An Analysis of the Current Situation of the Chinese Clothing Craze in the Context of the Rejuvenation of Chinese Culture, Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, Vol. 466, p.504

Are wars won on the battlefield?

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A German woman being trained to use a Panzerfaust in 1945, highlighting the fact that wars are not over until the defeated deem it so. Photo Credit: Wikimedia, used under Creative Commons

When one thinks of war, one tends to picture the clash of opposing means of force. Whether this be skirmishes in the back alleys of Mogadishu, or the grinding of men and machine in the hellish fields of the Somme, and perhaps more recently, crippling cyber attacks targeting the infrastructure of societies; either way, one tends to picture a battlefield. This then leads many to assume that this is where wars are won or lost. This assumption is wrong. The answer to the question of this article, put simply, is an unequivocal no. Nor has it ever been the case throughout history.

The battlefield, where the physical or virtual fighting takes place, is used as a space to settle the trial of strength – where the means of the participants clash and compete in an attempt to overcome the other. However, this is not what war is truly about. This confusion is illustrated by the two somewhat contradictory definitions of war provided by Clausewitz in On War. Firstly, that ‘war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale’[1]– suggesting that the fighting, the trial of strength, on the battlefield is where war occurs and the outcome determined. He then goes on to define war as, ‘an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’[2] – this encapsulates the true essence of On War – and indeed of the phenomenon of war itself.

This definition suggests that war is not won by the trial of strength on the battlefield – but by a clash of wills – namely the political wills of the entities in conflict. So, the central question this article will explore is: Is war decided by the trial of strength on the battlefield; or is it primarily a clash of wills – and therefore settled in the political minds of its participants?

As insinuated above, the battlefield is never completely physical. The non-physical, or the moral as Clausewitz refers to it as, plays a significant role. In the modern strategic lexicon, this includes concepts such as information, cyber and psychological operations, which prey on spaces such as social media platforms and the morale of military forces. Such non-kinetic means are always at play in war, and similarly to kinetic means, it acts as a battlefield where conflicting parties seek to disrupt, coerce, or defeat one another’s forces and/or populations. More often than not, the physical and the moral go hand-in-hand in an effort to overcome the enemy. In a physical sense, this is obviated by the concept of decisive battle – such as the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805, where Napoleon’s victory on the battlefield essentially secured the defeat of the Third Coalition. In a non-physical sense, a good example is the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, where the advanced information and psychological operations of Hezbollah shattered IDF morale and Israeli domestic support for the war. At face value, it seems these wars were decided on the battlefield – the former on the physical, and the latter on the non-physical. However, one must consider that in both instances, the defeated party retained the means to continue (the Austrians/Russians still had remnants of an army and Israel could well have continued despite the pressure to withdraw). This is a testimony to the fact that although what unfolds on the battlefield may directly lead to the end of a war, the diminished will of the defeated is immutably what ends war.

Building on this, the perception that the clash of wills is the deciding factor of war, is supported by the reality that war is fundamentally underpinned by politics. Politics, a concept which rationalises and organises human activity, is, of course, fundamental to war; a purposeful and organised human activity. It gives war its direction and purpose. From this, one can confidently say that the political will of a party in war is central. Without the will to fight a war, there can be no war; and in contrast, with the will to continue the fight, there will always be war. The examples given in the previous paragraph have addressed the first part of that sentence. For the second, two examples provide an insight into this reality. Firstly, in the Second World War by April 1945 German forces had been depleted and were scattered: the trial of strength had been unambiguously won by the allies. However, the war continued at bitter intensity for over a month – until the Nazi German leadership lost the will to continue and unconditionally surrendered. The second example is the US-led War in Afghanistan. By 2002, Taliban forces had been decimated and its leadership either killed, captured or in exile – it had both physically and non-physically been driven out of Afghanistan. Despite NATO’s overwhelming victory in the trial of strength, the war was far from won. The Taliban returned, and now, two decades on, are firmly back in control of Afghanistan. These two examples are clear demonstrations of the fact that victory in war is not decided on the battlefield, but when one’s political will overcomes the enemy’s.

This article has aimed to highlight the distinction between two critical aspects of war: the trial of strength and the clash of wills. Having done so, it is clear that the trial of strength occurs on the battlefield, and in some cases may seem to be decisive. However, this is always subordinate to the clash of wills – a conceptual space where wars are won or lost within the political minds of its participants.

[1] Carl von Clausewitz, Beatrice Heuser, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, On War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.13.

[2] Ibid.

Why must Myanmar take the strategic, non-violent path?

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Non-violent protest in Myanmar holds a sign reading, “My ex is bad. But Myanmar military is worse”. Photo Credit: Thu Tun, used under Creative Commons.

Editor’s Note: The author of this article has requested anonymity. After review by Strife’s Managing Board, this article is being published anonymously in accordance with our documented Publication Ethics.

The Machiavellian question of whether it is better for the prince to be loved or feared can be applied to Myanmar’s military – the Tatmadaw. Could the Tatmadaw ever be loved? To most outsiders, it is a brutal, unaccountable and corrupt institution. And this may indeed be the case. A country’s military should be professional and politically neutral, with the sole purpose of defending the sovereign against foreign invaders. They should never turn their guns on their own people nor govern the country in any capacity except security-related matters.

However, Myanmar is far from an ideal republic. There is such a huge gap between the Tatmadaw’s actual behaviour and how it ought to behave that it is pointless judging it on moral grounds. The more insightful question is why, despite numerous massive popular uprisings since the Tatmadaw’s inception, haven’t we seen any significant loyalty shifts within the institution? The Tatmadaw has survived the decades-long dictatorships of General Ne Win and Senior General Than Shwe without showing any signs of major internal loyalty shifts.

The past six decades of mostly quasi-military rule have not been short of mass popular uprisings either. There were the University of Rangoon students protesting against military rule in 1962, the waves of protests from economic grievances in the 1970s, protest over U Thant’s burial in 1974, the infamous 8888 uprising in 1988, the Saffron Revolution in 2007 and the current crisis. All these movements were brutally crushed yet failed to cause any significant loyalty shifts within the Tatmadaw. Would another potential dictatorship, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, be any different this time?

Continual conflict on all sides

The Tatmadaw is understandably far more paranoid than other militaries. Since its founding, the Tatmadaw has fought the British and the Japanese for independence, the Burmese Communist Party, a huge number of ethnic insurgencies, the Kuomintang, and drug lords, all while attempting to consolidate the state after independence. In 1949, just a year after independence and following the rebellion of the Burmese communists and the Karen, large swathes of countryside and suburbs of the then-capital Rangoon were in the hands of either the Burmese Communist Party or Karen rebels. It is from this position of weakness that the Tatmadaw reasserted territorial control over the country.

The Tatmadaw have fought non-stop bloody wars on multiple fronts, in malaria-infested jungles and difficult terrain, against a multitude of rebellions and adversaries, some with superior resources and weapons. It is in this context of continual uprisings that the absence of internal loyalty shifts and the brutal, uncompromisable Tatmadaw must be understood. Whatever internal divisions exist within it, when faced with any force threatening to jeopardise its mission of preventing the disintegration of the Myanmar union, the Tatmadaw closes ranks and faces the common enemy. Regardless of which dictator is in charge, the Tatmadaw’s history is one of counter-insurgencies preventing the disintegration of the union.

The means of nation-building and counter-insurgency are inherently conflicting, but the ends can be surprisingly in harmony. Counter-insurgency serves to preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity – prerequisites for state-building. As battle-hardened soldiers, the Tatmadaw will sacrifice most things over territorial control and integrity. Their baptism in the harsh realities of the battlefields against a multitude of adversaries in difficult environments taught them that fear is more reliable than love. As Machiavelli put it, love is fickle while fear is constant.

Nevertheless, the Tatmadaw must understand that nation-building is not simply a counter-insurgency project. Winning hearts and minds is as important as their tried and trusted ‘four-cuts’ or scorched-earth strategies.

“Tatmadaw and the People … Crush All Those Harming the Union” - Sign outside Mandalay Palace - Mandalay – Myanmar. Photo Credit: Adam Jones, Ph.D, used under Creative Commons.

Wasted opportunity

It is a great pity that the Tatmadaw missed the opportunity to be both feared and loved at the same time, respected rather than loathed by the majority today. A beloved yet feared Tatmadaw could have served both counter-insurgency and nation-building objectives. Aung San Suu Kyi held the key to this. She will go down in history as an extraordinary lady, a once-in-a-generation figure. She has natural charm, charisma and eloquence, and readily elicits virtually unconditional popular support, regardless of her government’s performance. How much of her popularity stems from her persona, her struggle against the Tatmadaw or the people’s deep dislike of the Tatmadaw is irrelevant. What is relevant is that her popularity extends across ethnic boundaries, except for the Arakanese. This is critical for a country such as Myanmar, where state-building has been challenged from the start by deep ethnolinguistic cleavages and multiple simultaneous, militarised and ethnic-based self-determination claims. Any meaningful portion of ethnic minorities’ love for Aung San Suu Kyi, paired with the Tatmadaw’s military might, could have been a perfect match. Their combined powers of seduction and coercion, love and fear, could have been harnessed towards the dual projects of state-building and counter-insurgency, gaining legitimacy from meaningful support of ethnic minorities.

There is nothing fundamentally incompatible between Aung San Suu Kyi and the Tatmadaw that would have doomed their cooperation from the start. Ironically, they share a similar Burmese Buddhist ethnonationalist state view for Myanmar and an authoritarian hands-on management persona. Their inability to work together stems rather from egoistic factors. Why ego is the greatest enemy to the peace process in Myanmar deserves a detailed discussion. But Myanmar now has to deal with the more pressing issue of the increasingly violent resistance.

The strategic advantage of non-violence

People understandably were aggrieved when they felt the 2020 elections were stolen from them. Being emotional and angry are natural reactions in such circumstances. But fighting violence with violence gives the weaker side nothing to gain but emotional venting and, in extreme circumstances, martyrdom, while more innocent people die. What good comes from taking the violent resistance path if it means to play the martyr, gain public sympathy, and in the process, the young lose their chance to outlive the generals they so despise and be the change themselves in years to come?

This does not mean that the seemingly weak have no way to win against the strong and get the results they want.

Aung San Suu Kyi could single-handedly take on the Tatmadaw in a strategic, non-violent manner. Her non-violent struggle for democracy from the 1990s to the 2000s ultimately led to the Tatmadaw’s voluntary democratic transition in 2011 after two decades of junta rule. This gave rise to the most prosperous period since independence.

Violence is often condoned only as a last resort in a desperate situation; a necessary evil as a means to an end. However, the idea of violence as an effective way to win concessions from a repressive regime does not stand up to research. Unless a genocide is occurring, non-violence almost always has a strategic advantage over violent resistance. The ethical and security barriers to resistance participation are always lower for non-violent resistance than for insurgencies or terror tactics. Those engaging in non-violent movements are more likely to gain sympathy and credibility from potential local and international partners or supporters and, more importantly, from the ruling elites. The sympathy and credibility earned from a non-violent struggle create loyalty shifts within security forces that are better than violent resistance, which would create an ‘us-against-them’ bunker mentality in an already paranoid, disliked and isolated Tatmadaw.

Studies have shown that non-violent resistance campaigns are much more effective than violent ones at achieving their objectives. Chenoweth and Stephan’s critically acclaimed research on non-violent civil resistance uncovered exactly that. They found that countries in which there were non-violent campaigns were about ten times more likely to transition to democracies within five years, compared to countries in which there were violent campaigns – whether the campaigns succeeded or failed. Even when non-violent campaigning appears to fail, there is increased potential for democracy over time. This is not the case for failed insurgencies. Transitions that occur in the wake of successful non-violent resistance movements create more durable, internally peaceful democracies than those provoked by violent insurgencies. On the other hand, when violent insurgencies succeed, the country is far less likely to become democratic and more likely to return to civil war.

Despite how non-violent resistance may appear to be ineffective in a complex country such as Myanmar, it still has to be chosen because it is more effective than violence in eventually getting results. The International Center on Nonviolent Conflict provides Burmese translated online resources illustrating such non-violent resistance methods.

On the brink of disaster

One may argue that Myanmar has already been in violent conflict for decades and any additional violence would make no difference. This argument is dangerous because Myanmar has all the hallmarks of a conflict trap of genocidal proportions, with humanitarian consequences rivalling any crisis in history. One just has to look at its natural resources and drug production to fuel conflicts, its high numbers of ethnic armed groups, the ethnic and religious frictions, and the hilly and mountainous terrain conducive to a war of attrition. Add to that Myanmar’s geopolitical location with its potential to become a battlefield for proxy wars of the world and regional superpowers, weak state institutions, historical tendencies towards violence, poverty, and endemic corruption. Even if the increasingly violent resistance were to cause such damage to the Tatmadaw that confidence was shaken among the ranks and a significant split occurred, the resulting power vacuum would lead to a full-blown civil war. The ethnic armed groups would likely be drawn into the conflict from the highlands down the Irrawaddy valley, with their different alliances and agendas, with every person for themselves, adding to the numerous ongoing humanitarian crises.

Mae La refugee camp since 1984, Tak, Thailand. Photo Credit: Mikhail Esteves, used under Creative Commons.

Non-violence – the only viable option

Violent resistance provokes overreaction from the Tatmadaw, resulting in more grievances and loss of lives and thus more overreaction in return. History teaches us countless lessons of violence begetting violence. Therefore, one should ask if a military solution could ever be appropriate for not only the ongoing anti-regime movement but also the endless ethnic conflict? Successful insurgencies or guerrilla campaigns mostly rely on external sponsors and ultimately winning the war of attrition. Any support would have to come from bordering countries, and it is unlikely that China, Bangladesh, India, Laos or Thailand would support a violent campaign in Myanmar.

There is the option to continue the war of attrition, but as Sun Tzu said in “The Art of War”, no state has benefited from prolonged warfare, and victory without fighting is the epitome of military strategy. Non-violent resistance campaigns are more effective in achieving results, and once they have succeeded, are more likely to establish democratic regimes with a lower probability of a relapse into civil war. Myanmar has suffered enough from a never-ending war of attrition since 1949 and the only path towards quality peace is non-violence.

Could Terrorists Use Afghanistan to Conduct External Ops Sooner than the Biden Administration Wants the World to Believe?

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Portrait of the terrorists who perpetrated a mass-casualty attack at a Shiite mosque in Kandahar during Friday prayers on October 15, 2021, distributed on Telegram Channels used to manage distribution of ISIS’ official propaganda (Source: Michael S. Smith II)

Nearly 20 years after the 9/11 attacks, United States President Joseph R. Biden, Jr decided to withdraw US military and other governmental personnel from Afghanistan. Once the withdrawal was underway, it became evident that the Taliban could and would reclaim control of most of the country. Since then, the Biden administration has strived to assuage concerns that either al-Qaeda, which has a longstanding alliance with the Taliban, or Islamic State (ISIS), which has a sizable presence of members in the country, could immediately use Afghanistan to conduct external operations. A notable example was seen in remarks issued by Under Secretary of Defense Colin Kahl during an open US Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. In an exchange with the committee’s chair, Dr. Kahl advised, “I think the intelligence community currently assesses that both ISIS-K and al-Qaeda have the intent to conduct external operations, including against the US, but neither currently has the capability to do so.” History suggests this is a problematic assessment. Because the external operations programs managed by al-Qaeda and ISIS are much more dynamic than the one overseen by Usama bin Ladin on September 11, 2001. Plus, the situation in Afghanistan may be increasing their capabilities to conduct newer forms of external operations sooner than Dr. Kahl has led the Senate Armed Services Committee—thus the world—to believe either terrorist group can.

A New Paradigm of External Operations

When the American born al-Qaeda cleric Anwar al-Awlaki partnered with Samir Khan to launch a new ezine named Inspire, a sea change in al-Qaeda’s global jihad came into clearer view.

Already, al-Awlaki’s online activities had indicated al-Qaeda was keen to expand its capabilities to generate buy-in for an ideology that could imbue some new adherents in the West with a sense of urgency to “defend” their faith vis-à-vis acts of terrorism. Before Khan moved from the US to Yemen to join forces with al-Awlaki, authorities’ responses to his online activities provided al-Qaeda with evidence that the US Government was not prepared to tackle such innovative efforts to build support for the group’s global jihad. As Khan put it in the second issue of Inspire while expressing his surprise that federal agencies had not disrupted his plans to travel overseas to join al-Qaeda in October 2009, “I was quiet [sic] open about my beliefs online and it didn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out I was al Qaeda to the core.”[i] Indeed, prior to Khan’s departure for Yemen, then-Congressman Sue Myrick, a member of the US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and chair of the Congressional Anti-Terrorism Caucus who represented the North Carolina congressional district in which Khan resided, had expressed concerns about his online activities to the FBI.[ii] In a recent discussion with me about open source intelligence’s (OSINT) potential utilities in counterterrorism, Congressman (Ret) Myrick noted, “When he was in Charlotte, working out of his parents’ basement, he changed servers constantly, used foreign ones, so they never could charge him,” adding: “It was a total screw up by the FBI.”

Perhaps more importantly, al-Qaeda also had evidence that al-Awlaki’s blog posts and YouTube content had likely helped stimulate Nidal Hasan’s interests in perpetrating a terrorist attack at Fort Hood in November 2009. Regardless of whether al-Awlaki should be painted as the radicalizing force, Hasan had contacted al-Awlaki via e-mail to try to confirm that attacks targeting US military personnel would be permissible, according to al-Awlaki’s notions of sharia (Islamic law). That al-Awlaki did not reply to Hasan’s e-mail with a message contesting the legitimacy of the following directive issued by bin Ladin and other Salafi-Jihadist luminaries in their 1998 declaration of war with the US and Jews was almost certainly the stuff of inspirational silence:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it …

Yet, prior to 2010, al-Awlaki’s online activities had not offered such concrete evidence that he aimed to expand al-Qaeda’s capabilities to orient the interests of his target audience towards using items in their mothers’ kitchens to make bombs and perpetrate terrorist attacks. This was made clear with a how-to feature story in the first issue of Inspire that was published online in 2010.

Also made clear by the first issue of Inspire was al-Qaeda’s interest in establishing direct and safe lines of communication with individuals in the West who may be willing to serve as agents in its external operations program. Not only did al-Awlaki and Khan provide Gmail, Hotmail, Fastmail and Yahoo e-mail addresses that could be used to contact them; they published a four-page tutorial on how al-Qaeda enthusiasts in the West could use an encrypted correspondence tool to exchange messages with them.

That al-Qaeda’s second and presumably current leader determined there was profit to be garnered from the model of online incitement developed by al-Awlaki and Khan is made evident from the continued publication of Inspire and variations thereof following their deaths in 2011, as well as al-Qaeda’s expanded use of popular and “dark” social media since. Notable dividends include the Boston Marathon bombings in April 2013 and the attack at the offices of Charlie Hebdo in January 2015. According to the US Justice Department’s chief expert witness in the prosecution of Dzokhar Tsarnaev, perpetrators of the former plot gathered instructions for producing their bombs from the aforementioned article published in the first issue of Inspire, titled “Make a bomb in the kitchen of your Mom.” A victim targeted in the latter attack in France was featured in a hit list that was published in the tenth issue of Inspire, which was published online in the spring of 2013.

As I noted in testimony for a US Senate hearing in 2017, following the declaration of its so-called “caliphate,” ISIS took al-Awlaki’s online model for expanding al-Qaeda’s capabilities to wage jihad in the West to “new heights.” In 2014, it should have been clear to officials in the US Intelligence Community who were briefing senior officials like then-Vice President Biden that ISIS’ intensely incitement-focused propaganda was intended to support its external operations. Abu Mohamed al-Adnani (d. 2016), the group’s spokesman who declared ISIS had established a “caliphate” in 2014, was also managing its external operations program. This indicated that orchestrating attacks in the West would feature prominently in how ISIS leaders would seek to define perceptions of the group. So too did the abundance of threats against Western nations in the group’s propaganda. Additionally, by the end of 2014, the most prominent narrative directed at consumers of the group’s propaganda that was tailored for (prospective) supporters in the West emphasized the following action items: According to Islamic traditions, all Muslims must give baya (allegiance) to ISIS’ “caliph,” and this allegiance is demonstrated with one of the following two actions: Making hijrah (emigrating) to the “caliphate” to support the group, or, if one is unable to do so, perpetrating terrorist attacks in their home country.

Since then, ISIS has used its propaganda that is tailored to present an image of strength and durability—thus worthiness of support—paired with an aggressive exploitation of social media technologies, along with more user-friendly encrypted communication tools than were available to al-Awlaki, to orchestrate exceedingly more attacks in the West than al-Qaeda. In many cases, these attacks have been perpetrated by terrorists not trained in either conflict zones or “sanctuaries.” In most cases, their selections of targets and tools used to perpetrate attacks have reflected adherence to directives devolved in ISIS propaganda. So too have these terrorists’ efforts to firmly define their actions as contributions to ISIS’ global jihad pursuant to the following guidance that was published in the fourth issue of its infamous ezine Dabiq in October 2014:

At this point of the crusade against the Islamic State, it is very important that attacks take place in every country that has entered into the alliance against the Islamic State, especially the US, UK, France, Australia and Germany. … It is important that the killing becomes attributed to patrons of the Islamic State who have obeyed its leadership. … Otherwise, crusader media makes such attacks appear to be random killings.

By ensuring their actions were understood as efforts to fulfill expectations for group supporters’ conduct set in ISIS propaganda, these de facto agents of ISIS’ external operations have done more than just demonstrate their faithful adherence to the group’s gudiance. They have also helped ISIS—which al-Adnani claimed was the true steward of bin Ladin’s manhaj (methodology) weeks before declaring it had established a “caliphate”—appear as a more competent and dedicated manager of a global jihad than al-Qaeda under the leadership of bin Ladin’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

The Current Situation in Afghanistan: New Fuel for the New Paradigm of External Operations?

The current situation in Afghanistan could be used by both al-Qaeda and ISIS to conduct external operations sooner than the Biden administration apparently wants the world to believe. It enhances each group’s capabilities to project an image of strength and durability. This, in turn, fuels their powers of persuasion that factor centrally in their capabilities to conduct effective recruitment-cum-incitement campaigns in the cyber domain focused on grooming agents for external operations here in the West.

For al-Qaeda, the hasty withdrawal of the US military has enabled the group to meet a key expectation set by bin Ladin’s external communications: al-Qaeda and its allies can survive “long wars” with the United States and its closest allies, which bin Ladin believed would “bleed” America of vast amounts of financial resources, influence in the Muslim world and the political will to deny participants in the wider Salafi-Jihadist movement capabilities to pursue their chief goal of restoring a caliphate. This intensifies the perceptibility of al-Qaeda as a credible organization that is pursuing a viable strategy for achieving that inspirational goal. The optics of a Taliban “victory” corresponding with the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks also reinforces the view of al-Qaeda as not only an important force in, but also a key beneficiary of the apparently successful effort to transition Afghanistan back into an “Islamic Emirate.” Indeed, that the Taliban has not disavowed al-Qaeda conveys a message to al-Qaeda’s wider support base that Afghanistan is likely to be a safer haven for the group than ever before. Here, it is useful to consider that, as demonstrated by ISIS following the declaration of its “caliphate,” de facto control of territory factors importantly in Salafi-Jihadists’ capabilities to fashion a group as a legitimate enterprise that is worthy of support—including support furnished in the form of terrorist attacks perpetrated in the West.

For ISIS, recent developments in Afghanistan have rendered an abundance of opportunities to further contrast the group with al-Qaeda. Further, it is doing this in ways that can provide particularly potent incentives for individuals who share these groups’ goal of restoring a caliphate to help ISIS assert dominance in the wider Salafi-Jihadist movement. Notably, by seizing on the opportunity to perpetrate attacks targeting American military personnel at Hamid Karzai International Airport, ISIS simultaneously highlighted two things that are almost certainly of great interest to prospective recruits, including members of competing groups like al-Qaeda who may be willing to defect into ISIS’ ranks: There were substantial opportunities to kill US military personnel, but neither al-Qaeda, nor its chief ally, the Taliban, were seizing them. This reinforces ISIS’ claims that al-Qaeda has deviated from the path of jihad charted by bin Ladin. Thus, as al-Adnani put it in an address just before he declared ISIS had established a “caliphate,” al-Qaeda is no longer the “base of jihad.” Moreover, the spectacular effects produced by the attack at the airport in Kabul on August 26, 2021 that was perpetrated by a single ISIS member—in particular, the deaths of 13 US military personnel—paired with the surge of ISIS-claimed attacks in Afghanistan thereafter, are successes that can help the group animate aspirations among supporters in the West to perpetrate attacks here.

Ultimately, the situation in Afghanistan is very likely to stimulate interests among sympathetic consumers of al-Qaeda’s and ISIS’ propaganda here in the West in doing things to help these groups advance their global agendas. Given the increased emphasis among the US and its closest allies on denying prospective aspirant terrorists capabilities to travel abroad to join these groups, one of the easiest things al-Qaeda and ISIS enthusiasts here in the West can do to support them is volunteering to serve as agents in their external operations. This makes amplifying the notion that neither group can immediately capitalize on the situation in Afghanistan to help them orchestrate attacks in the US a risky business, both in terms of the Biden administration’s political and national security management concerns. Not only could this undermine confidence in President Biden if attacks occur, potentially offering Donald Trump and other prospective contenders for the presidency renewed opportunities to harness concerns about counterterrorism policies to boost their candidacies the way that Trump did in 2016; it creates additional incentives for al-Qaeda and ISIS to increase their efforts to push supporters in the US to perpetrate attacks. Indeed, as bin Ladin clearly understood, defying expectations about Salafi-Jihadists’ capabilities to advance their agendas that are set by their powerful enemies can help inspire confidence in groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS. Thus, perhaps it is not a coincidence that, right now, there is a push underway to help increase al-Qaeda’s capabilities to attract support from English speakers by increasing the availability of English-language translations of its propaganda.

[i] Citing the transliteration of the group’s name used by Khan.

[ii] The author was a contributing expert to the Congressional Anti-Terrorism Caucus.

Strife Journal: First round of Call for Papers for December 2021

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Strife is pleased to announce the opening of the first round of Call for Papers for 2022, with a deadline for all papers of 11 December 2021. We intend to publish Issue 17 in early February 2022.

Strife publishes articles on the theme of conflict, broadly defined. Submissions may include studies of conflict in history, art, and media, of the relationship between war and state, of the interrelation of war and society, analyses of strategy, operations and military tactics, diplomacy and international relations, as well as more narrowly defined subjects. There is no restriction as to period or geographical focus.

Strife Journal - Call for Papers

Articles should be between 4000–6000 words and include an abstract of 100 words. Submitted articles must meet the outlined submission guidelines. Articles that do not meet referencing and formatting guidelines risk being rejected for publication.

Book reviews should be between 800-1000 words, including a short descriptive summary of the book but primarily be focused on a critical analysis of the publication. Books chosen for book reviews should have been published within the past two years.

Please email submissions to [email protected].