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Risking New York for Paris? The Illusion of the US Nuclear Umbrella

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by Orion Noda

President Donald J. Trump reinstates sanctions on Iran after the US withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal in May 2018 (Image credit: Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images)

Deterrence theory is almost as old as the nuclear age. Consequently, the idea of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and the use of nuclear weapons as a retaliatory deterrent has dominated the field of nuclear weapons and politics from the 1950s onwards.[1] However, like any field, a series of biases infect it. This blind trust and belief in the postulations of Deterrence Theory has established what Nick Ritchie called the “regime of nuclear truth” and denominated “nuclear absolutism.”[2] The effects of this unquestionable belief in Deterrence Theory sharply increases States’ reliance on and valuing of nuclear weapons. Consequentially, it poses an existential threat to disarmament processes and severely undermines nuclear weapon States’ Article VI obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is long past time these ‘truths’ were punctured.

Deterrence Theory, derived from a Realist school of thought, postulates that the possession of nuclear weapons – the ultimate deterrent – will thwart and deter attacks against the possessor. The sheer destructive power inherent in a single nuclear weapon, let alone thousands detonating in quick succession, make their use (almost) unthinkable. As a means to solidifying a unified front against the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Western European States along with the United States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 to deter the Soviet Union’s massive conventional forces, as well as its ever-increasing nuclear arsenal after its first test a few months later. With NATO, the United States became the guarantor of the defence of Western Europe, and the so-called US nuclear umbrella was born.

As stated in Article V of the NATO treaty, an attack on one member was an attack on all of them. The US nuclear umbrella is, therefore, a security assurance agreement that the US deterrent intended primarily to defend itself, also extends over the territory of its NATO partners.[3] In other words, the United States would defend NATO members against aggressors, even resorting to nuclear weapons, should the situation require these capabilities to be deployed. In theory, the US nuclear umbrella would soothe NATO members’ anxieties and serve as an alternative to the acquisition of their own nuclear weapons.[4] However, given its Realist roots, the crucial question arises: when push comes to shove, would the United States be willing to risk its own security to defend its allies in Europe? What are the costs of sustaining the illusion of the US nuclear umbrella? While these questions retained an academic quality for some time, in the Age of Trump, they urgently require revisiting.

Alliances under Anarchy: a Realist Take

Realism puts significant emphasis on self-help given the anarchical setting of the International System. Cooperation is scarce and limited, and only possible if states see it in their primal interest of survival and quest for power. Nevertheless, military alliances do happen and are circumscribed in the theoretical postulations of Realism—they last for as long as the states involved see it as comparatively advantageous. In particular, alliances are formed to counter a third, more powerful, state.[5]

The US nuclear umbrella, one of the crown jewels of NATO, relies heavily on the existence and credibility of military alliances. If the alliance fails, so do the security assurances. In that sense, even though military alliances do exist, it seems almost incredible that, under Deterrence and, therefore, Realist logic, military alliances would include credible nuclear security assurances. In other words, following the Realist rationale of self-help and its ultimate goal of survival, it seems highly unlikely that a state would risk its own security and survival to come to the defence of another state, ally or not, that is threatened by a third.

Historically, military alliances based on mutual assistance and defence have proven to be nothing but empty promises. In 1924, Czechoslovakia and France signed the Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, which stated that the two States would come to the other’s aid in times of peril.[6] In 1938, given the rise of tensions just before the Second World War in Europe, Czechoslovakia also had a gentleman’s agreement with the United Kingdom regarding the latter’s aid in case of a military invasion of the former by Germany.[7] However, when Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, neither agreement was fulfilled, following several of the bedrock assumptions of the Realist school of thought.

Alliances, therefore, are susceptible to failure. As hard as it is for military alliances to succeed, the nuclear age amplifies the obstacles for their endurance. Even at the height of the Cold War, inside the war planning rooms of the Pentagon and the Strategic Air Command, the nuclear security assurances seemed to tremble. During the Berlin Crisis of 1961, top US officials were reconsidering whether the United States should employ nuclear weapons to defend an eventual military incursion of the USSR in West Germany.[8] Since the development of nuclear weapons and the dominating logic of nuclear deterrence, it is perfectly reasonable to argue that security assurances in the nuclear age are quasi-empty words. In 2020, revisiting the bases of the US nuclear umbrella—particularly in Europe—does it still hold any value as a credible security assurance?

New York for Paris? The US Nuclear Umbrella Revisited

The strength of the US nuclear umbrella guarantee raised questions from the very start, most notably from France. In the 1960s, General Charles de Gaulle was highly sceptical of US nuclear security assurances, particularly after the USSR developed intercontinental ballistic missiles with enough range to reach the United States. This scepticism led de Gaulle to pose the question whether US President John F. Kennedy would be willing to risk New York for Paris. Eventually, this very lack of confidence fomented the development of France’s force de frappe—the French nuclear arsenal – allowing France to be able to protect itself and avoid a strict dependency on NATO.[9]

The question posed by de Gaulle summarises the central issues with the credibility of US – or any – nuclear security assurances and umbrellas. In 1970, given the USSR’s massive conventional forces and its nuclear parity with the US, President Richard M. Nixon believed the nuclear umbrella was no longer sustainable.[10] Despite his beliefs, Nixon could not publicly admit the frailty of the US nuclear umbrella lest it create anxieties in its European allies and tampers with the Cold War balance.[11]

Fast forward to the present day, Donald Trump was elected President in 2016 with the slogan ‘America First.’ Ever since tensions have risen in the nuclear sphere in multiple fronts. President Trump, echoing President Harry S. Truman’s words from 1945, famously threatened “fire and fury” against North Korea and withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal. Moreover, relations with Russia have also deteriorated after the mutual withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and the seemingly unwillingness to extend New START—the only treaty remaining treaty limiting US and Russia’s nuclear arsenals—despite Russian President Putin’s positive signalling towards extension.

Similarly, President Trump has repeatedly shown his contempt for NATO, after moving to cut US contributions to the organisation. Despite Trump’s increased reliance on nuclear weapons and desire of a larger arsenal, it seems unlikely Trump and his ‘America First’ mentality would risk New York – or any other US city, for that matter—for Paris. The illusion of the US nuclear umbrella seems to be surfacing at last. On the other side of the Atlantic, a recent poll conducted by the Körber Foundation showed that the German population would rather either rely on France and the United Kingdom for nuclear assurances or even forgo them than to rely on the US nuclear umbrella. Notwithstanding, high-ranking military officers seem to hold on to the current regime of nuclear truth.

Sustaining the illusion of the US nuclear umbrella incurs other costs whose effects have a global reach. By perpetuating the current regime of nuclear truth, the US is selling its nuclear umbrella, using it as a rock-solid alibi to keep the United States from abiding by its disarmament commitments. Under Article VI of the NPT, each State “[…] undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”.[12] One key-argument against US nuclear disarmament for decades has been the anxieties it would create amongst its allies under the US nuclear umbrella.

The nuclear non-proliferation regime is already strained as it is. Arms control seems to be failing and non-nuclear weapons States are frustrated with the slow pace of disarmament efforts. The so-called ‘grand bargain’ of the NPT – non-proliferation in exchange for nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and the promise of disarmament – is in jeopardy. The maintenance and belief in the US nuclear umbrella and the growing frustration from the non-nuclear weapon States with its nuclear peers coalesce in existential threats to the cornerstone treaty keeping nuclear proliferation at bay. Were the illusion of the umbrella finally exposed, it would eliminate a key hindrance to nuclear disarmament.

The US nuclear umbrella seems to have lost its credibility. President Trump, in practicing his ‘America First’ policy has opened the blinds showing the illusion of its nuclear security assurances, particularly in the post-Cold War world. The dismantlement of the US nuclear umbrella – being replaced by a European nuclear umbrella, led by France and the United Kingdom, or eliminated completely – would likely have no de facto changes in European security. Rather, it would cripple to anti-disarmament movement in the United States. The United States is unlikely to risk New York for Paris, and its European allies seem to already know it. Waking up from this illusion would create a more inviting environment for nuclear disarmament.

[1] Lawrence Freedman and Jeffrey Michaels, eds. (2019), The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

[2] Nick Ritchie (2013), Valuing and Devaluing Nuclear Weapons, Contemporary Security Policy, 34(1):152.

[3] Today, the US nuclear umbrella extends also to Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

[4] France and the United Kingdom, both NATO members, are nuclear weapons States, despite being under the US nuclear umbrella. France’s development of nuclear weapons was fomented, in part, by General Charles de Gaulle’s lack of confidence in the US nuclear umbrella. See Fred Kaplan (2020), The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War. New York: Simon & Schuster.

[5] See, e.g., Hans Morgenthau (1948), Politics Among Nations. New York: A. A. Knopf; John Mearsheimer (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton.

[6] Treaty of Alliance and Friendship (1924), 23 U.N.T.C., pp. 163-169.

[7] See, e.g., Gerhard Weinberg (1995), A World at Arms: a Global History of World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[8] Kaplan (2020).

[9] Ibid.

[10] James Cameron (2018), The Double Game: The Demise of America’s First Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic Arms Limitation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[11] Melvyn Leffler and Odd Westad, eds. (2010). The Cambridge History of the Cold War Volume II: Crises and Détente. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[12] The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), 729 U.N.T.S., 173.

Orion is a doctoral researcher currently at the Department of War Studies – King’s College London. He joined the Department of War Studies in 2019, as part of the Joint PhD-programme between King’s College London and the University of São Paulo, his home institution. He holds an MA (Hons) in International Security from the University of Groningen and a BA in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais, with a period at the Sorbonne University – Paris XIII. His doctoral research focuses on nuclear weapons and politics, particularly the symbolism behind nuclear weapons. He analyses the overarching relationship between symbolism, identity, and behaviour within the nuclear arena, focusing on the history of US nuclear strategy post-Hiroshima.

Ikenberry’s ‘Liberal Leviathan’ and American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump

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by Paakhi Bhatnagar

The American President Donald Trump during his inauguration speech in 2017 (Image Credit: Pool)

 

America’s world leadership is in crisis. Amidst a trade war with China, an unprecedented withdrawal of forces from the Middle East, and an increasingly hostile attitude toward international alliances and institutions, Donald Trump has exacerbated the crisis of America’s authority in the international system. We live under a zeitgeist where the American grand strategy is progressively becoming inward-focusing and lacking a coherent external vision. Perhaps now is a better time than any to go back to the theoretical literature on internationalism and what it can tell us about America’s grand strategy despite, in an endeavour to counter the international detriment of its global retreat.

In Liberal Leviathan, published in 2011, G. John Ikenberry unpicks the crisis of authority and governance prevalent in the liberal international system by arguing for America to adopt a grand strategic vision of liberal internationalism. The title of the book in itself is quite intriguing as it invokes significance to the Hobbesian conception of ‘Leviathan.’ The United States’ hegemony was based on Hobbesian grounds in the sense that other states had consensually handed the ‘reign of power’ to America. For Ikenberry, it is this very consensus that is now in crisis.

The book’s core argument is substantiated by theoretical underpinnings as Ikenberry commits the first half of the literature to liberal institutionalism and what this particular mode of organization has to offer for US grand strategy going forward. Although superfluous at times, this theoretical foundation of liberalism provides a logical premise for him to then make policy suggestions for America. In fact, the key strength of the book comes from Ikenberry’s ability to uphold his thesis throughout the dense literature, ensuring the reader is never in doubt about the author’s advocation for a liberal internationalist policy.

Ironically, Ikenberry’s heightened focus on the liberal theory of the international system also constitutes his key weakness. By holding liberal internationalism on a pedestal, Ikenberry formulates a parochial vision of the system, effectively removing other theories, such as the balance of power, from the narrative. The concept of rising powers is one example that poses a challenge to Ikenbery’s central argument of liberal internationalism. As highlighted by John Mearsheimer, a famous critic of Ikenberry, it is inevitable that rising powers will turn against the liberal international order. Ikenberry has been careful in conceding to the fact that it is the very nature of the liberal order that accommodates and encourages rising powers. But, in contrast to Mearsheimer, he believes that the liberal order would facilitate cooperation and stability through multilateral treaties and institutions instead of creating instability in the system. To do this, America would need to adopt a liberal internationalist grand strategy and actively engage itself in the rebuilding of international institutions. This, however, does not seem to be the direction towards which Trump’s foreign policy is heading.

Written during the aftermath the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the sense of anxiety around the American position in the international system is very apparent in the book. This anxiety can now very well be translated into the current dilemma faced by the American government: whether to reclaim its position as a natural hegemon and project its policies internationally, or whether to focus inwardly to sustain its domestic voters. This dilemma is especially relevant in Donald Trump’s America.

The current American President Donald J. Trump’s policies have prescribed to what Walter Russel Mead has termed the ‘Jacksonian tradition’ after American President Andrew Jackson. Trump’s disengagement from multilateral institutions and his incessant focus on America’s domestic voters is comparable to Jackson’s populism and bilateralism in World War II. Trump has steered the country’s grand strategy to a very different trajectory from what Ikenberry had prescribed. For Ikenberry, the US has strong incentives to sustain its hegemony in a liberal international order by renegotiating its position and establishing multilateral agreements. In fact, he goes on to say that multilateral agreements and rules provide a foundational basis for states to interact within the liberal system. While the US has remained a key player in global politics since this book was written, its international presence in the system has been relatively declining. In this sense, the US does seem to be renegotiating its place in the international system, but not on the terms Ikenberry had proposed. The reason for this, is the rise in nationalism both externally in other states, and, more importantly, internally in America.

Nationalism is an important phenomenon that cannot be undermined by internationalism. Although after the Cold War the ideology of liberal democracy upheld by the US became the driving force for political organization, nationalism in the country continued to brew. This gave voice to the concerns of many about the cost America had to pay for maintaining its hegemonic position. This phenomenon of nationalism highlights the key weakness of Ikenberry’s argument as he fails to engage with the prevalence of different ideologies within and outside of America that would reject a renewed American hegemony. This is especially conspicuous in Trump’s ‘America First’ policy. Trump has not only questioned the utility of long-standing alliances like NATO but has also implemented a foreign policy that has been responsible for America’s retreat from the international system.

Moreover, Ikenberry stands quite strongly on the issue of China, viewing it as ‘one of the great dramas of the twenty-first century’. He maintains the belief that China should be acclimatised to the liberal world order and not left out of it. This would not only maintain stability but also make China’s international presence contingent on its compliance with the liberal international order. Thus, an important aspect of US grand strategy according to Ikenberry would be to engage with China through multilateral trade institutions. Previous presidencies, like those of Obama and Clinton, had made it clear that they were trying to enroll China in the international order. Trump, on the other hand, is engaging with- or rather, disengaging from - China in a very different way. Waging a trade war and imposing bilateral sanctions goes starkly against Ikenberry’s advice.

While the debate on whether Trump actually has a grand strategic vision for America remains heated, there is no denying that if there is a grand strategy it is definitely not one of liberal internationalism. What, then, should formulators of American grand strategy take away from Liberal Leviathan? Ikenberry proposes quite succinctly that America should adopt a ‘milieu’ based grand strategy where it strives to structure the international environment in ways that are conducive to its own long-term security. This is, perhaps, the strongest policy advice laid out in the book.

The ‘brave new world’ that America finds itself in now is one where newer threats like global warming, jihadist terrorism, the rise of the far-right, etc. proliferate. Therefore, it is increasingly important for America to adapt its grand strategy to encompass all these global forces. Moreover, great power competition, as spurred by the rising power of China in the international system, has become an imperative issue for US foreign policy. Although there are several paths that America could take in its role in the international system, Ikenberry does quite clearly lay out the foundations for America’s liberal internationalist role. Whether American grand strategy is heading in the direction advised by Ikenberry or not, readers and budding grand strategists can certainly benefit from his argument on one particular trajectory that America could assume amidst the crisis of the liberal world order.

Paakhi Bhatnagar is an undergraduate International Relations student in her penultimate year at King’s College London. She is especially interested in the securitization of migration issues along with socio-economic policies and their impact on the working class. In addition to being a Copy Editor at Strife blog, she is also the Editorial Assistant at International Relations Today and the City News Editor at London Student. You can find her on Twitter at @paakhibhatnagar.

Donald Trump: A Unique Figure in the History of U.S. Foreign Policy?

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by Nicole Brodie

31 July 2019

President Donald Trump at a Make America Great Again rally in Mesa, Arizona, on Oct. 19, 2018. (Image credit: Charlotte Cuthbertson/The Epoch Times)

“Our plan will put America First. Americanism, not globalism, will be our credo. As long as we are led by politicians who will not put America First, then we can be assured that other nations will not treat America with respect.”

This quote, from the 2016 Republican National Convention, is a fantastic summation of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy stance. American foreign policy for the past 70 years has been one of interventionism and globalism. Trump is the only post-Second World War American president to explicitly endorse an ‘America First’ position – a phrase with significant nationalist and isolationist history. The phrase was originally used during the First World War by Woodrow Wilson and other government figures, to represent American neutrality. It was then co-opted in the lead up to America’s involvement in World War II by the America First party, whose anti-Semitic, pro-fascist rhetoric led to it being disbanded in 1941 after Pearl Harbor. This group infamously included far-right, pro-Nazi figures such as Charles Lindbergh and Henry Ford. It is difficult to believe Trump and his speech-writing team do not know the historical implications of using such a phrase when referring to his foreign policy, especially when there is a demonstrated understanding of the historical background of his other major slogan, ‘Make America Great ‘, having referenced its prior use by Ronald Reagan several times.

Trump is not the first isolationist president in American history – the Monroe Doctrine, declaring that the United States would not get involved in any European affairs, was a cornerstone of American foreign policy for nearly a century, and Woodrow Wilson was re-elected due to his isolationist policies. It is important to consider the nature of American isolationism at the time, though, as America was not yet a superpower, and at the time had little prior involvement with European politics. However, with the rise of a liberal international order led by the United States in the aftermath of World War II such political views fell to the wayside. World War II made America a superpower, and as the only Western power left relatively unharmed, it began to not only get involved in, but lead global politics. Since then, America’s involvement and influence in international relations has only grown.

Trump is the first president in the past 70 years to express such isolationist opinions openly. His reasoning for having such a nationalist viewpoint is perhaps what makes him a truly unique figure in the history of American foreign policy. Past isolationist presidents have acted largely on the current state of the world and what was best for America in the present– but Trump’s brand of foreign policy has mostly been reactionary, stemming from his own ideas of how America has been treated, not from its current situation. While it could be argued that both Monroe and Wilson were also acting on their own perceptions, both their policies reflected the status of America at the time, as a nation already fairly removed from the rest of the world’s affairs. President Trump, however, is contradicting America’s existing role and wanting to take an entirely different direction. Trump’s vision of America is of a nation which does not bow to the demands of other nations if those demands are not to America’s direct benefit

“Our country is in serious trouble. We don’t have victories any more. We used to have victories but [now] we don’t have them. When was the last time anybody saw us beating, let’s say, China, in a trade deal? They kill us. I beat China all the time. All the time.”

This unwillingness to compromise is dangerous, as America’s influence throughout the past 70 years has been so strong specifically due to its relationships with allies and its reputation as a champion of liberal democracy – though this has been damaged in recent years, especially in the Middle East where backing down from its existing commitments can only harm America’s international standing, as well as the strength of its alliances – one only needs to look at the opinions recently expressed by various world leaders to see this. Trump has also demonstrated a highly revisionist view of American history. Foreign policy moves hailed as triumphs by previous administrations are derided by him and his supporters as examples of America getting taken advantage of – NAFTA, NATO, and the Paris Accords, for example. Every American president from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Barack Obama has supported the strengthening of America’s international ties and the expansion of liberal democracy – all except Donald Trump.

“We want to take our country back. Our country is disappearing. You look at the kind of deals we make. You look at what’s happening, our country is going in the wrong direction, and so wrong, and it’s got to be stopped and it’s got to be stopped fast.”

Trump’s following makes him a unique figure when considering his foreign policy. A significant proportion of his supporter base is intensely focused on identity and culture, and specifically on how theirs is being attacked. This in itself is not particularly unusual, but the way in which his supporters eschew the existing political system in favour of something, and someone, entirely different certainly is. They believe their identity as the ‘average’ middle-class Christian American, and by extension, ‘America’ itself, is being erased by an increasingly multicultural and globalist United States. Many fervently believe Trump and his ‘Make America Great Again’ stance will reverse that process. Even without focusing on the number of far right attacks that have occurred since he took office, Trump’s policies of nationalism and Americanism have allowed a resurgence in such sentiments among the public (and not just in America). Trump himself has decried the far-right and their ethno-nationalism, but his foreign policy stances have had a bolstering effect on them, and have allowed them to interpret his words as supporting their politics. It is unusual for any president to have such an intense following, especially ones who twist his every word to legitimize their views.

Trump’s best-known slogans may not be unique (both ‘America First’ and ‘Make America Great Again’ have been used in past campaigns by Woodrow Wilson and Ronald Reagan, respectively), but his views on foreign policy certainly are, as are his actions and words. He is the only president since before the Second World War (a significant amount of time for a nation only 243 years old) to renounce America’s globalist policies, and the only one in the history of the nation to buck the established tradition quite so thoroughly (and gleefully) based, seemingly, on largely his own opinions. This return to isolationist sentiment has already hurt America’s relationships with its allies, and can only further harm both its relationships and its influence. Trump himself summed up his worldview quite clearly:

“You know they have a word, it sort of became old-fashioned, it’s called a nationalist, and I say ‘really, we’re not supposed to use that word?’ Do you know what I am? I’m a nationalist.”

Nicole Brodie is a third-year History and International Relations student at King’s College London. Her interests are American foreign policy and 20th century European history. You can find her on Twitter @nicoleebrodie. This article is the second of two winning essays of a writing competition jointly organised by the convenors of the module “Contemporary Issues in International History” and the Strife Blog.

Bibliography

Dunn, Susan. “Trump’s ‘America First’ Carries Ugly Echo.” CNN. April 28, 2016. Accessed March 19, 2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/27/opinions/trump-america-first-ugly-echoes-dunn/index.html.

Trump, Donald J. Speech, Republican National Convention, 21 July 2016. https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974

Trump, Donald J. Announcement of Presidental Bid. Speech, Trump Tower, 16 June 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donald-trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.12b716055c01

Trump, Donald J. Foreign Policy Speech. Speech, Washington D.C., 27 April 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript-trump-foreign-policy.html

Trump, Donald J. Address at Liberty University. Speech, Liberty University (Lynchburg, Virginia), 18 January 2016. https://www.c-span.org/video/?403331-1/donald-trump-remarks-liberty-university

Trump, Donald J. Campaign Rally of Senator Ted Cruz. Speech, Houston, Texas, 22 October 2018. https://www.businessinsider.in/trump-declares-himself-a-nationalist-while-stumping-for-ted-cruz/articleshow/66327534.cms

 

Feature — Winning the Disinformation War Against the West

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By Andrzej Kozłowski

13 May 2019

The Ministry of Defence badge on a computer chip. Britain will build a dedicated capability to counter-attack in cyberspace and, if necessary, to strike in cyberspace. (Crown Copyright/Chris Roberts)

The rapid expansion of the Internet in the nineties encouraged the expectation among Western politicians and experts that liberal democracy would come to dominate the world and authoritarian regimes would slowly collapse. It was hoped that the easy and fast access to uncensored information would strengthen civil society and opposition in authoritarian countries by empowering a free press, facilitating the planning and organisation of social and revolutionary movements which would overwhelm the ruling governments. However, things took a different trajectory and Internet tools such as social media have become a double-edged sword, effectively being employed against democratic countries to wreak information havoc and spread propaganda to undermine democratic processes.

A more serious problem than we think

The key event which demonstrated the power of social media, was the presidential election in the United States in 2016, when Russian hackers from the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), along with trolls from the Internet Research Agency, engaged in a disinformation campaign to influence the outcome of the election. Their main aim and the impact on Trump’s victory are disputed. However, this incident showed the importance of the Internet and social media and how easily public opinion can be manipulated by the newest technologies. Since that moment, policymakers and chiefs of intelligence and counterintelligence of NATO and EU countries have warned about the potential threat of external meddling in other elections in the West. Indeed, Russia attempted to meddle in the elections in France, the Netherlands and Germany but did not achieve an outcome comparable to the American presidential election of 2016.

Not only has disinformation been used to influence election processes, it has also been deployed to split societies by drawing attention to the most controversial cases. The waves of immigrants, which came to Europe in recent years, have divided societies of Western countries. This division has been strengthened by the fake stories of grave crimes committed by immigrants. A lot of people believed in them and were upset by this immigrant behaviour, leading some towards feelings of vengeance. Here, disinformation contributed to the violent acts against immigrants but also increased distrust in the mainstream media and towards politicians who seem to have overlooked these events. Social media were also used to influence voter behaviour in important referendums like the one in Spain and the United Kingdom, supporting Brexit and the secessionist movement in Catalonia.

Last but not least, the anti-vaccination movement, strongly present on social media, poses a threat for the lives of citizens in the West. As a result, illnesses like measles, which had formerly been eliminated by vaccines, have reemerged. The latest research shows that this movement was not spontaneous but rather state-inspired and strongly promoted on the Internet.

Western institutions have identified Russia as the perpetrator of these campaigns, but facing up to the problem of disinformation has become one of the most crucial challenges. However, there is a high probability that other countries could follow or have already followed in Russia’s footsteps. The West needs to prepare by building a resilient society resistant to disinformation and propaganda and ready to deter potential foes.

Front page of European Commission’s “Final Report of the High Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation” (European Commission)

Building an information-resilient society

Building an information-resilient society requires the close cooperation of four main entities: the government, civil society, social media platform owners, and the traditional media.

Governments

Despite the growing role of the private sector in cyberspace, the government ought to play a crucial role in initiating and coordinating actions that counter disinformation. First and foremost, the government needs to engage with professionals in combating this phenomenon. Think tanks and non-profit organisations cannot resist information and psychological operations orchestrated by the professionals from secret services due to their lack of financial sources, access to sensitive information, advanced systems of early warning and a sufficient staff size. However, some of these abilities and tools are in the hands of the counterintelligence agencies, which ought to assist such think tanks.

Moreover, the government needs to dominate the information sphere before elections and referendums. The constant warnings about the potential interference and manipulation of public opinion ought to come from the heads of intelligence and counterintelligence. Some may claim that spreading panic would be counterintuitive. Yet embedding a form of vigilance and awareness similar to that which occurs on, say, April Fool’s Day, about potential disinformation is crucial and can strip potential assailants from their biggest advantage: surprise. The cases of France and Germany are particularly telling. Before the elections in both countries, politicians and secret service officers warned about potential manipulations, which during the elections themselves were restrained to a minimum.

The government also ought to prepare a clear legal framework to help social media bigwigs eliminate detrimental content from their platforms. These laws ought to be effective and feasible but also remain adaptable to technological reality and transparent in order to avoid accusations of political bias. Internet-users ought to be aware that they can be penalised for inappropriate behaviour and not for political views.

The next task of the government is to prepare politicians and administrative staff for possible disinformation campaigns. It should be done on two levels: by organising training and practice for politicians and civil servants on how to recognize disinformation on the Internet, and by ensuring that political parties are prepared, especially during election campaigns.

Governments should also not hesitate to ban certain media from attending official press conferences if it has been established that these media act as propaganda instruments . For example, during the election in France, the French government’s administration of Emmanuel Macron banned the Sputnik and Russia Today journalists, limiting the freedom the media to spread disinformation.

The social media enterprises

Social media are used as tools to spread disinformation and influence democratic processes in many countries. It has become a significant problem for their executives, especially for Twitter and Facebook. Particularly after the 2016 presidential election in the United States both companies were under considerable public criticism. In response, they heavily invested in eliminating fake content and accounts responsible for spreading disinformation. This policy should be continued in close cooperation with government entities, which should help by identifying hostile accounts. However, the decisions made by social media enterprises should be clearly explained to avoid accusation of censorship.

Civil Society

The role of non-profit organizations cannot be underestimated, but they ought not play a central role in fighting disinformation. Instead, they ought to help government and social media enterprises identify propaganda and fake content but their role ought to remain advisory. Such organisations could effectively set up educational campaigns, teaching citizens how to avoid disinformation by fact-checking news and content on the Internet.

The Media

In the past, traditional media played the role of gatekeepers by filtering the flow of information and eliminating fake news. Currently, in the era of social media and direct access to information, this role has changed. However, traditional media still has a role to play. They ought to create special roles in the editorial team to trace fake news and stories and reveal it to the public. It would give them back the role of modern gatekeepers in the new era of social media. Furthermore, journalists are among the most popular persons on Twitter and Facebook and are often a source of news and information. If journalists spread fake news intentionally or unintentionally, this fake news becomes more and more reliable. Therefore media should organize special courses and training to raise awareness among journalists about appropriately sourcing information.

Last but not the least, the government needs to coordinate the efforts of all entities engaged in fighting disinformation. If the government fails in this role, the system will not work as one cohesive entity, but there will be a constellation of single, loosely related entities with overlapping tasks and lack of resources.

Creating effective and reliable deterrence

Building a society resistant to disinformation is a part of an effective strategy to fight disinformation. The remaining task is to deter potential agents of disinformation by establishing punishments. These penalties ought not be limited to cyberspace, but may also consider other measures, such as economic sanctions. In most cases, it is difficult to respond to these agents of disinformation by proportional information campaign. The obstacle lies in the authoritarian nature of the aggressor.

Because the election process in authoritarian states serves as a mere formality where public opinion and society cannot be effectively influenced, approaching aggressors with economic sanctions might be more effective in deterring such actions. However, even considering the authoritarian nature of the regime, online activity ought to be considered. The possible options could include demonstrating to the home population the inherently corrupt nature of the regime, under which the average citizen lives under inadequate conditions. The next potential strategy refers to the example of “The Union of the Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia”, a former Soviet organisation that influenced the attitudes of Soviet-Russian society towards the Afghan world. A similar scenario could be used to reveal the number of troops killed in the wars in Syria or in the Ukraine. Thirdly, it is a good idea to create the Russian version of Wikileaks service, that would deliver materials compromising the Russian materials and put them on the a bulletproof website.

Economic sanctions are another powerful tool that can be used by the West. Such sanctions have been surprisingly effective against Russia. Freezing oligarchs’ assets or introducing travel bans can hurt the closest circle of Moscow’s cronies and stop them from visiting their luxurious residences in Western Europe.

The next powerful tool of punishing Russia for its aggressive behaviour in this domain would be to expel Russian diplomats from Western countries. At first glance, it may look like the standard retaliation in the international arena. Considering the fact that in some countries like the UK, half of the Russian embassy staff worked for the Russian intelligence services, expelling Russian diplomats could effectively paralyse the work of the Russian intelligence network.

Every kind of Russian interference in the Western infosphere should be met with one of these effective measures Such measures would also deter any other country from following Russia. The West needs to demonstrate the willingness and determination to punish agents of disinformation, who have tried to infiltrate its own Internet sphere.

Conclusion and recommendations

The key to win the disinformation war is, first and foremost, to treat it as an existential threat perceived as a strategic priority. Thus significant financial resources need to be invested to counter this problem. Success is determined by the resilience of society and reliable forms of deterrence. Both require effective cooperation among the government, traditional media, social media enterprises and civil society; professional government agencies should be included in fighting against disinformation.

Effective cooperation among these entities allows us to create a warning system, which is crucial because opponents benefit from the element of surprise. Therefore, every user of the Internet, from government clerks to journalists, has to be educated to raise awareness of information threats. There should be a transparent legal framework, which helps to eliminate the disinformation from the public sphere without being accused of political bias. However, building a resilient society is not enough– forms of deterrence are also required. Such deterrence consists of a variety of measures, extended beyond the information sphere.

Flagging certain media outlets as propaganda instruments and banning their journalists from attending press conferences is the next step.

Dr Andrzej Kozłowski is the editor-in-chief of CyberDefence24.pl, the biggest portal on cyber security and information warfare in Poland. Alongside with his work as a journalist, he is a lecturer at the University of Lodz, Collegium Civitas in Warsaw and European Academy of Diplomacy (EAD). In 2016, Dr Kozłowski successfully defended his PhD dissertation entitled: “The Security Policy of the United States in Cyberspace (1993-2012). Comparative Analysis”. He is an expert at several Polish think-tanks such as The Institute of Security and Strategy Foundation, Warsaw Institute For Strategic Initiatives and The Casimir Pulaski Foundation.

Image source: Flickr

A Matter of Survival: How the Trade War will Shape China’s Future

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By Francesca Ghiretti and Lloyd Yijue Liu

2 May 2019

The trade war between the US and China is just the tip of the iceberg of deeper differences that will have complex ramifications (Manufacturing.net)

 

The trade war between the US and China is more than what meets the eye, and this is not a mystery. In fact, besides the trade deficit, there are multiple aspects at stake: intellectual property rights, the opening of the Chinese market and most of all, the political-economic system of China. The economic aspects appear to be laden with heavy political values for both actors. For Trump the trade war is a political means aimed at reinvigorating his political message with the eye on re-election, while for Xi Jinping it is a matter of survival, both his and that of the Communist Party of China (CPC).

Although negotiations are ongoing, the deeper political issues on the table risk triggering a mutation of the trade war. During the current state of affairs, an open armed conflict is highly unlikely. However, it is probable that the conflict between China and the US may spread to other countries and areas of interest, thus creating a complex matrix of entangled elements. The fight for technological advancement appears to be the most notorious battlefield, leading many to believe that in the near future the trade war could take on the shape of a technology war. The case of Huawei and the debate on AI are only two early examples of what such a conflict might look like. One wonders: why technology? Technological advancement is fundamental for the survival of the American primacy in the world and of the CPC in China. Both powers are aware that those who will lead the technological revolution that is unfolding under our eyes will lead the world in the coming years. After all, Britain would have hardly had the capacity to build an empire without the advantage of the first industrial revolution, and the West would have looked very differently and occuped a very different global position were it not for the industrial (and technological) revolutions.

Thus, both China and the US interpret the ongoing power struggle as a matter of survival, and technological development appears to be the main arena in which the battle is fought. In the long-run, instances for the US and China to face each other and present their contrasting models will not be lacking in number. However, in the short term, an agreement might be reached. It is for this reason that we propose three different scenarios each consisting of a possible outcome of the current negotiations between the two countries. In scenario one, an agreement is reached, and all tariffs are dropped. Scenario two describes the current situation– a state of limbo where some tariffs are in place but there is still space for communication and for a sudden turn in any direction. In the third scenario the US and China are unable to get a significant deal, leading to the prolonging and worsening of hostilities.

There is a perceivable division between the motives of President Donald Trump and those of the American strategists. The former needs a victory in view of the upcoming elections, even more so following the failure of the negotiations with North Korea. American strategists, on the other hand, appear to be seeking a more radical change in China’s way of doing business. Trump’s goal is to obtain an agreement which has the aspect of a victory for the US, with China expected to open its market to more American investments and firms, protect intellectual property and balance the trade deficit. Such objective seeks only a superficial change which would mean sizeable but not system-changing concessions by China.

The adoption of a Foreign Investment Law by China and the reform of the law on Intellectual Property suggests China’s propension to implement a few changes in order to find an agreement with the US, at least formally. On the other hand, the broader aims of the strategists seek deeper changes which ultimately would strip the CPC of its absolute centrality. This might be a real deal-breaker, should they be seriously pursued. In fact, Xi understands the importance of achieving an agreement for the sake of the Chinese economy. However, the survival of the CPC and its control over the entire Chinese society will always remain the first priority. All in all, what is to be expected is a temporary deal where China makes some quantitatively significant concessions but leaves structural changes to an unknown future.

Scenario 1. Trade deal (Tariffs at 0%)

In the first scenario the trade war ends with the US and China reaching an agreement which leads to the abolition of all the tariffs. However, this scenario envisages not a peace treaty but a regulated and extended truce. The deeper issue however, the nature of the Chinse political system, will not have been resolved. The basis of the Chinese government’s actions lays firmly with the doctrine of the ‘party leads everything’ (党是领导一切的) and is expected to remain. Here, the CPC would keep on centrally managing all aspects of China’s life, including areas which in the West are usually private or independent, such as academia and the judiciary. If the US is seeking a change in such approach, this issue is destined to come to the surface again at some point in the future and spur a conflict between the two.

In the short run, however, China will certainly be more collaborative with the US and the West. This would not mean a return to Deng Xiaoping’s ‘hide and bide’ paradigm, but a purely rhetorical switch to a more low-key and friendly campaign to present the ‘rise of China’ to the world, while creating more skillful ways of attracting foreign talent and importing technology and know-how from developed countries to develop China itself. Moreover, forging new strategic partnerships in the Western sphere would be easier with the blessing of the US and China’s renewed collaborative attitude.

Scenario 2. Further extending the deadline for a deal (Tariffs at 10%)

Currently, we are likely to be living the last moments of this transition scenario, which is probably advantaging China more than the US. The longer the negotiation lasts, the more uncertainty to the global economy and pressure on Trump’s credentials it will bring. The CPC is not immune to the political repercussions of a slowing economy, but unlike Trump, Xi does not have to face elections in a few months. Were it not for these looming elections, Trump too would have highly benefitted from a longer period for negotiations, as it would have allowed him to test whether China’s promises turned into reality. In such a scenario, a full-fledged deal (Scenario 1) would still be on the table, but China would have time to consider and perhaps test other alternatives. To force the Americans to reach a suboptimal deal and to protect their own economy from future repercussions, the Chinese might try to intensify their transactions with other trading partners. They might also try to explore possible fractures between the US and its allies, such as the EU, while exploiting the disruption of the global supply chain of goods manufactured in the country, such as tech components, to increase the pressure on the reaching of a deal and preparing for more negative alternative scenarios.

Scenario 3. No deal (Tariffs at 25%)

This is not the most likely outcome. However, with Trump and Xi, two stubborn leaders leading the discussions, this option cannot be ruled out. In this case, China and the US would become more assertive in implementing their own plans and fulfilling their geopolitical interests. Thus, multiple actors and areas of interests, such as technology, geopolitical claims and multilateral settings, would be involved in the disputes which is likely to take place simultaneously in different arenas, an example of which was the run for technological advancement previously mentioned. If the conflict becomes further politicised; China will make it difficult for the US to reach its goals in any international issues which China has influence on (such as in North Korea, the South China Sea or instances presented to the UN Security Council). At the same time, China would actively strengthen its already existing alliances, seek new allies and leverage any possible dispute between the US and its allies.

At home, the CPC would further devalue the Renminbi (RMB) to maintain China’s competitive edge while promoting stronger nationalism. In fact, it is believed that after 1979, the way in which the CPC maintained the level of legitimacy it needed to govern has slowly shifted from a nationalistic rhetoric to a more pragmatic promise of future wealth for Chinese people. Now that growth is slowing, and the West is becoming more hostile to China’s economic power, the CPC is attempting to transform the public’s economic grievances into a nationalistic feeling of an imminent external threats, which would grant the Party more space of maneuver. Interestingly, although often thought otherwise, it has been shown that the younger generations are at the same time materialistic and nationalistic, the use of an emergency rhetoric might override their materialistic need and help them endure economic difficulty in time of perceived external threats.

Regardless of the outcome of the trade war, the Chinese government could use its tax policy and the control of property price to encourage consumer spending. Furthermore, the CPC is likely to implement more large-scale infrastructure construction projects to keep the economy running in an attempt to mitigate the impact of the trade war and the slowing economy. An excellent example of this is the outcome of the recent Belt and Road Forum where China has strongly reaffirmed its commitment to the realisation of the project, robustly responding to the increasing skepticism towards the feasibility of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In China, more openness of the market has oftne been followed by a tightening effort for societal control to avoid a Soviet-style system collapse, this is likely to remain the case in the foreseeable future. Abroad, as in Scenario 2, China would seek new allies. However, according to the outcome of the trade war, the degree of assertiveness used by China to pursue such goal will change.

In conclusion, none of the scenarios presented rules out a future clash between the US and China, as the power struggle between the two will endure even after reaching a potential agreement. Their embodiment of different, and in certain aspects antithetical, models of governance and development will impede the complete appeasement between the two, leaving the world politics and economy in an uncertain state of affairs. In the long-run, this is likely to end with a drastic change in one of the two actors and the subsequent victory of one and loss of the other.

Francesca Ghiretti is a doctoral candidate at department of War Studies and European and International Relations at King’s College London where she has been awarded the Leverhulme scholarship ‘Interrogating Visions of a Post-Western World: Interdisciplinary and Inter regional Perspectives on the Future in a Changing International Order’. The focus of her thesis is the political response of the EU to Chinese foreign direct investments. Follow her @Fraghiretti.

Lloyd Yijue Liu is currently working as a research assistant for the China part of the research project Mapping Elite Networks and Governance in the 21st Century at the Department of Political Science at VU University of Amsterdam. He holds an advanced master’s degree in International Relations and Diplomacy from Leiden University and previously studied History and Modern European Studies at the University of British Columbia.