Philip Mayne

The United States, Saudi Arabia and Yemen: Same Crisis, Different Administrations

March 22, 2021 by Philip Mayne

By Philip Mayne

The outcome of the civil war in Yemen matters to the United States. Geographically, the country sits on the Maghreb Straits, a major trade route. Instability within the region has economic implications for the United States. The outcome of the conflict affects other key interests of the US, such as influence within the region and the containment of Iran.

The United States has been, and continues to be, concerned with an increase in Iranian influence and power within the region. The US and Iran have had a tense relationship for decades. In 2015, tensions were lifted slightly following a nuclear deal between the US and Iran, however President Trump abandoned this deal in 2018 and reinstated sanctions. Relations worsened following the assassination of General Soleimi in 2020 and Iran has vowed that it will seek revenge. The US sees Iran as potentially destabilising the region, which could affect US trade. US policy in Yemen has been guided by its wider interest of containing Iran.

In 2015, Saudi Arabia launched an intervention into Yemen to restore the Government. Since then, Saudi Arabia has been at the heart of US policy towards Yemen. Saudi Arabia provides an important Middle Eastern ally to the United States, as both seek to contain the influence of Iran within the region. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been in competition for dominance within the region for decades. Aggravated by religious tensions, the Saudi Arabia and Iran relationship can be perceived as a regional Cold War. The Yemen crisis can be perceived as part of the wider Iran-Saudi Proxy war. Saudi Arabia has backed the Yemeni government and Iran has supported the Houthi rebels, also known as Ansar Allah. Therefore, US-Yemen policy has revolved around one of its key Middle Eastern allies, Saudi Arabia.

What has US-Yemen Policy Looked like?

In 2015 the Obama administration, which had a tense and difficult relationship with Saudi Arabia, supported its intervention in Yemen. At the heart of this support has been trade. In 2010, Obama authorised a significant trade deal with the country. By the time he left office $115 billion worth of arms had been sold to Saudi Arabia.

The trade with Saudi Arabia increased under the Trump Administration. A major arms trade deal was secured with the Saudis in 2018, worth up to $380 billion across 10 years. By 2019, guided missiles and bombs made up the majority of the Saudi purchases. US officials have insisted that selling American weapons, such as precision air-to-ground Paveway Missiles, to the Saudis would help to avoid civilian casualties. However, the World Peace Foundation reported that Saudi Arabia has been deliberately targeting civilians with these ‘smart’ weapons. According to Security Assistance Monitor, continued weapons sales from the US has “enabled the Saudi regime to wage a brutal and indiscriminate bombing campaign in Yemen”. Infrastructure, such as fishing and farming, has also been targeted by the Saudis in an effort to starve the population into compliance.

Following reports of war crimes early in the war, the decision to continue to trade with Saudi Arabia, essentially enabling the Saudis to fight in Yemen, has become a controversial issue. The United Nations, in September 2019, urged all states to refrain from “providing arms that could be used in the conflict”. Despite this, Trump continued to sell arms to Saudi Arabia.

In 2019, Trump vetoed a resolution, which would have forced an end to US support of the War, on the grounds that the US must show commitment to its allies. He continued to make the weapons trade deals and integral part of US foreign policy, to counter Iran, boost US jobs and the US economy. Trump’s foreign policy ultimately elevated economics over other concerns. Trump’s reluctance to cut ties, or halt the arms trade with Saudi Arabia, has been perceived as giving the country the ‘green light’ for more atrocities, and the US has been criticised for looking the other way as one of its staunch allies has committed war crimes; such as the deliberate bombing of civilians. According to Human Rights Watch, the Saudi-led coalition have bombed hospitals, markets, mosques, detention centres, school buses and fishermen.

Biden’s Policy

The Biden administration has set out to transform US foreign policy. Biden has set out to rebuild US relations and rebuild “moral leadership”. Last week, the new administration has announced changes to its policy on the war in Yemen, and its relationship with Saudi Arabia. On 4 February 2021, Biden made his first speech on US foreign policy. Within the statement he said that he will be stepping up diplomacy efforts, to bring a ceasefire, open humanitarian channels and begin peace talks. Biden reiterated that the US would continue to support Saudi Arabia to defend its territory and sovereignty. But, importantly he said “to underscore our commitment, we are ending all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arms sales”.

The following day, Biden announced that his administration would revoke the terrorist designation of the Houthis. During his last few weeks in office, Trump designated the Houthis a terrorist organisation, in a move to “further malign activity by the Iranian regime”. However, the move was met with widespread condemnation. The move was opposed because designating the group as a terrorist organisation makes it harder to broker a resolution. The Financial Times expected that the designation would likely push the Houthi movement closer to Tehran, hardening the stances of both sides. Trump’s decision was met with condemnation by the UN, who argued that this would worsen the already dire humanitarian crisis. Since the start of the War, it is expected that more than 230,000 Yemenis have died due to war, mostly due to a lack of food, health services and infrastructure. The UN shared its concerns that the situation would worsen, as links to food and medical supplies could be interrupted. David Beasley, the Executive Director of the World Food Programme, warned that the designation could “be a death sentence to hundreds and thousands if not millions”.

The state department has said that Biden’s announcement does not mean that the US supports the Houthis, and nor does it support the conduct of the Houthis; who have used child soldiers and committed war crimes as well. Instead, it has been decided based on the humanitarian affects that the designation may have had. The UN has welcomed the change in policy calling it a “positive development” towards negotiations.

How important is this transition in policy?

Biden’s policy is a significant change from the last two administrations. He is reversing the policies of the Obama administration and he is trying to distance Washington from Riyadh, overturning the direction of Trump’s foreign policy. No longer will the US position be solely on supporting Saudi Arabia to keep Iran in check, instead it is to focus on human rights abuses on both sides of the war.

However, this policy change has come early in his administration and the effects are not yet clear. The freezing of the flow of US arms to Saudi will put the country under pressure. However, there are no immediate details on what the freeze means. It is not clear what “relevant” arms sales are. William Hartung, the director of the arms and security programme at the Centre for International Policy, said “To be effective, the new policy should stop all arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both proposed and in the pipeline, including maintenance and logistical support”. Therefore, if Biden does want to put pressure on Saudis to come to the negotiating table, the “relevant” arms sales freezes must be significant and wide ranging.

However, the US decision to freeze arms not only puts Saudi Arabia under pressure, but it also ramps up the pressure for other countries, such as Canada, France, Italy, Spain and the UK, selling arms and providing technical support to Saudi Arabia. The UK may be reluctant to do this, as the UK has a trade deal, which includes Typhoons and missiles, worth up to £5.4 billion.

However, if the UK and other allies continue to supply the Saudis, they appear to be out of line with the US. Even more so, due to Biden’s emphasis on the humanitarian issues of the war. Time will tell the impact of Biden’s change in policy.

However, early into his administration Biden has not hesitated to show his commitment to ending the war. In early February, he announced Timothy Lenderking as the US special envoy to Yemen, to open up diplomatic channels. On 7 February, Lenderking was sent to Iran to try to broker a cease-fire between then Yemeni government and the Houthi rebels. On 22 February, Lenderking began another humanitarian trip to several countries in the Gulf with the intention of bringing about a lasting political solution, and humanitarian relief to the people of Yemen.

The Biden Administration has taken a different approach to the Yemen crisis. The President appears to be committed to bringing peace to the country. Although the change in policy is welcome, it is premature to celebrate. It will take a continued commitment to stopping the war and applying pressure to its allies. There is still a long and uncertain road ahead for the people of Yemen, who have already suffered years of war, crisis, and hunger.

Philip Mayne is a final year PhD candidate at the University of Hull. He has a special interest in strategy, counterinsurgency, military ethics, military history, international security and relations. His thesis examines the relationship between military ethics and military effectiveness. Specifically, his work focuses on adherence to the Just War Tradition, and success in counterinsurgencies; through analysing the case studies of the Malayan Emergency, the Kenyan Emergency, the Algerian War and the Vietnam War. Philip has contributed to the Huffington Post and is an active member of the Hull University War Studies Research Group. Find him on Twitter @phil_mayne.

Feature - Tigray: A Potential Humanitarian Crisis

November 19, 2020 by Philip Mayne

Militia from the Amhara border region with Tigray rides out to face the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Ethiopia, 9 November 2020 (Image credit: Reuters/Tiksa Negeri)

In 2018 the newly appointed Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed formally brought an end to the Ethiopia-Eritrean War. The armed conflict, fought between 1998 and 2000 following the invasion of Badme by Eritrean forces, killed around 80,000 people and resulted in nearly two decades of tension between the two countries. It was in 2019 that PM Abiy was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for bringing peace to Ethiopia. Less than a year later, in October 2020, Ethiopia faces a civil war between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Abiy’s government. Following a reported attack from Tigray regional forces, Abiy ordered a military offensive in the Tigray region on 4 November 2020. The conflict is quickly becoming a major security concern for the country and its neighbours in the Horn of Africa. As the violence increases, there are increasing signs of a potential humanitarian crisis and instability in the region. Hundreds have already been killed, both sides are claiming war crimes, and thousands of refugees are fleeing the country.

The source of the conflict

The TPLF dominated Ethiopian politics between 1991 and 2019 as part of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF was made up of four parties each one representing each ethnic group in the country. Although all four parties were intended to have equal representation, the EPRDF was dominated by the TPLF, resulting in ethnic-based inequality and tensions. Following protests for reform, in 2019 Prime Minister Abiy merged former member parties of the EPRDF, and other ethnic parties that had been overlooked by the EPRDF, into the Prosperity Party (PP) in an attempt to have fairer representation in central government. However, the TPLF opposed the merger because they would lose their disproportionate influence, as Tigrayans only constitute six per cent of the population. The TPLF made a statement, claiming that the merging of the parties would be akin to bringing together “fire and hay”, and called for the public to oppose the reforms. Rising opposition to the government led to an increase in tensions between the TPLF and Abiy Ahmed.

In August 2020, landmark elections were meant to be held in Ethiopia; this was to be the Prosperity Party’s first electoral campaign. However, in March 2020 it was declared that all national and regional elections were to be postponed due to the coronavirus outbreak. Opposition groups questioned the decision, claiming that the prime minister was deliberately refusing to hold the elections. Tigray took the unilateral decision to hold regional elections in defiance of the governments’ demands on 8 September 2020. The Prime minister declared the election as illegal and compared them to the construction of shanties by ‘illegal dwellers.’ In October, the federal government began to withhold funds for social welfare programs in retaliation to the ‘illegal’ elections in Tigray.

By November tensions between the government and the Tigray region had reached boiling point, and on 4 November Abiy ordered the military to enter the Tigray region, reportedly in response to an attack on government forces by the TPLF. Abiy warned Tigray’s leaders that there is no place for ‘criminal elements’ in Ethiopia, adding that they would ‘extract these criminal elements [from Tigray and] relaunch our country on a path to sustainable prosperity for all.’ The TPLF, however, see the use of troops as punishment for the September vote, and an act of aggression. Debretsion Gebremichael, President of the Tigray region, said: ‘what has been initiated against us is clearly a war, an invasion … this is a war we’re conducting to preserve our existence.’

The government declared a six-month state of emergency across the Tigray region on 5 November. The declaration grants the government the power to suspend political and democratic rights. It also allows for the government to impose curfews, searches without warrants, communications and transportation restrictions and the detention of any person or suspect that is taking part in illegal activities. Under these regulations, Prime Minister Abiy had cut all communication and transport links to the Tigray region.

A humanitarian disaster?

At the time of writing, Ethiopia appears to be on the brink of a potentially long and bloody civil war. The fighting is already believed to have claimed the lives of hundreds of people and fighting has spread across the region. Even with the government cutting off all media and communication with the Tigray region, there have already been reports of atrocities across the region. Amnesty International reported that a massacre occurred in Tigray on 9 November possibly killing hundreds. Amnesty International has been unable to establish who is responsible for the hacking to death of civilians on 9 November. However, witnesses claim that both have been killing civilians. If the situation worsens, there are concerns that this will result in a major humanitarian crisis. The UN has warned that “if the Tigray national (and) regional forces and Ethiopian Government forces continue down the path they are on, there is a risk this situation will spiral totally out of control”.

Not only are civilians at risk of being killed by violence, but because government forces have closed the roads to Tigray, aid agencies are struggling to reach the most vulnerable; prior to the conflict there were already 96,000 Eritrean refugees living in Tigray and 100,000 internally displaced people. Currently, the UN provides food for 600,000 people in Tigray and there have already been shortages of basic commodities such as flour. There have also been cuts to essential services such as electricity and water. If the conflict continues, the humanitarian situation in Ethiopia will continue to worsen.

In less than two weeks, the fighting in Tigray has resulted in at least 21,000 refugees fleeing the violence into Sudan. One border point, which can typically accommodate 300 refugees, is currently overwhelmed with 6,000 people. If the conflict continues, it is expected that potentially hundreds of thousands of people may flee the violence.

Prospects for de-escalation/improvement

At present, the future for Ethiopia looks bleak. The country is on the cusp of a major humanitarian crisis, akin to the suffering endured during Ethiopia’s civil war of the 1980s. The flow of refugees is putting pressure on to neighbouring countries, and the conflict seems to be worsening. On 13 November reports of troops firing into the Amhara region, an area that backs the Abiy government raises fears that the conflict could spread across more regions of the country. Today, some reports also claim that Tigrayan forces have fired into Eritrea, with the TPLF forces suggesting that Eritrean forces are supporting the Ethiopian government. Relations between the TPLF leaders and Isaias Afwerki, the ruler of Eritrea, have been poor for decades. Eritrean conscription, a call-up of retired Eritrean senior officers, and troop movements towards to border have recently worsened tensions between the TPLF and its northern neighbour. If the violence in Ethiopia cannot be abated, then the conflict has the potential to spill further into Eritrea, and potentially into powers across the Horn of Africa.

However, there are efforts that can help alleviate the humanitarian crisis. One of the main issues concerns the ability of aid to reach the most vulnerable. Every day without aid the thousands of vulnerable people in the region become more vulnerable as access to necessities is becoming increasingly harder. The UN is negotiating with both sides for humanitarian corridors to be opened, but as of yet, they are still unable to enter the region. The government must open the Tigray region to aid agencies to begin alleviating the suffering of the Ethiopian people. One of the major concerns for the UN is food insecurity in the region. Currently, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council says that it has enough resources to meet the needs of 300,000 people until January 2021, half of those that needed it before the conflict, and the Joint Emergency Operation Plan NGO says that it needs to restock in December 2020 to ensure it can continue to assist the population. Without a resupply of food, there are fears that hundreds of thousands of people will be left without access to food. The UN reports show a similar situation for medicine and emergency supplies.

The most pressing priority is bringing about a cessation of hostilities to stop the violence before the conflict escalates into a protracted civil war that could further destabilise the region. Analysts have argued that it is not too late to stop the war from spiralling out of control. Pressure must be applied to get both parties to agree to a ceasefire. The United Nations Secretary-General has called for “all stakeholders to take urgent steps to calm tensions in the country and to resolve challenges through an inclusive and peaceful dialogue”. But if more pressure is applied from parties within Ethiopia, its neighbours in the Horn of Africa, the African Union and abroad, then perhaps the parties may be brought to the negotiating table and to agree on a potential ceasefire. By stopping the fighting, opening the Tigray region, a humanitarian disaster could be averted.

The best-case scenario for Ethiopia would be for both the TPLF and the Abiy Government to agree to a ceasefire, both communication and transport links would be opened in Tigray allowing for aid to reach those who need it. The worst-case would be the escalation of violence, resulting in a catastrophic humanitarian disaster, the deaths of thousands of Ethiopians and potentially destabilise the region. The current circumstances indicate the worst-case scenario is more likely to become the reality, as Prime Minister Abiy said on 17 November that the chance for a ceasefire has expired, and the TPLF have reiterated that they will not back down. Therefore, there must be more international pressure on both parties to change their position and come to the negotiating table.

Yemen: A Failure of Human Security

July 22, 2020 by Philip Mayne

The enduring conflict in Yemen has driven many into refugee camps (Image credit: UNICEF/Alessio Romenzi)

Since its reunification in 1990, Yemen has been ravaged by economic failure and internal conflict. In 2015, a civil war erupted between the government and the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia Muslim minority. In 2018, when the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) began fighting the government for control of the southern city of Aden, the STC announced self-rule on 26 April 2020 for the areas under its control. At the time of writing the Yemeni government continues to be embroiled in a civil war against the Houthis in the North, the STC in the South, and other rebel groups elsewhere in the country. Yemen is witnessing some of the worst human security failings in recent years.

What is Human Security?

Following the end of the Cold War, intrastate conflicts became prominent across the globe. Traditional international relations theories, blinkered at the state level of analysis, failed to examine these sub-state conflicts. Human security was introduced in 1994 with the publication of the United Nations Development (UNDP) report. Human security makes the individual the referent object of security. Human security focuses on establishing ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ for every individual. However, threats to human security remain numerous. The 1994 report lists seven main categories of threat, including food security, health security and personal security. Yemen is one example of a state failing to meet human security in these aspects.

Food (In)security

As a result of the conflict, poverty is rife within Yemen. Almost half of the population is living on less than US$3.10 a day, and over five million people live on less than $1.90 a day. Even more people are at risk of falling into poverty. Without income, buying necessities becomes almost impossible. The economic situation in Yemen, in terms of wages, employment, and the Yemeni currency itself, is worsening, yet food prices continue rising.

However, there is more to food security than the ability to buy food. Food security is also the ability to always have physical, social, and economic access to safe and nutrient-rich food. In Yemen, even for those who can afford it, access to food and water is minimal at best. Much of the basic infrastructure has been decimated by the war. It is estimated that 3.5 million people have lost access to piped water, due to conflict. Access to food is also limited.

Yemen is heavily dependent on imports to satisfy domestic consumption. Yet successive governments failed to establish an effective infrastructure to allow the feeding of the nation. Moreover, the conflict has restricted the ability to access this imported food. At least 5.1 million people in seventy-five districts have been cut off from access to imports and humanitarian assistance due to restrictions imposed by authorities during the conflict. The situation has worsened due to the COVID-19 pandemic; as supply routes were closed due to international lockdowns, thereby slowing down trade. In addition to Yemen’s woes, a locust swarm sweeping over the country has begun to affect agricultural production. The results of food insecurity in the country could be devastating.

The multifaceted issues that have caused food insecurity in Yemen have resulted in a situation that is beyond dire. Yemen now faces the worst food security crisis in decades. Over twenty million Yemenis are food insecure, and ten million are at the brink of famine and starvation. 65,000 people are already in the advanced stages of hunger and extreme food deprivation. Over two million children, under the age of five, are also suffering from chronic malnutrition. In 2019, it was reported that extreme hunger and disease had directly killed up to 85,000 children. It is clear that Yemen is clearly failing in terms of food security, and keeping the people of Yemen fed poses one of the greatest international challenges on the world stage.

Health (In)security

In addition to inadequate economic and food insecurity, Yemen faces a severe health crisis. Health facilities have been depleted due to the conflict, as shelling and airstrikes have damaged hospitals, healthcare workers have been assaulted and medical facilities have been occupied. The lack of access to clean water and sanitation resulted in a major cholera outbreak in 2016. Since 2018, there have been nearly one million suspected cholera cases. As it stands, cholera, dengue, malaria, and poor sanitation are still prevalent, and the health services are already overstretched.

Unfortunately, COVID-19 has exacerbated Yemen’s struggles. As of 14 July, the number of cases in Yemen is 1502, with 425 deaths. This figure, is likely lower than the reality, as they are from government reports, and insurgent groups have been accused of concealing the outbreak. Nonetheless, the virus is rapidly spreading in Yemen; and the fatality rate is four times the global average.

The focus on COVID-19 has resulted in other services being reduced, resulting in other negative implications for health security. Yemen currently has a maternal mortality rate that is 47 times that of the UK. However, The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has been forced to suspend reproductive health care in 140 out of 180 health facilities. Only 40 facilities now provide these facilities across the entire country. This reduction in funding risks the lives of 2 million women and girls of childbearing age. The UNFPA states “Some 320,000 pregnant women will be cut off from lifesaving reproductive health services, while 48,000 women could die from complications of pregnancy and childbirth”. Prior to COVID-19, Yemen failed to provide sufficient health services and provide care for the population. In the current crisis, the future looks even bleaker.

Personal (In)security

In the last five years, over 112,000 people have died as a direct result of the conflict in Yemen. 25,000 of these casualties were in 2019 alone. In February of this year the Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), confirmed that since March 2015, 7,734 civilians have been killed directly because of the war, including 2,103 children. In the first quarter of 2020, 270 civilians were killed as a result of the conflict.

Intrastate conflicts often include high levels of civilian casualties as local populations get caught up in the conflict. However, in Yemen, there is evidence that points to the deliberate targeting of civilians. In June 2020, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reported that between January and December 2019, there were thirty-five targeted attacks against schools and hospitals. These attacks were carried out by all sides of the conflict. One report states that in 2019, the conflict was responsible for killing one child younger than 5 every twelve minutes. It is clear that personal security is not being met in Yemen, with indiscriminate force being used by the Saudi-led coalition, and indiscriminate weapons, such as banned mines, by rebels.

Indirectly, the conflict has created another personal security issue, as the number of displaced people in the country stands at over 3.6 million. Displaced people are at higher risk of exploitation, harassment, and violence. Women and girls, who make up half of all displaced people, are particularly at risk. Some girls have been forced into child marriages, and other women have been subjected to domestic abuse, yet there has been a reluctance to report such crimes.

In addition to women, displaced children are at risk of threats to their personal security. Currently, it is estimated that there are two million displaced children in Yemen; many without their families. These children are especially vulnerable to physical and sexual abuse, exploitation, and recruitment into armed groups. Again, as with other human security issues, personal security is far from being realised in Yemen.

What Solution?

Efforts by the United Nations and several international NGOs have alleviated some of the suffering through providing humanitarian aid and assistance in Yemen. But with the combination of continued conflict and a global pandemic, the outlook for Yemen continues to be a human security disaster, unless one of these issues can be alleviated.

Conflict has been central to the human security crisis in Yemen. If there is any chance of alleviating the suffering in Yemen, then the first and most important step is to bring an end to the on-going conflict. After five years of conflict and with no end in sight, outright military victory seems highly unlikely. Therefore, international actors need to continue to convince all parties to open discussions and negotiate an end to the conflict.

Negotiations between the parties are not unprecedented. Regional actors have had some success in bringing the parties to the table. In November 2019 the, albeit short-lived, power-sharing Riyadh Agreement was signed after negotiations between the Yemeni government and STC were brokered by Saudi Arabia. International organisations too have had some success. In December 2018 the UN-brokered the Stockholm Agreement, which implemented a ceasefire in the city of Hudaydah, allowing aid to enter the city and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe. Therefore, the UN, and other actors, must continue their efforts calling all parties to seek a negotiated peace. Without peace, there is little hope that the suffering in Yemen can be alleviated, and Yemen will continue to be one of the greatest human security failures of recent times.