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Strife Series: Colonial Legacies – Seeds of Violence – A Colonial Tale of Undivided Assam and its tryst with Ethnic Conflict

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Achik Matkrik Elite Force (AMEF) members surrender to Police, 22 January 2016. Photo Credit: Vishma Thapa, Licensed under Creative Commons

The strategic importance of the North Eastern states of India could not be disputed during the long stretch of colonial rule in India. Unifying the North East into British India was of absolute political necessity, concerning the relations with what was then known as Burma. The physical geography of North Eastern India, especially states like Assam, is mountainous. The presence of a plethora of tribal groups including the Miris, Mikirs, Lushai, Jaintia and Khamptis made the task of colonial administration very tricky in these spaces of both geographical and political upheavals. The margins of linguistic diversity and cultural practices in this region renders it an exciting place for any form of anthropological excavation. It is still considered a “miniature India,” marking the presence of such diverse ethnic groups. Ethnicity has played a major role in the politics of Assam since colonial times. Therefore, in order to make sense of the post-colonial developments in Assam, one needs to contextualize its colonial roots first. The nature of militarization, the rise of insurgent groups demanding secession, and frequent violent clashes between ethnic groups that we witness now in Assam in the 21st century, all have roots set in its colonial legacy.

The rationale of colonial interest in Assam was purely monetary in nature. The colonization of Assam’s tea estates was the beginning of the larger scheme of division and exploitation. The language policy in the valley was suppressive, making the Bengali community more dominant compared to the “Assamese” in language training. The creation of a new top-down hierarchy of Bengali officials made the landscape of Assam more divided, marking the onset of both social and economic exploitation. One of the most important waves of migration, during the colonial years, was the migration of peasants from East Bengal. This also marked demographic changes in the sub-region, provoking public pressure. The “Line System” was conceived in 1916 in response to these demographic changes in Assam, which made the Assamese-speaking population more susceptible to “otherized” communities. The Line System was an administrative decision of drawing a line between the tribal tracts in the hilly areas and the general districts of Assam. This exercise of boundary drawing set a limit to district jurisdiction and started defining areas of autonomy and areas of control.  The inception of drawing the Inner Line can be narrowed down to the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation of 1873. The drawing of administrative lines bifurcated the supposedly “hill tracts” and “plain areas”. The British interest in administering these spaces was twofold. Firstly, for revenue-generating concerns and secondly, the political significance of governing the North East. British interest in tea plantations, and surveying of land for this purpose, forced them to arrive at conflicting standoffs with hill tribes. Under these contexts, the boundaries were drawn to administratively focus on plain areas and keep the hill tracts under autonomy. This colonial mindset precipitated the hardened bifurcation between the hills and the plains.

The larger British political interest in the North Eastern Frontier grew more concrete with French involvement in Burma in the 1890s. And subsequently, the rise of China in South East Tibet. These concerns forced the British to spearhead the “line system” even further, with the creation of buffer states. The politics of boundary-making and autonomy around the hill tracts created consolidated cultural identities and a sense of alienation of the hill tribes in post-colonial India as well. The construction of categories like excluded areas, and backward tracts became a framework of governance even after Independence where identities had grown political wings. The neglect of plain tribes like the Bodo Kacharis and their conflict with the umbrella identity of “Assamese” in post-colonial India, was a breeding ground for the streaks of ethnic violence one witnesses in this region.

Independent Assam was built on the colonial understanding of divisive institutionalism. The constitutional protection of autonomy under the Sixth Schedule was granted to states like Assam, to maintain their own autonomous district councils. This gave considerable autonomy to the hills and frontier tribes of Assam. But the alienation of the plains tribes like the Bodo Kacharis, and their general political neglect, made it a breeding ground for future insurgencies. The very division of hills and plains was a colonial construct, which had little significance in contemporary Assamese Politics. The creation of consolidated racial identities, along with political under-representation—created a cocktail strong enough to spit ethnic fires for decades to come.

Currently, Assam, and North Eastern India more generally, are dominated by large insurgent groups like the Bodoland Liberation Tiger—often clashing with other ethnic groups. These clashes were perpetuated by a series of migrations from neighbouring countries like Bangladesh in the 1970s and 1980s. This influx of “other”, “foreign”, and “alien” immigrants into the plains of Assam, further inflamed the already delicate situation. With the politicization of “Muslim” immigrants, the conflict soon took on a religious aspect within the wider political context of the 1990s. Ethnic cleansing in villages of the Kamrup District in July 2012 exemplifies the dark side of ethnic strife between Bodos and Bengali Muslims in Assam. Last year on 26th July, we witnessed clashes with the Assam and Mizoram Police forces as well. These examples are important as they draw attention to the history of such inter-state boundary related disputes, which have a colonial legacy. The colonial tendency to draw lines for administrative reasons and revenue sharing concerns has planted infinite seeds of racial alienation. The creation of institutions of autonomy in post-colonial India has ultimately caused more damage than repair.

References:

  • Baruah, S (2001): India Against Itself (New Delhi: Oxford University Press).
  • Baruah, S (2010): Ethnonationalism in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press)
  • Brass, Paul. (1991). Ethnicity and Nationalism, Theory and Comparison. New Delhi: Sage.
  • Gait, S Ε (2003): A History of Assam (New Delhi: Surjeet Publication)
  • Goswami, Sandhya (2001), “Ethnic Conflict in Assam”, The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol 62, June 2001.
  • Hussain, Monirul. (1992), “Tribal Question in Assam”, Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay, May 6.
  • Misra, Udayan. (1989) “ Bodo Stir: Complex Issues, Unattainable Demands”, Economic and Political Weekly. Bombay. May 2.
  • Murshid, Navine (2016) “Assam and the Foreigner Within”, Asian Survey, Vol 56, June 2016.

Strife Series: Colonial Legacies – Re-Drawing the Lines: The Construction of India’s Geopolitics and Its Impact on the Rise of Insurgencies and Separatist Movements Post-Independence

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A. J. Johnson’s 1865 map of India and Southeast Asia. Public Domain

In 1947, the Independence from British rule promised both political and religious freedom for India. However, through the last-minute implementation of partition, the British secured independence for India at the cost of a massive displacement and rise in discontent among the population. Branding India painfully, Partition has become central to modern identity in the Indian subcontinent. During this time, Partition represented the shift of political borders cutting through India to create Pakistan resulting in riots, mass casualties, and a colossal wave of migration which still weighs heavily in the hearts of many today. This event saw the movement of around 16 million Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims to what later became known as modern India. Across the Indian subcontinent, communities began experiencing a massive outbreak of sectarian violence with Hindus and Sikhs on one side and Muslims on the other. Why does it matter? To this day the redrawing of India’s borders continues to play a role as social division and separatist sentiments have given rise to insurgencies and separatist movements.

As a mosaic of ethnicities, languages, and religions, India faces the challenge of being a single homogenous state. Once ruled under different rajas, the India known to the world today is a product of British colonial legacies. Bearing in mind previous cases of the British dividing their former colonies, it comes as no surprise that most of their former colonies currently face secessionist movements. Likewise, since the independence of the country, the Indian separatists and insurgent movements have been a big issue for the country. Inheriting borders and divisions created by the colonial masters, post-colonial countries such as India continued similar policies of emphasizing existing ethnic, racial, and religious divides to manage dissent.

In addition to this factor, the Theory of deprivation states that insurgencies are preceded by a mismatch in social, economic, and political conditions along with the belief that governments are incapable of maintaining social order (339)[1]. Facing relative deprivation, India’s rise of insurgencies post-Partition, as further explored in this article, comes as no surprise.[2] India’s social division and separatism link most insurgent groups with the desire to control a particular area. Considered to be the country’s most important internal security threat, the rise of the Maoist insurgency in India can be traced back to British colonial rule. Shivaji Mukherjee highlights that ethnic/land inequality and weak development/state capacity created by the British colonial administrators set up the political opportunity structures for insurgency and secession movements[3].

To rule India, the British depended on indirect rule through princely states and zamindars known as the landlord revenue system. Through the administration of princely states, native rulers were allowed to oversee administration, taxation, and law with the condition of obeying the British[4]. Although this gave rulers substantial autonomy, past studies suggest that princely states tended to be on the lower ranks of development, bureaucratic quality, and institutions and produced prominent levels of social exclusion for the poor[5]. Despite indirect rule institutions being banned in 1947, Mukherjee points out that their effects persisted from 1950 to 1970. Therefore, capitalizing on the inequalities left behind the British rule, rebels have been able to use weak state capacities with low development and grievances to heighten their influence to become a prominent threat.

Since its Independence, India has contended with ethnic movements in various states based on demands for complete secession from India—for example, the state of Punjab wishing to form a separate country called Khalistan. Other movements are those pushing for insurrections to earn autonomy within India—for example, the Maoist Insurgency. The Khalistan movement and Maoist Insurgency in India, used indirect rule institutions, sustained ethnic/land inequality and weak development/state capacity to their advantage to expand their ideological frames. By adding a new dynamic order which drastically changed the existing social and economic order, many princely states continued to struggle to redress the grievances of their population. The Indian government’s response to the movements has varied widely, ranging from violent repression or partial accommodations to demands.

Case Studies

Khalistan Movement: In the 1980s, Punjab experienced a nationalist group imposing violent extremism to demand a separate country, ‘Khalistan’, based on the Sikh religion.[6] These claims to a new nation have been rooted as early as independence. In due course after India’s Independence, tensions between the Sikhs and the Hindus in Punjab surfaced, leading to grievances from the Sikhs against the Indian government.  Disappointed by the outcome of the partition, Sikh leaders had wanted a state along Pakistani lines for the creation of a Sikh nation. Separated into the states of Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh in 1966, many Sikhs saw their original state being further divided along linguistic lines and religious beliefs. As a result, between 1980 and 2000, the Khalistan movement gained traction for its attempts to create an independent state followed by a series of violent events including bombings, the assassination of Indira Gandhi, kidnappings, selective killings, and massacres of civilians. In 1984, the movement took to the international stage as Canada-based Khalistan separatists conducted an attack on an Air India flight en route from Toronto to New Delhi.[7] As the movement continued and the violence escalated, tensions between the Hindu and Sikh communities furthered. On the one hand, anti-Hindu propaganda encouraged violence against the Hindus and on the other, the Indian Government with the local Punjab police responded with force, at times committing human rights abuses to end the militancy.

Naxalite-Maoist Insurgency: India’s Naxalite-Maoist started in the 1920s as an anti-colonial struggle when the country was still ruled by Britain. The first radical Marxist movement arose shortly after independence in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh. The first armed uprising was launched in 1967 when a landlord killed a landless worker in Naxalbari village for ploughing a patch of land (253).[8]  Encountering the Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML), the Naxals and the Communists united to overthrow the ‘semi-colonial and semi-feudal Indian state’ through a people’s war which was put down by force after 72 days (about 2 and a half months).  However, while the attack was officially shut down other actors were inspired to take up the cause. During the following eight years, the movement splintered, and grievances witnessed a decline. With the liberalization of the Indian economy in 2004, the movement relapsed as the exploitation of forest resources by the private sector grew. Following the merger of the CPI-M-L (People’s War) and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI), the Naxals became a powerful agrarian movement to establish a socialist-communist rule. Estimated to be around 11,500 fighters and 38,000 fighters armed with basic weapons (bows and arrows and machetes), the Naxalites fought for anti-mining agitation, land acquisition and discrimination based on caste[9]. Due to the resulting Naxalite threat, the Indian government took drastic measures against the movement as 84 million tribal became victims of violence and counter-violence with the eradication of the group[10]. While the government was successful in crushing the insurgency, the impact of the British colonial legacy remains to be a root issue of the grievances faced by many including those who attempted to take on the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency.

Seven and a half decades later, India continues to be impacted and shaped by its colonial past. Constituting diverse ethnic backgrounds and religious beliefs, when governed as a homogenous place, India faces the risk of abetting insurgencies and separatist movements. While insurgencies are extremely difficult to defeat once entrenched, by addressing community grievances and recognizing the importance of inclusive politics it is possible to prevent them from taking root in the first place. Thus, moving forward the rise of radical politics with inflammatory language is a serious threat to India’s stability.

[1] Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010.

[3] Mukherjee, Shivaji. “Colonial Origins of Maoist Insurgency in India: Historical Institutions and Civil War.” The Journal of conflict resolution 62, no. 10 (2018): 2232–2274.

[4] Fisher, Michael H. 1991. Indirect Rule in India. Residents and the Residency System, 1764- 1858. Delhi, India: Oxford University Press.

[5] Wucherpfennig, Julian, Philipp Hunziker, and Lars-Erik Cederman. 2016. “Who Inherits the

State? Colonial Rule and Post-Colonial Conflict.” American Journal of Political Science

60 (4): 882-98.

[6] Gupte, Pranay. 1985. “THE PUNJAB: TORN BY TERROR.” The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/1985/09/08/magazine/the-punjab-torn-by-terror.html.

[7] Chakraborty, Chandrima. 2019. “Canada”s indifference to the 1985 Air India bombing is disturbing.” Quartz. https://qz.com/india/1652007/canadas-indifference-to-the-1985-air-india-bombing-is-disturbing/.

[8] Ahlawat, Dalbir. “Maoist Insurgency in India: Grievances, Security Threats and Counter-Strategies.” Journal of policing, intelligence and counter terrorism 13, no. 2 (2018): 252–266.

[9] Kumar, Kamal. 2013. “Analysis: India”s Maoist challenge | Features.” Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/8/24/analysis-indias-maoist-challenge.

[10] Ibid

Strife Series: Colonial Legacies – Macaulayism – a colonial legacy that lingers long in India

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Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay. Public Domain Photo.

In a country as diverse as India would anyone imagine that many Indians feel comfortable writing in English rather than writing in their native language/ mother tongue. How did the language English spread its influence in this heavily populated country? To know the answer to this we need to start from the 1600s when the British East India Company entered the subcontinent via Surat (located in the west of India) as spice traders.[1] The company were awarded permission from the Mughal rulers in the north and the Vijayanagara Gadariya rulers in the south to establish factories. Slowly, but steadily, the company realized the fortunes the subcontinent held and used the cracks among the Indian princes by the 1750s to evolve from a trading company into a ruling company. The East India Company grew tremendously powerful, but due to the Sepoy’s mutiny (1857-1858), the company finally dissolved, and the British Crown took complete control over the subcontinent.[2]

The British Raj gave India “gifts” such as liberalism, the rule of law, cricket, incipient democracy, and a well-knit railway system. Moreover, the welding together of 17 provinces and 562 princely states (except partition)[3] enabled India to become the vast united country that it is today. Also, let us not forget about the architectural traces left behind by the Raj, such as the marvellous high courts, government buildings, libraries, universities, and the many splendours of New Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Madras.[4]

The above indeed represent the country’s colonial legacy, yet the most deliberate gift given to India by the British Raj (which most people undermine), is the English language. Who we should give credit to is Mr. Thomas Babington or Lord Macaulay, the man who brought the English language and British education to India in the 1830s.[5] He wrote in the Minute that “We must do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indians in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and intellect.”[6]

Thanks to him, the East India Company and the British government invested in the provision of English language education and the promotion of ‘European learning’ in the region.[7] Nevertheless, the primary purpose behind teaching the language to a handful of middlemen (their local assistants/workers) was that conveying the orders of the British Raj to their colonial subjects would be made easier with the presence of these intermediaries. Without a doubt, it can be said that the British had no plans to provide language education to the enormous population of India, nor was the Raj willing to spend its money on ‘the Indians or the dogs.’[8] It is the Indians who seized the opportunity to learn the English language and turned it into an apparatus for their own independence, that is, by using it to express nationalist sentiments against the Raj.

Within a few years after Independence, 15th August 1947, the Constitution of India came into effect on 26th January 1950.  The Constitution of India represents the longest handwritten constitution ever, with 25 parts containing 448 articles and 12 schedules, and was originally written down both in English and Hindi.[9] The Indian Constituent Assembly’s usage of English for writing the constitution can be seen as a mark of the growing importance of this language in the subcontinent.

With around seven decades of independence, India claims to be the world’s second-largest English-speaking country.[10] In a globalized economy, this represents an advantage and helps in social mobility. However, every coin has two sides; parents are under tremendous pressure to earn enough money to send their children to an ‘English medium labelled school’ instead of the state-sponsored or the central government schools, as the teaching in these schools is not done in English (considered as a waste of government resources). Moreover, children are pressurised by parents to enter these ‘English medium schools’ and must go through stressful interviews and exams. Whilst it can be considered problematic that children are taught English before their native language or mother tongue, it is understandable that parents want their children to get a decent job. In a globalized world, English is a must. This leads to English being regarded as the language of status and achievement in India (to the extent where middle-class and higher-class families see English as a basic requirement for the bride and the groom, in a society where around 90 per cent of the marriages are arranged).[11] This perpetuates another layer of societal hierarchy, internalized oppression, and control that the country can do without. Similarly, the Indian government is unable to abolish the caste system as it is deeply embedded in the grassroots of Indian society.

India has 22 scheduled languages recognized by its Constitution (one of which is Hindi – a language spoken by the majority of the Indian population) and thousands of other languages with rich cultural heritage. However, with the rising dominance of English, an imminent conflict over which language should be considered the national language of India can be expected sometime in the future. The British colonization did not end when the British flag went down, and the Indian flag went up, as the effects of colonization linger in the psychological realm, where self and identity (mother tongues) become subject to a second form of colonization,[12] all thanks to Lord Macaulay.

[1] When and why did the British first choose to invade India? August 26, 2019.

[2] The National Archives, CASE STUDY 4: BACKGROUND LIVING IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE: INDIA.

[3] Hemant Sigh, History and date of formation of Indian states since 1947, 6 August 2019.

[4] DAVID GILMOUR, HOW MODERN INDIA WAS BUILT ON THE LEGACY OF BRITISH INSTITUTIONS, JANUARY 30, 2019.

[5] A minute to acknowledge the day when India was ‘educated’ by Macaulay, September 17, 2019.

[6] Shashi Tharoor, ‘But what about the railways …?’ ​​The myth of Britain’s gifts to India, March 8, 2017.

[7] A minute to acknowledge the day when India was ‘educated’ by Macaulay, September 17, 2019.

[8] Gajendra Singh, No dogs, no Indians: 70 years after partition, the legacy of British colonialism endures, August 15, 2017.

[9] Hemant Sigh, Constitution of India: Parts, Schedules & Articles- All In A Glance, 25 November 2021.

[10] Zareer Masani, English or Hinglish – which will India choose?, 27 November 2012.

[11] What the data tells us about love and marriage in India, 8 December 2021.

[12] Sunil Bhatia, HOW ENGLISH CREATES A NEW CASTE SYSTEM IN INDIA, JUN 14, 2017.

Strife Series: Colonial legacies and the shaping of political institutions in Greater South Asia: from decolonisation to modern-day – Introduction

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India-Pakistan Border Wagha. Photo Credit: Koshy Koshy, licensed under Creative Commons.

Greater South Asia as seen on maps today would have been unrecognisable to the European colonial powers which dominated the region from the 15th century up until decolonisation in the mid-20th century. Usually understood to be comprised of 9 states, including India, Myanmar, and Afghanistan, South Asia is a diverse and complex region made up of different cultures, languages and ethnicities. It is pertinent to consider why these 9 states have been grouped as a region; why should these countries, created relatively recently, go together? An obvious answer is geography—they are all situated in one geographical area of the world. But then, where should we draw the boundary for South Asia? Sometimes Afghanistan is included in South Asia and sometimes it is not. The answer lies in the shared regional colonial histories. Though each country has a unique character and story to tell, the impact of colonialism has touched the region as a whole and has left shared colonial legacies, though these vary in similarity between states. Despite the fact that Afghanistan was never directly colonised and thus was deemed a ‘Graveyard of Empires,’ Afghanistan has colonial legacies stemming from contested borders with the British Raj and thus should be included under the South Asian umbrella. In fact, the process of forming the regional idea of South Asia can be traced back to British rule and is itself a colonial legacy. The vast British empire in South Asia was made up of the Raj, now India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and their colony in Burma, now Myanmar, but this area was all administrated by one office and was one unit of governance. Therefore, it seems fitting to look back to the colonial history of South Asia to make some sense of the region as it is today.

Great Britain was undoubtedly the most significant colonial power shaping the region, though competition with other great powers including France and Russia also made an impact. Since the decolonisation of South Asia, government institutions left behind by the British, in varying states of effectiveness, have been consolidated or created entirely anew. Borders have shifted, with East Pakistan becoming the entirely new nation of Bangladesh following the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. Furthermore, insurgencies and ethnic cleansing have become a familiar plague within some South Asian nations. The impacts of colonial legacies on the Greater South Asia region are deep and pervasive still.

Given the importance of India within the British Empire, the most distinctive and divisive colonial legacy is that of partition, whereby India and Pakistan were split along religious lines in 1947. This event brought unimaginable suffering and loss of life, with the resounding effects still felt today. Beyond this most obvious legacy of colonial rule, other remnants, including the English Language, the impacts of British ‘divide and conquer,’ and ‘othering’ policies, have been left behind, which still greatly influence South Asia today. Britain also ruled Burma, now Myanmar, until 1948, and made unsuccessful attempts to conquer Afghanistan. This series will focus especially upon these three nations to explore the ways in which this legacy of colonialism has impacted the politics and political institutions in Greater South Asia.

Strife Series: Arctic Maritime Security – The Arctic Race – Western Sanctions, Energy Resources and Challenges to Arctic Maritime Security

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Ice Camp Skate in support of Ice Exercise 2018. Photo Credit: US Department of Defense, Public Domain.

Bordered by five states — Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States (US) — the Arctic Region is a resource bonanza, it is rich in both proven and unproven resources. It is estimated that the Arctic Region holds around 22% of the world’s undiscovered energy resources, much of which lies below melting sea ice, making the region a potential flashpoint for conflicting offshore claims. Environmental changes like melting sea ice, may make it easier to exploit these resources and raise tensions in the Far North. But key questions remain. What are the risks and challenges associated with the development of new energy resources in the Arctic and how will the Western sanctions against Russia affect the Arctic arms race?

Arctic energy exploitation has been ongoing since the early 1920s. And major resource extraction dates back even earlier, to the Klondike Gold Rush in 19th-century Alaska and 19th century whaling. Today, the US Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic region accounts for 13% of the total undiscovered oil and 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas.

Around 84% of these resources are located offshore in the Arctic Ocean, making it a region of strategic importance for Arctic states and a potential resource battleground.

Within the Arctic, energy reserves are not distributed equally among Arctic states. Russia, for instance, accounts for around eighty percent of its remaining offshore oil and gas reserves in the Arctic Ocean, with the American resources constituting around 33% and 18% of the total recoverable offshore oil and gas for the whole region. The economic development of energy resources is also unequal and exacerbated by unequal production and exploitation. Norway ranks first in terms of gas production, despite having low access to offshore gas resources. Yet despite these discrepancies, this large amount of estimated resources has attracted the attention of various actors and competitors, from coastal and external states to private and lobbying companies. For instance, the Russian Federation has lately proposed opening its Arctic shelf to private energy companies, and intensified modernisation programmes for Arctic energy development. Bringing about concerns for a race to develop Arctic energy resources, Russia has pushed for new trade and shipping routes, established partnerships with external actors such as China and Saudi Arabia, and developing new pipelines, notably the ambitious Arctic Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) 2 project. Despite the recent international sanctions on Russia and the halt in construction on the pipeline, years of increasing investments and multinational cooperation with other countries such as France, Korea and Japan, signal that the pipeline may yet have a future, albeit one that straddles geopolitical fault lines. Cancelled since the start of the war in Ukraine, deals like the LNG 2 project nonetheless demonstrate how Russia has added new players to the gamble for Arctic.

The arrival of new actors in the region, drawn by energy resources, increases the risks of conflict, as well as encroachment of new shipping routes over Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Arctic nations have various, competing claims over the extent of their EEZs over the Arctic Ocean, notably Russia. Despite international agreements such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Russia has frequently lodged submissions to extend its continental shelf next to Danish and Canadian EEZs, striving for access to extended rights of energy resources exploitation. As much as these claims do not indicate future conflicts over borders and continental shelves, they still illustrate how the race for Arctic energy resources institutionalises Arctic maritime security at the international legal level.

Furthermore, private and state-owned energy companies are also increasingly eyeing towards the Arctic for hydrocarbon drilling and exploitation like the British multinational oil and gas company Shell plc, or Russia’s semi-private and semi state-owned Gazprom and Rosneft. As the degree of state involvement in these companies varies, it indicates a divergence in policy frameworks for energy exploitation, and hence in the applicability of international regulations to private corporations. The sanctions against Russian energy giants Rosneft and Gazprom will surely tip the edge of the Arctic race, as Russian companies risk losing the benefits of their exploitation and production, given their dependence on Western technologies. Besides, Russia has seen its export markets shrink since the start of the war. Yet despite such challenges, Russia is unlikely to halt its Arctic developments. As Russia President Vladimir Putin had already stated in 2019, “sanctions have not stopped Russian Arctic hydrocarbons development.” And while the impact of the current sanctions on Russia is unclear and has largely avoided targeting the Russian energy sector, it remains that Russia will turn towards Asian markets, and increase its military presence in the North.

Tension between increasing availability and exploitability of offshore energy resources as a result of global warming, and concerns about the environmental impact of resource exploitation is another fault line in the Arctic. The emission of greenhouse gases has doubled in the last two decades, leading to increasing temperatures, rising sea level and melting ice. Companies such as Shell have considered increasing offshore drilling during summer, as ice melting continues opening new possibilities for oil extraction. However, critics argue hat this may risk further endangering maritime biodiversity, including the particular fauna and flora endemic to the region. What is more, the consequences of oil spills would be tremendous and further risk endangering human security in the whole Northern Pole. To mitigate the risks posed to the environment, some border states have launched initiatives to preserve Arctic biodiversity. The US has notably passed under Congress voting the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (1960), establishing  the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). Tasked with protecting Arctic wilderness on the Alaskan territory and territorial waters, the ANWR is nonetheless subject to frequent Congress votings to pass legislations authorising the opening of some areas of the refuge to drilling and exploitation. Hence, resource exploitation risks taking precedence over environmental issues. The multiplication of transit routes and resources exploitation may well degrade the safety of sea routes, with frequent glacier melt endangering maritime circulation. Coupled with climate change, this concern for the preservation of Arctic biodiversity indicates well some challenges for Arctic environmental security at the maritime level. Indeed, the more fuels are burned for drilling resources, the more greenhouse gases are emitted. And the more such gases are created, the more glaciers melt, opening new routes and opportunities for offshore drilling. Further complicating the situation is that further Western sanctions on Russia will also risk jeopardising any environmental framework that could have existed between Arctic states.

The development and exploitation of energy resources in the Arctic present economic, environmental and human challenges for Arctic maritime security. The involvement of multiple actors and powers in resources drilling and exploitation, not yet heralding military or border conflicts, nonetheless risks endangering coastal states’ economic and environmental security, as competition is sure to take its toll on environmental cooperation. Western sanctions on Russia will speed the Arctic energy race up by closing Western markets to Russian resources and forcing Russia to turn towards alternative markets, hence bringing even more spotlight to the Arctic region. The multiplication of actors and EEZ claims risk increasing as Russia will strive to develop its access to offshore resources to satisfy new markets. The Arctic race may now lead to tensions over energy resources, amid renewed concerns over climate change. The Western sanctions on Russia will need to be even more focused to counter any Russian Arctic assertive endeavour.