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Organised crime and terrorism Part II: Negotiating with bombs - The Sicilian mafia’s attempts at intimidating the Italian state

February 17, 2016 by Martin Stein

This is the second piece in Strife’s four-part series exploring the relationship between organised crime and terrorism in a 21st century security environment. The First part can be found here.

By: Martin Stein

The devastating effects of the Milan car bomb, 28 July 1993. Source: Wikimedia.

In the night between 26 and 27 May 1993, a wide deflagration stuck Florence, seemingly from its medieval centre. A car bomb, loaded with 277kg of explosives, had detonated in via dei Georgofili, a narrow road behind the world-known Uffizi art gallery. The bomb destroyed the Torre dei Pulci, a tower built during the Renaissance. There were five victims: in the Torre, in fact, Angela Fiume (36 years old), the warden, lived with his husband, Fabrizio Nencioni (39), and their two daughters, Nadia (9) and Caterina (2 months). The bomb also, in addition, caused a fire that killed Dario Capolicchio (22), a college student. There were 48 injured alongside heavy damages to the nearby Uffizi building. Around 25% of the paintings in the area were damaged, some of them beyond any possibility of repair[1].

Three other bombings occurred exactly two months after the Florence attack. Two car bombs detonated in Rome, in front of two different churches (San Giorgio al Velabro and San Giovanni in Laterano), injuring 22 people but with no casualties. A third car bomb was placed in Milan, Italy’s financial centre. The blast damaged the Contemporary Art Pavillion and killed a traffic inspector, three firefighters and a Moroccan migrant. In Italy, the shock from the incidents was immediate. Most of the population were unprepared, as Italians believed that terrorism had ended in the “Seventies” otherwise known as the “Lead Years”[2].

Bloodshed, however, was not uncommon in those years. In 1992, three events stood out for importance: this time, they all happened in Sicily. On 12 March, the passenger of a passing motorbike shot the Christian Democrat politician Salvo Lima in Palermo. On 23 May, a bomb exploded under the official car of Judge Giovanni Falcone, one of the recent protagonists of the struggle against the Sicilian Mafia. The explosive device killed Falcone, his wife and his three police-officer escort. Finally, on 19 July, a car bomb placed under the house of Judge Paolo Borsellino, the other protagonist of the recent Mafia prosecutions. The blast killed the Judge and five police servicemen.

These assassinations could have been the ultimate setback for the struggle against the Mafia. It had taken decades, for Italy at large and for the Sicilian society in particular, to acknowledge openly even the existence of this criminal organisation[3]. Its workings and its activities were, for most of the Cold War period, secret and unnoticeable. Mafiosi composed local disputes, imposed their protection racket, and collected their own taxation (the pizzo)[4]. Most importantly, local Families controlled a sizeable portion of votes. This meant that they were able to strike a deal with local politicians, mostly from the Christian Democrat party, to exchange electoral success for state inaction and distribution of public money[5]. Thus, Mafiosi and their political allies were often in charge of providing key public services, including hospitals and transportation. Then, even if Mafia violence sometimes exploded in savage wars for internal predominance, until the 1980s, its overarching infiltration of the local authority went largely unnoticed.

This began to change in the 1970s. The Mafia Families had suffered a backlash from the State in the previous decade, due to a massacre occurred during the first Mafia war. The “Lead Years”, instead, brought a new opportunity: the heroin trade. Some Mafiosi had already been engaged in smuggling[6], but, after the start of the “War on Drugs”, prominent bosses turned their organisation to trafficking on a larger scale, also by exploiting their connections with the American Cosa Nostra. Important leaders like Stefano Bontate and Tano Badalamenti started making estimated millions of dollars. In the meantime, however, they ignored a dangerous menace to their domination. From the town of Corleone, near Palermo, a group of prominent killers rose up. Their first leader was Luciano Leggio, who then transmitted his power to two main associates, Totò Riina and Bernardo Provenzano. The Corleonesi, as they were known, started encroaching on the whole organisation, by investing money in making allies and acquiring loyalties, instead of buying luxury goods. Even if Bontate and Badalamenti were much richer, the Corleonesi rapidly became militarily more powerful. By 1977, they managed to expel Badalamenti from the Commission, the general ruling organ of the Mafia. In 1981, they started the second Mafia war, by directly killing Badalamenti and Bontate[7].

In the following three years, the Corleonesi successfully achieved the Mafia equivalent of a coup d’état. They showed that military power and support from the Families was more important than wealth and drug trade connections. They stepped up the number of killings, eventually murdering more than 200 affiliates to the rival families. They effectively turned a war into a slaughter, as their enemies were too astonished by the series of attacks to react in any manner. The Corleonesi also showed a never before seen eagerness to inflict harm and with that guiding mentality they irredeemably damaged the old Mafia tenets. Mafiosi from Corleone spared no relative, when they carried out their assassinations. In one case, a “man of honour” managed to escape from an assassination attempt, and they retaliated by killing 35 of his relatives.

By the end of 1983, Totò Riina, then the leader of the Corleone group, had taken over the whole organisation. The Mafia came under the dominion of this aggressive and harsh élite, which spelled its subsequent crisis. Riina, in fact, did not stop with the utter defeat of the rival Families. Soon, he started ordering killings based on suspects only, and he quickly ended up eliminating his own allies and associates. By those years, however, a new group of judges had united in Palermo, including judges Falcone and Borsellino[8]. The climate of fear established by the Corleonesi ultimately convinced some of the most desperate Mafiosi to surrender to the State, exchanging insider information for a reduced sentence. These figures were the pentiti, “repented ones”. In September 1984, Tommaso Buscetta decided to turn into one of them. This decision was critical, as he became the highest-ranked Mafioso collaborating with justice[9].

Buscetta’s witnessing, along with the contribution from other pentiti, helped the team of Judges to set a “maxi-trial” against 474 Mafiosi in February 1986. This trial ended on 31 January 1992 with a judgement by the Court of Cassation. The Court upheld the sentences and, for the first time, declared the Mafia to be a single organisation, with the Commission responsible for its murders. Riina used to scorn the Italian state, as it did not support those who tried to fight organised crime[10]. With the maxi-trial final sentence, however, the authorities had inflicted a significant blow on his affiliates. He answered in the way that he knew best: by murder.

Riina and some of his followers believed that the Italian State would ultimately back down. They felt betrayed by the Christian Democrat party, their old partner for embezzlement and corruption operations. They even felt betrayed by the Catholic Church, which had begun to denounce in earnest the Mafia’s violence. They were convinced that they could coerce the Christian Democrats and the Church into submission and force them to ignore the Mafia, as it happened before. This, however, was not possible anymore. The Corleonesi succeeded in killing Falcone and Borsellino and in enacting the bombings in Florence, Milan, and Rome. However, the very political system that had protected them was tumbling down. The collapse of the Soviet Union spelled the end of the Communist Party; a wave of corruption scandals effectively dissolved the Christian Democracy and the Socialists. In this atmosphere of unforeseen political transformation, the tide turned against the Mafia. The years of the car bombs were the years when fundamental legal measures were approved. Among them, pentiti started to enjoy a witness protection scheme, a new anti-Mafia authority was established, the police were given the option to infiltrate the organisation, and tougher prison conditions were made available for high-ranking Mafiosi[11].

By the mid-1990s, the bombing campaign had largely receded. Far from intimidating the Italian state, terrorist tactics had backfired tremendously. As the Italian political system changed, the Sicilian Mafia had decided to act violently in the moment when their erstwhile protectors were disappearing. The whole organisation seemed hijacked by its Corleonesi core. This exercised an immense pressure on the Mafia, and many of its affiliates turned to cooperating with the state. The syndicate had lost its ancient rules and most importantly, its lost focus of its main reason to exist, - making money. After the arrest of Riina, in 1994, Bernardo Provenzano became the new “boss of bosses” and, as he was a more cautious man, he patiently tried to regain control of the Sicilian territory. After its imprisonment, in 2006, Matteo Messina Denaro, a relatively young leader, has probably decided that preserving the protection racket and getting a share of the drug trade was more than enough. Without car bombs and targeted killings, the Mafia transformed into a wider, untraceable organisation, whose laundered money has reached all of Italy and the wealthiest parts of the European continent.

Martin Stein is an LLM (Master in Laws) student from University College London. His research interests include transnational organised crime, international illicit trade, and international police cooperation.

 

Notes:

[1] F. D’Emilio, Car Bomb Blast Damages Florence’s Uffizi Gallery; Explosion Kills 5; Glass Shields Save Most Paintings, Washington Post, May 28, 1993, p. A31.

[2] Longrigg, C., Boss of Bosses. A Journey into the Heart of the Sicilian Mafia, New York, NY, Thomas Dunne Books, pp. 120-121.

[3] Stille, A., Their Thing, The American Scholar, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Spring, 1995), p. 292.

[4] Gambetta, D., The Sicilian Mafia: the business of private protection, Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 1993.

[5] Shelley, L. I., Mafia and the Italian State: The Historical Roots of the Current Crisis, Sociological Forum, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 668-669.

[6] Antonino Calderone, a “repented” member of the Mafia, writes in his memoirs of the transformation from smuggling cigarettes to dealing heroin. In P. Arlacchi, Men of dishonor: Inside the Sicilian Mafia, New York, NY, Morrow Pub., 1995.

[7] Dickie, J., Cosa Nostra. A History of the Sicilian Mafia, NY, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 284-289.

[8] Dickie, pp. 298-9.

[9] He, in fact, was one of the founders of the Commission, back in 1957. Dickie, p. 236.

[10] Dickie, p. 297.

[11] Dickie, p. 315.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Italy, Mafia, terrorism

Italian Elections stalemate: Berlusca Bunga Bunga, Rigor Mortis, A Retired Priest, the Communist and a Clown. An Analysis.

February 26, 2013 by Strife Staff

By Pablo De Orellana

This is not a joke. These are the nicknames of the principal politicians participating in the election, except for the priest and the clown. The latter cannot participate in person, but has been the underestimated wildcard in this this shuffle of Italian fortunes.

On Sunday, three women hurled themselves naked at Silvio Berlusconi howling “Basta Berlusconi” [“Enough Berlusconi”], in one of many and desperate signs of the overdrawn exhaustion of the Italian political class and the loathing that it has garnered among voters. Berlusconi is still politically alive and kicking in yet another election campaign. This is because of the incredible challenges facing Italy and especially the deep unpopularity of the Monti technocrat government. The difficulties and brutal cuts of Italy’s latest austerity drive cannot be overstated. The trouncing of Monti’s hopes in this election is proof of this clearly expressed resentment.

This is not a common election. At first sight the results (see below for detailed breakdown) appear to reflect the old right-left divide, with reincarnations of the old DC (Christian Democratic Party) and PS (Socialist Party) –the originals died drowned in the embezzled funds of the Tangentopoli scandal in the 1990s. There are, however, a number of new wildcards complicating the equation. Most importantly, Italy has not seen circumstances so dire for a generation with a stagnant economy, record unemployment and rapidly falling living standards.

Mario “Rigor Mortis” Monti is the loathed bogeyman of this election. Most political discourse in this campaign has been written and spoken in reference Italy’s financial credibility, which Monti has promised to fix with increasing doses of austerity bloodletting. The proverbial straw was the IMU tax, a levy on the value of a household’s primary property. This has caused exasperation in a country where low and middle earners are already very heavily taxed, with horror stories of bankrupt families due to the IMU. In some regards, Monti too has been an unconventional saviour of Italian finances. In Italy’s past debt scares (they happen every decade) una tantum (‘once only’) taxes were levied on luxury properties such as second and third homes, luxury cars, capital gains, bonuses. Monti, on the other hand, can be credited with importing European Neo-Conservative economics, with the resulting faith in public service cuts and increased taxation of the most numerous part of the population - who on average make little more than 900 per month (INSEE data) - rather than higher earners or corporations such as Berlusconi’s own Mediaset Group. Not unlike George Osborne, Monti’s entire programme is ostensibly designed to uphold the credibility of Italy’s credit ratings. Monti has run in this election as leader of a coalition of small centrist parties, although their parliamentary weight is negligible at just over 10% of the vote. This is clear proof of the great resentment that austerity measures have elicited in Italy.

Italy’s centre-left party grouping, the Partito Democratico (PD) led by Pier Luigi (aka “ex-Communist”) Bersani, has been a great disappointment both in campaign and in today’s results. PD promised to keep the course and spirit of Monti’s reforms - albeit with a few concessions to the need for growth measures - and indeed looked likely to form a coalition with Monti. This unexciting passive acceptance of the austerity dogma has alienated many supporters and has allowed other protest candidates to trounce its advantage in polls over the last few weeks. In last night’s results, PD is basically tied in voting percentages with Berlusconi’s alliance of conservative parties and only just ahead of Beppe Grillo’s 5-Star Movement. Italy’s puzzlingly complex voting laws give the PD bloc extra bonus seats, which should make the lower house just about governable.

Then come the rogues: the ones defined by opposition to the Monti administration and austerity policies. The most puzzling aspect of this election, and one that foreign analysts seem to miss, is that Silvio “Bunga Bunga” Berlusconi has, in an incredible piece of high-speed historical reframing, recast himself as a rebel, a transgressor to the Merkel-imposed austerity dogma and calling into question Euro membership, the EU, Mario Monti’s reforms and budget cuts. Most spectacularly, only a few days ago Berlusconi made the extraordinary promise of returning paid IMU tax to taxpayers if elected. He is now at the head of the second biggest group in the Lower House.

Machiavelli was right in decrying his indignation at Italy being saddled with the Papal Curia, and the Vatican has had varying policies in its involvement with Italian democracy, from sometimes banning the faithful from voting, to sanctioning specific parties. Yet another unusual factor, one that might be overlooked is the Pope’s resignation. Whilst in recent years the Church has not attempted to excommunicate stray voters and has adopted subtler means, its influence cannot be underestimated. It is likely that the Vatican’s temporary distraction has been to the disadvantage of conservatives and especially Mario Monti’s group.

Finally, the greatest surprise to those not accustomed to Italy’s political volatility and unfamiliar with recent economic woes is the success of the party led by comedian Beppe “Clown” Grillo, the 5-Star Movement. It has exceeded all projections, and is now the single largest party in the lower house (although it is outdone by the centre right and centre left alliances). It stood on a simple basis: reforming the overpaid, corrupt, rentier, clientelist and mafia-tainted nature of Italian politics by “sending the old [politicians] home”; reforming Italy’s economic course towards fairer taxation, limiting the rampant tax evasion of the richest individuals and corporations, removing austerity policies and encouraging higher employment and stemming Italy’s tragic graduate brain drain.

Considering Monti’s very poor showing, this Movement’s surprise showing is all the more important: The 5-Star Movement now holds the balance of power in the lower house. Grillo has declared that he wants no alliance with the old parties, and this is further complicated by the Movement’s staunch anti-austerity policy. I suspect that, barring fresh elections to resolve this stalemate, PD will have to make concessions to the Movement to be able to govern; but considering Bersani’s strongly-worded disapproval of the comedian’s protest party and its policies, this seems unlikely.

This election is not only a stalemate, but speaks of the worldwide dilemmas of democracy, finance, debt and the economic future of Europe. Sadly, the stalemate is fodder for market instability, political instability and stagnation. It is not clear who has won this election; what is clear is that there is one loser: Italy.

Dante Alighieri put it better than I ever could. Reader, I will let you translate these sad verses.

Italia, poi che se’ sì grande
che per mare e per terra batti l’ali,
e per lo ‘nferno tuo nome si spande!
Tra li ladron trovai cinque cotali
tuoi cittadini onde mi ven vergogna,
e tu in grande orranza non ne sali.

Dante, Inferno, XXVI, 1-6

—

Detailed election results in full as well as the fine detail of Italy’s complex electoral laws can be found on <http://elezioni.interno.it/camera/scrutini/20130224/C000000000.htm> [last accessed 26 February 2013]

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Elections, Italy, Mario Monti, Pablo De Orellana, Silvio Berlusconi

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