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You are here: Home / Archives for terror

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Where Evil met its End

June 7, 2019 by Miles Vining

by Miles Vining

7 June 2019

(Miles Vining)

Our relief group provided humanitarian assistance to people fleeing the last stronghold of ISIS in Baghouz, Syria. In Feburary and March 2019 we fed over 25,000 and treated over 4,000 wounded. These were mostly ISIS families, a number of which were in critical condition from the fighting and air strikes in the city. Our positions were from the frontline on the bluffs above the Euphrates River east of the city back to the IDP collection points in the desert. While at these forward positions of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), there were numerous SDF casualties incurred from ISIS positions in the valley.

A month after ISIS was defeated, we entered the city of Baghouz. Our first venture was down the bluffs where we had previously taken cover. Underneath them we found the dugouts and cut-outs that numerous fighters had occupied during the battle. Evidence of airstrikes against them was clearly visible with the busted Kalashnikov rifles and twisted hulks in the craters that spanned the walking path next to the Euphrates. Civilians flooded through this path as did ISIS fighters. We found improvised ISIS claymores (complete with cloth carrying handles), and satchel charges held together by transparent tape strewn haphazardly on the ground, as if their former owners decided to ditch them in a hurry. Pointed out by some SDF fighters were the skeletal remains of a dead fighter, his now sun-bleached spine poking through the collar of his camouflage caliphate-issued fatigues. His skull was several feet from him, between the severed body lay the “black standard”, a nylon square of a flag with the caliphate’s slogans stencil-painted on it.

After our walk, we drove to the centre of the town of Baghouz, now completely empty of any life apart from the SDF forces that were stationed in it. During the battle, the area was filled with vehicles of all conceivable types, multiplying the size of the tiny hamlet of Baghouz by at least a factor of ten. Baghouz was a tiny town that become surrounded by a huge tent city during the battle. But in reality, we were only seeing a tiny city centre that had what was essentially a Syrian version of an enormous trailer park that developed around it. Everything and everyone that could be loaded onto a moving vehicle and driven from Raqqa to this little obscure corner of Syria was there, forming the likes of a tent and vehicle city that easily rivalled most music festival campouts in the United States and Europe.

Although we could not walk through the largest of the tent cities due to ongoing clearing operations, we were able to visit that small centre of Baghouz itself. Many of the bodies had been buried, but you could still smell them. And if you happened to have a stuffy nose, the swarms of flies left no doubt in anyone’s mind as to the amount of death and destruction that had occurred here. As we carefully picked our way through buildings and grass spaces once crawling with the remnants of the so-called Islamic state, we did not get the impression of a sort of deathly zombie land or ghost town. If anything, it seemed more like a town that might have had a hurricane come through and everyone simply left in a hurry, waiting somewhere else to come back and restart. There was not a feeling of sinister evil that one might have expected to be omnipresent in the very air molecules.

Then came the suicide belts and vests. We found them in refrigerators, tucked between bushes, strewn across dirt dugouts where families had lived. Poking out from beneath discarded clothes in the empty houses, there was even one sitting in the corner of a rooftop where we paused to eat lunch. One rough estimate we had was that we came across some component of a suicide vest every twenty meters or so. One surprise discovery was an IED manufacturing tent in an open field, components and raw materials still waiting to be stuffed into vests or satchel charges. As if the operator had suddenly realised a late-night soccer game was already twenty minutes into the broadcast and he needed to catch the play, never to return. Upon geospatial analysis of the coordinates of the site, we found out that the tent had been erected in late January. Another discovery was that of a clinic tent complete with sheet metal shelving units still stacked with unopened medicine boxes and vials. This location had apparently caught fire as evidenced by the charred remains of equipment and the burnt down canvas covering. Eerily and straight out of a horror movie was a medical reclining chair, bent upwards at an angle among the black ash of what was left of the tent.

We found so much ordinance among the various sites that at times it was comical. RPG warheads had been shattered to pieces and were laying in puddles as if a part of some olive drab toy kit that had bounced out of a toddler’s hands. Spent shell casings lay strewn among numerous houses, while more PG7 warheads were even completely intact. The SDF had been collecting discarded ordnance since the battle’s conclusion, with piles and piles of captured materiel in the courtyard of one of the houses, but there was still so much more to be picked up. There are many metrics for determining the evil that ISIS became during its reign of terror. Numbers of civilians killed or enslaved, prisoners tortured or beheaded. One of our post-caliphate metrics in Baghouz was stumbling upon suicide belts. Just like how fleeing passengers on a ship are handed life preservers, so did the last of the caliphate’s residents got handed suicide belts. But unfortunately to many in the West, the so-called Islamic State is already becoming a fading memory of a terrorist organization that tried and ultimately failed in its attempt at Islamic utopia. Hopefully what we found on the ground in Baghouz can be a reminder to those that this monster of a creation was tangible evidence of the evil that can still manifest itself among us today.


Miles Vining is a volunteer relief worker behind SDF lines in Baghouz.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Baghouz, Bomb vests, ISIS, Syria, terror

A Helping Hand in the Struggle against Terrorist Cyber-Activity

April 9, 2016 by Strife Staff

This is the sixth and final piece in a series of articles we will be featuring on Strife in the coming week looking at the role of Proxy Warfare in the 21st century by Series Editor Cheng Lai Ki. Previous articles in the series can be found here.

By: Elmer Hernandez

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The declaration of war by Anonymous on the Islamic State (IS) directed public attention to what seemed to be an action movie plot: the hacker heroes against the terrorists. Some applauded the initiative, in what they feel is a needed response to Government inefficiency, while others mocked and denounced the declaration as nothing but the latest Anonymous attention-grabbing headline, soon to be forgotten. Neither credulous and naïve optimism, nor outright mockery, are adequate however.

Terrorist activity in cyberspace is widespread, fluid and hard to tackle. Their use of technologies like the internet, social media and encrypted means of communication, represent an escalating concern. Government efforts could still use additional specialized support, hacktivist and related groups are an interesting source to consider. Despite the media hype, Anonymous is nowhere near the only group in this struggle, the rise of Ghost Security Group (GSG) is a prime example of a new type of approach.

After splitting from Anonymous last fall, this particular group has become closer to private sector actors such as Kronos Advisory, and with Kronos’ founder Michael Smith as an intermediary, they have begun working with Governments. Smith “recognized the value of our work and began forwarding our data to appropriate parties in various states as it proved viable and pertinent” says GSG’s technology lead Raijin Rising[1].

GSG differs from a lot of current hacktivist initiatives, for instance some of the activities the group carries out appear to go beyond the efforts of many other groups in terms of complexity. Such activities include counter surveillance, cryptocurrency tracing, data mining and penetration testing. This has led many in the community to criticize GSG as moving away from hacktivism and morphing into some sort of security consultancy, but Raijin insists GSG is still well within the hacktivist realm, concerned with their own agendas when not aiding governments and private entities.

These groups can provide support to existing efforts. States already possess important capabilities to counter and detect terrorist activity through their intelligence and security agencies, such as GCQH, MI5 and MI6 here in the United Kingdom. They also work with private sector actors for a more effective approach, including companies such as Facebook. Nevertheless the authorities will eventually need the help of subversive groups, suggests Raijin. In fact he says authorities have already started developing cyber teams of their own to tackle IS activity, but nothings beats the experience of groups like his. “Groups like ours know the enemy already – we know their culture, their tools, their leaders and their methods”.

His statements are not to be taken lightly. Others have long been aware of the potential value of these groups, Russia is a worrying example. Pro-Kremlin proxy youth groups like Nashi have allegedly been used to censor opposition, as well as conducting espionage and cyber-attacks against other states[2]. There is also the more professional work of groups such as APT 28[3], although not much is known about their composition. Furthermore the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is allegedly recruiting hackers and developing cyber units to mobilize against IS[4]. It is evident the Russian State is aware of the benefits of fostering and maintaining hacker expertise as a vital resource that might otherwise prove hard to find[5].

These proxy-type examples do not represent a model liberal democracies should follow, but they should provide a wake-up call in that illiberal regimes are not ignoring an important resource.

Consequently it would be unwise to simply mock such idea without proper consideration. For those who are sceptical it must be noted that cooperation between security actors and hacktivists is not unprecedented, for example Cult of the Dead Cow offered and allegedly provided assistance to the FBI’s Magic Lantern initiative together with Microsoft [6]. Indeed the suggestion of the potential of hacktivists as assets for national cybersecurity is not a new one, it has been made at least since the turn of the millennium[7].

However, and despite what we could consider as a boom in hacktivist activity in the past 8 years, such suggestion is still not taken seriously enough. “Working with ‘hacktivists’ is still a taboo subject for most entities and most would never admit at this time to using or receiving our information” Raijin recognizes. Understandably, governments and law enforcement might be reluctant to cooperate with hacktivists and hackers, perhaps out of fear of appearing incompetent and inefficient for accepting the help of vigilante groups and individuals.

Some will say that government need not refuse such help, but simply keep it hidden and deny any such links. Interestingly enough Raijin himself suggests that those benefitting from their work would appreciate GSG to continue operating silently too. Silence notwithstanding it would be naïve to think governments are currently rejecting contributions from hacktivist groups. There are claims of hacktivists efforts having prevented attacks, GSG’s work has allegedly prevented violence in various places from Tunisia to New York, while other Anonymous affiliated initiatives have reportedly done the same in countries like Italy.

Those demanding proof and acknowledgement by the relevant authorities will probably remain unsatisfied, but such critics do not seem to understand what they are asking for. Fears of perceived incompetency and inefficiency by authorities are not the only reasons for the lack of evidence. If this cooperation is taking place, as it seems to be, and is proving effective, it makes little sense to compromise any aspect of this relationship only for the sake of appeasing sceptics or giving hacktivist groups public acknowledgment. Cooperation with hacktivists will most likely never be officially recognized, this seems to be their inevitable fate.

While disappointing, Raijin highlights how public recognition is not their prime goal “our mission is to save lives and put a stop to sickening brutality…. We didn’t start this fight for fame”. Similarly it is not important for him to prove anything to any outsiders, claiming that the group nevertheless has the relevant evidence, “we save everything and we have the documents and screenshots that were used to validate specific threat vectors that were forwarded to entities”.

Within the hacktivist community, some consider it foolish and dangerous to get too close to government while others condemn any form and degree of such cooperation[8], in what they see as a naturally antagonistic relationship. If wider efforts are to be effective however, cooperation with authorities is paramount. Hacktivist groups can contribute to existing governmental efforts only if they have the right coordination, this is important for two reasons.

First, the independent initiatives of various hacktivist groups have the potential of disrupting already ongoing operations by authorities. Intelligence is vital, common hacktivist action such as web defacements, distributed denial of service attacks and any sort of meddling with key social media accounts can deprive authorities of important sources of information. GSG claim they have become aware of this, and have moved away from what they describe as brute force methods and instead focus on more intelligence related operations.

Second, many other hacktivist activities have been strongly criticized for their lack of quality which can affect innocent people. Anonymous is a relevant example, doxing campaigns have proved to be inaccurate and have put people who have nothing to do with IS at risk. Even GSG themselves are not free from these types of criticism, which goes to show the deep scepticism that exists towards any sort of non-governmental efforts, no matter their apparent level of sophistication.

Despite of such issues Raijin remains confident about the value of the work of independent groups, “We’ve already shown that our work can responsibly provide actionable intelligence…”. The prospect of increased incorporation of hacktivist efforts into a wider multilateral initiative “is looming on the horizon”, but it is no certainty. Raijin says that so far authorities seem to be mimicking their efforts by creating teams of their own instead of tapping into their experience, perhaps a balance can be struck. One thing is clear however, it makes little sense to ignore extra technical expertise that could provide a helping hand to existing efforts; the hacktivist initiative should not be rejected but guided.

 

 

Elmer Hernandez is an MA student in Intelligence and International Security. His academic interests include hacktivism, surveillance and cybersecurity especially within Latin America. He is available for contact at [email protected].


 

 

Notes:

[1] Interview with Raijin Rising, transcript included.

[2] Jose Nazario. Politically Motivated Denial of Service Attacks. (Conference on Cyber Warfare,

  1. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence [CCDCOE] 2009).

[3] FireEye. APT 28: A Window into Russia’s Cyber Espionage Operations? (2014).

[4] Eugene Gerden. ISIS vs Anonymous - and Russia? (SC Magazine 2015).

[5] Keir Giles. “Information Troops” – a Russian Cyber Command? (Proceedings form the 3rd International Conference on Cyber Conflict, 2011) pp. 54-55.

[6] Dorothy E. Denning. Cyber Conflict as an Emergent Social Phenomenon. In: HOLT, T. J. & SCHELL, B. H. (eds.) Corporate Hacking and Technology-Driven Crime: Social Dynamics and Implications. (New York: Information Science Reference 2011).

[7] Mark G. Milone. Hacktivism: Securing the National Infrastructure. (The Business Lawyer, 58,

383-413, 2002).

[8] David Gilbert. Anonymous Is Hacking ISIS, But Warns Collaborating With US Government Is ‘Deeply Stupid’. (International Business Times 2015)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: cyber, Hacktivism, terror

‘Remember, remember…’ year three: The police, terror and consent

November 5, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Jill Russell:

Parliament Votes On Air Strikes Against The Islamic State In Iraq

‘Murderous Plan to Kill Police Officers Disrupted.’ 27 October 2014

On this the third anniversary of StrifeBlog’s arrival and commemoration of the security ramifications of Guy Fawkes Day, I would like to consider Isil’s recent threats in which the group has called for independent, self-motivated attacks against police officers. [1] Attempting to spur on what they hope might be some legion of stranded but loyal followers, their vision is of lone wolves let loose upon their targets, which makes the opening headline quoted above seem quite sinister.

Except that headline was in fact a reference to events in Northern Ireland. In that case, a group had called in a bomb threat to a location where another had been placed in hopes of catching the officers sent to deal with the first unawares. The gambit failed as the second device was discovered and disposed of without harm.

It is cold comfort, then, that Isil’s threat is not novel, especially in recent British experience. And on its own, if we are honest, neither is such a tactic any sort of strategic threat. Unlike our seventeenth-century plotters, whose planned mass destruction of the government – in structure and flesh – would displace power according to their preferences, singular attacks upon individuals do not in themselves enable such change. Nor, given British tradition, is it likely to change much about everyday life or policy. Certainly those responsible for the Northern Ireland bomb threat expected only minor political effects from their action. Similarly, in recent years PSNI officers have been targeted in shootings. In those cases it is understood that those responsible – identified by some as a splinter faction of the most radical republicans – envision nothing more than a modest effect: target Catholic officers to deter others in the same community from serving. This tactic is only a small part of a strategy seeking to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process.

It seems, then, that with respect to the West and those foreign powers Isil views as a threat, the group’s current agenda for action is spectacular but pointless acts of barbarism, death and tragedy to little political effect, and not even much terror. Officers, singly and by force, and with their fellow citizens, will mourn and lament any loss. It would be a tragedy for all involved, but I struggle to imagine those same officers and organizations folding in the face of such an act. So why does this particular episode merit consideration as a security concern?

While Isil may not be savvy enough to imagine the ramifications of their actions, such a targeted campaign against the police could, in fact, threaten the foundation upon consent of British policing. Disrupting that keystone of the fine institution which has served well through tumult, disorder, war and peace, would be a success Isil could not have envisaged.

In the short term, care must be taken when considering what measures would be appropriate to maximize officer safety. One American politician, with a background in law enforcement, recently called for the arming of the British police. Whether this is a policy change that is in the interest of the country, its police, or its people, this response to a moment of crisis would certainly lack due consideration of the effect it would have upon the culture of British policing or the terms of consent. And, once armed, a reversal of policy would be highly unlikely. This would necessarily change the nature of the relationship between the police and society, it would increase the distance between officers and those whom they serve, protect, and, in a certain sense, represent.

More worrying is the spectre haunting police and community relations, especially its potential to weaken consent across many critical demographics. If we are honest, Isil’s announcement targets vulnerable members of immigrant and minority communities. The same communities with whom the police are struggling to build better relations. This is a crucial moment, and how the police respond to the threat by way of their interactions with these segments of the public will matter. It would be too tragically easy for the police to allow fear to drive a wedge of suspicion between them and the relevant communities, to break the fragile but growing bonds of consent which inevitably develop within every new generation of recent arrivals. Such a trend could, in fact, create the real and serious problem of growing disaffection with British society, laws and governance, in which case, the needs and objectives of Isil would be served by fractures and increasing strife for the British at home.

But whereas consent could be mortally wounded by rash and ill-considered responses to this threat, it is equally true that this is also a moment where the terms of consent could be strengthened, its wisdom reaffirmed. In addition to every bit of fine, pro-active counter-terror tactic and policy, the single best weapon against Isil and its immediate and long-term threats is the strength of relations between the relevant communities and individuals and the police. Local knowledge and assistance are the most effective answers to lone wolves, plots, and radicalization. Every action taken to build rapport, trust and respect between the two will not only be an improvement to security, but will be a down-payment on the strength and vibrancy of society in years to come.

These moments are the crossroads in history. At such points, there is often confusion over which path to take. While it might seem that the signs point only towards fear, despair, and deep societal division and weakening, in fact the option in the other direction should be the beacon.

Jill S. Russell is a regular contributor to Strife, Kings of War and Small Wars. She is currently completing her doctoral dissertation on American military logistics and strategic culture. You can follow her on Twitter @jsargentr.

NOTES:
[1] This threat has been made to law enforcement and government personnel in the US and Canada as well. See, for example, the Joint Intelligence Bulletin from 11 October.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: consent, policing, terror, terrorism control

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