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The Case of the Wagner Group: the problematics of outsourcing war

January 19, 2022 by Cristina Coellen

U.S. Army soldiers wait to board a C-17 Globemaster III aircraft at Joint Base Balad, Iraq, on Nov. 17, 2008. Photo Credit: US Air Force, used under Creative Commons.

After nearly eight years of a continuous European military presence in Mali, the French and German Ministers of Defence suddenly threatened to withdraw their respective troops from the long-standing military missions in support of the Malian efforts in counterterrorism in September 2021. The reason? The government in Bamako had allegedly begun negotiating with the Russian Wagner Group to receive more international support in combatting the various jihadist movements on its soil. French Minister of Defence Florence Parly warned: “If Mali commits to a partnership with mercenaries […] it will lose the support of the international community”. A few months later, reports of Wagner operating side by side with Malian armed forces in counterterrorism operations have been confirmed. Yet what is the Wagner Group, and why is it a threat that, next to more official military activities by Russia, is becoming more and more of a concern to the international community?

The Wagner Group (группа Вагнера in Russian) is a company offering military services independently from Russia’s official armed forces. Wagner’s origins are obscure, and the group continues to present somewhat of a mystery for media and governments alike. The name is said to stem from Dmitri Utkin, an ex-Spetsnaz officer, whose nom de guerre is Wagner, in a nod to the German classical composer Richard Wagner. Another name commonly associated with the group is Evgeny Prigozhin; also nicknamed “Putin’s Chef” for his catering business and his services to the Kremlin, this oligarch is considered as the principal financial source for the group, although he denies any links to Wagner.

The geographic presence of Wagner is continuously expanding and increasingly concerning the international community, as the case of Mali illustrates. According to Wagner’s official website, following missions in Ukraine – likely in support of separatist forces in the Donbass region, although this is not mentioned –, they are active in a wide range of African countries such as Mozambique or Libya, and have additionally become involved in the Syrian civil war. Moscow officially supports Syrian President Assad’s regime, and for instance deploys military planes for air strikes against Syrian rebel positions. However, Wagner forces on the ground seem to have played a greater role than Russian official military involvement might make seem. Present in Syria since 2015, the group were notably involved in the beheading of an alleged deserter of the Syrian army. This underlines one of the major concerns associated with Wagner: the numerous allegations of severe human rights violations committed by members of Wagner in the field in Africa and in the Middle East.

Wagner’s presence in the Central African Republic (CAR) marks an even clearer case in point. On 8 June 2021, the French government announced the suspension of its military cooperation and financial aid for the CAR. France cited the Russian influence and “complicity” from the Central African government in a Russian anti-French campaign as its reasons for the suspension. The CAR, torn apart by continuous conflicts between rebels and government forces, is a country rich in minerals, and has thus sparked international economic interest. A UN peace-keeping mission – the Minusca – has also attempted to bring some stability to this nation. The Russian presence in the country is however not only linked to economic interests, but has become politically significant too, not only in the context of the French withdrawal. The members of Wagner sent to the CAR are described as simple military “instructors” for the Central African armed forces (FACA) by Russia. However, reports and investigations have revealed that they may be far more active than the term “instructor” suggests, and by doing so, they enable Russia to lend military aid without risking an official military campaign and possible interference from the West. In the CAR, Russian mercenaries are accused of human rights violations, reaching from torture to extra-judicial executions. In a stark contrast to this, Wagner and Moscow have chosen to portray the Russian military presence in the country as an act of heroism, cementing the image of Wagner soldiers as saviour-like figures in the propaganda film “Tourist”, produced jointly with the Central African state in 2021.

Russian officials associated with Wagner have maintained silence over both the accusations of human rights violations and the active role Wagner employees seem to play in foreign conflicts. This is very likely due to the fact that, ironically, companies like Wagner are officially banned in Russia. What’s more, a number of Russian investigative journalists working on finding out more about the paramilitaries have died in unclear circumstances. Journalist Maxim Borodin’s sudden and unexplained death after falling from a balcony was considered a suicide by Russian authorities; the three journalists Orkhan Dzhemal, Aleksander Rastorguyev and Kirill Radchenko were killed while investigating the group in the CAR in 2018. Up to this day, it is unclear why and by whom they were murdered. While it has not been formally proven that their research activities directly led to their assassination, it is yet another cause for concern related to Wagner.

The Wagner Group qualifies as what is known as a PMC, meaning a “private military company”. The use of PMCs in comparison to regular armed forces or intelligence services has arguably increased over the last decades; PMCs usually provide a variety of services, ranging from offering security guard services to training military personnel for combat to taking on a more active role in conflicts themselves, although this latter function often takes place in a legally grey area. Wagner is not the only PMC in the world. Indeed, the use of such companies is increasing, especially in the US, where Constellis, which merged several security and military service providers under its name, is the biggest company in this sector. Similar enterprises exist around the world and in particular in countries with long-standing histories of conflict or involvement in international conflicts.

The existence of PMCs highlights a few major problems in modern-day warfare and military organisations: for one, PMCs create a considerable dilemma with regard to international law concerning military conflicts. The Geneva Convention forms the basis of legal regulations in warfare, yet there are a number of difficulties with regards to the regulation of PMCs as private companies operating in the military field. For instance, when contractors belonging to a PMC take on a role more active than merely providing training or passive support to armed forces, their legal status becomes problematic. Military activities for personal profit in a country that is not necessarily one’s own can make a contractor pass to a mercenary status; neither civilian nor soldier, mercenaries have become a global legal problem especially when it comes to prosecution of war crimes or human rights violations – such as is the case with Wagner – as existing legislation either provides loopholes or is insufficient. While the United Nations Mercenary Convention was specifically designed to prohibit the use of mercenaries, it was only ratified by 35 countries. Countries that actively use PMCs such as the US, the UK, Israel or Russia were not among them, allowing their mercenaries to operate freely.

In this context, mercenaries, highly-trained soldiers on hire for anyone who pays them and with few legal restrictions to their activities, can become a threat; the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moise in July 2021 is a primary example. Those responsible for murdering him in his private residence have been identified as a group of mostly Colombian mercenaries and ex-soldiers of the Colombian army. Colombia, a country itself haunted by interior conflict for decades, relies heavily on its armed forces in the fight against drug lords and thus produces a significant number of highly-trained veterans, who then become a popular choice for recruiters of PMCs.

But PMCs also shine light on another problem that is often overlooked in military organisations around the world. As they largely consist of ex-professional soldiers and special forces operators in particular, this suggests that there is an issue when it comes to reconverting and reintegrating ex-military personnel into society. While armed forces around the world offer reconversion courses for those ending their service, the transition from military to civilian society is more difficult than an average change of profession. Issues such as PTSD, injuries resulting in disabilities, isolation from friends and family after long periods of absence due to missions, as well the dichotomy between the clear structures of the military and the individualism of civil existence make adapting to “normal life” for ex-soldiers without adequate support highly difficult. While some resort to behaviours such as addiction or risk turning to crime, for others returning to a form of military service through becoming a so-called “contractor” for a PMC is an attractive alternative, as it allows them to return to an environment where they feel a greater sense of belonging than in civil society. [1] For the PMCs, on the other hand, an experienced veteran with previous military training is just as attractive as the PMC is to that veteran. They do not have to spend money training their new contractor and can rely on the veteran’s past experience instead.

Wagner could thus be qualified as a mere expression of a more global problem. The outsourcing of military conflicts to private companies makes war even more of a business than it already is, and risks complicating the existing problems of legal responsibility, national and economic interests and human rights abuses. Yet we should not forget that Wagner’s case remains particular; as a PMC with very likely links to the Russian government through Prigozhin and with its soldiers accused of severe human rights violations in several zones of conflict, Wagner should be seen as more than just a symptom of the changing landscape of warfare: it is also a military threat from Russia. Under Putin, Russia’s expansionary and threatening stance on the international political and military scene has arguably increased. It could be said that this mentality can be found with Wagner too: on their website, they state, referring to the number of completed operations “И это только начало!”. In translation, the sentence means “And this is only the beginning”.

[1] Verma, Priti “Reintegration of ex-Military Personnel with Civil Life – A social Issue and Big Challenge: An Empirical Study”, International Journal of Engineering and Management Research (June 2020), pp.94-95.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: cristina coellen, PMC, pmcs, private military companies, wagner group

PROXY Capabilities – The History and Future of Russian Private Military Companies

April 5, 2016 by Gregory Wilson

This is the second of a series of articles we will be featuring on Strife in the coming week looking at the role of Proxy Warfare in the 21st century by Series Editor Cheng Lai Ki. Previous articles in the series can be found here.

By: Gregory Wilson

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Source: Russia Today

On the eve of the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, it became apparent that Russia was furthering its path towards resurgence. Harshly criticizing Western actions, Russia began a series of interventions, notably in Syria and Ukraine. At home, President Vladimir Putin continues to solidify his rule, dominating elections and polls alike, while Russian nationalism and ultra-nationalism surges. In Europe, Russia has fanned the flames of populist nationalism, heavily supporting right-wing fringe groups in an apparent quest to destabilize Europe’s economic and political unity. Embroiled in a variety of conflicts, it comes as no surprise that Russian private military companies (PMC) have begun to operate not only in Russia, but across the globe. The real question lies in whether or not Russian PMCs will expand in the future, or remain as a sidelined player in Moscow’s arsenal.

In a 2011 address to the State Duma, Putin expressed support for the use of Russian PMCs as a tool for expanding government influence.[1] Despite this admission of support, the legal status of Russian PMCs straddles something of a grey area. Multiple Russian owners of PMCs have addressed these issues in interviews, claiming that Russia inherited their legal system from the Byzantine Empire, thus anything that isn’t explicitly prohibited is allowed.[2] This, however, has not stopped legislators from introducing bills that would fully legalize PMC groups in Russia, particularly of their use for the Russian government. A bill, submitted in 2014 by MP Gennady Nosovko of the Fair Russia party, was recently rejected by the Russian cabinet, citing security and legal issues.[3] While some follow voluntary regulations, PMCs in Russia will remain in the grey zone, neither legal nor prohibited. The future legality of PMCs in Russia is yet still unclear, as the same Nosovko promised future legislation.[4]

Regardless, this legal grey area has not prevented Russian PMCs from advertising their services in Russia and abroad. Overall, the use of PMCs worldwide has been varied. It was not until the 2003 Iraq War that PMCs began to massively grow. On the Russian side, PMCs have largely been confined to operations involving private Russian companies in Africa, the Middle East, and international waterways. The largest of the Russian PMCs, the RSB Group, has a detailed history, boasting operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, the North Caucasus, and Serbia.[5]

The most recent and notable example of Russian PMC operations occurred in Syria, 2013. The PMC group in question was the Slavonic Corps Limited, a Hong Kong registered company led by Director Sergei Kramskoy that primarily employed ex-Russian soldiers.[6] The Slavonic Corps heavily advertised in Russia, coordinated by Vyacheslav Kalashnikov, a lieutenant colonel in the FSB (Russia’s Federal Security Service) reserves who also happens to be the head of another PMC, the Moran Security Group.[7] The origins of this fighting force in Syria is massively convoluted, bearing ties with two separate PMCs and an officer in the FSB. In Moscow, the ex-soldiers were reassured on the legality of the operation, as their new role protecting key assets for the Syria regime was sanctioned by the FSB and the Russian government.[8]

Despite these assurances, the situation on the ground in Syria was far from adequate, with the soldiers severely underequipped and managed by Vadim Gusev, the deputy director of the Moran Security Group.[9] After a number of mishaps and a total of six wounded, the ex-soldiers mutinied and returned after battle with elements of the Syrian rebels.[10] However, once back in Russia, the men were apprehended by FSB, arresting Gusev and an Evgeny Sidorov, both members of the Moran Security Group, on charges of mercenary employment.[11] In the end, the story of the Slavonic Corps is almost unbelievable. A Russian PMC with ties to the FSB hires another Russian PMC to send forces to protect assets in Syria, who in turn are arrested upon return in Syria. With all parties denying or refusing to comment, the situation may never truly become clear. Regardless, these events must be seen as an example of the grey legality of Russian PMCs and the absolute mess that results.

With this turbulent history of Russian PMCs, it is now imperative that we look to the future of these organizations. Today, our understanding of what may come lies within the modern Russian-Ukrainian Conflict. Despite their initial denial, the Russian government had deployed unmarked Russian soldiers, not PMCs as far as it is known, in operations seizing the Crimean Peninsula and supporting Ukrainian separatists, sparking a massive outcry and souring relations with the West.[12] While this narrative may be well known, another element is critical in understanding the future of Russian PMCs. The ‘Night Wolves’ are Russia largest biker gang and the rabid supporters and exporters of Russian ultra-nationalism. In 2014, it was confirmed that the biker gang participated in the seizure of Crimea, assaulting a Ukrainian naval base and gas facility on the Black Sea, and has now created local chapters in Eastern Ukraine supporting the separatists there.[13] The most significant aspect of the Night Wolves is their relationship to President Putin. Alexander Zaldostanov, leader of the Night Wolves, has strong personal ties with Putin, who happens to be an honorary member and has provided over $1 million in grants to the gang.[14]

How exactly do the Night Wolves relate to the future of PMCs? Ultimately, the Night Wolves serves as a greater advantage to Putin and the Russian government than PMCs ever could. Officially, it is difficult to establish a direct tie between the government and the biker gang. With this plausible deniability at hand, the Kremlin has the assurance that the Night Wolves will continue their ideological operations in ways deemed acceptable or crucial to the overarching policies of the government. Furthermore, groups like the Night Wolves can operate offensively whereas official PMCs cannot, otherwise they are branded as mercenaries, something explicitly outlawed in Russian and the international community. In other cases where ideological militias or paramilitary elements cannot reach, Russian troops, whether or not they are marked as so, are more than appropriate. Thus, Russian PMCs are likely to remain on the backburner, unutilized by Putin and the Kremlin, remaining stagnant in their role as private security guards.

 

Gregory Wilson is a MA Candidate in Intelligence and International Security at King’s College London, specializing in the field of Russian/Soviet intelligence and regional security.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18671/

[2] http://www.france24.com/en/20150728-video-russia-pmc-private-military-companies-mercenaries-slavonic-corps-ukraine-syria

[3] https://www.rt.com/politics/316276-government-rejects-bill-to-introduce/

[4] Ibid

[5] http://rsb-group.org/about

[6] http://www.interpretermag.com/st-petersburg-sends-contractors-to-syria/

[7] http://www.interpretermag.com/the-last-battle-of-the-slavonic-corps/

[8] Ibid

[9] Ibid

[10] Ibid

[11] Ibid

[12] https://news.vice.com/article/the-surgeon-we-spoke-with-the-leader-of-putins-favorite-biker-club-the-night-wolves

[13] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/29/russian-biker-gang-in-ukraine-night-wolves-putin

[14] http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/15/night-wolves-biker-gang-a-key-element-in-vladimir-/?page=all

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: PMC, Russia, Syria, Ukraine

The role of strategic outsourcing in preventing the spread of ISIL

November 26, 2015 by Cheng Lai Ki

By: Cheng Lai Ki

British_PMC_with_G36K_and_ANA_soldier.jpg
Source: Wikimedia

Over the last eleven months, Sunni-jihadi extremists known as the the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or Islamic State and the Levant (ISIS/ISIL) have been directly involved in multiple crises resulting in the deaths and displacement of civilians in Syria[1], and more recently, in Paris. For ISIL, the battlefield is not constrained to one country but is the world, visible from the bomb placed on the Russian plane and the Paris attacks (i.e. Charlie Hebdo). Their use of unconventional warfare strategies[2] and association to unconventional resource avenues makes their pacification extremely difficult and time consuming for international intelligence and security agencies.

The aim of this article is to briefly demonstrate how a strategic private-government relationship with private military and security companies (PMSCs) can benefit existing operations against extremism and does not aim to criticize existing governmental efforts. PMSCs provide multiple benefits for governments either through force multiplication and contributing valuable skills or networks. To reveal how strategic privatisation of security services (SPSS) can assist operations against ISIL on domestic and foreign fronts, this article will briefly illuminate the benefits of PMSCs in contemporary intelligence and security operations, followed by contextualising operational contributions against various areas of security, intelligence and infrastructure support.

Benefits of PMSCs in contemporary security operations

Since the end of the Cold War, intelligence and security has evolved alongside the development of new communication and information technologies. The rise of the internet, secure packet sharing and the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are hallmarks of how security and intelligence sectors have entered the information era. PMSCs provide a broad range of services, ranging from operational manpower, training, logistical support and analytical assistance. The Research Institute for European and American Studies[3] revealed that 70% of the Untied States (US) intelligence budget authorised by Congress is spend on PMSC contractors. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) allegedly conducted rendition operations and clandestine raids with the assistance of Academi (formerly known as Blackwater) contractors to provide operational manpower between 2004 to 2006 during the height of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq[4]. Another example is the close relationship Military Professionals Resources Incorporated (MPRI), who possess extensive history in training support, and the US military. The utilisation of contractors are also exhibited in the United Kingdom, where British PMSC Minimal Risk was procured to provide security manage and intelligence analysts for operations in the Middle East[5].

Within the contemporary domain PMSCs are becoming increasingly involved in governmental security and intelligence operations. However, unlike governments, PMSCs are not necessarily constrained by political boundaries to assist in security and developmental operations in post-conflict domains. With strategic integration, PMSCs could be highly beneficial towards re-establishing security and critical infrastructures. This is arguably visible from the application of approved private vendors by the United Nations (UN) for humanitarian and security operations[6]. The extensive use of PMSCs by Western governments have made states more effective in developing security, assessing intelligence and developing infrastructures. The follow sections examine how PMSC effectiveness can be translated to operations against ISIL on foreign and domestic domains in security, intelligence and infrastructure.

Translating effectiveness into operations 

When engaging the problem of ISIL, governmental operations have focused on training rebel forces in Syria, directly engaging ISIL forces in the battlefield, developing intelligence for follow-on missions, and strengthening domestic security and warning procedures. When tackling ISIL, privatization can assist governments in three foundational domains of security, intelligence and infrastructure support within counter-extremism operations.

Addressing security domains within counter-extremism, PMSCs can provide effective manpower support and operational training in foreign and domestic theatres. Within domestic theatres, PMSCs can provide additional and improved static security support of private and public locations. In addition, PMSCs can also provide valuable training to local police and security agencies to respond to various threats.

Like other extremist organisations, ISIL possesses operational characteristics that have come under analysis by governmental agencies, academics and private entities. PMSC staff are often ex-governmental employees with extensive academic or practical experiences in various security domains. Domestically, the knowledge of PMSCs can provide valuable training and manpower support, as is with the MPRI-US relationship. In foreign domains, PMSCs can also provide manpower support through directly participating in hostilities. A South-African PMSC, Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Training (STTEP), a reminiscent of a former PSMC, Executive Outcomes (EO), has been successful in combating Islamic extremism in Africa through directly engaging hostile forces[7].

Some critics might argue against the incorporation of contractors into security infrastructures based on grounds of unaccountability and legitimacy. However, as corporate entities, PMSCs rely on providing effective and quality support to secure future bids. In addition, although not necessarily legal institutions, the Montreux Document and International Code of Conduct are two guidelines outlining the legal and practice recommendations to PMSCs[8]. Contrary to popular belief, PMSCs do not operate in a legal vacuum but are also privy to being indicted under international humanitarian law. In addition, weaker or post-conflict states might possess operational and security capability gaps in comparison to their stronger counterparts (i.e. US) that can be supplemented by PMSC services.

Efficient security

Efficient security relies on effective “intelligence” provision. The privatisation of western intelligence communities (IC) arguably started from the end of the Cold War and the dawn of the globalised information era, giving rise to multiple new international threats. Rathmell argues that intelligence privatisation benefits ICs in three main areas of collection, analysis and costs.[9] Since Rathmell wrote in the late 90s, technology has advanced, the world has seen the rise of surveillance drones with strike capabilities, the monitoring of fibre optical traffic by national agencies and the outsourcing of intelligence analysis to private firms (i.e. Control Risks).

The outsourcing of core intelligence functions can facilitate agencies to focus on high value targets and more immanent threats against national security. In addition to privatising various analytical components, intelligence organisations have also procured PMSCs for manpower purposes – previously indicated from the CIA procurement of Academi for rendition operations. With regards to ISIL, privatisation not only can provide governmental agencies support from other experienced intelligence analysts, usually employed by PMSCs after leaving governmental service, but such privatisation can also incorporate skills and networks that analysts would have obtained from working on other intelligence operations in other geographical or target domains.

This can be done while still acknowledging the risks and difficulties instigated by the politicisation of intelligence, alongside the “consumer-producer” dilemma[10] within ICs. However, the argument could be made that the plausible deniability of PMSC services could not only repair the once secret nature of ICs (arguably lost since the dawn of the information age and intelligence crises such as WikiLeaks and the actions of Edward Snowden), but also benefit intelligence operations in politically and legally conflicted areas.

When security and intelligence domains are reinforced, PMSCs can provide effective logistical assistance for “infrastructure support.” As a private entity, PMSCs can also be contracted by other PMSCs or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that are not providing security or intelligence but logistical support. Again, the benefits are similar to being employed by governments in the provision of direct security and consultation services.

A tripartite relationship between governmental agencies, NGOs and PMSCs would highly benefit existing operations against ISIL. For instance, domestically, NGOs can provide logistical support to hospitals or community outreach programs can benefit from governmental subsidisation and also the consultation knowledge from PMSC analysts. When engaging extremist organisations, community cohesion is just as vital as intelligence and direct action as outlined by the counter-terrorism, or CONTEST, strategy in the UK. On foreign soil, NGOs, charity organisation and the UN have been known to cooperate with select PMSCs to provide risk consultation, security and intelligence for operations in post-conflict regions with unstable civil infrastructures or governments[11].

Through cooperative efforts with the ICoC Association, NGOs, PMSCs and Governmental Agencies alongside some strategic planning and cooperation, states can quickly re-establish control over regions affect by ISIL attacks by providing secure healthcare and refugee support. The integration of PMSCs in developmental infrastructures would both improve ties between nations – though on a corporate level – but also potentially improve the quality of infrastructure management, training and operation for future expansion. It must be emphasized that his component of PMSC support focuses more on infrastructure redevelopment to prevent follow-on attacks by ISIL in the future.

Moving forward

The supplementary roles of PMSCs in the three domains of security, intelligence and infrastructure support within counter-extremism operations have been briefly illuminated above. ISIL in particular, like other extremist organisations, rely on underground networks and sympathetic communities to operate beyond borders. When confronting ISIL, international authorities need to establish effective communicative, warning and investigative channels. PMSCs, being private companies, are not necessarily bound by as many political ‘red-tape’ as some organisations when providing security and intelligence services. The corporate ties and networks between companies would inadvertently benefit the governments procuring their services. However, there are grey areas of legitimacy, accountability and power distribution when assigning privatised firms too much authority and jurisdiction over inherently governmental operations.

In conclusion, security and intelligence provisions of PMSCs can inform better governmental decisions alongside assisting in logistical support capabilities to re-establish control and provide care for those affected. To prevent further spread of ISIL, the world needs to unite through application of hard and soft power strategies in public and private domains.

Formerly an Officer in the Singapore Armed Forces, Cheng holds a Bachelor’s Honors degree in Criminology. He is currently undertaking his MA in Intelligence and International Security at King’s where his academic interests revolve around private military and security companies and their roles as security by proxy in the contemporary security theatre, and more broadly in international security and intelligence sectors. Cheng is currently a Series Editor with Strife.

Notes:

[1] Global Overview 2015: People internally displaced by conflict and violence, International Displacement Monitoring Centre: Norweigian Refugee Council, (6th May, 2015), Accessed November 16th, 2015, http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Media/201505-Global-Overview-2015/201505-Global-Overview-Highlights-document-en.pdf

[2] Counter-Unconventional Warfare, White Paper, United States Army Special Operations Command, (28th September 2014), Accessed November 16th, 2015, https://info.publicintelligence.net/USASOC-CounterUnconventionalWarfare.pdf

[3] Liaropoulos, A. & Konstantopoulos, I. ‘Privatization of Intelligence: Turning National Security into Business?’, RIEAS Research Institute for European and American Studies, Accessed November 14, 2015; http://rieas.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1319:privatization-of-intelligence-turning-national-security-into-business-&catid=14:transatlantic-studies&Itemid=89

[4] Mazzetti M. & Risen, J. ‘Blackwater Guards Tied to CIA Raids”, The New York Times, (December 10, 2009), Accessed January 12, 2015; http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/us/politics/11blackwater.html?r=1&_r=0

[5] 2012 FCO spend on hiring private military and security companies’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Freedom of Information Release, Accessed December 15, 2015; https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/foi-ref-0293-12.

[6] Cheng, L.K., Private Contractors, Governments and Security by Proxy: An analysis of contemporary challenges, governmental developments and international impacts of private military and security companies (2015), BA Dissertation, University of Leicester.

[7] Freeman, C. “How to defeat a Caliphate: Private military contractors have a bad name, but a great record against the Islamist insurgency in Nigeria”, The Spectator, (May 30th, 2015), Accessed November 18, 2015; http://new.spectator.co.uk/2015/05/mercenaries-could-transform-the-fight-against-isis-if-we-let-them/

[8] Cheng, Private Contractors, (2012).

[9] Rathmell, A. “Privatising Intelligence”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 11:2, (1998), 199-211, DOI: 10.1080/09557579808400199

[10] Herman, M, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, Cambridge: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

[11] “List of UN Secretariat Registered Vendors: Level 1 and 2”, United Nations, (March 23, 2015), Accessed April 2, 2015; https://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/un-secretariat-registered-vendors

 

 

 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: ISIL, ISIS, PMC, PMSC

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