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Russian PMCs in Africa: How the Kremlin converts hard power into economic opportunity

February 25, 2022 by David Salinger

Soldier Holding Gun /Photo Credit: Jakson Martins, licensed under Creative Commons

The primary driver of Russian expansion in Africa are Private Military Contractors (PMC). Exerting hard power, while maintaining plausible deniability for the Russian state, PMCs are active across Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and more. Providing a cheaper alternative to Russian army deployments, PMCs, like the infamous Wagner Group, enable Russia to generate economic outcomes. The mechanisms by which they do so, however, remain murky. I will therefore interrogate these processes, arguing that Russia’s strategy revolves around exchanging PMC-derived hard power for economic concessions and partnerships.

Russian influence in Africa

Russia relies on Soviet legacies to maintain and build its influence in Africa. With enduring historical ties rooted in Cold War geopolitics, Russia is less affected by accusations of neo-colonialism. It never held colonies on the continent and thus carries less baggage in its dealing with regional governments. Putin has promoted Russian partnerships as “no strings attached”, differentiating their agreements from those with former colonial powers which often demand political or structural economic reforms.

Russia has acted opportunistically to offer military assistance to states affected by civil war, social unrest, and terrorism. Wagner Group was sent to CAR in 2018 following the end of French peacekeeping mission Opération Sangaris and the failure of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force to disarm rebel groups. In Sudan and Madagascar, Russia answered calls for security assistance amidst social and political unrest. In Libya, up to 1200 Wagner troops directly supported Haftar’s LNA (Libyan National Army) 2019 Tripoli Offensive. Finally, Mali’s recent contracting of Wagner Group follows the gradual end of France’s counterterrorism mission Opération Barkhane, which has not solved lingering issues of terrorism in the Sahel, while significantly heightening anti-French sentiment in the country.

A clear strategic trend is therefore apparent, Russia is identifying African security vacuums and offering PMC-led military aid. However, such Russian military aid is not free, PMC forces are often deployed in exchange for economic concessions.

Russia’s geopolitical strategy

Putin believes Russia is a great power and should retain this position, no matter the cost. While Russia’s military power is widely recognized, the same cannot be said for its economy.

The Russian president employs a foreign policy that exploits Russia’s hard power to expand its economic ties. In what are known as “packages”, Moscow offers foreign governments PMC support in exchange for natural resource concessions and the opening of national markets to Russian companies. That African governments request assistance is crucial, as it gives Russian interventions a degree of legitimacy within the international community.

In the short term, Russia focuses on exploiting natural resource concessions. Such concessions are granted as direct payments for the deployment of Wagner Group forces. On top of natural resources, the Kremlin’s economic interests in Africa revolve around arms exports to the continent. These bilateral security ties provide billions to the Kremlin, essential for keeping foreign interventions going and financing the defence industry.

In the long term, Putin is looking to position Russian export companies at the centre of CAR’s, Libya’s, and DRC’s economies. Although these countries’ populations possess little purchasing power, this will not always be the case. Their large young populations represent key emerging consumer groups, thus far untapped by the global market. By stoking new, massive export markets for Russian companies, Putin is looking to plan ahead, positioning Russia to benefit from long term shifts in the global economy.

Finally, the Russian president seeks to establish a strong base of geopolitical influence in Africa. This would give Russia a foothold on Europe’s southern border, notably in Libya, boosting Russia’s geopolitical position vis-à-vis the EU. The Kremlin will continue to offer package deals to African countries with geographically strategic locations and maturing markets.

Plausible deniability and controlling PMCs

PMCs give Putin plausible deniability. They are neither part of, nor officially affiliated with, the Russian state, therefore the Kremlin cannot be held accountable for their actions. Furthermore, PMCs technically do not exist in Russia, as they are banned by the law. Employing these companies allows Russia is to mitigate scrutiny into its overseas operations, reflected by continued uncertainty about the exact number of Wagner personnel in Libya, CAR and DRC. The PMC’s covertness acts as force multipliers to contracting armies and to hide casualties from the general public.

Putin exploits the lack of legal status to control the PMCs, who suffer consequences when they step out of line, such as the shakeup of Wagner’s command after the battle of Kasham. Wagner Group is heavily connected to Russia’s military intelligence (GRU), its founder, Utkin, was the commander of the GRU’s 700th Special Forces Unit of the 2nd Separate Special Forces Brigade. Wagner Group’s headquarters are a shared military base with the GRU’s 10th Separate Special Purpose Brigade, based in Molkino, Krasnodar. The contractors receive passports from the Central Migration Office Unit 770-001, which are only issued for GRU operatives. In 2016, Putin honoured Utkin at a reception for the “Hero of the Fatherland Day”. When 33 Wagner Group operatives were arrested in Belarus during the 2020 presidential elections, Putin intervened personally to have them freed.

The lack of official connection between the contractors and the Russian state also makes their deployment far cheaper. A Wagner soldier’s monthly salary of $4,600 is almost four times that of a Russian soldier at $1,200. However, the mercenary’s salary, accommodation and equipment are paid by Wagner Group owner Prigozhin’s network, using income from the exploitation of natural resource concessions. Therefore, Russia deploys Wagner troops abroad with low financial drawbacks, only paying for transport and occasional medical treatment. By controlling Wagner’s operational capacity to deploy to conflict zones, the Kremlin’s exerts direct authority over the contractors.

Putin’s intercessions in favour of Wagner Group and the outfit’s very close ties to the GRU demonstrate a direct link between the mercenaries and the highest levels of the Russian state. These ties are further compounded by Putin’s inner circle often owning PMCs, natural resource companies and financial firms active in Africa.

PMC’s financial structure and economic interests

One man is at the centre of Putin’s private interests in Africa: Yuri Prigozhin. Kremlin insider and Wagner Group’s financier, Prigozhin was tasked to exploit African natural resources in exchange for Russian mercenary assistance. With Putin’s backing, the businessman set up contacts all over the continent, negotiating “package” agreements.

Prigozhin owns M Invest, an umbrella company that manages a mix of security and energy firms. Through this umbrella company, he secures natural resource concessions by negotiating “package” agreements in the Kremlin’s name. He then guards the natural resources with PMCs, exploits the resources with specialized energy companies, and distributes the profits amongst African partners, himself and likely the Kremlin. M Invest’s subsidiaries include Lobaye Invest, which extracts gold and diamonds in CAR, Meroe Gold, a gold mining operation in Sudan, and Sewa Security Services, which provides personal security for government officials.

Closely interlinked and with direct ties to the Kremlin, these companies further the interests of bigger Russian multinationals. For example, after a 9 month halt in operations that coincided with the Wagner-backed Tripoli offensive, Gazprom resumed operations in Libya in May 2021. The firm concurrently jumpstarted its pre-planned infrastructure expansion projects to boost gas production. This pattern of interlinked companies is repeated across the African countries where Russia has a significant presence.

Prigozhin is one of many oligarchs that control the system of highly interconnected security, energy and financial firms. Closely connected to these oligarchs, Putin, through his inner circle, stands to personally profit from Russia’s expansion into Africa. This operation is in line with the Russian President’s rule, defined by informal personal network connections and high military corruption.

Summary

In conclusion, Russian PMCs are a tool employed by the Kremlin to expand Russia’s economic, political and geopolitical influence in Africa. The contractors are at the heart of Russian strategy, which trades hard power assistance with natural resource concessions and long-term economic partnerships. Putin’s long-term strategy of gaining preferential market access to emerging African states furthers his Grand Strategy of maintaining Russia’s great power status. However, Putin’s private economic interests in the exploitation of natural resources points to an inability to separate personal gains from state governance. This blurring of the lines may hamper Russia’s long-term strategy on the continent. Nevertheless, in the short term, Russian PMCs are set to continue playing a defining role in Africa’s security sphere due to their efficiency and low operational costs.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: Africa, pmcs, private military contractors, Russia

The Case of the Wagner Group: the problematics of outsourcing war

January 19, 2022 by Cristina Coellen

U.S. Army soldiers wait to board a C-17 Globemaster III aircraft at Joint Base Balad, Iraq, on Nov. 17, 2008. Photo Credit: US Air Force, used under Creative Commons.

After nearly eight years of a continuous European military presence in Mali, the French and German Ministers of Defence suddenly threatened to withdraw their respective troops from the long-standing military missions in support of the Malian efforts in counterterrorism in September 2021. The reason? The government in Bamako had allegedly begun negotiating with the Russian Wagner Group to receive more international support in combatting the various jihadist movements on its soil. French Minister of Defence Florence Parly warned: “If Mali commits to a partnership with mercenaries […] it will lose the support of the international community”. A few months later, reports of Wagner operating side by side with Malian armed forces in counterterrorism operations have been confirmed. Yet what is the Wagner Group, and why is it a threat that, next to more official military activities by Russia, is becoming more and more of a concern to the international community?

The Wagner Group (группа Вагнера in Russian) is a company offering military services independently from Russia’s official armed forces. Wagner’s origins are obscure, and the group continues to present somewhat of a mystery for media and governments alike. The name is said to stem from Dmitri Utkin, an ex-Spetsnaz officer, whose nom de guerre is Wagner, in a nod to the German classical composer Richard Wagner. Another name commonly associated with the group is Evgeny Prigozhin; also nicknamed “Putin’s Chef” for his catering business and his services to the Kremlin, this oligarch is considered as the principal financial source for the group, although he denies any links to Wagner.

The geographic presence of Wagner is continuously expanding and increasingly concerning the international community, as the case of Mali illustrates. According to Wagner’s official website, following missions in Ukraine – likely in support of separatist forces in the Donbass region, although this is not mentioned –, they are active in a wide range of African countries such as Mozambique or Libya, and have additionally become involved in the Syrian civil war. Moscow officially supports Syrian President Assad’s regime, and for instance deploys military planes for air strikes against Syrian rebel positions. However, Wagner forces on the ground seem to have played a greater role than Russian official military involvement might make seem. Present in Syria since 2015, the group were notably involved in the beheading of an alleged deserter of the Syrian army. This underlines one of the major concerns associated with Wagner: the numerous allegations of severe human rights violations committed by members of Wagner in the field in Africa and in the Middle East.

Wagner’s presence in the Central African Republic (CAR) marks an even clearer case in point. On 8 June 2021, the French government announced the suspension of its military cooperation and financial aid for the CAR. France cited the Russian influence and “complicity” from the Central African government in a Russian anti-French campaign as its reasons for the suspension. The CAR, torn apart by continuous conflicts between rebels and government forces, is a country rich in minerals, and has thus sparked international economic interest. A UN peace-keeping mission – the Minusca – has also attempted to bring some stability to this nation. The Russian presence in the country is however not only linked to economic interests, but has become politically significant too, not only in the context of the French withdrawal. The members of Wagner sent to the CAR are described as simple military “instructors” for the Central African armed forces (FACA) by Russia. However, reports and investigations have revealed that they may be far more active than the term “instructor” suggests, and by doing so, they enable Russia to lend military aid without risking an official military campaign and possible interference from the West. In the CAR, Russian mercenaries are accused of human rights violations, reaching from torture to extra-judicial executions. In a stark contrast to this, Wagner and Moscow have chosen to portray the Russian military presence in the country as an act of heroism, cementing the image of Wagner soldiers as saviour-like figures in the propaganda film “Tourist”, produced jointly with the Central African state in 2021.

Russian officials associated with Wagner have maintained silence over both the accusations of human rights violations and the active role Wagner employees seem to play in foreign conflicts. This is very likely due to the fact that, ironically, companies like Wagner are officially banned in Russia. What’s more, a number of Russian investigative journalists working on finding out more about the paramilitaries have died in unclear circumstances. Journalist Maxim Borodin’s sudden and unexplained death after falling from a balcony was considered a suicide by Russian authorities; the three journalists Orkhan Dzhemal, Aleksander Rastorguyev and Kirill Radchenko were killed while investigating the group in the CAR in 2018. Up to this day, it is unclear why and by whom they were murdered. While it has not been formally proven that their research activities directly led to their assassination, it is yet another cause for concern related to Wagner.

The Wagner Group qualifies as what is known as a PMC, meaning a “private military company”. The use of PMCs in comparison to regular armed forces or intelligence services has arguably increased over the last decades; PMCs usually provide a variety of services, ranging from offering security guard services to training military personnel for combat to taking on a more active role in conflicts themselves, although this latter function often takes place in a legally grey area. Wagner is not the only PMC in the world. Indeed, the use of such companies is increasing, especially in the US, where Constellis, which merged several security and military service providers under its name, is the biggest company in this sector. Similar enterprises exist around the world and in particular in countries with long-standing histories of conflict or involvement in international conflicts.

The existence of PMCs highlights a few major problems in modern-day warfare and military organisations: for one, PMCs create a considerable dilemma with regard to international law concerning military conflicts. The Geneva Convention forms the basis of legal regulations in warfare, yet there are a number of difficulties with regards to the regulation of PMCs as private companies operating in the military field. For instance, when contractors belonging to a PMC take on a role more active than merely providing training or passive support to armed forces, their legal status becomes problematic. Military activities for personal profit in a country that is not necessarily one’s own can make a contractor pass to a mercenary status; neither civilian nor soldier, mercenaries have become a global legal problem especially when it comes to prosecution of war crimes or human rights violations – such as is the case with Wagner – as existing legislation either provides loopholes or is insufficient. While the United Nations Mercenary Convention was specifically designed to prohibit the use of mercenaries, it was only ratified by 35 countries. Countries that actively use PMCs such as the US, the UK, Israel or Russia were not among them, allowing their mercenaries to operate freely.

In this context, mercenaries, highly-trained soldiers on hire for anyone who pays them and with few legal restrictions to their activities, can become a threat; the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moise in July 2021 is a primary example. Those responsible for murdering him in his private residence have been identified as a group of mostly Colombian mercenaries and ex-soldiers of the Colombian army. Colombia, a country itself haunted by interior conflict for decades, relies heavily on its armed forces in the fight against drug lords and thus produces a significant number of highly-trained veterans, who then become a popular choice for recruiters of PMCs.

But PMCs also shine light on another problem that is often overlooked in military organisations around the world. As they largely consist of ex-professional soldiers and special forces operators in particular, this suggests that there is an issue when it comes to reconverting and reintegrating ex-military personnel into society. While armed forces around the world offer reconversion courses for those ending their service, the transition from military to civilian society is more difficult than an average change of profession. Issues such as PTSD, injuries resulting in disabilities, isolation from friends and family after long periods of absence due to missions, as well the dichotomy between the clear structures of the military and the individualism of civil existence make adapting to “normal life” for ex-soldiers without adequate support highly difficult. While some resort to behaviours such as addiction or risk turning to crime, for others returning to a form of military service through becoming a so-called “contractor” for a PMC is an attractive alternative, as it allows them to return to an environment where they feel a greater sense of belonging than in civil society. [1] For the PMCs, on the other hand, an experienced veteran with previous military training is just as attractive as the PMC is to that veteran. They do not have to spend money training their new contractor and can rely on the veteran’s past experience instead.

Wagner could thus be qualified as a mere expression of a more global problem. The outsourcing of military conflicts to private companies makes war even more of a business than it already is, and risks complicating the existing problems of legal responsibility, national and economic interests and human rights abuses. Yet we should not forget that Wagner’s case remains particular; as a PMC with very likely links to the Russian government through Prigozhin and with its soldiers accused of severe human rights violations in several zones of conflict, Wagner should be seen as more than just a symptom of the changing landscape of warfare: it is also a military threat from Russia. Under Putin, Russia’s expansionary and threatening stance on the international political and military scene has arguably increased. It could be said that this mentality can be found with Wagner too: on their website, they state, referring to the number of completed operations “И это только начало!”. In translation, the sentence means “And this is only the beginning”.

[1] Verma, Priti “Reintegration of ex-Military Personnel with Civil Life - A social Issue and Big Challenge: An Empirical Study”, International Journal of Engineering and Management Research (June 2020), pp.94-95.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: cristina coellen, PMC, pmcs, private military companies, wagner group

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