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Jack Cross

Greco-Turkish Relations: Two Centuries of Constant Competition

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Greek painting of the Battle of Velestino during the Greco-Turkish War, 1897 – Public Domain

There are few fraught relationships of international politics that are purely recent phenomena. There is almost always a deeper, historical basis for the hostility experienced between two states. The poor relations between Greece and Turkey are not simply the product of recent competition over natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean, but rather the latest chapter in two centuries of animosity. The 21st of March of this year marks the bicentennial of the Greek declaration of independence and the beginning of its bloody war of liberation against the Ottoman Empire, the historical predecessor of the modern Turkish state. In the years since Greek victory in this war, there have been six conflicts [1] in which Greece and Turkey have been enemies, with numerous crises and war scares in between. With the current Turkish government displaying neo-Ottoman characteristics, history is being brought to the forefront of their foreign policy. In order to understand the current animosity between Greece and Turkey, it is vitally important to look at the history of their relationship and the constant competition between the two states.

From the moment that Greek independence was confirmed in the London Protocol and Treaty of Constantinople, relations between the new kingdom and the Ottomans would be defined by tension and competition. Despite its small size, the new Greek state considered itself a successor state to the Byzantine Empire and therefore a direct rival to the Ottoman Empire. Throughout the nineteenth century, Greece sought to create a ‘greater’ kingdom, uniting the ethnic Greek population. This was pursued through various claims to Ottoman territory, initially with failed interventions against the Ottomans such as in the Crimean War (1853-56). However, their greatest successes came between 1912 and 1921, during the final demise of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of the modern Turkish state. Through success in the First Balkan War (1912-13), the Kingdom of Greece roughly doubled in size, entirely at the expense of the Ottomans. Greece would also go on to fight against the Ottomans during the First World War and the new Turkish state during their own war of independence. The latter of these conflicts, saw a large scale population exchange as well as atrocities committed by both sides against ethnic Greeks and Turks. Given the brutality of this conflict, relations between Greece and the new republican Turkish state began with deeply held feelings of distrust and an instinct to compete rather than co-operate. In the last two hundred years, Greece and Turkey have only fought on the same side of a conflict one, the Second Balkan War (1913). This was as co-belligerents not as allies and while both states are today part of the NATO alliance, this has not produced a new era of Greco-Turkish cooperation.

While the current Greek state may not have any Byzantine aspirations, throughout the past two centuries the Hellenic kingdom and subsequent republic has sought to replace the Ottoman-Turks as the dominant power in the Eastern Mediterranean. The key to achieving this dominance would be through naval power, controlling the routes from the Mediterranean to the Aegean.

Both Greece and the then Ottoman Empire considered themselves seafaring states, the former with a large number of islands to defend and the latter with a long, vulnerable coastline in Anatolia. During both the Greco-Turkish War (1897) and the First Balkan War (1912-13), Greece enjoyed its greatest successes against the Ottomans through the deployment of superior naval force. A powerful Greece at sea is therefore an understandable anxiety for the Turkish state as policymakers are all too aware of the historic difficulty there has been in defending the Anatolian coast. The current naval arms race between Greece and Turkey, with both sides expanding their surface and sub-surface capabilities, will only exacerbate these strategic concerns.

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, successive Greek governments sought to expand their territory further into the Mediterranean and the Aegean. This was first seen through the peaceful transfer of the Ionian Islands from Britain in 1864, followed by aggressive expansion through several conflicts including the Balkan Wars and the First World War. The end of the Second World War saw the transfer of the Dodecanese Islands from Italy, bringing Greek territory even closer to the Turkish coast, now only twenty-five miles away. While Turkey does not dispute Greece’s holdings in the Aegean, the current tension is a new variation of the historic competition for control of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The current dispute over access to natural gas in Eastern Mediterranean demonstrates the continued relevance of the historic themes that have characterised Greco-Turkish relations. While the competition over these resources also includes Egypt, Israel and Cyprus, at its heart it is a dispute between Athens and Ankara. The possibility of access to new mineral wealth is a hugely important opportunity for any state, especially two that have suffered recent economic woes. While it is Turkey that have taken the far more aggressive approach, with extensive exploration and deployment of naval assets, the Greeks have shown their willingness to engage in brinkmanship.

In the eyes of the governments of Greece and Turkey, in order to profit from these new resources, the other state must backdown. There is to be no mutual benefit, no cooperation. Whichever state gains access to these new natural gas deposits will be able to establish a vast zone of economic control over the Eastern Mediterranean, effectively achieving the long desired maritime dominance in the region. To some Turkish analysists, the current dispute is being viewed as another opportunity for Turkey to reverse some of the losses from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This is through the establishment of a ‘blue homeland’, with a clear zone of Turkish maritime control in the Mediterranean and the Aegean, a neo-Ottoman vision endorsed by Erdogan which would help to redress some of the losses to Greece and Cyprus in the post-independence era.

The Ottoman Empire may have collapsed ninety-nine years ago but the legacy of its demise is still alive and well in modern Greco-Turkish relations. Whether it be in the continued disputes over the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus or the competing claims over the natural resources of the Mediterranean, it is the most recent chapter in a two-hundred-year-old relationship defined by tension and rivalry. Too often analysts treat current diplomatic problems as purely modern phenomena, ignoring the historical trajectory within which they sit. This does not mean that crises suddenly become resolvable when policymakers understand their historical origins, but in the case of Greece and Turkey it means that one can appreciate that this goes far deeper than merely a tug of war over natural gas deposits. Nonetheless, we should not be wedded to historical determinism when looking at modern international relations. The tension which has dominated Greco-Turkish relations demonstrates that any lasting solution must be a compromise which can satisfy some, but not all, of each side’s aims. As long as both opt for a winner takes all approach, the hostility of centuries past will continue to define the present.

[1] Emmanuel Karagiannis, ‘The Coming Arms Race in the Eastern Mediterranean’ Royal United Services Institute (July 2021)

[2] Wars in which Greece and Turkey/Ottomans were on opposing sides: Crimean War, Greco-Turkish War, First Balkan War, First World War, Turkish War of Independence, Turkish Invasion of Cyprus

[3] Christopher Clark, Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (Penguin, 2012)

[4] Vasileios Th. Meichanetsidis, ‘The Genocide of the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, 1913–1923: A Comprehensive Overview’ Genocide Studies International, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2015)

[5] Peter Kincaid Jensen, ‘The Greco-Turkish War, 1920-22’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (November 1979)

[6] Vassilis K. Fouskas, ‘Uncomfortable Questions: Cyprus, October 1973-August 1974’, Contemporary European History, Vol. 14, No. 1 (February 2005)

[7] Galip Dalay, ‘Turkey, Europe, and the Eastern Mediterranean: Charting a way out of the current deadlock’ Brookings Institute (January 2021)

[8] Patrick Wintour, ‘How a rush for Mediterranean gas threatens to push Greece and Turkey into war’ The Guardian (September 2020)

The HMS Defender Incident: Russia, the Crimea and the Insecurity of an Illegal Annexation

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HMS DEFENDER transits through the Suez Canal. Picture: LA(Phot) Dan Rosenbaum. Licensed under Creative Commons.

On the 23rd of June, when it was reported that Russian ships fired warning shots at HMS Defender, a British Type-45 destroyer several miles of the Crimean coast, the world was reminded of the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine as well as the continuous Russian occupation of Crimea since 2014. The presence of British naval forces in the Black Sea is not a new phenomenon, as NATO conducts annual exercises in the region, often hosted by Romania. While the incident saw no casualties, it has generated novel Russian paranoia regarding its position in the Black Sea. The Kremlin has accused NATO of unprovoked aggression in the Black Sea and has pledged a strong response – although it is not clear what long-term steps Russia can take. It is important to remember that the Russian annexation of Crimea receives limited international recognition and that the peninsula is almost entirely surrounded by Ukrainian territory. Crimea is therefore vulnerable to the probes and prods of NATO forces who wish to test the Russian military. Incidents such as this expose the fact that despite the annexation being in its seventh year, Russia’s position in the region remains weaker than it appears. But is this an issue that the Kremlin can resolve? They cannot suddenly turn their illegal annexation into a legal one and NATO shows no signs of backing down in its competition with Russia in the Black Sea.

Historically, the Black Sea region has been a crucial part of Russian grand strategy, throughout the imperial, soviet and republican eras. It represents the possibility of a year-round warm water port at Sevastopol, and the ability for Russian maritime commerce and military assets to move through the Straits of the Dardanelles, into the Mediterranean. Since the reign of Catherine the Great, Russia has used numerous conflicts and crises to expand its control in the Black Sea and when this was lost during the breakup of the Soviet Union it was not long before the new Russian state sought an opportunity to regain a foothold. This was achieved in 2014 with minimal difficulty as the Russian military occupied the Crimean Peninsula, while Russian backed separatists in eastern Ukraine began and still continue to wage a civil war. The illegality of Russia’s annexation is straightforward: no state has the right to change the borders or territorial integrity of another, by force. Simply put, the right of conquest has no legal standing in the 21st century. Western states may have condemned the annexation and leveed sanctions against Russia, but they have taken no military steps to force Russia out of Crimea. Now that Russia once again holds a position in the Black Sea, they will not surrender it easily.

The HMS Defender incident is not an isolated occurrence. In recent days, the Dutch vessel HNLMS Evertsen had a close run in with several Russian fighter jets, described as a ‘mock attack’. This has all come as NATO commences Operation Sea Breeze 21, a series of joint naval exercises with Ukraine across the Black Sea. This year’s Sea Breeze exercises will also be the largest in the program’s history. They will involve five thousand personnel and thirty-two ships, with more than thirty countries participating. Naval incidents between Russia, NATO and its allies are nothing new as in April it was reported that Royal Navy vessels were deployed in the English Channel to escort a group of Russian ships as they passed through the Dover Strait. Individual NATO states such as the UK have also signed new naval agreements with Ukraine, providing training support as well as new defensive equipment. Rather than leave Ukraine to an uncertain and likely unpleasant fate, NATO is clearly seeking to bolster the state as a crucial partner against Russian expansionism. The new war of words between Russia and NATO over the incident with HMS Defender will likely to do nothing to deter the western allies from maintaining their position in Ukraine and the Black Sea.

The problem that Russia faces is that as its annexation of Crimea was illegal, it cannot claim jurisdiction over the region’s territorial waters, so NATO vessels can continue to move through these waters provided they have permission from Ukraine. This was the primary justification for NATO to conduct the Sea Breeze exercises so close to Russian territory. Russia has also responded to the NATO exercises with its own live fire drills in the Black Sea, these following on from the land-based exercises they conducted in Crimea in April. While it is highly unlikely that NATO or any individual power will try to reverse the Crimean annexation by force, it presents an opportunity for Russia’s opponents to demonstrate their military reach and their continued opposition to the Russian presence in Ukraine.

For all its shows of strength in Ukraine, Russian policy is flailing . The separatists they back in eastern Ukraine may still hold territory, but they have not achieved a resounding victory. The government in Kiev continues to enjoy western backing, which shows no signs of declining and while NATO views Russian Black Sea presence as vulnerable, they will continue to conduct naval exercises. Essentially, this issue is unresolvable for the Kremlin: Russian strategic aims prevent scaling back their position in Crimea and western policy, alongside international law, hampers their attempts to solidify their hold on the region. Under international law, Crimea is Ukrainian, therefore the waters surrounding Crimea are Ukrainian. It does not matter how much military hardware Russia dispatches to the Crimea, it will not change this legal reality. Ultimately, it will be this fact that Russia will continue to be unable to escape.

A second Crimean War is not on the horizon. The five hundred will not charge again into the valley of death and the Thin Red Line will not have to hold. However, the ongoing disputes over Crimea will continue to simmer, with incidents similar to HMS Defender bound to happen again. This is something that the Russians will likely be forced to tolerate, while still displaying its military strength, both in response to NATO actions and their domestic audience. The impasse between the two sides shows no signs of being resolved. Neither Ukraine nor NATO will use force to expel Russia from Crimea, but they’re sure to make the annexation as uncomfortable for the Kremlin as possible.

The Coup May Have Failed, But Jordan’s Troubles Are Far From Over

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King Abdullah delivers the Speech from the Throne opening the second ordinary session of the 18th Parliament. Amman, 12 November 2017, Royal Hashemite Archive, public domain.

When news of political turmoil comes out of the Middle East, there are a variety of states that you would expect to be involved, but one that you would not expect is the quiet kingdom of Jordan. For a number of decades now the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has stood as a reliable, stabilising force within a region that too often descends into crisis and chaos. However in April, King Abdullah II announced that a number of individuals, including former Crown Prince Hamzah had been arrested on suspicion of plotting a coup against the Crown and government. Intercepts of phone conversations appeared to show Hamzah’s staff seeking pledges of allegiance from various tribal leaders and military officers. This was the first time in Abdullah’s twenty-two year reign that there had been a serious threat to his rule. The former Crown Prince was imprisoned in the Royal Family’s compound, before it was announced that Hamzah had re-pledged his loyalty to the king . So, what does this mean for Jordan’s future? This new opposition has exposed significant faults within the country’s governance, with its population experiencing a third wave of the COVID-19 Pandemic and the economy in serious peril. There have also been rumours that foreign governments, including Jordan’s allies, were involved in the failed conspiracy. So, can the Royal Family maintain its position over the country and international backing or are there further crises to come?

It is important to understand the key position that Jordan holds within the Middle East policy of the US and its western allies. The US maintains a military presence in the country at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, which has been used extensively in the bombing campaigns against the former so-called Islamic State. The Jordanian Crown also holds the position of the custodian of the Muslim and Christian Holy Sites of Jerusalem and so along with its accommodation of large numbers of refugees, plays an important role in the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Moreover, the country , as of 2019, hosts the third highest population of Syrian refugees. Historically, the support offered to Jordan by the US and the West has invested in the personage of the Royal Family, who have since the independence of Transjordan in 1946 effectuated a pro-western foreign policy. During the attempted coup, US support for Jordan was reaffirmed in a telephone call between President Biden and the King. But it is worth noting that this support was given once the coup was over, not in the midst of the crisis. US support for the Jordanian Crown is not infinite and is based on the monarchy’s continual ability to provide stable leadership over the kingdom, capable of adaptation and reform.

One of the great strengths of the Jordanian regime has been its ability to adapt to demands for liberalisation. It is why the monarchy came out of the Arab Spring of 2011 largely unscathed. The use of a parliamentary model, albeit with a powerful monarchical head of state, has allowed Jordan to liberalise where necessary, without descending into the civil wars or counter-revolutions that other parts of the region have experienced. To this end, Jordan has been a good choice for a US ally, as it allows them to promote a reformist agenda, that could spread to the rest of the region. But despite this obvious strength, years of regional turmoil have taken their toll on the Jordanian people and Crown. Since before independence was granted, the supremacy of the Hashemite family had been based on two aspects: the support of foreign powers and the consent and fealty of tribal factions within the country. As long as the country and its parliamentary system prospers, the monarchy can be confident of this support. But recent years have exposed underlining flaws in the Jordanian economy and political system. It’s worth noting that the leader of the failed coup, the former Crown Prince Hamzah, has been a vocal critic of government policy, particularly over the issues of corruption and social policy. Jordan is not a resource rich country and often relies on foreign tourism and investment to sustain its economy, but the huge cost of supporting its refugee population and the current pandemic have taken their toll. In 2013 alone, the housing and supporting its refugee population cost the Jordanian government more than 620 million dollars. All this has robbed the country of vital revenues from tourism and as of this time last year, unemployment stood at a staggering 23%. Even before the pandemic took hold, Jordanian unemployment was still very high. The bleak economic picture has also led to a significant increase in negative attitudes within Jordan towards the refugee population. The combination of the refugee crisis, an already weak economy and the current pandemic has resulted in a situation in which at least 1 million Jordanians live below the poverty line, out of a population of 10 million. But this domestic fragility has been further exacerbated with the failed coup and increased tensions in recent years with Israel over small areas of disputed territory, thus presenting a risk that the monarchy’s international position may become as precarious as its domestic one.

It is easy to offer to support to someone who has just claimed a victory. The Biden Administration can offer such friendship to the Hashemite Monarchy as it will cost them little in political capital at present. But what of those crises to come? King Abdullah may have been able to keep his government and family together through sheer will on this occasion, but that there is no guarantee this will continue. For years now, Jordan has been a convenient ally for the West, as governments may use its military bases and provide it with assistance, without most of the moral questions that come attached with other Middle Eastern states. While the rumours of foreign backing of the coup may prove to be false, if true they would suggest that the strong diplomatic position that Jordan has enjoyed within the region may not be as strong as it once was. The Hashemite Monarchy, for better or worse plays an important role in the Middle East, as a fairly neutral neighbour of Israel and with a relative independence that allows it to mediate in regional disputes. But as the country declines further, this role could be over and uncertainty about the future could become even greater.

Ruling the Waves: What role will the Royal Navy play in Britain’s future?

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by Jack Cross

Royal Navy Type 23 Frigate HMS Northumberland
Photo Credit: Defence Images, licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

If one were to take a cursory look at a historical narrative on British power over the past several hundred years, there is always one recurring theme: the role of the Royal Navy. From the defeat of the Spanish Armada to victory in the Falklands War, naval power has played a key role in defining British power. But now that Britain seeks to carve out a new role for itself in the post-Brexit landscape, what role should the navy play in this? Back in November 2020, Boris Johnson declared that the most clear cut route to strengthen British power was in ‘building more ships for the Royal Navy’. The effective deployment of naval resources can help promote a nation’s global presence and Britain already has significant naval commitments around the world. But while a reenergised Royal Navy may certainly score some nostalgia points with calls to Britannia and the waves she ruled, it is unclear if there a want or a need for another major naval power on the world stage. Nor is it clear whether British policymakers have a clear vision for exactly how expanding the Royal Navy can further the country’s foreign policy aims.

It is important to first look at the current state of the Royal Navy. Throughout the period since the end of the Second World War, British naval capacity has been in steady decline with fewer vessels in use today than in any time in the past fifty years. Since the end of the Falklands War, Britain’s last conflict with a significant naval theatre, the number of submarines, destroyers and frigates possessed by the Royal Navy has more than halved. However in more recent times, the Royal Navy has seen some significant additions to its surface fleet, including two new aircraft carriers HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales, launched in 2017 and 2020 respectively. Ships such as these are particularly useful in helping to enhance Britain’s global presence as it allows for a combined deployment of sea and airpower. It is yet to be seen if the necessary aircraft and support vessels will also be built to protect these new carriers. Britain is also able to maintain a naval presence around the world, through its various naval bases such as those in Cyprus, Bahrain and its Overseas Territories. The new defence funding announced last year includes significant benefits for the navy, with new ship building projects and upgrades to existing vessels. But none of this is going to have an immediate practical impact on British diplomacy, given that large naval ships can take several years to build. Nevertheless, from this position, the future of the Royal Navy look promising; it has established itself as one of the most powerful navies in Europe, with a total of seventy seven operational vessels as of August 2020. This is in spite of the decision taken to suspend the Naval Reserve until April 2021, which had domestic rather than broader strategic implications, with an impact on border patrols in the Channel. By comparison, the French Navy only possesses twenty-two ships and while the Italian Navy has more vessels than the British, it has far fewer aircraft.

While the current trajectory of naval expansion is positive purely in terms of military capacity, it is unclear how the British government is going to use this as part of a wider strategy to further Britain’s foreign policy objectives. Already British naval forces take part in a wide range of NATO and other allied exercises, from the Mediterranean to the Pacific. This also covers a wide range of objectives, from anti-piracy operations to the enforcement of arms embargos. Withdrawal from the EU prevents British participation in operations Atalanta (protecting commercial shipping in the Indian Ocean) and Sophia (enforcing the UN arms embargo against Libya), thus reducing the country’s global presence. The challenge here is for the new naval expansion to be put to use, rather than purely exist as a signal of British re-engagement. Existing government publications on Global Britain include aims for greater naval deployments, however it is unclear as to exactly where these will be. The British government’s announcement to seek membership of the Trans-Pacific Partnership could potentially see a significant reorientation of British strategic interests, with naval applications as well. This year the Carrier Strike Group, led by HMS Queen Elizabeth will take part in exercises in the Pacific Region, as part of the Five Powers Defence Arrangements. These exercises will involve visits to key players in Asia, such as India, Japan and South Korea, highlighting the diplomatic nature of this venture, in demonstrating British security capabilities to foreign governments. Only time will tell if this military participation will translate into political influence.

So, will any of this naval activity to have a serious impact on Britain’s diplomatic fortunes? Naval power on its own can no longer turn a nation into a great power, especially in the post-colonial era. In seeking to ensure power in the future it is natural to look to past success for inspiration however it is rarely so simple as to write the past into the present. Just as with much of the rhetoric around Global Britain, there is a risk that the government is trying to recreate a world which no longer exists. Historically, British naval power was focused on the protection of trade and empire. But now the seas are largely free of pirates, colonialism is at an end and so, what role is there for the Royal Navy? While it nonetheless provides an excellent tool to help Britain retain its global role, one shouldn’t get carried away and think that it can become a panacea to cure all of the country’s diplomatic ills. With poor relations with the EU and a US administration which is not positively predisposed towards the UK, the British government must take every opportunity to improve its international standing. A more vigorous naval policy could allow Britain to take on greater security commitments around the world, establishing a position as an indispensable ally.

Jack Cross is currently pursuing a masters in the History of War in the War Studies Department at King’s College London. His main research interests are diplomatic history, the role of great and middle powers within current international politics, as well as the politics of the Balkans and Middle East.

In foreign policy, Canada has chosen style over substance

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by Jack Cross

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is welcomed to the Philippines for the 31st ASEAN Summit in Manila (Credit: Adam Scotti, PMO)

After the triumph of his election victory in 2015, the new Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau declared: “Canada is back!”. Five years on from that soundbite, many are starting to ask, where has Canada gone? On the international stage, the Trudeau government has been noticeably absent. There has been a lack of commitment to international peacekeeping missions, and a general lack of energy in its foreign policy and diplomatic activities.

The Trudeau Ministry began with such promise, declaring a ‘feminist foreign policy,’ and a re-engagement in international affairs. While this was largely to satisfy its domestic audience, it did raise hopes for Canadian diplomacy. But in June 2020 the Canadian government suffered the embarrassment of failing to secure a temporary seat on the UN Security Council. This was despite intensive lobbying, spending $2 million on the effort and sending Trudeau on a world tour. While this not a rejection of Canada’s ‘feminist foreign policy, it was a rejection of Canada’s approach to the UN and its desire for greater influence. This was a second defeat in seeking a seat for Canada, as the previous Harper Ministry had made the attempt ten years ago. At present Canada appears increasingly isolated and saddled with an ineffective foreign policy full of great style but lacking in proper substance.

A key problem in current Canadian foreign policy is a lack of substance and action to back up its style and rhetoric. While this is not an unusual position for a government to be in, the Trudeau Ministry has clearly wished to expand Canadian influence on the world stage, as a more palatable North American alternative to the bullish, isolationist policies of the outgoing Trump Administration. However, influence is usually dependent on participation, something which the current government has failed to recognise.

As of November 2020, there were less than fifty Canadian military and police personnel involved in UN peacekeeping missions. This ranks them 76th in terms of the size of their contribution and makes up roughly 0.046% of the total number of personnel involved in peacekeeping missions. These figures go against previous promises made by Trudeau, to provide the UN with six hundred soldiers and one hundred and fifty police officials for peacekeeping work by 2019. Not only this, and despite rhetoric to the contrary, Canada’s commitment to UN climate change goals has been lukewarm. On current projections, the Canadian government is unlikely to meet any of its 2030 climate targets. While Canada is not alone in its climate policy failures, when seeking it elevate its position within the UN, a good record on pursing its goals would certainly have been an asset. One would presume that governments base their vote on council membership on what a country has to offer and clearly a large bloc of UN member states do not know what Canada has to offer. Of the four states which put themselves forward for this slate of UN elections, Canada, Ireland, Norway and San Marino (which withdrew itself from consideration), Canada is considered the most powerful of the four, as a member of the G8 and with a larger military global military presence. Yet power on paper does not always equate to success.

By direct comparison, the two member states who beat Canada for Security Council seats, Ireland and Norway, both rank higher in terms of contributions to UN peacekeeping. While it is true that Canada’s monetary contribution to the UN budget is larger than that of Norway and Ireland combined, this does not equate to active participation. It’s also worth noting that the Canadian government only began their campaign for the 2020 vote in 2016, whereas Ireland and Norway announced their intention for this particular election in 2005 and 2007. This sort of late decision reaffirms the idea of Canadian inactivity, as governments of both major parties failed to launch an earlier bid for this seat. It suggests that Canada wants a seat at the top table, without doing the hard graft needed to actually get there.

The problem of style over substance can be seen right across current Canadian foreign policy and diplomatic efforts. The idea of an explicitly ‘feminist’ foreign policy is an initiative which should be applauded, seeking to empower women around the world, through education, financial independence and control over their own bodies. However, this has not always stood up to scrutiny. While there have been some clear successes, such as a focus on children and the empowerment of women through Canadian assistance in Mali, there have been inconsistencies within the government’s policy. The Canadian government have continued to sell arms to Saudi Arabia whose ruling class’s attitude towards women needs no explanation. In 2019 alone, arms exports worth almost $3 billion were delivered to Saudi Arabia, almost doubling the previous year’s exports and dwarfing annual amounts sold under the previous Conservative government.

Canada’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is hardly a unique one within global politics, but it does directly contradict their officially feminist foreign policy. It has continued to sell arms to a state which has presided over a humanitarian disaster in Yemen, propping up a government which itself has an appalling record on women’s rights. By contrast, Canada has imposed an arms embargo against Turkey, citing concerns over human rights abuses and its intervention in the Syrian Civil War. More damaging than this was Trudeau’s defence of the engineering firm SNC-Lavalin, senior officials of which admitted to committing fraud and bribery while operating in Libya. Governmental ethics officials confirmed in 2019 that Trudeau’s interference in the investigation amounted to a serious ethics violation. Actions like this have harmed Canada’s reputation around the world, with polling data showing that 41% of Canadians believe that the country’s international standing is poorer than it was ten years ago.

So, what can be done to reverse the decline in Canada’s international fortunes? From everything already discussed, it’s clear that if Canada continues to pursue a seat on the UN Security Council, reengagement is required. Partly, this means greater commitments to peacekeeping missions and to combating climate change. Though most importantly, it means following through on promises. At present, the foreign policy commitments made by the Trudeau Ministry remain largely unfulfilled. If the Canadian government wishes to be taken seriously, then it needs to start following through on its pledges. Once Canadian politicians understand this, they can start to repair the damage and return the country’s standing to the more respectable position it once enjoyed. It was the late Pierre Trudeau, former prime minister and father of the incumbent who in the pursuit for international peace, earned the praise of John Lennon and became the first western leader to recognise the People’s Republic of China. The elder Trudeau charted an independent, successful course for Canadian foreign policy, perhaps the younger can still do so as well.

Jack Cross is currently pursuing a masters in the History of War in the War Studies Department at King’s College London. His main research interests are diplomatic history, the role of great and middle powers within current international politics, as well as the politics of the Balkans and Middle East.